UNIVERSITY 
AT   LO 

OF  CALIFORNIA 
S  ANGELES 

43 


Prairie  Edition 


or  the 

History  of  the  United  States  Navy  during 
the  Last  War  with  Great  Britain 

to  which  is  appended  an  account  of 

The  Battle  of  New  Orleans 

By 

Theodore  Roosevelt 

Author  of  "American  Ideals,"  "The  Wilderness  Hunter," 
"  Hunting  Trips  of  a  Ranchman,"  etc. 


PART  I. 
/  2.4*7 

G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 

NEW  YORK  &  LONDON 

Gbe  fuitoherbocfcer  presg 

1903 

Jet  -TT  .   I  3  0  4 


COPYRIGHT,  i88« 

BY 
G.  P.  PUTNAM'S  SONS 


El 


.  I 


PREFACE. 

THE  history  of  the  naval  events  of  the  War 
of  1812  has  been  repeatedly  presented  both 
to  the  American  and  the  English  reader. 
Historical  writers  have  treated  it  either  in 
connection  with  a  general  account  of  the  con- 
test on  land  and  sea,  or  as  forming  a  part  of 
the  complete  record  of  the  navies  of  the  two 
nations.  A  few  monographs,  which  confine 
themselves  strictly  to  the  naval  occurrences, 
have  also  appeared.  But  none  of  these  works 
can  be  regarded  as  giving  a  satisfactorily  full 
or  impartial  account  of  the  war — some  of  them 
being  of  the  "  popular "  and  loosely-con- 
structed order,  while  others  treat  it  from  a 
purely  partisan  standpoint.  No  single  book 
can  be  quoted  which  would  be  accepted  by 
the  modern  reader  as  doing  justice  to  both 
sides,  or,  indeed,  as  telling  the  whole  story. 
Any  one  specially  interested  in  the  subject 
must  read  all  ;  and  then  it  will  seem  almost  a 
hopeless  task  to  reconcile  the  many  and  widely 
contradictory  statements  he  will  meet  with. 

There  appear  to  be  three  works  which, 
taken  in  combination,  give  the  best  satisfac- 
tion on  the  subject.  First,  in  James'  "  Naval 
History  of  Great  Britain  "  (which  supplies  both 
the  material  and  the  opinions  of  almost  every 

3 


4  PREFACE. 

subsequent  English  or  Canadian  historian) 
can  be  found  the  British  view  of  the  case.  It 
is  an  invaluable  work,  written  with  fulness 
and  care  ;  on  the  other  hand  it  is  also  a  piece 
of  special  pleading  by  a  bitter  and  not  over- 
scrupulous partisan.  This,  in  the  second 
place,  can  be  partially  supplemented  by  Feni- 
more  Cooper's  "  Naval  History  of  the  United 
States."  The  latter  gives  the  American  view 
of  the  cruises  and  battles  ;  but  it  is  much  less 
of  an  authority  than  James',  both  because  it 
is  written  without  great  regard  for  exactness, 
and  because  all  figures  for  the  American  side 
need  to  be  supplied  from  Lieutenant  (now 
Admiral)  George  E.  Emmons'  statistical "  His- 
tory of  the  United  States  Navy,"  which  is  the 
third  of  the  works  in  question. 

But  even  after  comparing  these  three 
authors,  many  contradictions  remain  unex- 
plained, and  the  truth  can  only  be  reached  in 
such  cases  by  a  careful  examination  of  the 
navy  "  Records,"  the  London  "  Naval  Chron- 
icle," "Niles*  Register,"  and  other  similar 
documentary  publications.  Almost  the  only 
good  criticisms  on  the  actions  are  those  inci- 
dentally given  in  standard  works  on  other  sub- 
jects, such  as  Lord  Howard  Douglass'  "  Naval 
Gunnery,"  and  Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere's 
"  Guerres  Maritimes."  Much  of  the  material 
in  our  Navy  Department  has  never  been 
touched  at  all.  In  short,  no  full,  accurate, 
and  unprejudiced  history  of  the  war  has  ever 
been  written. 

The  subject  merits  a  closer  scrutiny  than  it 
has  received.  At  present  people  are  begin- 
ning to  realize  that  it  is  folly  for  the  great 


PREFACE.  5 

English-speaking  Republic  to  rely  for  defence 
upon  a  navy  composed  partly  of  antiquated 
hulks,  and  partly  of  new  vessels  rather  more 
worthless  than  the  old.  It  is  worth  while 
to  study  with  some  care  that  period  of 
our  history  during  which  our  navy  stood 
at  the  highest  pitch  of  its  fame ;  and  to 
learn  anything  from  the  past  it  is  necessary 
to  know,  as  near  as  may  be,  the  exact  truth. 
Accordingly  the  work  should  be  written  im- 
partially, if  only  from  the  narrowest  motives. 
Without  abating  a  jot  from  one's  devotion  to 
his  country  and  flag,  I  think  a  history  can  be 
made  just  enough  to  warrant  its  being  received 
as  an  authority  equally  among  Americans  and 
Englishmen.  I  have  endeavored  to  supply 
such  a  work.  It  is  impossible  that  errors, 
both  of  fact  and  opinion,  should  not  have 
crept  into  it ;  and  although  I  have  sought  to 
make  it  in  character  as  non-partisan  as  pos- 
sible, these  errors  will  probably  be  in  favor  of 
the  American  side. 

As  my  only  object  is  to  give  an  accurate 
narrative  of  events,  I  shall  esteem  it  a  par- 
ticular favor  if  any  one  will  furnish  me  with 
the  means  of  rectifying  such  mistakes ;  and  if 
I  have  done  injustice  to  any  commander,  or 
officer  of  any  grade,  whether  American  or 
British,  I  shall  consider  myself  under  great 
obligations  to  those  who  will  set  me  right. 

I  have  been  unable  to  get  access  to  the 
original  reports  of  the  British  commanders, 
the  logs  of  the  British  ships,  or  their  muster- 
rolls,  and  so  have  been  obliged  to  take  them 
at  second  hand  from  the  "  Gazette,"  or  "  Naval 
Chronicle,"  or  some  standard  history.  The 


6  PREFACE. 

American  official  letters,  log-books,  original 
contracts,  muster-rolls,  etc.,  however,  being 
preserved  in  the  Archives  at  Washington,  I 
have  been  able,  thanks  to  the  courtesy  of  the 
Hon.  Wm.  H.  Hunt,  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
to  look  them  over.  The  set  of  letters  from 
the  officers  is  very  complete,  in  three  series, 
— "  Captains'  Letters,"  "  Masters'  Comman- 
dant Letters,"  and  "  Officers'  Letters,"  there 
being  several  volumes  for  each  year.  The 
books  of  contracts  contain  valuable  informa- 
tion as  to  the  size  and  build  of  some  of  the 
vessels.  The  log-books  are  rather  exasperat- 
ing, often  being  very  incomplete.  Thus  when 
I  turned  from  Decatur's  extremely  vague 
official  letter  describing  the  capture  of  the 
Macedonian  to  the  log-book  of  the  Frigate 
United  States,  not  a  fact  about  the  fight  could 
be  gleaned.  The  last  entry  in  the  log  on  the 
day  of  the  fight  is  "  strange  sail  discovered  to 
be  a  frigate  under  English  colors,"  and  the 
next  entry  (on  the  following  day)  relates  to 
the  removal  of  the  prisoners.  The  log  of  the 
Enterprise  is  very  full  indeed,  for  most  of  the 
time,  but  is  a  perfect  blank  for  the  period  dur- 
ing which  she  was  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Burrows,  and  in  which  she  fought  the  Boxer. 
I  have  not  been  able  to  find  the  Peacock's  log 
at  all,  though  there  is  a  very  full  set  of  letters 
from  her  commander.  Probably  the  fire  of 
1837  destroyed  a  great  deal  of  valuable  ma- 
terial. Whenever  it  was  possible  I  have  re- 
ferred to  printed  matter  in  preference  to  man- 
uscript, and  my  authorities  can  thus,  in  most 
cases,  be  easily  consulted. 

In  conclusion  I  desire  to  express  my  sin- 


PREFACE.  7 

cerest  thanks  to  Captain  James  D.  Bulloch, 
formerly  of  the  United  States  Navy,  and 
Commander  Adolf  Mensing,  formerly  of  the 
German  Navy,  without  whose  advice  and 
sympathy  this  work  would  probably  never 
have  been  written  or  even  begun. 

New  York  City,  1882. 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 


I  ORIGINALLY  intended  to  write  a  com- 
panion volume  to  this,  which  should  deal  with 
the  operations  on  land.  But  a  short  exami- 
nation showed  that  these  operations  were 
hardly  worth  serious  study.  They  teach 
nothing  new  ;  it  is  the  old,  old  lesson,  that  a 
miserly  economy  in  preparation  may  in  the 
end  involve  a  lavish  outlay  of  men  and  money, 
which,  after  all,  comes  too  late  to  more  than 
partially  offset  the  evils  produced  by  the 
original  short-sighted  parsimony.  This  might 
be  a  lesson  worth  dwelling  on  did  it  have  any 
practical  bearing  on  the  issues  of  the  present 
day  ;  but  it  has  none,  as  far  as  the  army  is 
concerned.  It  was  criminal  folly  for  Jeffer- 
son, and  his  follower  Madison,  to  neglect  to 
give  us  a  force  either  of  regulars  or  of  well- 
trained  volunteers  during  the  twelve  years 
they  had  in  which  to  prepare  for  the  struggle 
that  any  one  might  see  was  inevitable  ;  but 
there  is  now  far  less  need  of  an  army  than 
there  was  then.  Circumstances  have  altered 
widely  since  1812.  Instead  of  the  decaying 
might  of  Spain  on  our  southern  frontier,  we 
have  the  still  weaker  power  of  Mexico.  In- 
stead of  the  great  Indian  nations  of  the  in- 
terior, able  to  keep  civilization  at  bay,  to  hold 
in  check  strong  armies,  to  ravage  large 

9 


io        PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 

stretches  of  territory,  and  needing  formidable 
military  expeditions  to  overcome  them,  there 
are  now  only  left  broken  and  scattered  bands 
which  are  sources  of  annoyance  merely. 
To  the  north  we  are  still  hemmed  in  by  the 
Canadian  possessions  of  Great  Britain  ;  but 
since  1812  our  strength  has  increased  so  pro- 
digiously, both  absolutely  and  relatively,  while 
England's  military  power  has  remained  almost 
stationary,  that  we  need  now  be  under  no  ap- 
prehensions from  her  land-forces ;  for,  even  if 
checked  in  the  beginning,  we  could  not  help 
conquering  in  the  end  by  sheer  weight  of 
numbers,  if  by  nothing  else.  So  that  there  is 
now  no  cause  for  our  keeping  up  a  large  army ; 
while,  on  the  contrary,  the  necessity  for  an 
efficient  navy  is  so  evident  that  only  our  almost 
incredible  short-sightedness  prevents  our  at 
once  preparing  one. 

Not  only  do  the  events  of  the  war  on  land 
teach  very  little  to  the  statesman  who  studies 
history  in  order  to  avoid  in  the  present  the 
mistakes  of  the  past,  but  besides  this,  the 
battles  and  campaigns  are  of  very  little  in- 
terest to  the  student  of  military  matters.  The 
British.regulars,  trained  in  many  wars,  thrashed 
the  raw  troops  opposed  to  them  whenever  they 
had  any  thing  like  a  fair  chance  ;  but  this  is 
not  to  be  wondered  at,  for  the  same  thing  has 
always  happened  the  world  over  under  similar 
conditions.  Our  defeats  were  exactly  such 
as  any  man  might  have  foreseen,  and  there  is 
nothing  to  be  learned  from  the  follies  com- 
mitted by  incompetent  commanders  and  un- 
trained troops  when  in  the  presence  of  skilled 
officers  having  under  them  disciplined  soldiers. 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION.         n 

The  humiliating  surrenders,  abortive  attacks, 
and  panic  routs  of  our  armies  can  all  be  paral- 
leled in  the  campaigns  waged  by  Napoleon's 
marshals  against  the  Spaniards  and  Portu- 
guese in  the  years  immediately  preceding  the 
outbreak  of  our  own  war.  The  Peninsular 
troops  were  as  little  able  to  withstand  the 
French  veterans  as  were  our  militia  to  hold 
their  own  against  the  British  regulars.  But 
it  must  always  be  remembered,  to  our  credit, 
that  while  seven  years  of  fighting  failed  to 
make  the  Spaniards  able  to  face  the  French,1 
two  years  of  warfare  gave  us  soldiers  who 
could  stand  against  the  best  men  of  Britain. 
On  the  northern  frontier  we  never  developed 
a  great  general, — Brown's  claim  to  the  title 
rests  only  on  his  not  having  committed  the 
phenomenal  follies  of  his  predecessors, — but 
by  1814  our  soldiers  had  become  seasoned, 
and  we  had  acquired  some  good  brigade  com- 
manders, notably  Scott,  so  that  in  that  year  we 
played  on  even  terms  with  the  British.  But  the 
battles,  though  marked  by  as  bloody  and  obsti- 
nate fighting  as  ever  took  place,  were  waged  be- 
tween small  bodies  of  men,  and  were  not  distin- 
guished by  any  feats  of  generalship,  so  that 
they  are  not  of  any  special  interest  to  the  his- 
torian. In  fact,  the  only  really  noteworthy 
feat  of  arms  of  the  war  took  place  at  New 
Orleans,  and  the  only  military  genius  that  the 

1  At  the  closing  battle  of  Toulouse,  fought  between 
the  allies  and  the  French,  the  flight  of  the  Spaniards 
was  so  rapid  and  universal  as  to  draw  from  the  Duke 
of  Wellington  the  bitter  observation,  that  "  though  he 
had  seen  a  good  many  remarkable  things  in  the  course 
of  his  life,  yet  this  was  the  first  time  he  had  ever  seen 
ten  thousand  men  running  a  race." 


13          PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 

struggle  developed  was  Andrew  Jackson. 
His  deeds  are  worthy  of  all  praise,  and  the 
battle  he  won  was  in  many  ways  so  peculiar 
as  to  make  it  well  worth  a  much  closer  study 
than  it  has  yet  received.  It  was  by  far  the 
most  prominent  event  of  the  war ;  it  was  a 
victory  which  reflected  high  honor  on  the 
general  and  soldiers  who  won  it,  and  it  was 
in  its  way  as  remarkable  as  any  of  the  great 
battles  that  took  place  about  the  same  time 
in  Europe.  Such  being  the  case,  I  have  de- 
voted a  chapter  to  its  consideration  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  chapters  devoted  to  the  naval 
operations. 
\j 

As  before  said,  the  other  campaigns  on  land 
do  not  deserve  very  minute  attention  ;  but,  for 
the  sake  of  rendering  the  account  of  the  battle 
of  New  Orleans  more  intelligible,  I  will  give 
a  hasty  sketch  of  the  principal  engagements 
that  took  place  elsewhere. 

The  war  opened  in  mid-summer  of  1812,  by 
the  campaign  of  General  Hull  on  the  Michigan 
frontier.  With  two  or  three  thousand  raw 
troops  he  invaded  Canada.  About  the  same 
time  Fort  Mackinaw  was  surrendered  by  its 
garrison  of  60  Americans  to  a  British  and  In- 
dian force  of  600.  Hull's  campaign  was  un- 
fortunate from  the  beginning.  Near  Browns- 
town  the  American  Colonel  Van  Home,  with 
some  200  men,  was  ambushed  and  routed 
by  Tecumseh  and  his  Indians.  In  revenge 
Col.  Miller,  with  600  Americans,  at  Ma- 
guaga  attacked  150  British  and  Canadians 
under  Capt.  Muir,  and  250  Indians  under 
Tecumseh,  and  whipped  them, — Tecumseh's 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION,         13 

Indians  standing  their  ground  longest.  The 
Americans  lost  75,  their  foes  180  men.  At 
Chicago  the  small  force  of  66  Americans  was 
surprised  and  massacred  by  the  Indians. 
Meanwhile,  General  Brock,  the  British  com- 
mander, advanced  against  Hull  with  a 
rapidity  and  decision  that  seemed  to  paralyze 
his  senile  and  irresolute  opponent.  The  lat- 
ter retreated  to  Detroit,  where,  without  strik- 
ing a  blow,  he  surrendered  1,400  men  to 
Brock's  nearly  equal  force,  which  consisted 
nearly  one  half  of  Indians  under  Tecumseh. 
On  the  Niagara  frontier,  an  estimable  and 
honest  old  gentleman  and  worthy  citizen, 
who  knew  nothing  of  military  matters,  Gen. 
Van  Rensselaer,  tried  to  cross  over  and  attack 
the  British  at  Queenstown  ;  1,100  Americans 
got  across  and  were  almost  all  killed  or  capt- 
ured by  an  equal  number  of  British,  Cana- 
dians and  Indians,  while  on  the  opposite  side 
a  larger  number  of  their  countrymen  looked 
on,  and  with  abject  cowardice  refused  to  cross 
to  their  assistance.  The  command  of  the 
army  was  then  handed  over  to  a  ridiculous 
personage  named  Smythe,  who  issued  procla- 
mations so  bombastic  that  they  really  must 
have  come  from  an  unsound  mind,  and  then 
made  a  ludicrously  abortive  effort  at  inva- 
sion, which  failed  almost  of  its  own  accord. 
A  British  and  Canadian  force  of  less  than  400 
men  was  foiled  in  an  assault  on  Ogdensburg, 
after  a  slight  skirmish,  by  about  1,000  Ameri- 
cans under  Brown  ;  and  with  this  trifling  suc- 
cess the  military  operations  of  the  year  came 
to  an  end. 

Early  in   1813,  Ogdensburg  was  again  at- 


14        PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 

tacked,  this  time  by  between  500  and  600 
British,  who  took  it  after  a  brisk  resistance 
from  some  300  militia ;  the  British  lost  60  and 
the  Americans  20,  in  killed  and  wounded. 
General  Harrison,  meanwhile,  had  begun  the 
campaign  in  the  Northwest.^  At  Frenchtown, 
on  the  river  Raisin,  Winchester's  command  of 
about  900  Western  troops  was  surprised  by  a 
force  of  1,100  men,  half  of  them  Indians, 
under  the  British  Colonel  Proctor.  The  right 
division,  taken  by  surprise,  gave  up  at  once ; 
the  left  division,  mainly  Kentucky  riflemen, 
and  strongly  posted  in  houses  and  stockaded 
enclosures,  made  a  stout  resistance,  and  only 
surrendered  after  a  bloody  fight,  in  which  180 
British  and  about  half  as  many  Indians  were 
killed  or  wounded.  Over  300  Americans  were 
slain,  some  in  the  battle,  but  most  in  the 
bloody  massacre  that  followed.  After  this, 
General  Harrison  went  into  camp  at  Fort 
Meigs,  where,  with  about  1,100  men,  he  was 
besieged  by  1,000  British  and  Canadians 
under  Proctor  and  1,200  Indians  under  Te- 
cumseh.  A  force  of  1,200  Kentucky  militia 
advanced  to  his  relief  and  tried  to  cut  its  way 
into  the  fort  while  the  garrison  made  a  sortie. 
The  sortie  was  fairly  successful,  but  the  Ken- 
tuckians  were  scattered  like  chaff  by  the 
British  regulars  in  the  open,  and  when  broken 
were  cut  to  pieces  by  the  Indians  in  the 
woods.  Nearly  two-thirds  of  the  relieving 
troops  were  killed  or  captured  ;  about  400  got 
into  the  fort.  Soon  afterward  Proctor  aban- 
doned the  siege.  Fort  Stephenson,  garri- 
soned by  Major  Croghan  and  160  men,  was 
attacked  by  a  force  of  391  British  regulars, 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION.         15 

who  tried  to  carry  it  by  assault,  and  were  re- 
pulsed with  the  loss  of  a  fourth  of  their  num- 
ber. Some  four  thousand  Indians  joined 
Proctor,  but  most  of  them  left  him  after 
Perry's  victory  on  Lake  Eri<p  Then  Harrison, 
having  received  large  reinforcements,  invaded 
Canada.  At  the  River  Thames  his  army  of 
3,500  men  encountered  and  routed  between 
600  and  700  British  under  Proctor,  and  about 
1,000  Indians  under  Tecumseh.  The  battle 
was  decided  at  once  by  a  charge  of  the  Ken- 
tucky mounted  riflemen,  who  broke  through 
the  regulars,  took  them  in  rear,  and  captured 
them,  and  then  dismounting  attacked  the 
flank  of  the  Indians,  who  were  also  assailed 
by  the  infantry.  Proctor  escaped  by  the  skin 
of  his  teeth  and  Tecumseh  died  fighting,  like 
the  hero  that  he  was.  This  battle  ended  the 
campaign  in  the  Northwest.  In  this  quarter 
it  must  be  remembered  that  the  war  was,  on 
the  part  of  the  Americans,  mainly  one  against 
Indians ;  the  latter  always  forming  over  half 
of  the  British  forces.  Many  of  the  remainder 
were  French  Canadians,  and  the  others  were 
regulars.  The  American  armies,  on  the  con- 
trary, were  composed  of  the  armed  settlers  of 
Kentucky  and  Ohio,  native  Americans,  of 
English  speech  and  blood,  who  were  battling 
for  lands  that  were  to  form  the  heritage  of 
their  children.  In  the  West  the  war  was  only 
the  closing  act  of  the  struggle  that  for  many 
years  had  been  waged  by  the  hardy  and  rest- 
less pioneers  of  our  race,  as  with  rifle  and  axe 
they  carved  out  the  mighty  empire  that  we 
their  children  inherit ;  it  was  but  the  final  ef- 
fort with  which  they  wrested  from  the  Indian 


1 6         PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION". 

lords  of  the  soil  the  wide  and  fair  domain  that 
now  forms  the  heart  of  our  great  Republic. 
It  was  the  breaking  down  of  the  last  barrier 
that  stayed  the  flood  of  our  civilization ;  it 
settled,  once  and  forever,  that  henceforth  the 
law,  the  tongue,  and  the  blood  of  the  land 
should  be  neither  Indian,  nor  yet  French,  but 
English.  The  few  French  of  the  West  were 
fighting  against  a  race  that  was  to  leave  as 
little  trace  of  them  as  of  the  doomed  Indian 
peoples  with  whom  they  made  common  cause. 
The  presence  of  the  British  mercenaries  did 
not  alter  the  character  of  the  contest;  it 
merely  served  to  show  the  bitter  and  narrow 
hatred  with  which  the  Mother-Island  regarded 
her  greater  daughter,  predestined  as  the  latter 
was  to  be  queen  of  the  lands  that  lay  beyond 
the  Atlantic. 

Meanwhile,  on  Lake  Ontario,  the  Americans 
made  successful  descents  on  York  and  Fort 
George,  scattering  or  capturing  their  compar- 
atively small  garrisons  ;  while  a  counter  de- 
scent by  the  British  on  Sackett's  Harbor  failed, 
the  attacking  force  being  too  small.  ,  After  the 
capture  of  Fort  George,  the  Americans  invaded 
Canada;  but  their  advance  guard,  1,400  strong, 
under  Generals  Chandler  and  Winder,  was 
surprised  in  the  night  by  800  British,  who, 
advancing  with  the  bayonet,  broke  up  the  camp, 
capturing  both  the  generals  and  half  the  artil- 
lery. Though  the  assailants,  who  lost  220  of 
their  small  number,  suffered  much  more  than 
the  Americans,  yet  the  latter  were  completely 
demoralized,  and  at  once  retreated  to  Fort 
George.  Soon  afterward,  Col.  Boerstler  with 
about  600  men  surrendered  with  shamefully 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION.        17 

brief  resistance  to  a  somewhat  smaller  force 
of  British  and  Indians.  Then  about  300  Brit- 
ish crossed  the  Niagara  to  attack  Black  Rock 
which  they  took,  but  were  afterward  driven  off 
by  a  large  body  of  militia  with  the  loss  of  40 
men.  Later  in  the  season  the  American  Gen- 
eral McClure  wantonly  burned  the  village  of 
Newark,  and  then  retreated  in  panic  flight 
across  the  Niagara.  In  retaliation  the  British 
in  turn  crossed  the  river ;  600  regulars  sur- 
prised and  captured  in  the  night  Fort  Niagara, 
with  its  garrison  of  400  men ;  two  thousand 
troopers  attacked  Black  Rock,  and,  after  los- 
ing over  a  hundred  men  in  a  smart  engagement 
with  somewhat  over  1,500  militia  whom  they 
easily  dispersed,  captured  and  burned  both 
it  and  Buffalo.  Before  these  last  events  took 
place  another  invasion  of  Canada  had  been 
been  attempted,  this  time  under  General  Wil- 
kinson, "an  unprincipled  imbecile,"  as  Scott 
very  properly  styled  him.  It  was  mismanaged 
in  every  possible  way,  and  was  a  total  failure ; 
it  was  attended  with  but  one  battle,  that  of 
Chrystler's  Farm,  in  which  1,000  British,  with 
the  loss  of  less  than  200  men,  beat  back  double 
their  number  of  Americans,  who  lost  nearly 
500  men  and  also  one  piece  of  artillery.  The 
American  army  near  Lake  Champlain  had 
done  nothing,  its  commander,  General  Wade 
Hampton,  being,  if  possible,  even  more  in- 
competent than  Wilkinson.  He  remained  sta- 
tionary while  a  small  force  of  British  plundered 
Plattsburg  and  Burlington  ;  then,  with  5,000 
men  he  crossed  into  Canada,  but  returned 
almost  immediately,  after  a  small  skirmish  at 
Chauteaugay  between  his  advance  guard  and 


1 8         PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 

some  500  Canadians,  in  which  the  former  lost 
41  and  the  latter  22  men.  This  affair,  in  which 
hardly  a  tenth  of  the  American  force  was  en- 
gaged, has  been,  absurdly  enough,  designated 
a  "battle"  by  most  British  and  Canadian 
historians.  In  reality  it  was  the  incompetency 
of  their  general  and  not  the  valor  of  their  foes 
that  caused  the  retreat  of  the  Americans.  The 
same  comment,  by  the  way,  applies  to  the  so- 
called  "  Battle  "  of  Plattsburg,  in  the  following 
year,  which  may  have  been  lost  by  Sir  George 
Prevost,  but  was  certainly  not  won  by  the 
Americans.  And,  again,  a  similar  criticism 
should  be  passed  on  General  Wilkinson's  at- 
tack on  La  Colle  Mill,  near  the  head  of  the 
same  lake.  Neither  one  of  the  three  affairs 
was  a  stand-up  fight ;  in  each  a  greatly  su- 
perior force,  led  by  an  utterly  incapable  gen- 
eral, retreated  after  a  slight  skirmish  with  an 
enemy  whose  rout  would  have  been  a  matter 
of  certainty  had  the  engagement  been  per- 
mitted to  grow  serious. 

In  the  early  spring  of  1814  a  small  force  of 
1 60  American  regulars,  under  Captain  Holmes, 
fighting  from  behind  felled  logs,  routed  200 
British  with  a  loss  of  65  men,  they  themselves 
losing  but  8.  On  Lake  Ontario  the  British 
made  a  descent  on  Oswego  and  took  it  by  fair 
assault ;  and  afterward  lost  180  men  who  tried 
to  cut  out  some  American  transports,  and  were 
killed  or  captured  to  a  man.  All  through 
the  spring  and  early  summer  the  army  on  the 
Niagara  frontier  was  carefully  drilled  by  Brown, 
and  more  especially  by  Scott,  and  the  results  of 
this  drilling  were  seen  in  the  immensely  im- 
proved effectiveness  of  the  soldiers  in  the 


PREFACE  TO   THIRD  EDITION.         19 

campaign  that  opened  in  July.  Fort  Erie  was 
captured  with  little  resistance,  and  on  the  4th 
of  July,  at  the  river  Chippeway,  Brown,  with 
two  brigades  of  regulars,  each  about  1,200 
strong,  under  Scott  and  Ripley,  and  a  brigade 
of  800  militia  and  Indians  under  Porter,  mak- 
ing a  total  of  about  3,200  men,  won  a  stand- 
up  fight  against  the  British  General  Riall,  who 
had  nearly  2,500  men,  1,800  of  them  regulars. 
Porter's  brigade  opened  by  driving  in  the 
Canadian  militia  and  the  Indians  ;  but  was 
itself  checked  by  the  British  light-troops.  Rip- 
ley's  brigade  took  very  little  part  in  the  battle, 
three  of  the  regiments  not  being  engaged  at 
all,  and  the  fourth  so  slightly  as  to  lose  but  five 
men.  The  entire  brunt  of  the  action  was  borne 
by  Scott's  brigade,  which  was  fiercely  attacked 
by  the  bulk  of  the  British  regulars  under  Riall. 
The  latter  advanced  with  great  bravery,  but 
were  terribly  cut  up  by  the  fire  of  Scott's  reg- 
ulars ;  and  when  they  had  come  nearly  up 
to  him,  Scott  charged  with  the  bayonet  and 
drove  them  clean  off  the  field.  The  American 
loss  was  322,  including  23  Indians  ;  the  British 
loss  was  515,  excluding  that  of  the  Indians. 
The  number  of  Americans  actually  engaged 
did  not  exceed  that  of  the  British ;  and  Scott's 
brigade,  in  fair  fight,  closed  by  a  bayonet 
charge,  defeated  an  equal  force  of  British  reg- 
ulars. 

On  July  25th  occurred  the  Battle  of  Niagara, 
or  Lundy's  Lane,  fought  between  General 
Brown  with  3,100  '  Americans  and  General 

1  As  near  as  can  be  found  out ;  most  American 
authorities  make  it  much  less  ;  Lossing,  for  example, 
says,  only  2,400. 


20        PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 

Drummond  with  3,500'  British.  It  was 
brought  on  by  accident  in  the  evening,  and 
was  waged  with  obstinate  courage  and  savage 
slaughter  till  midnight.  On  both  sides  the 
forces  straggled  into  action  by  detachments. 
The  Americans  formed  the  attacking  party. 
As  before,  Scott's  brigade  bore  the  brunt 
of  the  fight,  and  over  half  of  his  men 
were  killed  or  wounded;  he  himself  was 
disabled  and  borne  from  the  field.  The 
struggle  was  of  the  most  desperate  character, 
the  combatants  showing  a  stubborn  courage 
that  could  not  be  surpassed.2  Charge  after 
charge  was  made  with  the  bayonet,  and  the 
artillery  was  taken  and  retaken  once  and 
again.  The  loss  was  nearly  equal :  on  the 
side  of  the  Americans,  854  men  (including 
Generals  Brown  and  Scott,  wounded)  and 
two  guns ;  on  that  of  the  British,  878  men 
(including  General  Riall  captured)  and  one 
gun.  Each  side  claimed  it  as  a  victory  over 
superior  numbers.  The  truth  is  beyond 
question  that  the  British  had  the  advantage 

1  General   Drummond   in   his   official    letter  makes 
it  but   2,800;   James,  who  gives   the   details,  makes 
it   3,000    rank    and  file ;    adding    13    per    cent,    for 
the   officers,   sergeants,   and   drummers,  brings  it   up 
to  3,400 ;  and  we  still  have  to  count  in  the  artillery 
drivers,  etc. 

2  General   Drummond  writes  :  "  In  so  determined  a 
manner  were  their  attacks  directed  against  our  guns 
that  our  artillerymen  were  bayoneted  while  in  the  act 
of  loading,  and  the  muzzle  of  the  enemy's  guns  were 
advanced  within  a  few  yards  of  ours."     Even  James 
says :    "  Upon    the    whole,   however,    the   American 
troops  fought  bravely ;  and  the  conduct  of  many  of  the 
officers,  of  the  artillery  corps  especially,  would  have 
done  honor  to  any  service." 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION.         21 

in  numbers,  and  a  still  greater  advantage  in 
position  ;  while  it  is  equally  beyond  question 
that  it  was  a  defeat  and  not  a  victory  for  the 
Americans.  They  left  the  field  and  retired 
in  perfect  order  to  Fort  Erie,  while  the  British 
held  the  field  and  the  next  day  pursued  their 
foes. 

Having  received  some  reinforcements 
General  Drummond,  now  with  about  3,600 
men,  pushed  forward  to  besiege  Fort  Erie,  in 
which  was  the  American  army,  some  2,400 
strong,  under  General  Gaines.  Col.  Tucker 
with  500  British  regulars  was  sent  across  the 
Niagara  to  destroy  the  batteries  at  Black 
Rock,  but  was  defeated  by  300  American  reg- 
ulars under  Major  Morgan,  fighting  from  be- 
hind a  strong  breastwork  of  felled  trees,  with 
a  creek  in  front.  On  the  night  of  the  i5th  of 
August,  the  British  in  three  columns  advanced 
to  storm  the  American  works,  but  after 
making  a  most  determined  assault  were 
beaten  off.  The  assailants  lost  900  men,  the 
assailed  about  80.  After  this  nothing  was 
done  till  Sept.  i7th,  when  General  Brown, 
who  had  resumed  command  of  the  American 
forces,  determined  upon  and  executed  a  sortie. 
Each  side  had  received  reinforcements  ;  the 
Americans  numbered  over  3,000,  the  British 
nearly  4,000.  The  fighting  was  severe,  the 
Americans  losing  500  men ;  but  their  op- 
ponents lost  600  men,  and  most  of  their 
batteries  were  destroyed.  Each  side,  as  usual, 
claimed  the  victory ;  but,  exactly  as  Lundy's 
Lane  must  be  accounted  an  American  defeat, 
as  our  forces  retreated  from  the  ground,  so 
this  must  be  considered  an  American  victory, 


22         PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 

for  after  it  the  British  broke  up  camp  and 
drew  off  to  Chippeway.  Nothing  more  was 
done,  and  on  November  5th  the  American 
army  recrossed  the  Niagara.  Though  marked 
by  some  brilliant  feats  of  arms  this  four 
months'  invasion  of  Canada,  like  those  that 
had  preceded  it,  thus  came  to  nothing.  But 
at  the  same  time  a  British  invasion  of  the 
United  States  was  repulsed  far  more  dis- 
gracefully. Sir  George  Prevost,  with  an 
army  of  13,000  veteran  troops,  marched 
south  along  the  shores  of  Lake  Champlain 
to  Plattsburg,  which  was  held  by  General 
Macomb  with  2,000  regulars,  and  perhaps 
double  that  number  of  nearly  worthless 
militia  ; — a  force  that  the  British  could  have 
scattered  to  the  winds,  though,  as  they  were 
strongly  posted,  not  without  severe  loss. 
But  the  British  fleet  was  captured  by  Com- 
modore MacDonough  in  the  fight  on  the 
lake ;  and  then  Sir  George,  after  some  heavy 
skirmishing  between  the  outposts  of  the  armies, 
in  which  the  Americans  had  the  advantage, 
fled  precipitately  back  to  Canada. 

All  through  the  war  the  sea-coasts  of  the 
United  States  had  been  harried  by  small  pred- 
atory excursions ;  a  part  of  what  is  now  the 
State  of  Maine  was  conquered  with  little  re- 
sistance, and  kept  until  the  close  of  hostilities  ; 
and  some  of  the  towns  on  the  shores  of 
Chesapeake  Bay  had  been  plundered  or 
burnt.  In  August,  1814,  a  more  serious  in- 
vasion was  planned,  and  some  5,000  troops — 
regulars,  sailors,  and  marines — were  landed, 
under  the  command  of  General  Ross.  So 
utterly  helpless  was  the  Democratic  Adminis- 


PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION.        23 

tration  at  Washington,  that  during  the  two 
years  of  warfare  hardly  any  steps  had  been 
taken  to  protect  the  Capitol,  or  the  country 
round  about ;  what  little  was  done  was  done 
entirely  too  late,  and  bungled  badly  in  addi- 
tion. History  has  not  yet  done  justice  to  the 
ludicrous  and  painful  folly  and  stupidity  of 
which  the  government  founded  by  Jefferson, 
and  carried  on  by  Madison,  was  guilty,  both  in 
its  preparations  for,  and  in  its  way  of  carrying 
on,  this  war  ;  nor  is  it  yet  realized  that  the  men 
just  mentioned,  and  their  associates,  are 
primarily  responsible  for  the  loss  we  suffered 
in  it,  and  the  bitter  humiliation  some  of  its  in- 
cidents caused  us.  The  small  British  army 
marched  at  will  through  Virginia  and  Mary- 
land, burned  Washington,  and  finally  re- 
treated from  before  Baltimore  and  re-embarked 
to  take  part  in  the  expedition  against  New 
Orleans.  Twice,  at  Bladensburg  and  North 
Point,  it  came  in  contact  with  superior  num- 
bers of  militia  in  fairly  good  position.  In 
each  case  the  result  was  the  same.  After 
sone  preliminary  skirmishing,  manoeuvring, 
and  volley  firing,  the  British  charged  with  the 
bayonet.  The  rawest  regiments  among  the 
American  militia  then  broke  at  once ;  the 
others  kept  pretty  steady,  pouring  in  quite  a 
destructive  fire,  until  the  regulars  had  come  up 
close  to  them,  when  they  also  fled.  The 
British  regulars  were  too  heavily  loaded  to 
pursue,  and,  owing  to  their  mode  of  attack, 
and  the  rapidity  with  which  their  opponents 
ran  away,  the  loss  of  the  latter  was  in  each 
case  very  slight.  At  North  Point,  however, 
the  militia,  being  more  experienced,  behaved 


24        PREFACE  TO  THIRD  EDITION. 

better  than  at  Bladensburg.  In  neither  case 
were  the  British  put  to  any  trouble  to  win 
their  victory. 

The  above  is  a  brief  sketch  of  the  cam- 
paigns of  the  war.  It  is  not  cheerful  reading 
for  an  American,  nor  yet  of  interest  to  a 
military  student ;  and  its  lessons  have  been 
taught  so  often  by  similar  occurrences  in 
other  lands  under  like  circumstances,  and 
moreover,  teach  such  self-evident  truths,  that 
they  scarcely  need  to  be  brought  to  the  notice 
of  an  historian.  But  the  crowning  event  of 
the  war  was  the  Battle  of  New  Orleans ;  re- 
markable in  its  military  aspect,  and  a  source 
of  pride  to  every  American.  It  is  well  worth 
a  more  careful  study,  and  to  it  I  have  devoted 
the  last  chapter  of  this  work. 

New  York  City,  1883. 


PRINCIPAL   AUTHORITIES   REFERRED  TO. 

(SEE  ALSO  IN  ALPHABETICAL  PLACE  IN  INDEX.) 

American  State  Papers. 

Brenton,  E.  P.  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain, 
1783  to  1836.  2  vols.,  octavo.  London,  1837. 

Broke,  Adm.,  Memoir  of,  by  Rev.  J.  G.  Brighton. 
Octavo.  London,  1866. 

"  Captains'  Letters  "  in  Archives  at  Washington. 

Codrington,  Adm.  Sir  E.  Memoirs,  edited  by  his 
daughter.  2  vols.,  octavo.  London,  1873. 

Coggeshall,  George.  History  of  American  Priva- 
teers. New  York,  1876. 

Cooper,  J.  F.  Naval  History  of  the  United  States. 
New  York,  1856. 

Dundonald,  Earl.  Autobiography  of  a  Seaman. 
London,  1860. 

Douglass,  Lord  Howard.  Naval  Gunnery.  Oclavo. 
London,  1860. 

Emmons,  Lieut.  G.  E.  Statistical  History  of  United 
States  Navy,  1853. 

Farragut,  Adm.  D.  G.,  Life  of,  by  his  son,  Loyall 
Farragut.  Octavo.  New  York,  1878. 

Graviere,  Adm.,  J.  de  la.  Guerres  Maritimes.  2 
vols.,  octavo.  Paris,  1881. 

James,  William.  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain. 
6  vols.,  octavo,  London,  1837. 

James,  William.  Naval  Occurrences  with  the 
Americans.  Octavo,  London,  1817. 

Lossing,  Benson  J.  Field-book  of  the  War  of  1812. 
Octavo,  New  York,  1869. 

Low,  C.  R.  History  of  the  Indian  Navy,  1613  to 
1863.  2  vols.,  octavo.  London,  1877. 

London  Naval  Chronicle. 

Marshall.  Royal  Naval  Biography.  12  vols.,  octa- 
vo. London,  1825. 

"  Masters-Commandant  Letters  "  in  the  Archives  at 
Washington. 

25 


26         AUTHORITIES  REFERRED  TO. 

Morris,  Com.  Charles.  Autobiography.  Anna- 
polis, 1880. 

Naval  Archives  at  Washington. 

Niles.     Weekly  Register. 

Pielat,  B.  La  Vie  et  les  Actions  Memorables  du 
St.  Michel  de  Ruyter.  Amsterdam,  1677. 

Riviere,  Lieut.  H.  La  Marine  Fran9aise  sous  le 
Regime  de  Louis  XV.  Paris,  1859. 

Tatnall,  Commod.,  Life,  by  C.  C.  Jones,  Jr.  Sa- 
vannah, 1878. 

Toussard,  L.  de.  American  Artillerists'  Companion. 
Phila.  1811. 

Troude,  O.  Batailles  Navales  de  la  France.  Paris, 
1868. 

Ward,  Com.  J.  H.    Manual  of  Naval  Tactics.    1859. 

Yonge,  Charles  Duke.  History  of  the  British 
Navy.  3  vols.,  octavo.  London,  18(36. 


CONTENTS. 


PREFACE 3 

CHAPTER  I. 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Causes  of  the  war  of  1812 — Conflicting  views  of 
America  and  Britain  as  regards  neutral  rights — Those 
of  the  former  power  right — Impossibility  of  avoiding 
hostilities — Declaration  of  war  June  18,  1812 — Slight 
preparations  made — General  features  of  the  contest — 
Race  identity  of  combatants — The  treaty  of  peace 
nominally  leaves  the  situation  unchanged — But  practi- 
cally settles  the  dispute  in  our  favor  in  respect  to  mari- 
time rights-^The  British  navy  and  its  reputation  prior 
to  1812 — Comparison  with  other  European  navies- 
British  and  American  authorities  consulted  in  the  pres- 
ent work 31 

CHAPTER  II. 

Overwhelming  naval  supremacy  of  England  wheli 
America  declared  war  against  her — Race  identity  of 
the  combatants — American  navy  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war — Officers  well  trained — Causes  tending  to  make 
our  seamen  especially  efficient — Close  similarity  be- 
tween British  and  American  sailors — Our  ships  manned 
chiefly  by  native  Americans,  many  of  whom  had  for- 
merly been  impressed  into  the  British  navy — Quotas  of 
seamen  contributed  by  the  different  States — Navy 
yards — I -ists  of  officers  and  men — List  of  vessels — Ton- 
nage— Different  ways  of  estimating  it  in  Britain  and 
America — Ratings — American  ships  properly  rated— 


28  CONTENTS. 

Armaments  of  the  frigates  and  corvettes — Three  styles 
of  guns  used — Difference  between  long  guns  and  car- 
ronades — Short  weight  of  American  shot — Comparison 
of  British  frigates  rating  38  and  American  frigates  rat- 
ing 44  guns — Compared  with  a  74 54 


CHAPTER  III. 
1812. 

ON  THE  OCEAN. 

Commodore  Rodgers'  cruise  and  unsuccessful  chase 
of  the  Belvidera — Engagement  between  Belvidera  and 
President — Hornet  captures  a  privateer — Cruise  of  the 
Essex — Captain  Hull's  cruise  and  escape  from  the 
squadron  of  Commodore  Broke — Constitution  captures 
Guerriere — Marked  superiority  shown  by  the  Ameri- 
cans—  Wasp  captures  Frolic — Disproportionate  loss  on 
British  side — Both  afterward  captured  by  Poictiers— 
Second  unsuccessful  cruise  of  Commodore  Rodgers — 
United  States  captures  Macedonian — Constitution  cap- 
tures Java — Cruise  of  Essex — Summary 109 

CHAPTER  IV. 
1812. 

ON   THE  LAKES. 

PRELIMINARY. — The  combatants  starting  nearly  on 
an  equality — Difficulties  of  creating  a  naval  force — 
Difficulty  of  comparing  the  force  of  the  rival  squad- 
rons— Meagreness  of  the  published  accounts — Unreli- 
ability of  authorities,  especially  James. — ONTARIO — Ex- 
traordinary nature  of  the  American  squadron — Cana- 
dian squadron  a  kind  of  water  militia — Sackctt's  Har- 
bor feebly  attacked  by  Commodore  Earle — Commo- 
dore Chauncy  attacks  the  Royal  George — And  bom- 
bards York. — ERIE — Lieutenant  Elliott  captures  the 
Detroit  and  Caledonia — Lieutenant  Angus'  unsuccess- 
ful attack  on  Red  House  barracks , , . .  181 


CONTENTS.  29 

CHAPTER  V. 
1813. 

ON  THE  OCEAN. 

Blockade  of  the  American  coast — Commodore  Por- 
ter's campaign  with  the  Essex  in  the  South  Pacific — 
Hornet  blockades  Bonne  Citoyenne — Hornet  captures 
Resolution — Hornet  captures  Peacock — Generous  treat- 
ment shown  to  the  conquered — Viper  captured  by  Nar- 
cissus— American  privateers  cut  out  by  British  boats — 
Third  cruise  of  Commodore  Rodgers — United  States, 
Macedonian,  and  Wasp  blockaded  in  New  London — 
Broke's  challenge  to  Lawrence — The  Chesapeake  cap- 
tured by  the  Shannon — Comments  and  criticisms  by 
various  authorities — Surveyor  captured  by  boats  of 
Narcissus — Futile  gunboat  actions — Britisn  attack  on 
Craney  Island  repulsed — Cutting  out  expeditions — The 
Argus  captured  by  the  Pelican — The  Enterprise  cap- 
tures the  Boxer — Ocean  warfare  of  1813  in  favor  of 
British — Summary 204 

CHAPTER  VI. 
1813. 

ON  THE  LAKES. 

ONTARIO— Comparison  of  the  rival  squadrons — 
Chauncy's  superior  in  strength — Chauncy  takes  York 
and  Fort  George — Yeo  is  repulsed  at  Sackett's  Harbor, 
but  keeps  command  of  the  lake — The  Lady  of  the  Lake 
captures  Lady  Murray — Hamilton  and  Scourge  founder 
in  a  squall — Yeo's  partial  victory  off  Niagara — Indeci- 
sive action  off  the  Genesee — Chauncy's  partial  victory 
off  Burlington,  which  gives  him  the  command  of  the 
lake — Yeo  and  Chauncy  compared — Reasons  for 
American  success. — ERIE — Perry's  success  in  creating 
a  fleet — His  victory — "  Glory  "  of  it  overestimated — 
Cause  of  his  success. — CHAMPLAIN — The  Growler  and 
Eagle  captured  by  gunboats — Summary  of  year's  cam- 
paign,,  ,,..,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,  269 


CHAPTER  L 

INTRODUCTORY. 

Causes  of  the  War  of  1812  —  Conflicting  views  of 
America  and  Britain  as  regards  neutral  rights  —  Those 
of  the  former  power  right  —  Impossibility  of  avoiding 
hostilities  —  Declaration  of  war  —  General  features  of 
the  contest  —  Racial  identity  of  the  contestants  —  The 
treaty  of  peace  nominally  leaves  the  situation  un- 
changed —  But  practically  settles  the  dispute  in  our  fa- 
vor in  respect  to  maritime  rights  —  The  British  navy 
and  its  reputation  prior  to  1812  —  Comparison  with 
other  European  navies  —  British  and  American  author- 
ities consulted  in  the  present  work. 


view  professed  by  Great  Britain  in 
J-  1812  respecting  the  rights  of  belligerents 
and  neutrals  was  diametrically  opposite  to 
that  held  by  the  United  States.  "Between 
England  and  the  United  States  of  America," 
writes  a  British  author,  "  a  spirit  of  animosity, 
caused  chiefly  by  the  impressment  of  British 
seamen,  or  of  seamen  asserted  to  be  such, 
from  on  board  of  American  merchant  vessels, 
had  unhappily  subsisted  for  a  long  time" 
prior  to  the  war.  "  It  is,  we  believe,"  he  con- 
tinues, "an  acknowledged  maxim  of  public 

31 


32  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

law,  as  well  that  no  nation  but  the  one  he  be- 
longs to  can  release  a  subject  from  his  natural 
allegiance,  as  that,  provided  the  jurisdiction 
of  another  independent  state  be  not  infringed, 
every  nation  has  a  right  to  enforce  the  serv- 
ices of  her  subjects  wherever  they  may  be 
found.  Nor  has  any  neutral  nation  such  a 
jurisdiction  over  her  merchant  vessels  upon 
the  high  seas  as  to  exclude  a  belligerent  na- 
tion from  the  right  of  searching  them  for  con- 
traband of  war  or  for  the  property  or  persons 
of  her  enemies.  And  if,  in  the  exercise  of 
that  right,  the  belligerent  should  discover  on 
board  of  the  neutral  vessel  a  subject  who  has 
withdrawn  himself  from  his  lawful  allegiance, 
the  neutral  can  have  no  fair  ground  for  re- 
fusing to  deliver  him  up  ;  more  especially  if 
that  subject  is  proved  to  be  a  deserter  from 
the  sea  or  land  service  of  the  former." ' 

Great  Britain's  doctrine  was  "  once  a  sub- 
ject always  a  subject."  On  the  other  hand, 
the  United  States  maintained  that  any  foreign- 
er, after  five  years'  residence  within  her  terri- 
tory, and  after  having  complied  with  certain 
forms,  became  one  of  her  citizens  as  com- 
pletely as  if  he  was  native  born.  Great 
Britain  contended  that  her  war  ships  possessed 
the  right  of  searching  all  neutral  vessels  for 
the  property  and  persons  of  her  foes.  The 
United  States,  resisting  this  claim,  asserted 
that  "  free  bottoms  made  free  goods,"  and 
that  consequently  her  ships  when  on  the  high 
seas  should  not  be  molested  on  any  pretext 

1  "  The  Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,"  by  William 
James,  vol.  iv,  p.  324. '  (New  edition  by  Captain  Cha- 
mier,  R.  N.,  London,  1837.) 


INTRODUCTION.  33 

whatever.  Finally,  Great  Britain's  system  of 
impressment,1  by  which  men  could  be  forcibly 
seized  and  made  to  serve  in  her  navy,  no  mat- 
ter at  what  costto  themselves,  was  repugnant 
to  every  American  idea. 

Such  wide  differences  in  the  views  of  the 
two  nations  produced  endless  difficulties.  To 
escape  the  press-gang,  or  for  other  reasons, 
many  British  seamen  took  service  under  the 
American  flag ;  and  if  they  were  demanded 
back,  it  is  not  likely  that  they  or  their  Amer- 
ican shipmates  had  much  hesitation  in  swear- 
ing either  that  they  were  not  British  at  all,  or 
else  that  they  had  been  naturalized  as  Amer- 
icans. Equally  probable  is  it  that  the  Amer- 
ican blockade-runners  were  guilty  of  a  great 
deal  of  fraud  and  more  or  less  thinly  veiled 
perjury.  But  the  wrongs  done  by  the  Amer- 
icans were  insignificant  compared  with  those 
they  received.  Any  innocent  merchant  vessel 
was  liable  to  seizure  at  any  moment ;  and 
when  overhauled  by  a  British  cruiser  short  of 
men  was  sure  to  be  stripped  of  most  of  her 
crew.  The  British  officers  were  themselves 
the  judges  as  to  whether  a  seaman  should  be 
pronounced  a  native  of  America  or  of  Britain, 
and  there  was  no  appeal  from  their  judgment. 
If  a  captain  lacked  his  full  complement  there 
was  little  doubt  as  to  the  view  he  would  take 
of  any  man's  nationality.  The  wrongs  inflicted 
on  our  seafaring  countrymen  by  their  impress- 
ment into  foreign  ships  formed  the  main  cause 
of  the  war.  .jS 

There  were  still  other  grievances  which  Sre 

1  The  best  idea   of  which   can  be  gained  by  reading 
Marryatt's  novels. 


34  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

thus  presented  by  the  British  Admiral  Coch- 
rane.1  "  Our  treatment  of  its  (America's) 
citizens  was  scarcely  in  accordance  with  the 
national  privileges  to  which  the  young  Re- 
public had  become  entitled.  There  were  no 
doubt  many  individuals  among  the  American 
people  who,  caring  little  for  the  Federal  Gov- 
ernment, considered  it  more  profitable  to  break 
than  to  keep  the  laws  of  nations  by  aiding  and 
supporting  our  enemy  (France),  and  it  was 
against  such  that  the  efforts  of  the  squadron 
had  chiefly  been  directed;  but  the  way  the 
object  was  carried  out  was  scarcely  less  an 
infraction  of  those  national  laws  which  we 
were  professedly  enforcing.  The  practice  of 
taking  English  (and  American)  seamen  out  of 
American  ships  without  regard  to  the  safety 
of  navigating  them  when  thus  deprived  of 
their  hands  has  been  already  mentioned.  To 
this  may  be  added  the  detention  of  vessels 
against  which  nothing  contrary  to  international 
neutrality  could  be  established,  whereby  their 
cargoes  became  damaged,  the  compelling 
them,  on  suspicion  only,  to  proceed  to  ports 
other  than  those  to  which  they  were  destined  ; 
and  generally  treating  them  as  though  they 
were  engaged  in  contraband  trade.  *  *  * 
American  ships  were  not  permitted  to  quit 
English  ports  without  giving  security  for  the 
discharge  of  their  cargoes  in  some  other 
British  or  neutral  port."  On  the  same  sub- 
ject James  *  writes  :  "  When,  by  the  maritime 

1  "  Autobiography  of  a  Seaman,"  by  Thomas,  tenth 
Earl  of  Dundonald,  Admiral  of  the  Red,  Rear-Admiral 
of  the  Fleet,  London,  1860,  vol.  i,  p.  24. 


INTRODUCTION.  35 

supremacy  of  England,  France  could  no  longer 
trade  for  herself,  America  proffered  her  serv- 
ices, as  a  neutral,  to  trade  for  her ;  and 
American  merchants  and  their  agents,  in  the 
gains  that  flowed  in,  soon  found  a  compensa 
tion  for  all  the  perjury  and  fraud  necessary 
to  cheat  the  former  out  of  her  belligerent 
rights.  The  high  commercial  importance  of 
the  United  States  thus  obtained,  coupled  with 
a  similarity  of  language  and,  to  a  superficial 
observer,  a  resemblance  in  person  between 
the  natives  of  America  and  Great  Britain,  has 
caused  the  former  to  be  the  chief,  if  not  the 
only  sufferers  by  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
search.  Chiefly  indebted  for  their  growth  and 
prosperity  to  emigration  from  Europe,  the 
United  States  hold  out  every  allurement  to 
foreigners,  particularly  to  British  seamen, 
whom,  by  a  process  peculiarly  their  own,  they 
can  naturalize  as  quickly  as  a  dollar  can 
exchange  masters  and  a  blank  form,  ready 
signed  and  sworn  to,  can  be  filled  up.1  It  is 
the  knowledge  of  this  fact  that  makes  British 
naval  officers  when  searching  for  deserters 
from  their  service,  so  harsh  in  their  scrutiny, 
and  so  sceptical  of  American  oaths  and 
asseverations." 

The  last  sentence  of  the  foregoing  from 
James  is  an  euphemistic  way  of  saying  that 
whenever  a  British  commander  short  of  men 
came  across  an  American  vessel  he  impressed 
all  of  her  crew  that  he  wanted,  whether  they 
were  citizens  of  the  United  States  or  not.  It 
must  be  remembered,  however,  that  the  only 
reason  why  Great  Britain  did  us  more  injury 

1  This  is  an  exaggeration. 


36  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

than  any  other  power  was  because  she  was 
better  able  to  do  so.  None  of  her  acts  were 
more  offensive  than  Napoleon's  Milan  decree, 
by  which  it  was  declared  that  any  neutral  ves- 
sel which  permitted  itself  to  be  searched  by  a 
British  cruiser  should  be  considered  as  British, 
and  as  the  lawful  prize  of  any  French  vessel. 
French  frigates  and  privateers  were  very  apt 
to  snap  up  any  American  vessel  they  came 
across,  and  were  only  withheld  at  all  by  the 
memory  of  the  sharp  dressing  they  had  re- 
ceived in  the  West  Indies  during  the  quasi- 
war  of  1799-1800.  What  we  undoubtedly 
ought  to  have  done  was  to  have  adopted  the 
measure  actually  proposed  in  Congress,  and 
declared  war  on  both  France  and  England.  As 
it  was,  we  chose  as  a  foe  the  one  that  had 
done,  and  could  still  do,  us  the  greatest 
injury. 

The  principles  for  which  the  United  States 
contended  in  1812  are  now  universally  ac- 
cepted, and  those  so  tenaciously  maintained 
by  Great  Britain  find  no  advocates  in  the 
civilized  world.  That  England  herself  was 
afterwards  completely  reconciled  to  our  views 
was  amply  shown  by  her  intense  indignation 
when  Commodore  Wilkes,  in  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  search  for  the  persons  of  the  foes  of 
his  country,  stopped  the  neutral  British  ship 
Trent ;  while  the  applause  with  which  the  act 
was  greeted  in  America  proves  pretty  clearly 
another  fact,  that  we  had  warred  for  the  right, 
not  because  it  was  the  right,  but  because  it 
agreed  with  our  self-interest  to  do  so.  We 
wer?  contending  for  "  Free  Trade  and  Sailors' 
Rights  " :  meaning  by  the  former  expression,  ^ 


INTRODUCTION.  37 

freedom  to  trade  wherever  we  chose  without* 
hindrance  save  from  the  power  with  whom  we 
were  trading ;  and  by  the  latter,  that  a  man 
who  happened  to  be  on  the  sea  should  have 
the  same  protection  accorded  to  a  man  who 
remained  on  land.  Nominally,  neither  of 
these  questions  was  settled  by,  or  even  alluded 
to,  in  the  treaty  of  peace ;  but  the  immense 
increase  in  reputation  that  the  navy  acquired 
during  the  war  practically  decided  both  points 
in  our  favor.  Our  sailors  had  gained  too 
great  a  name  for  any  one  to  molest  them  with 
impunity  again. 

x"  Holding  views  on  these  maritime  subjects  so 
radically  different  from  each  other,  the  two 
nations  could  not  but  be  continually  dealing 
with  causes  of  quarrel.  Not  only  did  British 
cruisers  molest  our  merchant-men,  but  at 
length  one  of  them,  the  5o-gun  ship  Leopard 
attacked  an  American  frigate,  the  Chesapeake, 
when  the  latter  was  so  lumbered  up  that  she 
could  not  return  a  shot,  killed  or  disabled 
some  twenty  of  her  men  and  took  away  four 
others,  one  Briton  and  three  Americans,  who 
were  claimed  as  deserters.  For  this  act  an 
apology  was  offered,  but  it  failed  to  restore 
harmony  between  the  two  nations.  Soon 
afterward  another  action  was  fought.  The 
American  frigate  President^  Commodore  Rod- 
gers,  attacked  the  British  sloop  Little  £eltt 
Captain  Bingham,  and  exchanged  one  or  two 
broadsides  with  her, — the  frigate  escaping  scot- 
free  while  the  sloop  was  nearly  knocked  to 
pieces.  Mutual  recriminations  followed,  each 
side  insisting  that  the  other  was  the  assailant. 
When  Great  Britain  issued  her  Orders  in 

14—2  B 


38  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

Council  forbidding  our  trading  with  France, 
we  retaliated  by  passing  an  embargo  act, 
which  prevented  us  from  trading  at  all.  There 
could  be  but  one  result  to  such  a  succession 
of  incidents,  and  that  was  war.  Accordingly,, 
in  June,  1812,  war  was  declared;  and  as  a> 
contest  for  the  rights  of  seamen,  it  was  largely 
waged  on  the  ocean.  We  also  had  not  a 
little  fighting  to  do  on  land,  in  which,  as  a 
rule,  we  came  out  second-best./  Few  or  no 
preparations  for  the  war  had  been  made,  and 
the  result  was  such  as  might  have  been  antici- 
pated. /  After  dragging  on  through  three 
dreary  and  uneventful  years  it  came  to  an  end 
in  1815,  by  a  peace  which  left  matters  in 
almost  precisely  the  state  in  which  the  war 
had  found  them.  On  land  and  water  the 
contest  took  the  form  of  a  succession  of  petty 
actions,  in  which  the  glory  acquired  by  the 
victor  seldom  eclipsed  the  disgrace  incurred 
by  the  vanquished.  Neither  side  succeeded 
in  doing  what  it  intended.  Americans  de- 
clared that  Canada  must  and  should  be 
conquered,  but  the  conquering  came  quite  as 
near  being  the  other  way.  British  writers 
insisted  that  the  American  navy  should  be 
swept  from  the  seas  ;  and,  during  the  sweeping 
process  it  increased  fourfold. 

When  the  United  States  declared  war,  Great 
Britain  was  straining  every  nerve  and  muscle 
in  a  death  struggle  with  the  most  formidable 
military  despotism  of  modern  times,  and  was 
obliged  to  entrust  the  defence  of  her  Canadian 
colonies  to  a  mere  handful  of  regulars,  aided 
by  the  local  fencibles.  But  Congress  had 
provided  even  fewer  trained  soldiers,  and 


INTRODUCTION. 


39 


relied  on  the  militia.  The  latter  chiefly  ex- 
ercised their  fighting  abilities  upon  one 
another  in  duelling,  and,  as  a  rule,  were 
afflicted  with  conscientious  scruples  whenever 
it  was  necessary  to  cross  the  frontier  and 
attack  the  enemy.  Accordingly,  the  cam- 
paign opened  with  the  bloodless  surrender  of 
an  American  general  to  a  much  inferior  British 
force,  and  the  war  continued  much  as  it  hadV 
begun;  we  suffered  disgrace  after  disgrace, 
while  the  losses  we  inflicted,  in  turn,  on  Great 
Britain  were  so  slight  as  hardly  to  attract  her 
attention.  At  last,  having  crushed  her  greater  ( 
foe,  she  turned  to  crush  the  lesser,  and,  in  her 
turn,  suffered  ignominious  defeat.  By  this 
time  events  had  gradually  developed  a  small 
number  of  soldiers  on  our  northern  frontier, 
who,  commanded  by  Scott  and  Brown,  were 
able  to  contend  on  equal  terms  with  the 
veteran  troops  to  whom  they  were  opposed, 
though  these  formed  part  of  what  was  then 
undoubtedly  the  most  formidable  fighting 
infantry  any  European  nation  possessed.  The 
battles  at  this  period  of  the  struggle  were 
remarkable  for  the  skill  and  stubborn  courage 
with  which  they  were  waged,  as  well  as  for 
the  heavy  loss  involved ;  but  the  number  of 
combatants  was  so  small  that  in  Europe  they 
would  have  been  regarded  as  mere  outpost 
skirmishes,  and  they  wholly  failed  to  attract 
any  attention  abroad  in  that  period  of  colossal 
armies. 

When  Great  Britain  seriously  turned  her  at- 
tention to  her  transatlantic  foe,  and  assembled 
in  Canada  an  army  of  14,000  men  at  the  head 
of  Lake  Champlain,  Congressional  forethought 


40  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

enabled  it  to  be  opposed  by  soldiers  who,  it  is 
true,  were  as  well  disciplined,  as  hardy,  and 
as  well  commanded  as  any  in  the  world,  but  ^ 
who  were  only  a  few  hundred  strong,  backed 
by  more  or  less  incompetent  militia.  Only 
McDonough's  skill  and  Sir  George  Prevost's 
incapacity  saved  us  from  a  serious  disaster  ; 
the  sea-fight  reflected  high  honor  on  our  sea- 
men, but  the  retreat  of  the  British  land-forces  \ 
was  due  to  their  commander  *and  not  to  their 
antagonists.  Meanwhile  a  large  British  fleet 
in  the  Chesapeake  had  not  achieved  much 
glory  by  the  destruction  of  local  oyster-boats 
and  the  burning  of  a  few  farmers'  houses,  so 
an  army  was  landed  to  strike  a  decisive  blow. 
At  Bladensburg  '  the  five  thousand  British  reg- 
ulars, utterly  worn  out  by  heat  and  fatigue,  by 
their  mere  appearance,  frightened  into  a  panic 
double  their  number  of  American  militia  well 
posted.  But  the  only  success  attained  was 
burning  the  public  buildings  of  Washington, 
and  that  result  was  of  dubious  value.  Balti- 
more was  attacked  next,  and  the  attack  re- 
pulsed, after  the  forts  and  ships  had  shelled 
one  another  with  the  slight  results  that  usually 
attend  that  spectacular  and  harmless  species 
of  warfare. 

.A  The  close  of  the  contest  was  marked  by  the  <r* 
extraordinary  battle  of  New  Orleans.  It  was 
a  perfectly  useless  shedding  of  blood,  since 
peace  had  already  been  declared.  There  is 
hardly  another  contest  of  modern  times  where 
the  defeated  side  suffered  such  frightful  car- 
nage, while  the  victors  came  off  almost  scathe- 

1  See  the  "  Capture  of  Washington,"  by  Edward  D. 
Ingraham  (Philadelphia,  1849). 


INTRODUCTION.  41 

less.  It  is  quite  in  accordance  with  the  rest 
of  the  war  that  the  militia,  hitherto  worse  than 
useless,  should  on  this  occasion  win  against 
great  odds  in  point  of  numbers  ;  and,  more- 
over, that  their  splendid  victory  should  have 
been  of  little  consequence  in  its  effects  upon 
the  result.  On  the  whole,  the  contest  by  land, 
where  we  certainly  ought  to  have  been  suc- 
cessful, reflected  greater  credit  on  our  antag- 
onists than  upon  us,  in  spite  of  the  services  of 
Scott,  Brown,  and  Jackson.  Our  small  force 
of  regulars  and  volunteers  did  excellently ;  as^ 
for  the  militia,  New  Orleans  proved  that  they 
could  fight  superbly ;  and  the  other  battles  that 
they  generally  would  not  fight  at  all. 

At  sea,  as  will  appear,  the  circumstances 
were  widely  different.     Here  we  possessed  a 
small  but  highly  effective  force,  the  ships  well  ,1 
built,  manned  by  thoroughly  trained  men,  and  \ 
commanded  by  able  and  experienced  officers. 
The  deeds  of  our  navy  form  a  part  of  history 
over  which  any  American  can  be  pardoned  for 
lingering. 

Such  was  the  origin,  issue,  and  general 
character  of  the  war.  It  may  now  be  well  to 
proceed  to  a  comparison  of  the  authorities  on 
the  subject.  Allusion  has  already  been  made 
to  them  in  the  preface,  but  a  fuller  reference 
seems  to  be  necessary  in  this  connection. 

At  the  close  of  the  contest,  the  large  major- 
ity of  historians  who  wrote  of  it  were  so  bit- 
terly rancorous  that  their  statements  must  be 
received  with  caution.  For  the  main  facts  I 
have  relied  wherever  it  was  practicable,  upon 
the  official  letters  of  the  commanding  officers, 


42  '  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

taking  each  as  authority  for  his  own  force  and 
loss. l  For  all  the  British  victories  we  have 
British  official  letters,  which  tally  almost  ex- 
actly, as  regards  matters  of  fact  and  not  of 
opinion,  with  the  corresponding  American 
accounts.  For  the  first  year  the  British  also 
published  official  accounts  of  their  defeats, 
which  in  the  cases  of  the  Guerriere,  Macedo- 
nian and  Frolic,  I  have  followed  as  closely  as 
the  accounts  of  the  American  victors.  The 
last  British  official  letter  published  announc- 
ing a  defeat  was  that  in  the  case  of  \htjava, 
and  it  is  the  only  letter  that  I  have  not  strictly 
accepted.  The  fact  that  no  more  were  pub- 
lished thereafter  is  of  itself  unfortunate ;  and 
from  the  various  contradictions  it  contains  it 
would  appear  to  have  been  tampered  with. 
The  surgeon's  report  accompanying  it  is  cer- 
tainly false.  Subsequent  to  1812  no  letter  of 
a  defeated  British  commander  was  published,2 
and  I  have  to  depend  upon  the  various  British 
historians,  especially  James,  of  whom  more 
anon. 

The  American  and  British  historians  from 
whom  we  are  thus  at  times  forced  to  draw  our 
material  regard  the  war  from  very  different 

1  As  where  Broke  states  his  own  force  at  330,  his  an- 
tagonists at  440,  and  the  American  court  of  inquiry 
makes  the  numbers  396  and  379,  I  have  taken  them  as 
being  330  and  379  respectively.    This  is  the  only  just 
method ;  I  take  it  for  granted  that  each  commander 
meant  to  tell  the  truth,  and  of  course  knew  his  own 
force,  while  he  might  very  naturally  and  in  perfect  good 
faith  exaggerate  his  antagonist's. 

2  Except  about  the  battles  on  the  Lakes,  where  I 
have  accordingly  given  the  same  credit  to  the  accounts 
both  of  the  British  and  of  the  Americans. 


INTRODUCTION.  43 

standpoints,  and  their  accounts  generally  dif- 
fer. Each  writer  naturally  so  colored  the  af- 
fair as  to  have  it  appear  favorable  to  his  own 
side.  Sometimes  this  was  done  intentionally 
and  sometimes  not.  Not  unfrequently  errors 
are  made  against  the  historian's  own  side  ;  as 
when  the  British  author,  Brenton,  says  that 
the  British  brig  Peacock  mounted  32'$  instead 
of  24'$,  while  Lossing  in  his  "  Field  Book  of 
thg  War  of  1812  "makes  the  same  mistake 
about  the  armament  of  the  American  brig 
Argiis.  Errors  of  this  description  are,  of 
course,  as  carefully  to  be  guarded  against  as 
any  others.  Mere  hearsay  reports,  such  as 
"  it  has  been  said,"  "a  prisoner  on  board  the 
opposing  fleet  has  observed,"  "an  American 
(or  British)  newspaper  of  such  and  such  a  date 
has  remarked,"  are  of  course  to  be  rejected. 
There  is  a  curious  parallelism  in  the  errors  on 
both  sides.  For  example,  the  American,  Mr. 
Low,  writing  in  1813,  tells  how  the  Constitu- 
tion, 44,  captured  the  Guerriere  of  49  guns, 
while  the  British  Lieutenant  Low,  writing  in 
1880,  tells  how  the  Pelican,  18,  captured  the 
Argus  of  20  guns.  Each  records  the  truth 
but  not  the  whole  truth,  for  although  rating  44 
and  1 8  the  victors  carried  respectively  54  and 
21  guns,  of  heavier  metal  than  those  of  their 
antagonists.  Such  errors  are  generally  inten- 
tional. Similarly,  most  American  writers  men- 
tion the  actions  in  which  the  privateers  were 
victorious,  but  do  not  mention  those  in  which 
they  were  defeated;  while  the  British,  in  turn, 
record  every  successful  "  cutting-out  "  expedi- 
tion, but  ignore  entirely  those  which  termi- 
nated unfavorably.  Other  errors  arise  from 


44  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

honest  ignorance.  Thus,  James  in  speaking 
of  the  repulse  of  the  Endymiorfs  boats  by  the 
Neufchatel  gives  the  latter  a  crew  of  120  men ; 
she  had  more  than  this  number  originally,  but 
only  40  were  in  her  at  the  time  of  the  attack. 
So  also  when  the  captain  of  the  Pelican  writes 
that  the  officers  of  the  Argus  report  her  loss 
at  40,  when  they  really  reported  it  at  24  or 
when  Captain  Dacres  thought  the  Constittttion 
had  lost  about  20  men  instead  of  14.  The 
American  gun-boat  captains  in  recounting  their 
engagements  with  the  British  frigates  invariably 
greatly  overestimated  the  loss  of  the  latter. 
So  that  on  both  sides  there  were  some  inten- 
tional misstatements  or  garblings,  and  a  much 
more  numerous  class  of  simple  blunders,  aris- 
ing largely  from  an  incapacity  for  seeing  more 
than  one  side  of  the  question. 

Among  the  early  British  writers  upon  this 
war,  the  ablest  was  James.  He  devoted  one 
work,  his  "  Naval  Occurrences,"  entirely  to 
it ;  and  it  occupies  the  largest  part  of  the 
sixth  volume  of  his  more  extensive  "  History 
of  the  British  Navy."1  Two  other  British 
writers,  Lieutenant  Marshall2  and  Captain 
Brenton,8  wrote  histories  of  the  same  events, 
about  the  same  time ;  but  neither  of  these 
naval  officers  produced  half  as  valuable  a 
work  as  did  the  civilian  James.  Marshall 
wrote  a  dozen  volumes,  each  filled  with  several 
scores  of  dreary  panegyrics,  or  memoirs  of  as 

1  A  new  edition,  London,  $26. 

2  "  Royal  Naval  Biography,"  by  John  Marshall  (Lon- 
don, 1823-1835). 

"Naval  History  of  Great  Britain,"  by  Edward 
Pelham  Brenton  (new  edition,  London,  1837). 


INTRODUCTION.  45 

many  different  officers.  There  is  no  attempt  at 
order,  hardly  anything  about  the  ships,  guns, 
or  composition  of  the  crews  ;  and  not  even 
the  pretence  of  giving  both  sides,  the  object 
being  to  make  every  Englishman  appear  in 
his  best  light.  The  work  is  analogous  to  the 
numerous  lives  of  Decatur,  Bainbridge,  Porter, 
etc.,  that  appeared  in  the  United  States  about 
the  same  time,  and  is  quite  as  untrustworthy. 
Brenton  made  a  far  better  and  very  interest- 
ing book,  written  on  a  good  and  well-con- 
nected plan,  and  apparently  with  a  sincere 
desire  to  tell  the  truth.  He  accepts  the  Brit- 
ish official  accounts  as  needing  nothing  what- 
ever to  supplement  them,  precisely  as  Cooper 
accepts  the  American  officials'.  A  more  se- 
rious fault  is  his  inability  to  be  accurate. 
That  this  inaccuracy  is  not  intentional  is 
proved  by  the  fact  that  it  tells  as  often  against 
his  own  side  as  against  his  opponents.  He 
says,  for  example,  that  the  guns  of  Perry's  and 
Barclay's  squadrons  "were  about  equal  in 
number  and  weight,"  that  the  Peacock  (Brit- 
ish) was  armed  with  32*3  instead  of  24's,  and 
underestimates  the  force  of  the  second  Wasp. 
But  the  blunders  are  quite  as  bad  when  dis- 
tributed as  when  confined  to  one  side ;  in  ad- 
dition, Brenton's  disregard  of  all  details  makes 
him  of  but  little  use. 

James,  as  already  said,  is  by  far  the  most 
valuable  authority  on  the  war,  as  regards 
purely  British  affairs.  He  enters  minutely 
into  details,  and  has  evidently  laboriously 
hunted  up  his  authorities.  He  has  examined 
the  ships'  logs,  the  Admiralty  reports,  various 
treaties,  all  the  Gazette  reports,  gives  very 


46  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

well-chosen  extracts,  has  arranged  his  work 
in  chronological  order,  discriminates  between 
the  officers  that  deserve  praise  and  those  that 
deserve  blame,  and  in  fact  writes  a  work  which 
ought  to  be*  consulted  by  every  student  of 
naval  affairs.  But  he  is  unfortunately  afflicted 
with  a  hatred  toward  the  Americans  that 
amounts  to  a  monomania.  He  wishes  to  make 
out  as  strong  a  case  as  possible  against  them. 
The  animus  of  his  work  may  be  gathered  from 
the  not  over  complimentary  account  of  the 
education  of  the  youthful  seafaring  American, 
which  can  be  found  in  vol.  vi,  p.  113,  of  his 
"  History."  On  page  153  he  asserts  that  he 
is  an  "  impartial  Historian " ;  and  about 
three  lines  before  mentions  that  "  it  may  suit 
the  Americans  to  invent  any  falsehood,  no 
matter  how  barefaced,  to  foist  a  valiant  char- 
acter on  themselves."  On  page  419  he  says 
that  Captain  Porter  is  to  be  believed,  "  so  far 
as  is  borne  out  by  proof  (the  only  safe  way 
where  an  American  is  concerned)," — which 
somewhat  sweeping  denunciation  of  the  ve- 
racity of  all  of  Captain  Porter's  compatriots 
would  seem  to  indicate  that  James  was  not, 
perhaps,  in  that  dispassionate  frame  of  mind 
best  suited  for  writing  history.  That  he 
should  be  biassed  against  individual  captains 
can  be  understood,  but  when  he  makes  rabid 
onslaughts  upon  the  American  people  as  a 
whole,  he  renders  it  difficult  for  an  American, 
at  any  rate,  to  put  implicit  credence  in  him. 
His  statements  are  all  the  harder  to  confute 
when  they  are  erroneous,  because  they  are 
intentionally  so.  It  is  not,  as  with  Brenton 
and  Marshal],  because  he  really  thinks  a  Brit- 


INTRODUCTION.  47 

ish  captain  cannot be  beaten,  except  by  some 
kind  of  distorted  special  providence,  for  no 
man  says  worse  things  than  he  does  about 
certain  officers  and  crews.  A  writer  of  James' 
undoubted  ability  must  have  known  perfectly 
well  that  his  statements  were  untrue  in  many 
instances,  as  where  he  garbles  Hilyar's  ac- 
count of  Porter's  loss,  or  misstates  the  com- 
parative force  of  the  fleets  on  Lake  Cham- 
plain. 

When  he  says  (p.  194)  that  Captain  Bain- 
bridge  wished  to  run  away  from  the  Java,  and 
would  have  done  so  if  he  had  not  been  with- 
held by  the  advice  of  his  first  lieutenant,  who 
was  a  renegade  Englishman,1  it  is  not  of  much 
consequence  whether  his  making  the  state- 
ment was  due  to  excessive  credulity  or  petty 
meanness,  for,  in  either  case,  whether  the  de- 
fect was  in  his  mind  or  his  morals,  it  is 
enough  to  greatly  impair  the  value  of  his  other 
"facts."  Again,  when  James  (p.  165)  states 
that  Decatur  ran  away  from  the  Macedonian 
until,  by  some  marvellous  optical  delusion,  he 
mistook  her  for  a  32,  he  merely  detracts  a 
good  deal  from  the  worth  of  his  own  account. 
When  the  Americans  adopt  boarding  helmets, 
he  considers  it  as  proving  conclusively  that 
they  are  suffering  from  an  acute  attack  of 
cowardice.  On  p.  122  he  says  that  "  had  the 
President,  when  she  fell  in  with  the  Belvidera, 
been  cruising  alone  *  *  *  Commodore  Rod- 
gers  would  have  magnified  the  British  frigate 
into  a  line-of-battle  ship,  and  have  done  his 
utmost  to  avoid  her,"  which  gives  an  excellent 

1  Who,  by  the  way,  was  Mr.  Parker,  born  in  Virginia, 
and  never  in  England  in  his  life. 


48  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

idea  of  the  weight  to  be  attached  to  the  va- 
rious other  anecdotes  he  relates  of  the  much 
abused  Commodore  Rodgers. 

But  it  must  always  be  remembered  that  un- 
trustworthy as  James  is  in  anything  referring 
purely  to  the  Americans,  he  is  no  worse  than 
his  compeers  of  both  nationalities.  The  mis- 
statements  of  Niles  in  his  "  Weekly  Register  " 
about  the  British  are  quite  as  flagrant,  and  his 
information  about  his  own  side  even  more 
valuable.1  Every  little  American  author 
crowed  over  Perry's  "  Nelsonic  victory  over  a 
greatly  superior  force."  The  Constitution 
was  declared  to  have  been  at  a  disadvantage 
when  she  fought  the  Guerriere,  and  so  on  ad 
infinitum.  But  these  writers  have  all  faded 
into  oblivion,  and  their  writings  are  not  even 
referred  to,  much  less  believed.  James,  on 
the  contrary,  has  passed  through  edition  after 
edition,  is  considered  as  unquestionable  au- 
thority in  his  own  country,  and  largely  through- 
out Europe,  and  has  furnished  the  basis  for 
every  subsequent  account  by  British  authors. 
From  Alison  to  Lieutenant  Low,  almost  every 
English  work,  whether  of  a  popular  character 

1  In  Niles,  by  the  way,  can  be  found  excellent  exam- 
ples of  the  traditional  American  "spread-eagle  "  style. 
in  one  place  I  remember  his  describing  "The  Immor- 
tal Rodgers,"  baulked  of  his  natural  prey,  the  British, 
as  "  soaring  about  like  the  bold  bald  eagle  of  his  native 
land,"  seeking  whom  he  might  devour.  The  accounts 
he  gives  of  British  line-of-battle  ships  fleeing  from 
American  44*3  quite  match  James'  anecdotes  of  the 
latter's  avoidance  of  British  38*5  and  36'*  for  fear  they 
might  mount  twenty-four-pounders.  The  two  works 
taken  together  give  a  very  good  idea  of  the  war ;  separ- 
ately, either  is  utterly  unreliable,  especially  in  matters 
of  opinion. 


INTRODUCTION.  49 

or  not,  is,  in  so  far  as  it  touches  on  the  war, 
simply  a  "  rehash  "  of  the  works  written  by 
James.  The  consequence  is  that  the  British 
and  American  accounts  have  astonishingly 
little  resemblance.  One  ascribes  the  capture 
of  the  British  frigates  simply  to  the  fact  that 
their  opponents  were  "  cut  down  line-of-battle 
ships  "  ;  the  other  gives  all  the  glory  to  the 
"undaunted  heroism,"  etc.,  of  the  Yankee 
sailors. 

One  not  very  creditable  trait  of  the  early 
American  naval  historians  gave  their  rivals  a 
great  advantage.  The  object  of  the  former 
was  to  make  out  that  the  Constitution,  for  ex- 
ample, won  her  victories  against  an  equal  foe, 
and  an  exact  statement  of  the  forces  showed 
the  contrary  ;  so  they  always  avoided  figures, 
and  thus  left  the  ground  clear  for  James*  care- 
ful misstatements.  Even  when  they  criticised 
him  they  never  went  into  details,  confining 
themselves  to  some  remark  about  "  hurling" 
his  figures  in  his  face  with  "  loathing."  Even 
Cooper,  interesting  though  his  work  is,  has 
gone  far  less  into  figures  than  he  should,  and 
seems  to  have  paid  little  if  any  attention  to  the 
British  official  statements,  which  of  course 
should  be  received  as  of  equal  weight  with  the 
American.  His  comments  on  the  actions  are 
generally  very  fair,  the  book  never  being  dis- 
figured by  bitterness  toward  the  British  ;  but 
he  is  certainly  wrong,  for  example,  in  ascrib- 
ing the  loss  of  the  Chesapeake  solely  to  accident, 
that  of  the  Argus  solely  to  her  inferiority  in 
force,  and  so  on.  His  disposition  to  praise 
all  the  American  commanders  may  be  generous 
but  is  nevertheless  unjust.  If  Decatur's  sur- 


50  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812- 

render  of  the  President  is  at  least  impliedly 
praised,  then  Porter's  defence  of  the  Essex  can 
hardly  receive  its  just  award.  There  is  no 
weight  in  the  commendation  bestowed  upon 
Hull,  if  commendation,  the  same  in  kind 
though  less  in  degree,  is  bestowed  upon  Rod- 
gers.  It  is  a  great  pity  that  Cooper  did  not 
write  a  criticism  on  James,  for  no  one  could 
have  done  it  more  thoroughly.  But  he  never 
mentions  him,  except  once  in  speaking  of  Bar- 
clay's fleet.  In  all  probability  this  silence 
arose  from  sheer  contempt,  and  the  certainty 
that  most  of  James'  remarks  were  false  ;  but 
the  effect  was  that  very  many  foreigners  believe 
him  to  have  shirked  the  subject.  He  rarely 
gives  any  data  by  which  the  statements  of 
James  can  be  disproved,  and  it  is  for  this 
reason  that  I  have  been  obliged  to  criticise  the 
latter's  work  very  fully.  Many  of  James'  re- 
marks, however,  defy  criticism  from  their  ran- 
dom nature,  as  when  he  states  that  American 
midshipmen  were  chiefly  masters  and  mates 
of  merchantmen,  and  does  not  give  a  single 
proof  to  support  the  assertion.  It  would  be 
nearly  as  true  to  assert  that  the  British  mid- 
shipmen were  for  the  most  part  ex-members 
of  the  prize-ring,  and  as  much  labor  would  be 
needed  to  disprove  it.  In  other  instances  it 
is  quite  enough  to  let  his  words  speak  for  them- 
selves, as  where  he  says  (p.  155)  that  of  the 
American  sailors  one  third  in  number  and  one 
half  in  point  of  effectiveness  were  in  reality 
British.  That  is,  of  the  450  men  the  Consti- 
tution had  when  she  fought  i\itjava  150  were 
British,  and  the  remaining  300  could  have 
been  as  effectively  replaced  by  150  more  Brit- 


INTRO  D  uc  TION:  5 1 

ish.  So  a  very  little  logic  works  out  a  result 
that  James  certainly  did  not  intend  to  arrive 
at ;  namely,  that  300  British  led  by  American 
officers  could  beat,  with  ease  and  comparative 
impunity,  400  British  led  by  their  own  officers. 
He  also  forgets  that  the  whole  consists  of  the 
sum  of  the  parts.  He  accounts  for  the  victories 
of  the  Americans  by  stating  (p.  280)  that  they 
were  lucky  enough  to  meet  with  frigates  and 
brigs  who  had  unskilful  gunners  or  worthless 
crews  ;  he  also  carefully  shows  that  the  Mace- 
donian was  incompetently  handled, the  Peacock 
commanded  by  a  mere  martinet,  the  Alton's 
crew  unpractised  at  the  guns,  the  Epervier's 
mutinous  and  cowardly,  the  Penguin's  weak 
and  unskilful,  \htjavas  exceedingly  poor,  and 
more  to  the  same  effect.  Now  the  Americans 
took  in  single  fight  three  frigates  and  seven 
sloops,  and  when  as  many  as  ten  vessels  are 
met  it  is  exceedingly  probable  that  they  rep- 
resent the  fair  average  ;  so  that  James'  stric- 
tures, so  far  as  true,  simply  show  that  the 
average  British  ship  was  very  apt  to  possess, 
comparatively  speaking,  an  incompetent  cap- 
tain or  unskilful  crew.  These  disadvantages 
were  not  felt  when  opposed  to  navies  in 
which  they  existed  to  an  even  greater  extent, 
but  became  very  apparent  when  brought  into 
contact  with  a  power  whose  few  officers  knew 
how  to  play  their  own  parts  very  nearly  to 
perfection,  and,  something  equally  important, 
knew  how  to  make  first-rate  crews  out  of  what 
was  already  good  raw  material.  Finally,  a 
large  proportion  of  James'  abuse  of  the  Amer- 
icans sufficiently  refutes  itself,  and  perhaps 
Cooper's  method  of  contemptuously  disregard- 


52  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

ing  him  was  the  best ;  but  no  harm  can  follow 
from  devoting  a  little  space  to  commenting 
upon  him. 

Much  the  best  American  work  is  Lieutenant 
George  E.  Emmons'  statistical  "  History  of 
the  United  States  Navy."  Unfortunately  it  is 
merely  a  mass  of  excellently  arranged  and 
classified  statistics,  and  while  of  invaluable 
importance  to  the  student,  is  not  interesting 
to  the  average  reader.  Almost  all  the  state- 
ments I  have  made  of  the  force,  tonnage,  and 
armament  of  the  American  vessels,  though  I 
have  whenever  practicable  taken  them  from 
the  Naval  Records,  etc.,  yet  could  be  just  as 
well  quoted  from  Emmons.  Copies  of  most 
of  the  American  official  letters  which  I  have 
quoted  can  be  found  in  "  Niles'  Register," 
volumes  i  to  10,  and  all  of  the  British  ones  in 
the  "London  Naval  Chronicle"  for  the  same 
years.  It  is  to  these  two  authorities  that  I 
am  most  indebted,  and  nearly  as  much  so  to 
the  "  American  State  Papers,"  vol.  xiv.  Next 
in  order  come  Emmons,  Cooper,  and  the  in- 
valuable, albeit  somewhat  scurrilous,  James  ; 
and  a  great  many  others  whose  names  I  have 
quoted  in  their  proper  places.  In  commenting 
upon  the  actions  I  have,  whenever  possible, 
drawn  from  some  standard  work,  such  as  Ju- 
rien  de  la  Graviere's  "  Guerres  Maritimes," 
Lord  Howard  Douglass'  "Naval  Gunnery," 
or,  better  still,  from  the  lives  and  memoirs  of 
Admirals  Farragut,  Codrington,  Broke,  or 
Durham.  The  titles  of  the  various  works  will 
be  found  given  in  full  as  they  are  referred  to.1 

1  To  get  an  idea  of  the  American  seamen  of  that 
time  Cooler's  novels,  "  Miles  Wallingford,"  "  Home  as 


INTRODUCTION.  53 

In  a  few  cases,  where  extreme  accuracy  was 
necessary,  or  where,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
President's  capture,  it  was  desirable  that  there 
should  be  no  room  for  dispute  as  to  the  facts. 
I  have  given  the  authority  for  each  sentence ; 
but  in  general  this  would  be  too  cumbersome, 
and  so  I  have  confined  myself  to  referring,  at 
or  near  the  beginning  of  the  account  of  each 
action,  to  the  authorities  from  whom  I  have 
taken  it.  For  the  less  important  facts  on 
which  every  one  is  agreed  I  have  often  given 
no  references. 

Found,"  and  the  "  Pilot,"  are  far  better  than  any  his- 
tory ;  in  the  "  Two  Admirals  "  the  description  of  the 
fleet  manoeuvring  is  unrivalled.  His  view  of  Jack's 
life  is  rather  rose-colored  however.  "  Tom  Cringle's 
log  "  ought  to  be  read  for  the  information  it  gives, 
Marryatt's  novels  will  show  some  of  the  darker  aspects 
of  sailor  life. 


54 


NAVAL  WAR  OF 


CHAPTER  II. 

Overwhelming  naval  supremacy  of  England  when 
America  declared  war  against  her — Race  identity  of  the 
combatants — The  American  navy  at  the  beginning  of 
the  war — Officers  well  trained — Causes  tending  to 
make  our  seamen  especially  efficient — Close  similarity 
between  the  British  and  American  sailors — Our  ships 
manned  chiefly  by  native  Americans,  many  of  whom 
had  formerly  been  impressed  into  the  British  navy — 
Quotas  of  seamen  contributed  by  the  different  States 
— Navy  yards — Lists  of  officers  and  men — List  of 
vessels — Tonnage — Different  ways  of  estimating  it  in 
Britain  and  America — Ratings — American  ships  prop- 
erly rated — Armaments  ol  the  frigates  and  corvettes — 
Three  styles  of  guns  used — Difference  between  long 
guns  and  carronades — Short  weight  of  American  shot 
— Comparison  of  British  frigates  rating  38,  and  Ameri- 
can frigates  rating  44  guns — Compared  with  a  74. 

DURING  the  early  years  of  this  century 
England's  naval  power  stood  at  a  height 
never  reached  before  or  since  by  that  of  any 
other  nation.  On  every  sea  her  navies  rode, 
not  only  triumphant,  but  with  none  to  dispute 
their  sway.  The  island  folk  had  long  claimed 
the  mastery  of  the  ocean,  and  they  had 
certainly  succeeded  in  making  their  claim  com- 
pletely good  during  the  time  of  bloody  warfare 
that  followed  the  breaking  out  of  the  French 
Revolution.  Since  the  year  1792  each  Euro- 
pean nation,  in  turn,  had  learned  to  feel  bitter 
dread  of  the  weight  of  England's  hand.  In 
the  Baltic,  Sir  Samuel  Hood  had  taught  the 
Russians  that  they  must  needs  keep  in  port 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  55 

when  the  English  cruisers  were  in  the  offing. 
The  descendants  of  the  Vikings  had  seen 
their  whole  navy  destroyed  at  Copenhagen. 
No  Dutch  fleet  ever  put  out  after  the  day 
when,  off  Camperdown,  Lord  Duncan  took 
possession  of  De  Winter's  shattered  ships. 
But  a  few  years  before  1812,  the  greatest  sea- 
fighter  of  all  time  had  died  in  Trafalgar  Bay, 
and  in  dying  had  crumbled  to  pieces  the 
navies  of  France  and  of  Spain. 

From  that  day  England's  task  was  but  to  keep 
in  port  such  of  her  foes'  vessels  as  she  had 
not  destroyed.  France  alone  still  possessed 
fleets  that  could  be  rendered  formidable,  and 
so,  from  the  Scheldt  to  Toulon,  her  harbors 
were  watched  and  her  coasts  harried  by  the 
blockading  squadrons  of  the  English.  Else- 
where the  latter  had  no  fear  of  their  power 
being  seriously  assailed  ;  but  their  vast  com- 
merce and  numerous  colonies  needed  cease- 
less protection.  Accordingly  in  every  sea 
their  cruisers  could  be  found,  of  all  sizes, 
from  the  stately  ship-of-the-line,  with  her  tiers 
of  heavy  cannon  and  her  many  hundreds  of 
men,  down  to  the  little  cutter  carrying  but  a 
score  of  souls  and  a  couple  of  light  guns. 
All  these  cruisers,  but  especially  those  of  the 
lesser  rates,  were  continually  brought  into  con- 
tact with  such  of  the  hostile  vessels  as  had 
run  through  the  blockade,  or  were  too  small 
to  be  affected  by  it.  French  and  Italian 
frigates  were  often  fought  and  captured  when 
they  were  skirting  their  own  coasts,  or  had 
started  off  on  a  plundering  cruise  through  the 
Atlantic,  or  to  the  Indian  Ocean  ;  and  though 
the  Danes  had  lost  their  larger  ships  they 


5  6  NAVAL  WAR  OF  181 

kept  up  a  spirited  warfare  with  brigs  and  gun- 
boats. So  the  English  marine  was  in  constant 
exercise,  attended  with  almost  invariable 
success. 

Such  was  Great  Britain's  naval  power  when 
the  Congress  of  the  United  States  declared 
war  upon  her.  While  she  could  number  her 
thousand  sail,  the  American  navy  included  but 
half  a  dozen  frigates,  and  six  or  eight  sloops 
and  brigs  ;  and  it  is  small  matter  for  surprise 
that  the  British  officers  should  have  regarded 
their  new  foe  with  contemptuous  indifference. 
Hitherto  the  American  seamen  had  never 
been  heard  of  except  in  connection  with  two 
or  three  engagements  with  French  frigates, 
and  some  obscure  skirmishes  against  the 
Moors  of  Tripoli ;  none  of  which  could  pos- 
sibly attract  attention  in  the  years  that  saw 
Aboukir,  Copenhagen,  and  Trafalgar.  And 
yet  these  same  petty  wars  were  the  school 
which  raised  our  marines  to  the  highest 
standard  of  excellence.  A  continuous  course 
of  victory,  won  mainly  by  seamanship,  had 
made  the  English  sailor  overweeningly  self- 
confident,  and  caused  him  to  pay  but  little 
regard  to  manoeuvring  or  even  to  gunnery. 
Meanwhile  the  American  learned,  by  receiv- 
ing hard  knocks,  how  to  give  them,  and\ 
belonged  to  a  service  too  young  to  feel  an 
over-confidence  in  itself.  One  side  had  let  its 
training  relax,  while  the  other  had  carried  it 
to  the  highest  possible  point.  Hence  our 
ships  proved,  on  the  whole,  victorious  in  the 
apparently  unequal  struggle,  and  the  men  who 
had  conquered  the  best  seamen  of  Europe 
were  now  in  turn  obliged  to  succumb.  Com-  " 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812-  57 

pared  with  the  great  naval  battles  of  the  pre- 
ceding few  years,  our  bloodiest  conflicts  were 
mere  skirmishes,  but  they  were  skirmishes 
between  the  hitherto  acknowledged  kings  of 
the  ocean,  and  new  men  who  yet  proved  to  be 
more  than  their  equals.  For  over  a  hundred 
years,  or  since  the  time  when  they  had  con- 
tended on  equal  terms  with  the  great  Dutch 
admirals,  the  British  had  shown  a  decided 
superiority  to  their  various  foes,  and  during 
the  latter  quarter  of  the  time  this  superiority, 
as  already  said,  was  very  marked,  indeed  ;  in 
consequence,  the  victories  of  the  new  enemy 
attracted  an  amount  of  attention  altogether 
disproportionate  to  their  material  effects. 
And  it  is  a  curious  fact  that  our  little  navy, 
in  which  the  art  of  handling  and  righting  the 
old  broadside,  sailing  frigate  in  single  conflict 
was  brought  to  the  highest  point  of  perfection 
ever  reached,  that  this  same  navy  should 
have  contained  the  first  representative  of  the 
modern  war  steamer,  and  also  the  torpedo — 
the  two  terrible  engines  which  were  to  drive 
from  the  ocean  the  very  white-winged  craft 
that  had  first  won  honor  for  the  starry  flag. 
The  tactical  skill  of  Hull  or  Decatur  is  now 
of  merely  archaic  interest,  and  has  but  little 
more  bearing  on  the  manoeuvring  of  a  modern 
fleet  than  have  the  tactics  of  the  Athenian 
gallies.  But  the  war  still  conveys  some  most 
practical  lessons  as  to  the  value  of  efficient 
ships  and,  above  all,  of  efficient  men  in  them. 
Had  we  only  possessed  the  miserable  gun- 
boats, our  men  could  have  done  nothing  ;  had 
we  not  possessed  good  men,  the  heavy  frigates 
would  have  availed  us  little.  Poor  ships  and 


S8  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

impotent  artillery  had  lost  the  Dutch  almost 
their  entire  navy  ;  fine  ships  and  heavy  cannon 
had  not  saved  the  French  and  Spanish  from 
the  like  fate.  We  owed  our  success  to  putting 
sailors  even  better  than  the  Dutch  on  ships 
even  finer  than  those  built  by  the  two  Latin 
seaboard  powers. 

The  first  point  to  be  remembered  in  order 
to  write  a  fair  account  of  this  war  is  that  the  » 
difference  in  fighting  skill,  which  certainly 
existed  between  the  two  parties,  was  due 
mainly  to  training,  and  not  to  the  nature  of 
the  men.  It  seems  certain  that  the  American 
had  in  the  beginning  somewhat  the  advan- 
tage, because  his  surroundings,  partly  physical 
and  partly  social  and  political,  had  forced 
him  into  habits  of  greater  self-reliance. 
Therefore,  on  the  average,  he  offered  rather 
the  best  material  to  start  with  ;  but  the  differ- 
ence was  very  slight,  and  totally  disappeared 
under  good  training.  The  combatants  were 
men  of  the  same  race,  differing  but  little  from 
one  another.  On  the  New  England  coast  the 
English  blood  was  as  pure  as  in  any  part  of 
Britain  ;  in  New  York  and  New  Jersey  it  was 
mixed  with  that  of  the  Dutch  settlers — and 
the  Dutch  are  by  race  nearer  to  the  true  old 
English  of  Alfred  and  Harold  than  are,  for 
example,  the  thoroughly  anglicized  Welsh  of 
Cornwall.  Otherwise,  the  infusion  of  new 
blood  into  the  English  race  on  this  side  of 
the  Atlantic  has  been  chiefly  from  three 
sources — German,  Irish,  and  Norse;  and 
these  three  sources  represent  the  elemental 
parts  of  the  composite  English  stock  in  about 
the  same  proportions  in  which  they  were 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  59 

originally  combined,  —  mainly  Teutonic, 
largely  Celtic,  and  with  a  Scandinavian  ad- 
mixture. The  descendant  of  the  German  be- 
comes as  much  an  Anglo-American  as  the 
descendant  of  the  Strathclyde  Celt  has  already 
become  an  Anglo-Briton.  Looking  through 
names  of  the  combatants  it  would  be  difficult 
to  find  any  of  one  navy  that  could  not  be 
matched  in  the  other — Hull  or  Lawrence, 
Allen  Perry,  or  Stewart.  And  among  all  the 
English  names  on  both  sides  will  be  found 
many  Scotch,  Irish,  or  Welsh — McDonough, 
O'Brien,  or  Jones.  Still  stranger  ones  ap- 
pear :  the  Huguenot  Tattnall  is  one  among 
the  American  defenders  of  the  Constellation, 
and  another  Huguenot  Tattnall  is  among  the 
British  assailants  at  Lake  Borgne.  It  must 
always  be  kept  in  mind  that  the  Americans 
and  the  British  are  two  substantially  similar 
branches  of  the  great  English  race,  which 
both  before  and  after  their  separation  have 
assimilated,  and  made  Englishmen  of  many 
other  peoples.1  The  lessons  taught  by  the 
war  can  hardly  be  learned  unless  this  identity 
is  kept  in  mind.2 

1  The  inhabitants  of  Great  Britain  are  best  designated 
as  "  British  " — English  being  either  too  narrow  or  too 
broad  a  term,  in  one  case  meaning  the  inhabitants  of 
but  a  part  of  Britain,  and  in  the  other  the  whole  Anglo- 
Saxon  people. 

2  It  was  practically  a  civil  war,  and  was  waged  with 
much  harshness  and  bitterness  on  both  sides.     I  have 
already  spoken   of   the   numerous  grievances  of  the 
Americans ;    the    British,   in    turn,    looked   upon   our 
blockade-runners  which  entered  the  French  ports  ex- 
actly as   we    regarded,   at   a  later    date,  the  British 
steamers  that  ran  into  Wilmington   and  Charleston. 
It  is  curious  to  see  how  illogical  writers  are.    The 


60  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.    , 

To  understand  aright  the  efficiency  of  our 
navy,  it  is  necessary  to  take  a  brief  look  at 
the  character  and  antecedents  of  the  officers 
and  men  who  served  in  it. 

When  war  broke  out  the  United  States  Navy 
was  but  a  few  years  old,  yet  it  already  had 
a  far  from  dishonorable  history.  The  cap- 
tains  and  lieutenants  of  1812  had  been  taught 
their  duties  in  a  very  practical  school,  and  the 
flag  under  which  they  fought  was  endeared  to 
them  already  by  not  a  few  glorious  traditions 
• — though  these,  perhaps,  like  others  of  their 
kind,  had  lost  none  of  their  glory  in  the  tell- 
ing. A  few  of  the  older  men  had  served  in 
the  war  of  the  Revolution,  and  all  still  kept 
fresh  in  mind  the  doughty  deeds  of  the  old- 
time  privateering  war  craft.  Men  still  talked 
of  Biddle's  daring  cruises  and  Barney's  stub- 
born fights,  or  told  of  Scotch  Paul  and  the 
grim  work  they  had  who  followed  his  fortunes. 
Besides  these  memories  of  an  older  genera- 
tion, most  of  the  officers  had  themselves  taken 
part,  when  younger  in  years  and  rank,  in 
deeds  not  a  whit  less  glorious.  Almost  every 
man  had  had  a  share  in  some  gallant  feat,  to 
which  he,  in  part  at  least,  jowed  his  present 
position.  The  captain  had  perhaps  been  a 
midshipman  under  Truxton  when  he  took  the 
Vengeance,  and  had  been  sent  aboard  the  cap- 
tured French  frigate  with  the  prize-master; 

careers  of  the  Argus  and  Alabama  for  example,  were 
strikingly  similar  in  many  ways,  yet  the  same  writer 
who  speaks  of  one  as  an  "  heroic  little  brig."  will  call 
the  other  a  "  black  pirate."  Of  course  there  can  be 
no  possible  comparison  as  to  the  causes  for  which  the 
two  vessels  were  fighting ;  but  the  cruises  themselves 
were  very  much  alike,  both  in  character  and  history. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  6l 

the  lieutenant  had  borne  a  part  in  the  various 
attacks  on  Tripoli,  and  had  led  his  men  in 
the  desperate  hand-to-hand  fights  in  which 
the  Yankee  cutlass  proved  an  overmatch  for 
the  Turkish  and  Moorish  scimitars.  Nearly 
every  senior  officer  had  extricated  himself  by 
his  own  prowess  or  skill  from  the  dangers  of 
battle  or  storm  ;  he  owed  his  rank  to  the  fact 
that  he  had  proved  worthy  of  it.  Thrown 
upon  his  own  resources,  he  had  learned  self- 
reliance  ;  he  was  a  first-rate  practical  seaman, 
and  prided  himself  on  the  way  his  vessel  was 
handled.  Having  reached  his  rank  by  hard 
work,  and  knowing  what  real  fighting  meant, 
he  was  careful  to  see  that  his  men  were  trained 
in  the  essentials  of  discipline,  and  that  they 
knew  how  to  handle  the  guns  in  battle  as  well 
as  polish  them  in  peace.  Beyond  almost  any 
of  his  countrymen,  he  worshipped  the  "Grid- 
iron Flag,"  and,  having  been  brought  up  in 
the  Navy,  regarded  its  honor  as  his  own.  It 
was,  perhaps,  the  Navy  alone  that  thought 
itself  a  match,  ship  against  ship,  for  Great 
Britain.  The  remainder  of  the  nation  pinned 
its  faith  to  the  army,  or  rather  to  that  weakest 
of  weak  reeds,  the  militia.  The  officers  of 
the  navy,  with  their  strong  esprit  de  corps,  their 
jealousy  of  their  own  name  and  record,  and 
the  knowledge,  by  actual  experience,  that  the 
British  ships  sailed  no  faster  and  were  no 
better  handled  than  their  own,  had  no  desire 
to  shirk  a  conflict  with  any  foe,  and  having 
tried  their  bravery  in  actual  service,  they 
made  it  doubly  formidable  by  cool,  wary  skill. 
Even  the  younger  men,  who  had  never  been 
in  action,  had  been  so  well  trained  by  the 
14-3 


62  NATAL   WAR  OF  18 1 2. 

tried  veterans  over  them  that  the  lack  of  ex- 
perience was  not  sensibly  felt. 

The  sailors  comprising  the  crews  of  our 
ships  were  well  worthy  of  their  leaders. 
There  was  no  better  seaman  in  the  world 
than  American  Jack;  he  had  been  bred  to  his 
•work  from  infancy,  and  had  been  off  in  a  fish- 
ing dory  almost  as  soon  as  he  could  walk. 
When  he  grew  older,  he  shipped  on  a 
merchantman  or  whaler,  and  in  those  warlike 
times,  when  our  large  merchant-marine  was 
compelled  to  rely  pretty  much  on  itself  for 
protection,  each  craft  had  to  be  well  handled ; 
all  who  were  not  were  soon  weeded  out  by 
a  process  of  natural  selection,  of  which  the 
agents  were  French  picaroons,  Spanish 
buccaneers,  and  Malay  pirates.  It  was  a 
rough  school,  but  it  taught  Jack  to  be  both 
skilful  and  self-reliant ;  and  he  was  all  the 
better  fitted  to  become  a  man-of-war's  man, 
because  he  knew  more  about  fire-arms  than 
most  of  his  kind  in  foreign  lands.  At  home 
he  had  used  his  ponderous  ducking  gun  with 
good  effect  on  the  flocks  of  canvasbacks  in 
the  reedy  flats  of  the  Chesapeake,  or  among 
the  sea-coots  in  the  rough  water  off  the  New 
England  cliffs ;  and  when  he  went  on  a  sail- 
ing voyage  the  chances  were  even  that  there 
would  be  some  use  for  the  long  guns  before  he 
returned,  for  the  American  merchant  sailor 
could  trust  to  no  armed  escort. 

The  wonderful  effectiveness  of  our  seamen 
at  the  date  of  which  I  am  writing  as  well  as 
long  subsequently  to  it  was  largely  due  to  the 
curions  condition  of  things  in  Europe.  For 
thirty  years  all  the  European  nations  had 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  63 

been  in  a  state  of  continuous  and  very  com- 
plicated warfare,  during  the  course  of  which 
each  nation  in  turn  fought  almost  every  other, 
England  being  usually  at  loggerheads  with 
all.  One  effect  of  this  was  to  force  an 
enormous  proportion  of  the  carrying  trade  of 
the  world  into  American  bottoms.  The  old 
Massachusetts  town  of  Salem  was  then  one  of 
the  main  depots  of  the  East  India  trade ;  the 
Baltimore  clippers  carried  goods  into  the 
French  and  German  ports  with  small  regard 
to  the  blockade ;  New  Bedford  and  Sag 
Harbor  fitted  out  whalers  for  the  Arctic  seas 
as  well  as  for  the  South  Pacific ;  the  rich 
merchants  of  Philadelphia  and  New  York  sent 
their  ships  to  all  parts  of  the  world  ;  and 
every  small  port  had  some  craft  in  the  coast- 
ing trade.  On  the  New  England  seaboard 
but  few  of  the  boys  would  reach  manhood 
without  having  made  at  least  one  voyage  to  the 
Newfoundland  Banks  after  codfish ;  and  in 
the  whaling  towns  of  Long  Island  it  used  to 
be  an  old  saying  that  no  man  could  marry  till 
he  struck  his  whale.  The  wealthy  merchants 
of  the  large  cities  would  often  send  their  sons 
on  a  voyage  or  two  before  they  let  them  enter 
their  counting-houses.  Thus  it  came  about 
that  a  large  portion  of  our  population  was 
engaged  in  seafaring  pursuits  of  a  nature 
strongly  tending  to  develop  a  resolute  and 
hardy  character  in  the  men  that  followed  them. 
The  British  merchant-men  sailed  in  huge 
convoys,  guarded  by  men-of-war,  while,  as 
said  before,  our  vessels  went  alone,  and  relied 
for  protection  on  themselves.  If  a  fishing 
smack  went  to  the  Banks  it  knew  that  it  ran 


64  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

a  chance  of  falling  in  with  some  not  over- 
scrupulous Nova  Scotian  privateer.  The 
barques  that  sailed  from  Salem  to  the  Spice 
Islands  kept  their  men  well  trained  both  at 
great  guns  and  musketry,  so  as  to  be  able  to 
beat  off  either  Malay  proas,  or  Chinese  junks. 
The  New  York  ships,  loaded  for  the  West 
Indies,  were  prepared  to  do  battle  with  the 
picaroons  that  swarmed  in  the  Spanish  main  ; 
while  the  fast  craft  from  Baltimore  could  fight 
as  well  as  they  could  run.  Wherever  an 
American  seaman  went,  he  not  only  had  to 
contend  with  all  the  legitimate  perils  of  the 
sea,  but  he  had  also  to  regard  almost  every 
stranger  as  a  foe.  Whether  this  foe  called 
himself  pirate  or  privateer  mattered  but  little. 
French,  Spaniards,  Algerines,  Malays,  from 
all  alike  our  commerce  suffered,  and  against 
all,  our  merchants  were  forced  to  defend 
themselves.  The  effect  of  such  a  state  of 
things,  which  made  commerce  so  remunerative 
that  the  bolder  spirits  could  hardly  keep  out 
of  it,  and  so  hazardous  that  only  the  most 
skilful  and  daring  could  succeed  in  it,  was  to 
raise  up  as  fine  a  set  of  seamen  as  ever 
manned  a  navy.  The  stern  school  in  which 
the  American  was  brought  up,  forced  him  into 
hadits  of  independent  thought  and  action 
which  it  was  impossible  that  the  more  pro- 
tected Briton  could  possess.  He  worked 
more  intelligently  and  less  from  routine,  and 
while  perfectly  obedient  and  amenable  to  dis- 
cipline, was  yet  able  to  judge  for  himself  in 
an  emergency.  He  was  more  easily  managed 
than  most  of  his  kind — being  shrewd,  quiet, 
and,  in  fact,  comparatively  speaking,  rather 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  65 

moral  than  otherwise ;  if  he  was  a  New  Eng- 
lander,  when  he  retired  from  a  sea  life  he 
was  not  unapt  to  end  his  days  as  a  deacon. 
Altogether  there  could  not  have  been  better 
material  for  a  fighting  crew  than  cool,  gritty 
American  Jack.  Moreover,  there  was  a  good 
nucleus  of  veterans  to  begin  with,  who  were 
well  fitted  to  fill  the  more  responsible  posi- 
tions, such  as  captains  of  guns,  etc.  These 
were  men  who  had  cruised  in  the  little  Enter- 
Prise  after  French  privateers,  who  had  been 
in  the  Constellation  in  her  two  victorious  fights, 
or  who,  perhaps,  had  followed  Decatur  when 
with  only  eighty  men  he  cut  out  the 
Philadelphia,  manned  by  fivefold  his  force  and 
surrounded  by  hostile  batteries  and  war 
vessels, — one  of  the  boldest  expeditions  of  the 
kind  on  record. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  furthermore,  in  this  con- 
nection, that  by  a  singular  turn  of  fortune, 
Great  Britain,  whose  system  of  impressing 
American  sailors  had  been  one  of  the  chief 
causes  of  the  war,  herself  became,  in  con- 
sequence of  that  very  system,  in  some  sort  a 
nursery  for  the  seamen  of  the  young  Repub- 
lican navy.  The  American  sailor  feared 
nothing  more  than  being  impressed  on  a 
British  ship — dreading  beyond  measure  the 
hard  life  and  cruel  discipline  aboard  of  her  ; 
but  once  there,  he  usually  did  well  enough, 
and  in  course  of  time  often  rose  to  be  of  some 
little  consequence.  For  years  before  1812, 
the  number  of  these  impressed  sailors  was  in 
reality  greater  than  the  entire  number  serving 
in  the  American  navy,  from  which  it  will 
readily  be  seen  that  they  formed  a  good  stock 


66  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

to  draw  upon.  Very  much  to  their  credit, 
they  never  lost  their  devotion  to  the  home  of 
their  birth,  more  than  two  thousand  of  them 
being  imprisoned  at  the  beginning  of  the  war 
because  they  refused  to  serve  against  their 
country.  When  Commodore  Decatur  captured 
the  Macedonian,  that  officer,  as  we  learn  from 
Marshall's  "Naval  Biography"  (ii,  1019), 
stated  that  most  of  the  seamen  of  his  own 
frigate,  the  United  States,  had  served  in 
British  war  vessels,  and  that  some  had  been 
with  Lord  Nelson  in  the  Victory,  and  had  even 
been  bargemen  to  the  great  Admiral, — a 
pretty  sure  proof  that  the  American  sailors 
did  not  show  at  a  disadvantage  when  com- 
pared with  others.1 

Good  seaman  as  the  impressed  American 
proved  to  be,  yet  he  seldom  missed  an  oppor- 
tunity to  escape  from  the  British  service,  by 

1  With  perfect  gravity,  James  and  his  followers  as- 
sume Decatur' s  statement  to  be  equivalent  to  saying 
that  he  had  chiefly  British  seamen  on  board ;  whereas 
even  as  quoted  by  Marshall,  Decatur  merely  said  that 
"  his  seamen  had  served  on  board  a  British  man-of- 
war,"  and  that  some  "  had  served  under  Lord  Nelson." 
Like  the  Constitution,  the  United  States  had  rid  herself 
of  most  of  the  British  subjects  on  board,  before  sailing. 
Decatur's  remark  simply  referred  to  the  number  of  his 
American  seamen  who  had  been  impressed  on  board 
British  ships.  Whenever  James  says  that  an  Ameri- 
can ship  had  a  large  proportion  of  British  sailors 
aboard,  the  explanation  is  that  a  large  number  of  the 
crew  were  Americans  who  had  been  impressed  on 
British  ships.  It  would  be  no  more  absurd  to  claim 
Trafalgar  as  an  American  victory  because  there  was  a 
certain  number  of  Americans  in  Nelson's  fleet,  than  it 
is  to  assert  that  the  Americans  were  victorious  in  1812, 
because  there  were  a  few  renegade  British  on  boanl 
their  ship*, 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  67 

desertion  or  otherwise.  In  the  first  place,  the 
life  was  very  hard,  and,  in  the  second,  the 
American  seaman  was  very  patriotic.  He  had 
an  honest  and  deep  affection  for  his  own  flag, 
while,  on  the  contrary,  he  felt  a  curiously 
strong  hatred  for  England,  as  distinguished 
from  Englishmen.  This  hatred  was  partly  an 
abstract  feeling,  cherished  through  a  vague 
traditional  respect  for  Bunker  Hill,  and  partly 
something  very  real  and  vivid,  owing  to  the 
injuries  he,  and  others  like  him,  had  received. 
Whether  he  lived  in  Maryland  or  Massachu- 
setts, he  certainly  knew  men  whose  ships  had 
been  seized  by  British  cruisers,  their  goods 
confiscated,  and  the  vessels  condemned.  Some 
of  his  friends  had  fallen  victims  to  the  odious 
right  of  search,  and  had  never  been  heard  of 
afterward.  He  had  suffered  many  an  injury 
to  friend,  fortune,  or  person,  and  some  day  he 
hoped  to  repay  them  all ;  and  when  the  war 
did  come,  he  fought  all  the  better  because  he 
knew  it  was  in  his  own  quarrel.  But,  as  I 
have  said,  this  hatred  was  against  England, 
not  against  Englishmen.  Then,  as  now, 
sailors  were  scattered  about  over  the  world 
without  any  great  regard  for  nationality  ;  and 
the  resulting  intermingling  of  natives  and 
foreigners  in  every  mercantile  marine  was  es- 
pecially great  in  those  of  Britain  and  America, 
whose  people  spoke  the  same  tongue  and  wore 
the  same  aspect.  When  chance  drifted  the 
American  into  Liverpool  or  London,  he  was 
ready  enough  to  ship  in  an  Indiaman  or  whaler, 
caring  little  for  the  fact  that  he  served  under 
the  British  flag ;  and  the  Briton,  in  turn,  who 
found  himself  in  New  York  or  Philadelphia, 


68  NA  VAL  WAR  OF  18 1 2. 

willingly  sailed  in  one  of  the  clipper-built 
barques,  whether  it  floated  the  stars  and 
stripes  or  not.  When  Captain  Porter  wrought 
such  havoc  among  the  British  whalers  in  the 
South  Seas,  he  found  that  no  inconsiderable 
portion  of  their  crews  consisted  of  Americans, 
some  of  whom  enlisted  on  board  his  own  ves- 
sel; and  among  the  crews  of  the  American 
whalers  were  many  British.  In  fact,  though 
the  skipper  of  each  ship  might  brag  loudly  of 
his  nationality,  yet  in  practical  life  he  knew 
well  enough  that  there  was  very  little  to  choose 
between  a  Yankee  and  a  Briton.1  Both  were 
bold  and  hardy,  cool  and  intelligent,  quick 
with  their  hands,  and  showing  at  their  best  in 

1  What  choice  there  was,  was  in  favor  of  the  Ameri- 
can. In  point  of  courage  there  was  no  difference  what- 
ever. The  Essex  and  the  Lawrence,  as  well  as  the 
Frolic  and  the  Reindeer,  were  defended  with  the  same 
stubborn,  desperate,  cool  bravery  that  marks  the  Eng- 
lish race  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  But  the  Amer- 
ican was  a  free  citizen,  any  one's  equal,  a  voter  with  a 
personal  interest  in  his  country's  welfare,  and,  above 
all,  without  having  perpetually  before  his  eyes  the  de- 
grading fear  of  the  press-gang.  In  consequence,  he 
was  more  tractable  than  the  Englishman,  more  self-re- 
liant, and  possessed  greater  judgment.  In  the  fight 
between  the  Wasp  and  the  Frolic,  the  latter's  crew  had 
apparently  been  well  trained  at  the  guns,  for  they 
aimed  well ;  but  they  fired  at  the  wrong  time,  and 
never  corrected  the  error  ;  while  their  antagonists,  de- 
livering their  broadsides  far  more  slowly,  by  intelligently 
waiting  until  the  proper  moment,  worked  frightful 
havoc.  But  though  there  was  a  certain  slight  differ- 
ence between  the  seamen  of  the  two  nations,  it  must 
never  be  forgotten  that  it  was  very  much  less  than  that 
between  the  various  individuals  of  the  same  nation ; 
and  when  the  British  had  been  trained  for  a  few  years 
by  such  commanders  as  Broke  and  Manners,  it  was 
impossible  to  surpass  them,  and  it  needed  our  best  men 
to  equal  them. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  69 

an  emergency.  They  looked  alike  and  spoke 
alike ;  when  they  took  the  trouble  to  think, 
they  thought  alike ;  and  when  they  got  drunk, 
which  was  not  an  unfrequent  occurrence,  they 
quarrelled  alike. 

Mingled  with  them  were  a  few  seamen  of 
other  nationalities.  The  Irishman,  if  he  came 
from  the  old  Dano-Irish  towns  of  Waterford, 
Dublin,  and  Wexford,  or  from  the  Ulster 
coast,  was  very  much  like  the  two  chief  com- 
batants ;  the  Celto-Turanian  kern  of  the  west 
did  not  often  appear  on  shipboard.  The 
French,  Danes,  and  Dutch  were  hemmed  in  at 
home ;  they  had  enough  to  do  on  their  own 
sea  board,  and  could  not  send  men  into  for- 
eign fleets.  A  few  Norse,  however,  did  come 
in,  and  excellent  sailors  and  fighters  they 
made.  With  the  Portuguese  and  Italians,  of 
whom  some  were  to  be  found  serving  under 
the  union-jack,  and  others  under  the  stars  and 
stripes,  it  was  different ;  although  there  were 
many  excellent  exceptions  they  did  not,  as  a 
rule,  make  the  best  kind  of  seamen.  They 
were  treacherous,  fond  of  the  knife,  less  ready 
with  their  hands,  and  likely  to  lose  either  their 
wits  or  their  courage  when  in  a  tight  place. 

In  the  American  navy,  unlike  the  British, 
there  was  no  impressment ;  the  sailor  was  a 
volunteer,  and  he  shipped  in  whatever  craft 
his  fancy  selected.  Throughout  the  war  there 
were  no  "  picked  crews  "  on  the  American  side,1 

1  James'  statements  to  the  contrary  being  in  every 
case  utterly  without  foundation.  He  is  also  wrong  in 
his  assertion  that  the  American  ships  had  no  boys ; 
they  had  nearly  as  many  in  proportion  as  the  British. 
The  Constitution  had  31,  the  Adams  15,  etc.  So,  when 

14— 3  B 


70  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

excepting  on  the  last  two  cruises  of  the 
Constitution.  In  fact  (as  seen  by  the  letter  of 
Captain  Stewart  and  Bainbridge  to  Secretary 
Hamilton),  there  was  often  much  difficulty  in 
getting  enough  men.1  Many  sailors  preferred 
to  serve  in  the  innumerable  privateers,  and, 
the  two  above-mentioned  officers,  in  urging 
the  necessity  of  building  line-of-battle  ships, 
state  that  it  was  hard  work  to  recruit  men  for 
vessels  of  an  inferior  grade,  so  long  as  the 
enemy  had  ships  of  the  line. 

One  of  the  standard  statements  made  by 
the  British  historians  about  this  war  is  that 
our  ships  were  mainly  or  largely  manned  by 

he  states  that  our  midshipmen  were  generally  masters 
and  mates  of  merchantmen  ;  they  were  generally  from 
eleven  to  seventeen  years  old  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  and,  besides,  had  rarely  or  never  been  in  the  mer- 
chant marine. 

1  Reading  through  the  volumes  of  official  letters 
about  this  war,  which  are  preserved  in  the  office  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  one  of  the  most  noticeable 
things  is  the  continual  complaints  about  the  difficulty 
of  getting  men.  The  Adams  at  one  time  had  a  crew 
of  but  nineteen  men — "  fourteen  of  whom  are  marines," 
adds  the  aggrieved  commander.  A  log-book  of  one  of 
the  gun-boats  records  the  fact  that  after  much  difficulty 
two  men  were  enlisted — from  the  jail,  with  a  parenthe- 
tical memorandum  to  the  effect  that  they  were  both 
very  drunk.  British  ships  were  much  more  easily 
manned,  as  they  could  always  have  recourse  to  impress- 
ment. 

The  Constitution  on  starting  out  on  her  last  cruises 
had  an  extraordinary  number  of  able  seamen  aboard, 
viz.,  218,  with  but  92  ordinary  seamen,  12  boys,  and  44 
marines,  making,  with  the  officers,  a  total  of  440  men. 
(See  letter  of  Captain  Bainbridge,  Oct.  16,  1814;  it  is 
letter  No.  51,  in  the  fortieth  volume  of  "  Captains' 
Letters,"  in  the  clerk's  office  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Navy.) 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  71 

British  sailors.  This,  if  true,  would  not  inter- 
fere with  the  lessons  which  it  teaches ;  and, 
besides  that,  it  is  not  true. 

In  this,  as  in  everything  else,  all  the  modern 
writers  have  merely  followed  James  or  Bren- 
ton,  and  I  shall  accordingly  confine  myself  to 
examining  their  assertions.  The  former  be- 
gins (vol.  iv,  p.  470)  by  diffidently  stating 
that  there  is  a  "  similarity  "  of  language  be- 
tween the  inhabitants  of  the  two  countries — 
an  interesting  philological  discovery  that  but 
few  will  attempt  to  controvert.  In  vol.  vi,  p. 
154,  he  mentions  that  a  number  of  blanks 
occur  in  the  American  Navy  List  in  the 
column  "  Where  Born  "  ;  and  in  proof  of  the 
fact  that  these  blanks  are  there  because  the 
men  were  not  Americans,  he  says  that  their 
names  "  are  all  English  and  Irish. "  They 
certainly  are  ;  and  so  are  all  the  other  names 
in  the  list.  It  could  not  well  be  otherwise, 
as  the  United  States  Navy  was  not  officered 
by  Indians.  In  looking  over  this  same  Navy 

1  For  example,  James  writes  :  "  Out  of  the  32  cap- 
tains one  only,  Thomas  Tingey,  has  England  marked 
as  his  birthplace.  .  .  .  Three  blanks  occur,  and 
we  consider  it  rather  creditable  to  Captains  John 
Shaw,  Daniel  S.  Patterson,  and  John  Ord  Creighton, 
that  they  were  ashamed  to  tell  where  they  were  born." 
I  have  not  been  able  to  find  out  the  latter's  birth-place, 
but  Captain  Shaw  was  born  in  New  York,  and  I  have 
seen  Captain  Patterson  incidentally  alluded  to  as 
"  born  and  bred  in  America."  Generally,  whenever  I 
have  been  able  to  fill  up  the  vacancies  in  the  column 
"  Where  Born,"  I  have  found  that  it  was  in  America. 
From  these  facts  it  would  appear  that  James  was 
somewhat  hasty  in  concluding  that  the  omission  of  the 
birth-place  proved  the  owner  of  the  name  to  be  a  na- 
tive of  Great  Britain. 


72  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

List  (of  1816)  it  will  be  seen  that  but  a  little 
over  5  per  cent,  of  the  officers  were  born 
abroad — a  smaller  proportion  by  far  than 
would  exist  in  the  population  of  the  country 
at  large — and  most  of  these  had  come  to 
America  when  under  ten  years  of  age.  On  p. 
155  James  adds  that  the  British  sailors  com- 
posed "  one  third  in  number  and  one  half  in 
point  of  effectiveness  "  of  the  American  crews. 
Brenton  in  his  "  Naval  History  "  writes :  "  It 
was  said,  and  I  have  no  reason  to  doubt  the 
fact,  that  there  were  200  British  seamen 
aboard  the  Constitution?  These  statements 
are  mere  assertions,  unsupported  by  proof 
and  of  such  a  loose  character  as  to  be  difficult 
to  refute.  As  our  navy  was  small,  it  may  be 
best  to  take  each  ship  in  turn.  The  only  ones 
of  which  the  British  could  write  authoritatively 
were,  of  course,  those  which  they  captured. 
The  first  one  taken  was  the  Wasp.  James 
says  many  British  were  discovered  among  her 
crew,  instancing  especially  one  sailor  named 
Jack  Lang ;  now  Jack  Lang  was  born  in  the 
town  of  Brunswick,  New  Jersey,  but  had  been 
impressed  and  forced  to  serve  in  the  British  Navy. 
The  same  was  doubtless  true  of  the  rest  of 
the  "  many  British  "  seamen  of  her  crew ;  at 
any  rate,  as  the  only  instance  James  mentions 
(Jack  Lang)  was  an  American,  he  can  hardly 
be  trusted  for  those  whom  he  does  not 
name. 

Of  the  95  men  composing  the  crew  of  the 
Nautilus  when  she  was  captured,  "  6  were  de- 
tained and  sent  to  England  to  await  examina- 
tion as  being  suspected  of  being  British  sub- 

1  New  edition,  London,  1837,  vol.  ii,  p.  456. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  i^lz.  73 

jects. "  '  Of  the  other  small  brigs,  the  Viper, 
Vixen,  Rattlesnake,  and  Syren,  James  does  not 
mention  the  composition  of  the  crew,  and  I 
do  not  know  that  any  were  claimed  as  British. 
Of  the  crew  of  the  Argus  "about  loor  12 
were  believed  to  be  British  subjects ;  the 
American  officers  swore  the  crew  contained 
none ''  (James,  "  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  278). 
From  o  to  10  per  cent,  can  be  allowed. 
When  the  Frolic  was  captured  "  her  crew  con- 
sisted of  native  Americans "  (do,  p.  340). 
James  speaks  ("  History,"  p.  418)  of  "a  por- 
tion of  the  British  subjects  on  board  the 
Essex,"  but  without  giving  a  word  of  proof  or 
stating  his  grounds  of  belief.  One  man  was 
claimed  as  a  deserter  by  the  British,  but  he 
turned  out  to  be  a  New  Yorker.  There  were 
certainly  a  certain  number  of  British  aboard, 
but  the  number  probably  did  not  exceed 
thirty.  Of  the  Presidents  crew  he  says 
("Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  448):  "In  the 
opinion  of  several  British  officers  there  were 
among  them  many  British  seamen  ";  but  Com- 
modore Decatur,  Lieutenant  Gallagher,  and 
the  other  officers  swore  that  there  were  none. 
Of  the  crew  of  the  Chesapeake,  he  says,  "  about 

1  Quoted  from  letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers  of 
September  12,  1812  (in  Naval  Aichives,  "Captains' 
Letters,'1  vol.  xxv,  No.  43),  enclosing  a  "List  of 
American  prisoners  of  war  discharged  out  of  custody 
of  Lieutenant  William  Miller,  agent  at  the  port  of 
Halifax,"  in  exchange  for  some  of  the  British  captured 
by  Porter.  .This  list,  by  the  way,  shows  the  crew  of 
the  Nautilus  (counting  the  :4x  men  detained  as  British) 
to  have  been  95  in  number,  instead  of  106,  as  stated  by 
James.  Commodore  Rodgers  adds  that  he  has  de- 
tained 12  men  of  the  Guerrierc's  crew  as  an  offset  to 
the  6  men  belonging  to  the  Nautilus. 


74  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

32  "  were  British  subjects,  or  about  10  per 
cent.  One  or  two  of  these  were  afterward 
shot,  and  some  2 5,  together  with  a  Portuguese 
boatswain's  mate,  entered  into  the  British 
service.  So  that  of  the  vessels  captured  by 
the  British,  the  Chesapeake  had  the  largest 
number  of  British  (about  10  per  cent,  of  her 
crew)  on  board,  the  others  ranging  from  that 
number  down  to  none  af  all,  as  in  the  case  of 
the  Wasp. 

As  these  eleven  ships  would  probably  rep- 
resent a  fair  average,  this  proportion,  of  from 
o  to  10  per  cent.,  should  be  taken  as  the  proper 
one.  James,  however,  is  of  the  opinion  that 
those  ships  manned  by  Americans  were  more 
apt  to  be  captured  than  those  manned  by 
the  braver  British  ;  which  calls  for  an  exami- 
nation of  the  crews  of  the  remaining  vessels. 
Of  the  American  sloop  Peacock,  James  says 
("  Naval  Occurrences,"  p.  348)  that  "  several 
of  her  men  were  recognized  as  British  sea- 
men ";  even  if  this  were  true,  "  several  "  could 
not  probably  mean  more  than  sixteen,  or  10 
per  cent.  Of  the  second  Wasp  he  says, 
"  Captain  Blakely  was  a  native  of  Dublin, 
and,  along  with  some  English  and  Scotch,  did 
not,  it  may  be  certain,  neglect  to  have  in  his 
crew  a  great  many  Irish."  Now  Captain 
Blakely  left  Ireland  when  he  was  but  16  months 
old,  and  the  rest  of  James'  statement  is 
avowedly  mere  conjecture.  It  was  asserted 
positively  in  the  American  newspapers  that 
the  Wasp,  which  sailed  from  Portsmouth,  was 
manned  exclusively  by  New  Englanders,  ex- 
cept a  small  draft  of  men  from  a  Baltimore  pri- 
vateer, and  that  there  was  not  a  foreigner  in  her 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  75 

crew.  Of  the  Hornet  James  states  that  "  some 
of  her  men  were  natives  of  the  United  King- 
dom ";  but  he  gives  no  authority,  and  the  men 
he  refers  to  were  in  all  probability  those  spoken 
of  in  the  journal  of  one  of  the  Hornefs 
officers,  which  says  that  "  many  of  our  men 
(Americans)  had  been  impressed  in  the 
British  service."  As  regards  the  gun-boats, 
James  asserts  that  they  were  commanded  by 
"  Commodore  Joshua  Barney,  a  native  of  Ire- 
land."  This  officer,  however,  was  born  at 
Baltimore  on  July  6,  1759.  As  to  the  Consti- 
tution, Brenton,  as  already  mentioned,  sup- 
poses the  number  of  British  sailors  in  her 
crew  to  have  been  200  ;  James  makes  it  less, 
or  about  150.  Respecting  this,  the  only  def- 
inite statements  I  can  find  in  British  works 
are  the  following  :  In  the  "  Naval  Chronicle," 
vol.  xxix,  p.  452,  an  officer  of  the  Java  states 
that  most  of  the  Constitution's  men  were  Brit- 
ish, many  being  from  the  Guerriere ;  which 
should  be  read  in  connection  with  James' 
statement  (vol.  vi,  p.  156)  that  but  eight  of 
the  Guerriere's  crew  deserted,  and  but  two 
shipped  on  board  the  Constitution.  Moreover, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  these  eight  men  were  all 
impressed  Americans.  In  the  "  Naval  Chron- 
icle "  it  is  also  said  that  the  Chesapeake 's  sur- 
geon was  an  Irishman,  formerly  of  the  British 
navy ;  he  was  born  in  Baltimore,  and  was 
never  in  the  British  navy  in  his  life.  The 
third  lieutenant  "  was  supposed  to  be  an 
Irishman"  (Brenton,  ii,  456).  The  first  lieu- 
tenant "  was  a  native  of  Great  Britain,  we 
have  been  informed "  (James,  vi,  194)  ;  he 
was  Mr.  George  Parker,  born  and  bred  in 


76  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

Virginia.  The  remaining  three  citations,  if 
true,  prove  nothing.  "  One  man  had  served 
under  Mr.  Kent  "  of  the  Guerriere  (James,  vi, 
p.  153).  "  One  had  been  in  the  Achille  "  and 
"one  in  the  Eurydice"  (Brenton,  li,  456). 
These  three  men  were  most  probably  Amer- 
ican seamen  who  had  been  impressed  on 
British  ships.  From  Cooper  (in  "  Putnam's 
Magazine,"  vol.  i,  p.  593)  as  well  as  from 
several  places  in  the  Constitution's  log,1  we 
learn  that  those  of  the  crew  who  were  British 
deserters  were  discharged  from  the  Constitu- 
tion before  she  left  port,  as  they  were  afraid 
to  serve  in  a  war  against  Great  Britain.  That 
this  fear  was  justifiable  may  be  seen  by  read- 
ing James,  vol.  iv,  p.  483.  Of  the  four  men 
taken  by  the  Leopard  from  the  Chesapeake,  as 
deserters,  one  was  hung  and  three  scourged. 
In  reality  the  crew  of  the  Constitution  probably 
did  not  contain  a  dozen  British  sailors;  in 
her  last  cruises  she  was  manned  almost  ex- 
clusively by  New  Englanders.  The  only  re- 
maining vessel  is  the  United  States,  respecting 
whose  crew  some  remarkable  statements  have 
been  made.  Marshall  (vol.  ii,  p.  1019)  writes 
that  Commodore  Decatur  "  declared  there  was 
not  a  seaman  in  his  ship  who  had  not  served 
from  5  to  1 2  years  in  a  British  man-of-war," 

1  See  her  log-book  (vol.  ii,  Feb.  i,  1812  to  Dec.  13, 
1813) ;  especially  on  July  I2th,  when  twelve  men  were 
discharged.  In  some  of  Hull's  letters  he  alludes  to 
the  desire  of  the  British  part  of  the  crew  to  serve 
on  the  gun-boats  or  in  the  ports  ;  and  then  writes  that 
"  in  accordance  with  the  instructions  sent  him  by  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy  "  he  had  allowed  the  British- 
born  portion  to  leave  the  ship.  The  log-books  are  in 
the  Bureau  of  Navigation. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  77 

from  which  he  concludes  that  they  were  Brit- 
ish themselves.  It  may  be  questioned 
whether  Decatur  ever  made  such  an  asser- 
tion ;  or  if  he  did,  it  is  safe  to  assume  again 
that  his  men  were  long-impressed  Americans.1 
Of  the  Carolina's  crew  of  70  men,  five  were 
British.  This  fact  was  not  found  out  till  three 
deserted,  when  an  investigation  was  made  and 
the  two  other  British  discharged.  Captain 
Henly,  in  reporting  these  facts,  made  no  con- 

1  At  the  beginning  of  the  war  there  were  on  record 
in  the  American  State  Department  6,257  cases  of  im- 
pressed American  seamen.  These  could  represent  but 
a  small  part  of  the  whole,  which  must  have  amounted 
to  20,000  men,  or  more  than  sufficient  to  man  our 
entire  navy  five  times  over.  According  to  the  British 
Admiralty  Report  to  the  House  of  Commons,  Febru- 
ary i,  1815,  2,548  impressed  American  seamen,  who 
refused  to  serve  against  their  country,  were  imprisoned 
in  1812.  According  to  Lord  Castlereagh's  speech  in 
the  House,  February  18,  1813,  3,300  men  claiming  to 
be  American  subjects  were  serving  in  the  British  navy 
in  January,  1811,  and  he  certainly  did  not  give  any- 
thing like  the  whole  number.  In  the  American  service 
the  term  of  enlistment  extended  for  two  years,  and  the 
Irigate,  United  States,  referred  to,  had  not  had  her  crew 
for  any  very  great  length  of  time  as  yet.  If  such  a 
crew  were  selected  at  random  from  American  sailors, 
among  them  there  would  be,  owing  to  the  small  num- 
ber servingin  our  own  navy  and  the  enormous  number 
impressed  into  the  British  navy,  probably  but  one  of 
the  former  to  two  of  the  latter.  As  already  mentioned 
the  American  always  left  a  British  man-of-war  as  soon 
as  he  could,  by  desertion  or  discharge ;  but  he  had  no 
unwillingness  'to  serve  in  the  home  navy,  where  the  pay 
was  larger,  and  the  discipline  far  more  humane,  not  to 
speak  of  motives  of  patriotism.  Even  if  the  ex-British 
man-of-war's  man  kept  out  of  service  for  some  time, 
he  would  be  very  apt  to  enlist  when  a  war  broke  out, 
which  his  country  undertook  largely  to  avenge  his  own 
wrongs. 


7  8  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

cealment  of  his  surprise  that  there  should  be 
any  British  at  all  in  his  crew.1 

From  these  facts  and  citations  we  may  ac- 
cordingly conclude  that  the  proportion  of 
British  seamen  serving  on  American  ships 
after  the  war  broke  out,  varied  between  none, 
as  on  the  Wasp  and  Constitution,  to  ten  per 
cent.,  as  on  the  Chesapeake  and  Essex.  On 
the  average,  nine  tenths  of  each  of  our  crews 
were  American  seamen,  and  about  one  twen- 
tieth British,  the  remainder  being  a  mixture 
of  various  nationalities. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  is  to  be  said  that  the 
British  frigate  Guerriere  had  ten  Americans 
among  her  crew,  who  were  permitted  to  go 
beiow  during  action,  and  the  Macedonian 
eight,  who  were  not  allowed  that  privilege, 
three  of  them  being  killed.  Three  of  the 
British  sloop  Peacock's  men  were  Americans, 
who  were  forced  to  fight  against  the  Hornet  / 
one  of  them  was  killed.  Two  of  the  Epervier's 
men  were  Americans,  who  were  also  forced  to 
fight.  When  the  crew  of  the  Nautilus  was 
exchanged,  a  number  of  other  American  pris- 
oners were  sent  with  them  ;  among  these  were 
a  number  of  American  seamen  who  had  been 
serving  in  the  Shannon,  Acasta,  Africa,  and 
various  other  vessels.  So  there  was  also  a 
certain  proportion  of  Americans  among  the 
British  crews,  although  forming  a  smaller  per- 
centage of  them  than  the  British  did  on  board 
the  American  ships.  In  neither  case  was  the 
number  sufficient  to  at  all  affect  the  result. 

The  crews  of  our  ships  being  thus  mainly 

1  See  his  letter  in  "  Letters  of  Masters'  Command- 
ant," 1814,  i.  No.  1 1 6. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 


79 


native  Americans,  it  may  be  interesting  to  try 
to  find  out  the  proportions  that  were  furnished 
by  the  different  sections  of  the  country. 
There  is  not  much  difficulty  about  the  officers. 
The  captains,  masters  commandant,  lieu- 
tenants, marine  officers,  whose  birthplaces  are 
given  in  the  Navy  List  of  1816, — 240  in  all, — 
came  from  the  various  States  as  follows : 


f  N.  H., 

51 

New  England  <  R  a?St' 

20 
II 

' 

[  Conn., 

6; 

[N.  Y., 

Middle  States^  p'J1' 

22 

35 

)>    78 

[Dev 

4. 

District  of  Columbia  |  D.  C., 

4 

4 

rMd., 

46 

Va., 

42 

N.  C., 

4 

Southern  States  < 

S.  C., 

16 

•  116 

Ga., 

2 

La., 

4 

Ky., 

2 

Total  of  given  birthplaces     ....    240 

Thus,  Maryland  furnished,  both  absolutely 
and  proportionately,  the  greatest  number  of 
officers,  Virginia,  then  the  most  populous  of 
all  the  States,  coming  next ;  four-fifths  of  the 
remainder  came  from  the  Northern  States. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  get  at  the  birthplaces 
of  the  sailors.  Something  can  be  inferred 


8o  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

from  the  number  of  privateers  and  letters  of 
marque  fitted  out.  Here  Baltimore  again 
headed  the  list  ;  following  closely  came  New 
York,  Philadelphia,  and  the  New  England 
coast  towns,  with,  alone  among  the  Southern 
ports,  Charleston,  ,S.  C.  A  more  accurate 
idea  of  the  quotas  of  sailors  furnished  by  the 
different  sections  can  be  arrived  at  by  com- 
paring the  total  amount  of  tonnage  the  coun- 
try possessed  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war. 
Speaking  roughly,  44  per  cent,  of  it  belonged 
to  New  England,  32  per  cent,  to  the  Middle 
States,  and  n  per  cent,  to  Maryland.  This 
makes  improbable  (but  of  course  not  certain) 
that  three-fourths  of  the  common  sailors 
hailed  from  the  Northern  States,  half  the  re- 
mainder from  Maryland,  and  the  rest  chiefly 
from  Virginia  and  South  Carolina. 

Having  thus  discussed  somewhat  at  length 
the  character  of  our  officers  and  crews,  it  will 
now  be  necessary  to  present  some  statistical 
tables  to  give  a  more  accurate  idea  of  the 
composition  of  the  navy;  the  tonnage,  com- 
plements, and  armaments  of  the  ships,  etc. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war  the  Govern- 
ment possessed  six  navy  yards  (all  but  the 
last  established  in  1801)  as  follows  :  ' 

Minimum  number  of 
men  employed. 

IO 
20 
I  O2 


Place. 

Original  cos 

I, 

Portsmouth,  N.  H., 

$  5,500 

2. 

Charleston,  Mass., 

39»2  '4 

3- 

New  York, 

40,000 

4- 

Philadelphia, 

37,000 

5- 

Washington, 

4,000 

6. 

Gosport, 

12,000 

1  Report  of  Naval  Secretary  Jones,  Nov.  30,  1814. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  iSi2.  Si 

In  1812  the  following  was   the  number  of 

officers  in  the  navy :  ' 

12  captains, 

10  masters  commandant, 

73  lieutenants, 

53  masters, 
310  midshipmen, 
^42  marine  officers, 

500 

At  the  opening  of  the  year,  the  number  of 
seamen,  ordinary  seamen,  and  boys  in  service 
was  4,01  o,  and  enough  more  were  recruited 
to  increase  it  to  5,230,  of  whom  only  2,346 
were  destined  for  the  cruising  war  vessels, 
the  remainder  being  detailed  for  forts,  gun- 
boats, navy  yards,  the  lakes,  etc.2  The  ma- 
rine corps  was  already  ample,  consisting  of 
1,523  men.3 

No  regular  navy  lists  were  published  till 
1816,  and  I  have  been  able  to  get  very  little 
information  respecting  the  increase  in  officers 
and  men  during  1813  and  1814;  but  we  have 
full  returns  for  1815,  which  may  be  summar- 
ized as  follows :  4 

30  captains,  25  masters  commandant, 

141  lieutenants,  24  commanders, 

510  midshipmen,  230  sailing-masters, 

50  surgeons,  12  chaplains, 

50  pursers,  10  coast  pilots, 

45  captain's  clerks,  80  surgeon's  mates, 

1  "  List  of  Vessels,"  etc.,  by  Geo.  H.  Preble,  U.S.N. 
(1874). 

2  Report  of  Secretary  Paul  Hamilton,  Feb.  21,  1812. 
8  Ibid. 

4  Seybert's  "  Statistical  Annals,"  p.  676  (Philadel- 
phia, 1818). 


82  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

530  boatswains,   gunners,   carpenters,  and  sail- 
makers, 

268  boatswain's  mates,  gunner's  mates,  etc., 
1,106  quarter  gunners,  etc., 
5,000  able  seamen, 
6,849  ordinary  seamen  and  boys. 

Making  a  total  of  14,960,  with  2,715  marines.1 

Comparing  this  list  with  the  figures  given 
before,  it  can  be  seen  that  during  the  course 
of  the  war  our  navy  grew  enormously,  increas- 
ing to  between  three  and  four  times  its  original 
size. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  1812,  the 
navy  of  the  United  States  on  the  ocean  con- 
sisted of  the  following  vessels,  which  either 
were,  or  could  have  been,  made  available 
during  the  war :  a 


(Gun!).    Name- 

Where  Built. 

When 
Built. 

Ton- 
nage. 

Cost. 

44  United  States, 

Philadelphia, 

1797 

1576 

£299,336 

44  Constitution, 

Boston, 

'797 

1576 

302,718 

44  President, 

New  York, 

1800 

'5?6 

220,910 

38  Cottstellation, 

Baltimore, 

1797 

1265 

3  '4,2  '2 

38  Congress, 

Portsmouth, 

'799 

1268 

197,246 

38  Oiesapeake, 

Norfolk, 

'799 

1244 

220,677 

32  Essex, 

Salem, 

'799 

860 

139,362 

28  Adams, 

New  York, 

1799 

560 

76,622 

1  8  Hornet, 

Baltimore, 

1805 

480 

52,603 

1  8  Wasf, 

Washington, 

1806 

450 

40,000 

1  6  Argus, 

Boston, 

1803 

298 

37,428 

16  Syren, 

Philadelphia, 

1803 

250 

32,521 

14  Nautihis, 

Baltimore, 

1803 

185 

'8,763 

14  Vixen, 

Baltimore, 

1803 

185 

20,872 

12  Enterprise, 
12  Viper, 

Baltimore, 
Purchased, 

'799 
1810 

'65 
148 

16,240 

1  Report  of  Secretary  B.  W.  Crowninshield,  April  18, 
1816. 

2  Letter  of   Secretary  Benjamin  Stoddart  to   Fifth 
Congress,  Dec-  24,  1798;  Letters   of   Secretary  Paul 
Hamilton,  P'eb.  21,  1812 ;   "American  State  Papers," 
vol.  xix,  p.  149.     See  also  The  "  History  of  the  Navy 
of  the  United  States,"  by  Lieut.  G.  E  Emmons,  U.  S. 
N.   (published  in  Washington,   MDCCCLIII,  under  the 
authority  of  the  Navy  Department). 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  83 

There  also  appeared  on  the  lists  the  Neu* 
York,  36,  Boston,  28,  and  John  Adams,  28. 
The  two  former  were  condemned  hulks ;  the 
latter  was  entirely  rebuilt  after  the  war.  The 
Hornet  was  originally  a  brig  of  440  tons,  and 
18  guns;  having  been  transformed  into  a 
ship,  she  was  pierced  for  20  guns,  and  in  size 
was  of  an  intermediate  grade  between  the  Wasp 
and  the  heavy  sloops,  built  somewhat  later, 
of  509  tons.  Her  armament  consisted  of  32- 
pound  carronades,  with  the  exception  of  the 
two  bow-guns,  which  were  long  i2's.  The 
whole  broadside  was  in  nominal  weight  just 
300  pounds  ;  in  actual  weight  about  277 
pounds.  Her  complement  of  men  was  140, 
but  during  the  war  she  generally  left  port 
with  150.'  The  Wasp  had  been  a  ship  from 
the  beginning,  mounted  the  number  of  guns 
she  rated  (of  the  same  calibres  as  the  Hornefs) 
and  carried  some  ten  men  less.  She  was 
about  the  same  length  as  the  British  i8-gun 
brig-sloop,  but,  being  narrower,  measured 
nearly  30  tons  less.  The  Argus  and  Syren 
were  similar  and  very  fine  brigs,  the  former 
being  the  longer.  Each  carried  two  more 
guns  than  she  rated  ;  and  the  Argus,  in  addi- 
tion, had  a  couple  thrust  through  the  bridle- 
ports.  The  guns  were  24-pound  carronades, 
with  two  long  i2's  for  bow-chasers.  The 
proper  complement  of  men  was  100,  but  each 
sailed  usually  with  about  125.  The  four 

1  In  the  Hornet's  log  of  Oct.  25,  1812,  while  in  port, 
it  is  mentioned  that  she  had  158  men ;  four  men  who 
were  sick  were  left  behind  before  she  started.  (See, 
in  the  Navy  Archives,  the  Log-book,  Hornet,  Waspt 
and  Argus,  July  20,  1809,  to  Oct.  6,  1813.) 


84  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

smaller  craft  were  originally  schooners,  armed 
with  the  same  number  of  light  long  guns  as 
they  rated,  and  carrying  some  70  men  apiece  ; 
but  they  had  been  very  effectually  ruined  by 
being  changed  into  brigs,  with  crews  increased 
to  a  hundred  men.  Each  was  armed  with  18- 
pound  carronades,  carrying  two  more  than 
she  rated.  The  Enterprise,  in  fact,  mounted 
16  guns,  having  two  long  nines  thrust  through 
the  bridle-ports.  These  little  brigs  were 
slow,  not  very  seaworthy,  and  overcrowded 
with  men  and  guns;  they  all  fell  into  the 
enemy's  hands  without  doing  any  good  what- 
ever, with  the  single  exception  of  the  Enter- 
prise, which  escaped  capture  by  sheer  good 
luck,  and  in  her  only  battle  happened  to  be 
pitted  against  one  of  the  corresponding  and 
equally  bad  class  of  British  gun-brigs.  The 
Adams  after  several  changes  of  form  finally 
became  a  flush-decked  corvette.  The  Essex 
had  originally  mounted  twenty-six  long  xa's 
on  her  main-deck,  and  sixteen  24-pound  car- 
ronades on  her  spar-deck  ;  but  official  wisdom 
changed  this,  giving  her  46  guns,  twenty-four 
32-pound  carronades,  and  two  long  i2Js  on 
the  main-deck,  and  sixteen  32-pound  carron- 
ades with  four  long  i2's  on  the  spar-deck. 
When  Captain  Porter  had  command  of  her 
he  was  deeply  sensible  of  the  disadvantages 
of  an  armament  which  put  him  at  the  mercy 
of  any  ordinary  antagonist  who  could  choose 
his  distance;  accordingly  he  petitioned  sev- 
eral times,  but  always  without  success,  to 
have  his  long  i25s  returned  to  him. 

The  American  38*3  were  about  the  size  of 
the  British   frigates   of   the   same   rate,  and 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  85 

armed  almost  exactly  in  the  same  way,  each 
having  28  long  i8's  on  the  main-deck  and  20 
32-pound  carronades  on  the  spar-deck.  The 
proper  complement  was  300  men,  but  each 
carried  from  40  to  80  more.1 

Our  three  44-gun  ships  were  the  finest 
frigates  then  afloat  (although  the  British  pos- 
sessed some  as  heavy,  such  as  the  Egyptienne, 
44).  They  were  beautifully  modelled,  with 
v^ery  thick  scantling,  extremely  stout  masts, 
and  heavy  cannon.  Each  carried  on  her 
main-deck  thirty  long  24*5,  and  on  her  spar- 
deck  two  long  bow-chasers,  and  twenty  or 
twenty-two  carronades — 42-pounders  on  the 
President  and  United  States,  32-pounders  on 
the  Constitution.  Each  sailed  with  a  crew  of 
about  450  men — 50  in  excess  of  the  regular 
complement.* 

1  The  Chesapeake,  by  some  curious  mistake,  was  fre- 
quently rated  as  a  44,  and  this  drew  in  its  train  a  num- 
ber of  attendant   errors.     When   she   was   captured, 
James  says  that  in  one  of  her  lockers  was  found  a  let- 
ter, dated  in  February,  1811,  from  Robert  Smith,  the 
Secretary  of  War,  to  Captain  Evans,  at  Boston,  direct- 
ing him  to  open  houses  of  rendezvous  for  manning  the 
Chesapeake,  and  enumerating  her  crew  at  a  total  of  443. 
Naturally  this  gave  British  historians  the  idea  that  such 
was  the  ordinary  complement  of  our  38-gun  frigates. 
But  the  ordering  so  large  a  crew  was  merely  a  mistake, 
as  may  be  seen  by  a  letter  from  Captain  Bainbridge  to 
the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  which  is  given  in  full  in  the 
"Captains'  Letters,"  vol.  xxv,  No.  19  (Navy  Archives). 
In  it  he  mentions  the  extraordinary  number  of  men 
ordered  for  the  Chesapeake,  saying,  "  There  is  a  mis- 
take in  the   crew  ordered  for  the   Chesapeake,  as  it 
equals  in  number  the   crews  of  our  44-gun  frigates, 
whereas  the  Chesapeake\s  of  the  class  of  the  Congress 
and  Constellation." 

2  The  President  when  in  action  with  the  Endymion 
had  450  men  aboard,  as  sworn  by  Decatur ;  the  muster- 


86  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

It  may  be  as  well  to  mention  here  the  only 
other  class  of  vessels  that  we  employed  during 
the  war.  This  was  composed  of  the  ship- 
sloops  built  in  1813,  which  got  to  sea  in  1814. 
They  were  very  fine  vessels,  measuring  509 
tons  apiece,1  with  very  thick  scantling  and 
stout  masts  and  spars.  Each  carried  twenty 
32-pound  carronades  and  two  long  la's  with 
a  crew  nominally  of  160  men,  but  with  usually 
a  few  supernumeraries.8 

The  British  vessels  encountered  were  simi- 
lar, but  generally  inferior,  to  our  own.  The 
only  24-pounder  frigate  we  encountered  was 
the  Endymion,  of  about  a  fifth  less  force  than 
the  President.  Their  38-gun  frigates  were 
almost  exactly  like  ours,  but  with  fewer  men 


roll  of  the  Constitution,  a  few  days  before  her  action 
with  the  Guerriere  contains  464  names  (including  51 
marines) ;  8  men  were  absent  in  a  prize,  so  she  had 
aboard  in  the  action  456.  Her  muster-roll  just  before 
the  action  with  the  Cyane  and  Levant  shows  461  names. 

1  The  dimensions  were  117  feet  n  inches  upon  the 
gun-deck,  97  feet  6  inches  keel  for  tonnage,  measuring 
from  one  foot  before  the  forward  perpendicular  and 
along  the  base  line  to  the  front  of  the   rabbet  of  the 
port,  deducting  f  of  the  moulded  breadth  of  the  beam, 
which  is  31  feet  6  inches ;  making  50955  tons.     (See  in 
Navy  Archives,  "Contracts,"  vol.  ii,  p.  137.) 

2  The  Peacock  had  166  men,  as  we  learn  from  her 
commander,  Warrington's,  letter  of  June  ist  (Letter 
No.   140  in  "Masters'  Commandant   Letters,"   1814, 
vol.  i).    The  Frolic  took  aboard  "  10  or  12  men  beyond 
her  regular  complement "  (see  letter  of  Joseph  Bain- 
bridge,  No.  51,  in  same  vol.).     Accordingly  when  she 
was  captured  by  the  Orpheus,  the  commander  of  the 
latter,  Captain  Hugh  Pigot,  reported  the  number  of 
men  aboard  to  be  171.    The  Wasp  left  port  with  173 
men,  with  which  she  fought  her  first  action ;  she  had  a 
much  smaller  number  aboard  in  her  second. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  87 

in  crew  as  a  rule.  They  were  three  times 
matched  against  our  44-gun  frigates,  to  which 
they  were  inferior  about  as  three  is  to  four. 
Their  36-gun  frigates  were  larger  than  the 
Essex,  with  a  more  numerous  crew,  but  the 
same  number  of  guns ;  carrying  on  the  lower 
deck,  however,  long  i8's  instead  of  32-pound 
carronades, — a  much  more  effective  armament. 
The  32-gun  frigates  were  smaller,  with  long 
i2's  on  the  main-deck.  The  largest  sloops 
were  also  frigate-built,  carrying  twenty-two 
32-pound  carronades  on  the  main-deck,  and 
twelve  lighter  guns  on  the  quarter-deck  and 
forecastle,  with  a  crew  of  180.  The  large 
flush-decked  ship-sloops  carried  21  or  23 
guns,  with  a  crew  of  140  men.  But  our  ves- 
sels most  often  came  in  contact  with  the 
British  i8-gun  brig-sloop ;  this  was  a  tubby 
craft,  heavier  than  any  of  our  brigs,  being 
about  the  size  of  the  Hornet.  The  crew  con- 
sisted of  from  1 10  to  135  men  ;  ordinarily  each 
was  armed  with  sixteen  32-pound  carronades, 
two  long  6's,  and  a  shifting  1 2-pound  carron- 
ade ;  often  with  a  light  long  gun  as  a  stern- 
chaser,  making  20  in  all.  The  Reindeer  and 
Peacock  had  only  24-pound  carronades ;  the 
Epervier  had  but  eighteen  guns,  all  carron- 
ades.' 

Among  the  stock  accusations  against  our 

1  The  Epervier  was  taken  into  our  service  under  the 
same  name  and  rate.  Both  Preble  and  Emmons  de- 
scribe her  as  of  477  tons.  Warrington,  her  captor, 
however,  says:  "The  surveyor  of  the  port  has  just 
measured  the  Epervier  and  reports  her  467  tons."  (In 
the  Navy  Archives,  "  Masters'  Commandant  Letters," 
1814,  i,  No.  125.) 

For  a  full  discussion  of  tonnage,  see  Appendix,  A. 


88  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

navy  of  18x2,  were,  and  are,  statements  that 
our  vessels  were  rated  at  less  than  their  real 
force,  and  in  particular  that  our  large  frigates 
were  "  disguised  line-of-battle  ships."  As 
regards  the  ratings,  most  vessels  of  that  time 
carried  more  guns  than  they  rated ;  the  dis- 
parity was  less  in  the  French  than  in  either 
the  British  or  American  navies.  Our  38-gun 
frigates  carried  48  guns,  the  exact  number  the 
British  38's  possessed.  The  worst  case  of 
underrating  in  our  navy  was  the  Essex,  which 
rated  32,  and  carried  46  guns,  so  that  her  real 
was  44  per  cent,  in  excess  of  her  nominal 
force ;  but  this  was  not  as  bad  as  the  British 
sloop  Cyane ;  which  was  rated  a  20  or  22,  and 
carried  34  guns,  so  that  she  had  either  55  or 
70  per  cent,  greater  real  than  nominal  force. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  war  we  owned  two 
i8-gun  ship-sloops,  one  mounting  18  and  the 
other  20  guns;  the  i8-gun  brig-sloops  they 
captured  mounted  each  19  guns,  so  the  aver- 
age was  the  same.  Later  we  built  sloops  that 
rated  18  and  mounted  22  guns,  but  when  one 
was  captured  it  was  also  put  down  in  the 
British  navy  list  as  an  i8-gun  ship-sloop. 
During  all  the  combats  of  the  war  there  were 
but  four  vessels  that  carried  as  few  guns  as 
they  rated.  Two  were  British,  the  Epervier 
and  Levant,  and  two  American,  the  Wasp  and 
Adams.  One  navy  was  certainly  as  deceptive 
as  another,  as  far  as  underrating  went. 

The  force  of  the  statement  that  our  large 
frigates  were  disguised  line-of-battle  ships,  of 
course  depends  entirely  upon  what  the  words 
"  frigate  "  and  "  line-of-battle  ship  "  mean. 
When  on  the  loth  of  August,  1653,  De  Ruyter 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  89 

saved  a  great  convoy  by  beating  off  Sir  George 
Ayscough's  fleet  of  38  sail,  the  largest  of  the 
Dutch  admiral's  "33  sail  of  the  line"  carried 
but  30  guns  and  150  men,  and  his  own  flag- 
ship but  28  guns  and  134  men.1  The  Dutch 
book  from  which  this  statement  is  taken  speaks 
indifferently  of  frigates  of  18,40,  and  58  guns. 
Toward  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  the 
terms  had  crystallized.  Frigate  then  meant  a 
so-called  single-decked  ship ;  it  in  reality 
possessed  two  decks,  the  main,  or  gun-deck, 
and  the  upper  one,  which  had  no  name  at  all, 
until  our  sailors  christened  it  spar-deck.  The 
gun-deck  possessed  a  complete  battery,  and 
the  spar-deck  an  interrupted  one,  mounting 
guns  on  the  forecastle  and  quarter-deck.  At 
that  time  all  "  two-decked  "  or  "  three-decked" 
(in  reality  three-and  four-decked)  "  ships  were 
liners.  But  in  1812  this  had  changed  some- 
what ;  as  the  various  nations  built  more  and 
more  powerful  vessels,  the  lower  rates  of  the 
different  divisions  were  dropped.  Thus  the 
British  ship  Cyane,  captured  by  the  Constitution 
was  in  reality  a  small  frigate,  with  a  main-deck 
battery  of  22  guns,  and  12  guns  on  the  spar- 
deck;  a  few  years  before  she  would  have  been 
called  a  24-gun  frigate,  but  she  then  ranked 
merely  as  a  22-gun  sloop.  Similarly  the  50, 
and  64-gun  ships  that  had  fought  in  the  line 
at  the  Doggerbank,  Camperdown,  and  even  at 

1 "  La  Vie  et  les  Actions  Memorables  du  Sr.  Michel  de 
Ruyter  k  Amsterdam,  Chez  Henry  et  Theodore  Boom, 
MDCLXXXVII.  The  work  is  by  Barthelemy  Pielat,  a 
surgeon  in  de  Ruyter's  fleet,  and  personally  present 
during  many  of  his  battles.  It  is  written  in  French,  but 
is  in  tone  more  strongly  anti-French  than  anti-English. 


9o 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 


Abouhir,  were  now  no  longer  deemed  fit  for 
that  purpose,  and  the  74  was  the  lowest  line- 
of-battle  ship. 

The  Constitution,  President,  and  States  must 
then  be  compared  with  the  existing  European 
vessels  that  were  classed  as  frigates.  The 
French  in  1812  had  no  24-pounder  frigates, 
for  the  very  good  reason  that  they  had  all 
fallen  victims  to  the  English  i8-pounder's  ;  but 
in  July  of  that  year  a  Danish  frigate,  the  Nay- 
aden,  which  carried  long  24*8,  was  destroyed 
by  the  English  ship  Dictator,  64. 

The  British  frigates  were  of  several  rates. 
The  lowest  rated  32,  carrying  in  all  40  guns, 
26  long  i2's  on  the  main-deck  and  14  24-pound 
carronades  on  the  spar-deck — a  broadside  of 
324  pounds.1  The  36-gun  frigates,  like  the 
Phczbe,  carried  46  guns,  26  long  i8's  on  the 
gun-deck  and  32-pound  carronades  above. 
The  38-gun  frigates,  like  the  Macedonian,  car- 
ried 48  or  49  guns,  long  i8's  below  and  32- 
pound  carronades  above.  The  32-gun  frigates, 
then,  presented  in  broadside  13  long  i2's  be- 
low and  7  24-pound  carronades  above  ;  the 
38-gun  frigates,  14  long  i8's  below  and  1032- 
pound  carronades  above  ;  so  that  a  44-gun 
frigate  would  naturally  present  15  long  24*3 
below  and  12  42-pound  carronades  above,  as 
the  United  States  did  at  first.  The  rate  was 
perfectly  proper,  for  French,  British,  and  Danes 
already  possessed  24-pounder  frigates  ;  and 
there  was  really  less  disparity  between  the 
force  and  rate  of  a  44  that  carried  54  guns, 
than  there  was  in  a  38  that  carried  49,  or,  like 

1  In  all  these  vessels  there  were  generally  two  long 
6's  or  g's  substituted  for  the  bow-chase  carronades. 


'NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  91 

the  Shannon,  52.  Nor  was  this  all.  Two  of 
our  three  victories  were  won  by  the  Constitu- 
tion, which  only  carried  32-pound  carronades, 
and  once  54  and  once  52  guns  ;  and  as  two- 
thirds  of  the  work  was  thus  done  by  this  ves- 
sel, I  shall  now  compare  her  with  the  largest 
•  British  frigates.  Her  broadside  force  consist- 
ed of  15  long  24*3  on  the  main-deck,  and  on 
the  spar-deck  one  long  24,  and  in  one  case  10, 
in  the  other  1 1  32-pound  carronades — a  broad- 
side of  704  or  736  pounds.1  There  was  then 
in  the  British  navy  the  Acasta,  40,  carrying  in 
broadside  15  long  i8's  and  n  32-pound  car- 
ronades ;  when  the  spar-deck  batteries  are 
equal,  the  addition  of  90  pounds  to  the  main- 
deck  broadside  (which  is  all  the  superiority  of 
the  Constitution  over  the  Acasta)  is  certainly 
not  enough  to  make  the  distinction  between  a 
frigate  and  a  disguised  .74.  But  not  considering 
the  Acasta,  there  were  in  the  British  navy  three 
24-pounder  frigates,  the  Cornwallis,  Indefati- 
gable, and  Endymion.  We  only  came  in  con- 
tact with  the  latter  in  1815,  when  the  Constitu- 
tion had  but  52  guns.  The  Endymion  then 
had  an  armament  of  28  long  24's,  2  long  i8's, 
and  20  32-pound  carronades,  making  a  broad- 
side of  674  pounds,8  or  including  a  shifting 
24-pound  carronade,  of  698  pounds — just  six 
pounds,  or  i  per  cent.,  less  than  the  force  of 
that  "  disguised  line-of-battle  ship  "  the  Con- 
stitution !  As  the  Endymion  only  rated  as  a 
40,  and  the  Constitution  as  a  44,  it  was  in 

1  Nominally ;  in  reality  about  7  per  cent,  less  on  ac- 
count of  the  short  weight  in  metal. 

a  According  to  James  664  pounds :  he  omits  the  chase 
guns  for  no  reason. 


g2  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812, 

reality  the  former  and  not  the  latter  which  was 
underrated.  I  have  taken  the  Constitution, 
because  the  British  had  more  to  do  with  her 
than  they  did  with  our  other  two  44*3  taken  to- 
gether. The  latter  were  both  of  heavier  metal 
than  the  Constitution,  carrying  42 -pound  car- 
ronades.  In  1812  the  United  States  carried 
her  full  54  guns,  throwing  a  broadside  of  846 
pounds ;  when  captured,  the  President  carried 
53,  having  substituted  a  24-pound  carronade 
for  two  of  her  42*3,  and  her  broadside  amount- 
ed to  828  pounds,  or  1 6  per  cent,  nominal,  and, 
on  account  of  the  short  weight  of  her  shot,  9 
per  cent,  real  excess  over  the  Endymion.  If 
this  difference  made  her  a  line-of-battle  ship, 
then  the  Endymion  was  doubly  a  line-of-battle 
ship  compared  to  the  Congress  or  Constellation, 
Moreover,  the  American  commanders  found 
their  42-pound  carronades  too  heavy  ;  as  I 
have  said  the  Constitution  only  mounted  32's, 
and  the  United  States  landed  6  of  her  guns. 
When,  in  1813,  she  attempted  to  break  the 
blockade,  she  carried  but  48  guns,  throwing 
a  broadside  of  720  pounds — just  3  per  cent, 
more  than  the  Endymion.1  If  our  frigates 
were  line-of-battle  ships  the  disguise  was  cer- 

1  It  was  on  account  of  this  difference  of  3  per  cent, 
that  Captain  Hardy  refused  to  allow  the  Endymion  to 
meet  the  States  (James,  vi,  p.  470).  This  was  during 
the  course  of  some  challenges  and  counter-challenges 
which  ended  in  nothing,  Decatur  in  his  turn  being  un- 
willing to  have  the  Macedonian  meet  the  Statira,  unless 
the  latter  should  agree  not  to  take  on  a  picked  crew. 
He  was  perfectly  right  in  this  ;  but  he  ought  never  to 
have  sent  the  challenge  at  all,  as  two  ships  but  an  hour 
or  two  out  of  port  would  be  at  a  frightful  disadvantage 
in  a  fight. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  93 

tainly  marvellously  complete,  and  they  had  a 
number  of  companions  equally  disguised  in 
the  British  ranks. 

The  44's  were  thus  true  frigates,  with  one 
complete  battery  of  long  guns  and  one  inter- 
rupted one  of  carronades.  That  they  were 
better  than  any  other  frigates  was  highly 
creditable  to  our  ingenuity  and  national  skill. 
We  cannot,  perhaps,  lay  claim  to  the  invention 
and  first  use  of  the  heavy  frigate,  for  24- 
pounder  frigates  were  already  in  the  service  of 
at  least  three  nations,  and  the  French  36- 
pound  carronade,  in  use  on  their  spar-decks, 
threw  a  heavier  ball  than  our  42-pounder. 
But  we  had  enlarged  and  perfected  the  heavy 
frigate,  and  were  the  first  nation  that  ever 
used  it  effectively.  The  French  Forte  and  the 
Danish  Nayaden  shared  the  fate  of  ships 
carrying  guns  of  lighter  calibre ;  and  the 
British  24-pounders,  like  the  Endymion, 
had  never  accomplished  anything.  Hitherto 
there  had  been  a  strong  feeling,  especially  in 
England,  that  an  i8-pound  gun  was  as  effect- 
ive as  a  24-  in  arming  a  frigate ;  we  made 
a  complete  revolution  in  this  respect.  Eng- 
land had  been  building  only  i8-pounder 
vessels  when  she  ought  to  have  been  building 
24-pounders.  It  was  greatly  to  our  credit 
that  our  average  frigate  was  superior  to  the 
average  British  frigate ;  exactly  as  it  was  to 
our  discredit  that  the  Essex  was  so  ineffect- 
ively armed.  Captain  Porter  owed  his  defeat 
chiefly  to  his  ineffective  guns,  but  also  to 
having  lost  his  topmast,  to  the  weather  being 
unfavorable,  and,  still  more,  to  the  admirable 
skill  with  which  Hilyar  used  his  superior 


94 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812- 


armament.  The  Java,  Macedonian,  and  Guer- 
riere  owed  their  defeat  partly  to  their  lighter 
guns,  but  much  more  to  the  fact  that  their 
captains  and  seamen  did  not  display  either  as 
good  seamanship  or  as  good  gunnery  as  their 
foes.  Inferiority  in  armament  was  a  factor  to 
be  taken  into  account  in  all  the  four  cases, 
but  it  was  more  marked  in  that  of  the  Essex 
than  in  the  other  three  ;  it  would  have  been 
fairer  for  Porter  to  say  that  he  had  been  cap- 
tured by  a  line-of-battle  ship,  than  for  the 
captain  of  the  Java  to  make  that  assertion. 
In  this  last  case  the  forces  of  the  two  ships 
compared  almost  exactly  as  their  rates.  A 
44  was  matched  against  a  38 ;  it  was  not 
surprising  that  she  should  win,  but  it  was 
surprising  that  she  should  win  with  ease  and 
impunity.  The  long  24'$  on  the  Constitution's 
gun-deck  no  more  made  her  a  line-of  battle 
ship  than  the  32-pound  carronades  mounted 
on  an  English  frigate's  quarter-deck  and 
forecastle  made  her  a  line-of-battle  ship  when 
opposed  to  a  Frenchman  with  only  8's  and  6's 
on  his  spar-deck.  When,  a  few  years  before, 
the  English  Phoebe  had  captured  the  French 
Nereide,  their  broadsides  were  respectively 
407  and  258  pounds,  a  greater  disparity  than 
in  any  of  our  successful  fights  ;  yet  no  author 
thought  of  claiming  that  the  Phcebe  was  any- 
thing but  a  frigate.  So  with  the  Clyde, 
throwing  425  Ibs.,  which  took  the  Vestale, 
throwing  but  246.  The  facts  were  that  18- 
pounder  frigates  had  captured  12-pounders, 
exactly  as  our  24-pounders  in  turn  captured 
the  i8-pounders. 

Shortly  before  Great  Britain   declared  war 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  95 

on  us,  one  of  her  i8-pounder  frigates,  the  San 
Florenzo,  throwing  476  Ibs.  in  a  broadside, 
captured  the  i2-pounder  French  frigate  Pyscht, 
whose  broadside  was  only  246  Ibs.  The  force 
of  the  former  was  thus  almost  double  that  of 
the  latter,  yet  the  battle  was  long  and  des- 
perate, the  English  losing  48  and  the  French 
124  men.  This  conflict,  then,  reflected  as 
much  credit  on  the  skill  and  seamanship  of 
the  defeated  as  of  the  victorious  side ;  the 
difference  in  loss  could  fairly  be  ascribed  to 
the  difference  in  weight  of  metal.  But  where, 
as  in  the  famous  ship-duels  of  1812,  the 
difference  in  force  is  only  a  fifth,  instead  of  a 
half,  and  yet  the  slaughter,  instead  of  being  as 
five  is  to  two,  is  as  six  to  one,  then  the  victory 
is  certainly  to  be  ascribed  as  much  to  superi- 
ority in  skill  as  to  superiority  in  force.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  it  should  always  be  remem- 
bered that  there  was  a  very  decided  superiority 
in  force.  It  is  a  very  discreditable  feature  of 
many  of  our  naval  histories  that  they  utterly 
ignore  this  superiority,  seeming  ashamed  to 
confess  that  it  existed.  In  reality  it  was 
something  to  be  proud  of.  It  was  highly  to 
the  credit  of  the  United  States  that  her  frigates 
were  of  better  make  and  armament  than  any 
others  ;  it  always  speaks  well  for  a  nation's 
energy  and  capacity  that  any  of  her  imple- 
ments of  warfare  are  of  a  superior  kind.  This 
is  a  perfectly  legitimate  reason  for  pride. 

It  spoke  well  for  the  Prussians  in  1866  that 
they  opposed  breech-loaders  to  the  muzzle- 
loaders  of  the  Austrians ;  but  it  would  be  folly 
to  give  all  the  credit  of  the  victory  to  the 
breech-loaders  and  none  to  Moltke  and  his 


96  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

lieutenants.  Thus,  it  must  be  remembered 
that  two  things  contributed  to  our  victories. 
One  was  the  excellent  make  and  armament 
of  our  ships ;  the  other  was  the  skilful  sea- 
manship, excellent  discipline,  and  superb 
gunnery  of  the  men  who  were  in  them. 
British  writers  are  apt  only  to  speak  of  the 
first,  and  Americans  only  of  the  last,  whereas 
both  should  be  taken  into  consideration. 

To  sum  up  :  the  American  44-gun  frigate 
was  a  true  frigate,  in  build  and  armament, 
properly  rated,  stronger  than  a  38-gun  frigate 
just  about  in  the  proportion  of  44  to  38,  and 
not  exceeding  in  strength  an  i8-pounder 
frigate  as  much  as  the  latter  exceeded  one 
carrying  i2-pounders.  They  were  in  no  way 
whatever  line-of-battle  ships  ;  but  they  were 
superior  to  any  other  frigates  afloat,  and,  what 
is  still  more  important,  they  were  better 
manned  and  commanded  than  the  average 
frigate  of  any  other  navy.  Lord  Codrington 
says  ("Memoirs,"  i,  p.  310):  "But  I  well 
know  the  system  of  favoritism  and  borough 
corruption  prevails  so  very  much  that  many 
people  are  promoted  and  kept  in  command 
that  should  be  dismissed  the  service,  and  while 
such  is  the  case  the  few  Americans  chosen  for 
their  merit  may  be  expected  to  follow  up  their 
successes  except  where  they  meet  with  our 
best  officers  on  even  terms."  '  The  small  size 

1  To  show  that  I  am  not  quoting  an  authority  biassed 
in  our  favor  I  will  give  Sir  Edward  Codrington's  opin- 
ion of  our  rural  better  class  (i,  318).  "  It  is  curious  to 
observe  the  animosity  which  prevails  here  among  what 
is  called  the  better  order  of  people,  which  I  think  is 
more  a  misnomer  here  than  in  any  other  country  I  have 
ever  been.  Their  whig  and  lory  are  democrat  and 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  97 

of  our  navy  was  probably  to  a  certain  extent 
effective  in  keeping  it  up  to  a  high  standard ; 
but  this  is  not  the  only  explanation,  as  can  be 
seen  by  Portugal's  small  and  poor  navy.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  champions  or  pick  of  a 
large  navy  ought  to  be  better  than  the 
champions  of  a  small  one.1 

federalist,  and  it  would  seem  for  tne  sake  of  giving 
vent  to  that  bitterness  of  hatred  which  marks  the 
Yankee  character,  every  gentleman  (God  save  the  term) 
who  takes  possession  of  a  property  adopts  the  opposite 
political  creed  to  that  of  his  nearest  neighbor." 

1  In  speaking  of  tonnage  I  wish  I  could  have  got 
better  authority  than  James  for  the  British  side  of  the 
question.  He  is  so  bitter  that  it  involuntarily  gives 
one  a  distrust  of  his  judgment.  Thus,  in  speaking  of 
the  Penguin's  capture,  he,  in  endeavoring  to  show  that 
the  Hornefs  loss  was  greater  than  she  acknowledged, 
says,  "  several  of  the  dangerously  wounded  were  thrown 
overboard  because  the  surgeon  was  afraid  to  amputate, 
owing  to  his  want  of  experience  "  ("  Naval  Occurren- 
ces," 492).  Now  what  could  persuade  a  writer  to 
make  such  a  foolish  accusation  ?  No  matter  how  ut- 
terly depraved  and  brutal  Captain  Biddle  might  be,  he 
would  certainly  not  throw  his  wounded  over  alive  be- 
cause he  feared  they  might  die.  Again,  in  vol.  vi,  p. 
546,  he  says :  "  Captain  Stewart  had  caused  the  Cyaiie 
to  be  painted  to  resemble  a  36-gun  frigate.  The  object 
of  this  was  to  aggrandize  his  exploit  in  the  eyes  of  the 
gaping  citizens  of  Boston."  No  matter  how  skilful  an 
artist  Captain  Stewart  was,  and  no  matter  how  great 
the  gaping  capacities  of  the  Bostonians,  the  Cyane 
(which  by  the  way  went  to  New  York  and  not  Bos- 
ton) could  no  more  be  painted  to  look  like  a  36-gun 
frigate  than  a  schooner  could  be  painted  to  look  like  a 
brig.  Instances  of  rancor  like  these  two  occur  constantly 
in  his  work,  and  make  it  very  difficult  to  separate  what 
is  matter  of  fact  from  what  is  matter  of  opinion.  I 
always  rely  on  the  British  official  accounts  when  they 
can  be  reached,  except  in  the  case  of  the  Java,  which 
seem  garbled.  That  such  was  sometimes  the  case  with 
British  officials  is  testified  to  by  both  James  (vol.  iv,  p. 


98  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

Again,  the  armaments  of  the  American  as 
well  as  of  the  British  ships  were  composed  of 
three  very  different  styles  of  guns.  The  first, 
or  long  gun,  was  enormously  long  and  thick- 
barrelled  in  comparison  to  its  bore,  and  in 
consequence  very  heavy  ;  it  possessed  a  very 
long  range,  and  varied  in  calibre  from  two  to 
forty-two  pounds.  The  ordinary  calibres  in 
our  navy  were  6,  9,  12,  18,  and  24.  The  sec- 
ond style  was  the  carronade,  a  short,  light 
gun  of  large  bore  ;  compared  to  a  long  gun  of 
the  same  weight  it  carried  a  much  heavier  ball 
for  a  much  shorter  distance.  The  chief  cali- 
bres were  9,  12,  18,  24,  32,  42,  and  68  pound- 
ers, the  first  and  the  last  being  hardly  in  use  in 
our  navy.  The  third  style  was  the  columbiad, 
of  an  intermediate  grade  between  the  first  two. 
Thus  it  is  seen  that  a  gun  of  one  style  by  no 

17)  and  Brenton  (vol.  ii,  p.  454,  note)  From  the 
"  Memoir  of  Admiral  Broke  "  we  learn  that  his  public 
letter  was  wrong  in  a  number  of  particulars.  See  also 
any  one  of  the  numerous  biographies  of  Lord  Dundon- 
ald,  the  hero  of  the  little  Speedy^s  fight.  It  is  very 
unfortunate  that  the  British  stopped  publishing  official 
accounts  of  their  defeats ;  it  could  not  well  help  giving 
rise  to  unpleasant  suspicions. 

It  may  be  as  well  to  mention  here,  again,  that  James' 
accusations  do  not  really  detract  from  the  interest  at- 
taching to  the  war,  and  its  value  for  purposes  of  study. 
If,  as  he  says,  the  American  commanders  were  cowards, 
and  their  crews  renegades,  it  is  well  worth  while  to 
learn  the  lesson  that  good  training  will  make  such  men 
able  to  beat  brave  officers  with  loyal  crews.  And  why 
did  the  British  have  such  bad  average  crews  as  he 
makes  out  ?  He  says,  for  instance,  that  the  Java's  was 
unusually  bad;  yet  Brenton  says  (vol.  ii,  p.  461)  it  was 
like  "  the  generality  of  our  crews."  It  is  worth  while 
explaining  the  reason  that  such  a  crew  was  generally 
better  than  a  French  and  worse  than  an  American  one. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  99 

means  corresponds  to  a  gun  of  another  style 
of  the  same  calibre.  As  a  rough  example,  a 
long  12,  a  columbiad  18,  and  a  32-pound  car- 
ronade  would  be  about  equivalent  to  one  an- 
other. These  guns  were  mounted  on  two  dif- 
ferent types  of  vessel.  The  first  was  flush- 
decked  ;  that  is,  it  had  a  single  straight  open 
deck  on  which  all  the  guns  were  mounted. 
This  class  included  one  heavy  corvette,  (the 
Adams],  the  ship-sloops,  and  the  brig- sloops. 
Through  the  bow-chase  port,  on  each  side, 
each  of  these  mounted  a  long  gun  ;  the  rest 
of  their  guns  were  carronades,  except  in  the 
case  of  the  Adams,  which  had  all  long  guns. 
Above  these  came  the  frigates,  whose  gun- 
deck  was  covered  above  by  another  deck ;  on 
the  fore  and  aft  parts  (forecastle  and  quarter- 
deck) of  this  upper,  open  deck  were  also 
mounted  guns.  The  main-deck  guns  were  all 
long,  except  on  the  JSssex,  which  had  carron- 
ades ;  on  the  quarter-deck  were  mounted  car- 
ronades, and  on  the  forecastle  also  carronades, 
with  two  long  bow-chasers. 

Where  two  ships  of  similar  armament  fought 
one  another,  it  is  easy  to  get  the  comparative 
force  by  simply  comparing  the  weight  in 
broadsides,  each  side  presenting  very  nearly 
the  same  proportion  of  long  guns  to  carron- 
ades. For  such  a  broadside  we  take  half  the 
guns  mounted  in  the  ordinary  way  ;  and  all 
guns  mounted  on  pivots  or  shifting.  Thus 
Perry's  force  in  guns  was  54  to  Barclay's  63  ; 
yet  each  presented  34  in  broadside.  Again, 
each  of  the  British  brig-sloops  mounted  19 
guns,  presenting  10  in  broadside.  Besides 
these,  some  ships  mounted  bow-chasers  run 


100  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

through  the  bridle-ports,  or  stern-chasers, 
neither  of  which  could  be  used  in  broadsides. 
Nevertheless,  I  include  them,  both  because  it 
works  in  about  an  equal  number  of  cases 
against  each  navy,  and  because  they  were 
sometimes  terribly  effective.  James  excludes 
the  Guerriere's  bow-chaser ;  in  reality  he 
ought  to  have  included  both  it  and  its  fellow, 
as  they  worked  more  damage  than  all  the 
broadside  guns  put  together.  Again,  he  ex- 
cludes the  Endymiorfs  bow-chasers,  though  in 
her  action  they  proved  invaluable.  Yet  he 
includes  those  of  the  Enterprise  and  Argus, 
though  the  former's  were  probably  not  fired. 
So  I  shall  take  the  half  of  the  fixed,  plus  all 
the  movable,  guns  aboard,  in  comparing  broad- 
side force. 

But  the  chief  difficulty  appears  when  guns 
of  one  style  are  matched  against  those  of  an- 
other. If  a  ship  armed  with  long  i2's  meets 
one  armed  with  32-pound  carronades,  which 
is  superior  in  force  ?  At  long  range  the  first, 
and  at  short  range  the  second  ;  and  of  course 
each  captain  is  pretty  sure  to  insist  that  "  cir- 
cumstances "  forced  him  to  fight  at  a  disadvan- 
tage. The  result  would  depend  largely  on  the 
skill  or  luck  of  each  commander  in  choosing 
position. 

One  thing  is  certain  ;  long  guns  are  more 
formidable  than  carronades  of  the  same  cali- 
bre. There  are  exemplifications  of  this  rule 
on  both  sides ;  of  course,  American  writers, 
as  a  rule,  only  pay  attention  to  one  set  of  cases 
and  British  to  the  others.  The  Cyane  and 
Levant  threw  a  heavier  broadside  than  the 
Constitution  but  were  certainly  less  formidably 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  lot 

armed  ;  and  the  Essex  threw  a  heavier  broad- 
side than  the  Phxbe,  yet  was  also  less  formi- 
dable. On  Lake  Ontario  the  American  ship 
General  Pike  threw  less  metal  at  a  broadside 
than  either  of  her  two  chief  antagonists,  but 
neither  could  be  called  her  equal ;  while  on 
Lake  Champlam  a  parallel  case  is  afforded  by 
the  British  ship  Confiance.  Supposing  that 
two  ships  throw  the  same  broadside  weight  of 
metal,  one  from  long  guns,  the  other  from 
carronades,  at  short  range  they  are  equal ;  at 
long,  one  has  it  all  her  own  way.  Her  cap- 
tain thus  certainly  has  a  great  superiority  of 
force,  and  if  he  does  not  take  advantage  of  it 
it  is  owing  to  his  adversary's  skill  or  his  own 
mismanagement.  As  a  mere  approximation, 
it  may  be  assumed,  in  comparing  the  broad- 
sides of  two  vessels  or  squadrons,  that  long 
guns  count  for  at  least  twice  as  much  as  car- 
ronades of  the  same  calibre.  Thus  on  Lake 
Champlain  Captain  Downie  possessed  an  im- 
mense advantage  in  his  long  guns,  which 
Commodore  Macdonough's  exceedingly  good 
arrangements  nullified.  Sometimes  part  of 
the  advantage  may  be  willingly  foregone,  so  as 
to  acquire  some  other.  Had  the  Constitution 
kept  at  long  bowls  with  the  Cyane  and  Levant 
she  could  have  probably  captured  one  without 
any  loss  to  herself,  while  the  other  would 
have  escaped ;  she  preferred  to  run  down 
close  so  as  to  insure  the  capture  of  both, 
knowing  that  even  at  close  quarters  long  guns 
are  somewhat  better  than  short  ones  (not  to 
mention  her  other  advantages  in  thick  scant- 
ling, speed,  etc.).  The  British  carronades 
often  upset  in  action  ;  this  was  either  owing 

14—4  B 


102  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

to  their  having  been  insufficiently  secured, 
and  to  this  remaining  undiscovered  because 
the  men  were  not  exercised  at  the  guns,  or 
else  it  was  because  the  unpractised  sailors 
would  greatly  overcharge  them.  Our  better- 
trained  sailors  on  the  ocean  rarely  committed 
these  blunders,  but  the  less-skilled  crews  on 
the  lakes  did  so  as  often  as  their  antagonists. 
But  while  the  Americans  thus,  as  a  rule,  had 
heavier  and  better-fitted  guns,  they  labored 
under  one  or  two  disadvantages.  Our  found- 
ries were  generally  not  as  good  as  those  of  the 
British,  and  our  guns,  in  consequence,  more 
likely  to  burst ;  it  was  an  accident  of  this  na- 
ture which  saved  the  British  Belvidera;  and 
the  General  Pike,  under  Commodore  Chauncy, 
and  the  new  American  frigate  Guerriere  suf- 
fered in  the  same  way ;  while  often  the  muz- 
zles of  the  guns  would  crack.  A  more  uni- 
versal disadvantage  was  in  the  short  weight  of 
our  shot.  When  Captain  Blakely  sunk  the 
Avon  he  officially  reported  that  her  four  shot 
which  came  aboard  weighed  just  32  pounds 
apiece,  a  pound  and  three-quarters  more  than 
his  heaviest;  this  would  make  his  average  shot 
about  2^  pounds  less,  or  rather  over  7  per 
cent.  Exactly  similar  statements  were  made 
by  the  officers  of  the  Constitution  in  her  three 
engagements.  Thus  when  she  fought  ihe/ava, 
she  threw  at  a  broadside,  as  already  stated, 
704  pounds  ;  ih&Java  mounted  28  long  i8's, 
18  32-pound  carronades,  2  long  i2's,  and  one 
shifting  24-pound  carronade,  a  broadside  of 
576  pounds.  Yet  by  the  actual  weighing  of 
all  the  different  shot  on  both  sides  it  was 
found  that  the  difference  in  broadside  force 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  103 

was  only  about  77  pounds,  or  the  Constitution's 
shot  were  about  7  per  cent,  short  weight.  The 
long  24/5  of  the  United  States  each  threw  a 
shot  but  4^  pounds  heavier  than  the  long  i8's 
of  the  Macedonian ;  here  again  the  difference 
was  about  7  per  cent.  The  same  difference 
existed  in  favor  of  the  Penguin  and  Epervier 
compared  with  the  Wasp  and  Hornet.  Mr. 
Fenimore  Cooper1  weighed  a  great  number  of 
shot  some  time  after  the  war.  The  later  cast- 
ings, even,  weighed  nearly  5  per  cent,  less 
than  the  British  shot,  and  some  of  the  older 
ones,  about  9  per  cent.  The  average  is  safe 
to  take  at  7  per  cent,  less,  and  I  shall  through- 
out make  this  allowance  for  ocean  cruisers. 
The  deficit  was  sometimes  owing  to  windage, 
but  more  often  the  shot  was  of  full  size  but 
defective  in  density.  The  effect  of  this  can 
be  gathered  from  the  following  quotation  from 
the  work  of  a  British  artillerist :  "  The  greater 
the  density  of  shot  of  like  calibres,  projected 
with  equal  velocity  and  elevation,  the  greater 
the  range,  accuracy,  and  penetration."*  This 
defectiveness  in  density  might  be  a  serious  in- 
jury in  a  contest  at  a  long  distance,  but  would 
make  but  little  difference  at  close  quarters 
(although  it  may  have  been  partly  owing  to 
their  short  weight  that  so  many  of  the  Chesa- 
peake's  shot  failed  to  penetrate  the  Shannon's 

1  See  Naval  History,"  i,  p.  380. 

2  "  Heavy  Ordnance,"  Captain  T.  F.  Simmons,  R.  A., 
London,   1837.      James    supposes  that  the   "  Yankee 
captains "  have  in   each  case  hunted  round  till  they 
could  get  particularly  small   American  shot  to  weigh  ; 
and  also  denies  that  short  weight  is  a  disadvantage. 
The  last  proposition  carried  out  logically  would  lead 
to  some  rather  astonishing  results. 


104  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

hull).  Thus  in  the  actions  with  the  Macedon- 
ian and  Java  the  American  frigates  showed 
excellent  practice  when  the  contest  was  carried 
on  within  fair  distance,  while  their  first  broad- 
sides at  long  range  went  very  wild ;  but  in  the 
case  of  the  Guertiere,  the  Constitution  reserved 
her  fire  for  close  quarters,  and  was  probably 
not  at  all  affected  by  the  short  weight  of  her 
shot. 

As  to  the  officers  and  crew  of  a  44-gun 
frigate,  the  following  was  the  regular  comple- 
ment established  by  law :  ' 


1  captain, 

4  lieutenants, 

2  lieutenants  of  marines, 
2  sailing-masters, 

2  master's  mates, 
7  midshipmen, 

1  boatswain, 

2  boatswain's  mates 


purser, 
surgeon, 
surgeon's  mates, 
clerk, 
carpenter, 
carpenter's  mates, 
cook, 
chaplain. 


yeoman  of  gun-room, 

gunner,  50 

i     quarter  gunners,  120  able  seamen, 

coxswain,  1 50  ordinary  seamen, 

sailmaker,  30  boys, 

cooper,  50  marines. 

steward,  

armorer,  400  in  all. 
master  of  arms, 

An  i8-gun  ship  had  32  officers  and  petty 
officers,  30  able  seamen,  46  ordinary  seamen, 
12  boys,  and  20  marines — 140  in  all.  Some- 
times ships  put  to  sea  without  their  full  com- 
plements (as  in  the  case  of  the  first  Wasp]t 
but  more  often  with  supernumeraries  aboard. 
The  weapons  for  close  quarters  were  pikes, 
cutlasses,  and  a  few  axes  ;  while  the  marines 

1  See  State  Papers,  vol.  xiv,  159  (Washington,  1834). 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  105 

and  some  of  the  topmen  and  muskets,  and 
occasionally  rifles. 

In  comparing  the  forces  of  the  contestants 
I  have  always  given  the  number  of  men  in 
crew ;  but  thisdn  most  cases  was  unnecessary. 
When  there  were  plenty  of  men  to  handle  the 
guns,  trim  the  sails,  make  repairs,  act  as  ma- 
rines, etc.,  any  additional  number  simply 
served  to  increase  the  slaughter  on  board. 
The  Guerriere  undoubtedly  suffered  from  being 
short-handed,  but  neither  the  Macedonian  nor 
Java  would  have  been  benefited  by  the  pres- 
ence of  a  hundred  additional  men.  Barclay 
possessed  about  as  many  men  as  Perry,  but 
this  did  not  give  him  an  equality  of  force. 
The  Penguin  and  Frolic  would  have  been  taken 
just  as  surely  had  the  Hornet  and  Wasp  had 
a  dozen  men  less  apiece  than  they  did.  The 
principal  case  where  numbers  would  help 
would  be  in  a  hand-to-hand  fight.  Thus  the 
Chesapeake  having  fifty  more  men  than  the 
Shannon  ought  to  have  been  successful ;  but 
she  was  not,  because  the  superiority  of  her 
crew  in  numbers  was  more  than  counter- 
balanced by  the  superiority  of  the  Shannon's 
crew  in  other  respects.  The  result  of  the 
battle  of  Lake  Champlain,  which  was  fought 
at  anchor,  with  the  fleets  too  far  apart  for 
musketry  to  reach,  was  not  in  the  slightest 
degree  affected  by  the  number  of  men  on 
either  side,  as  both  combatants  had  amply 
enough  to  manage  the  guns  and  perform  every 
other  service. 

In  all  these  conflicts  the  courage  of  both 
parties  is  taken  for  granted;  it  was  not  so 
much  a  factor  in  gaining  the  victory,  as  one 


106  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

which  if  lacking  was  fatal  to  all  chances  of 
success.  In  the  engagements  between  regular 
cruisers,  not  a  single  one  was  gained  by  supe- 
riority in  courage.  The  crews  of  both  the 
Argus  and  Epervier  certainly  flinched  ;  but 
had  they  fought  never  so  bravely  they  were 
too  unskilful  to  win.  The  Chesapeake 's  crew 
could  hardly  be  said  to  lack  courage  ;  it  was 
more  that  they  were  inferior  to  their  opponents 
in  discipline  as  well  as  in  skill. 

There  was  but  one  conflict  during  the  war 
where  the  victory  could  be  said  to  be  owing 
to  superiority  in  pluck.  This  was  when  the 
Neufchatel  privateer  beat  off  the  boats  of  the 
Endymion.  The  privateersmen  suffered  a 
heavier  proportional  loss  than  their  assailants, 
and  they  gained  the  victory  by  sheer  ability 
to  stand  punishment. 

For  convenience  in  comparing  them  I  give 
in  tabulated  form  the  force  of  the  three  Brit- 
ish 38*5  taken  by  American  44*3  (allowing  for 
short  weight  of  metal  of  latter). 

CONSTITUTION.  GUERRIERE. 

30  long  24's,  30  long  i8's, 

2  long  24*3,  2  long  i2's, 

22  short  32's.  16  short  32's, 

i  short  18. 


Broadside,  nominal,  736  Ibs. 


real,  684  Ibs.  Broadside,  556  Ibs. 

UNITED   STATES.  MACEDONIAN. 

30  long  24's,  28  long  i8's, 

2  long  24*8,  2longi2's, 

22  short  42*3,  2  long  g's, 

1 6  short  32*5, 


Broadside,  nominal,  846  Ibs.  i  short  18. 

real,  786  Ibs. 


Broadside,  547  Ibs. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  107 

CONSTITUTION.  JAVA. 

30  long  24*3,  28  long  i8's, 

2  long  24*3,  2  long  12*8, 

20  short  32*3.  18  short  32*3, 

i  short  24. 


Broadside,  nominal,  704  Ibs. 

real,  654  Ibs.  Broadside,  576  Ibs. 

The  smallest  line-of-battle  ship,  the  74, 
with  only  long  i8's  on  the  second  deck,  was 
armed  as  follows  : 

28  long    32*8, 
28    "        i8's, 

6  "          I2'S, 

14  short  32*8, 

7  "       i8's, 

or  a  broadside  of  1,032  Ibs.,  736  from  long 
guns,  296  from  carronades  ;  while  the  Consti- 
tution threw  (in  reality)  684  Ibs.,  356  from 
long  guns,  and  328  from  her  carronades,  and 
the  United  States  102  Ibs.  more  from  her  car- 
ronades. Remembering  the  difference  be- 
tween long  guns  and  carronades,  and  con- 
sidering sixteen  of  the  74's  long  i8's  as  being 
replaced  by  42-pound  carronades  '  (so  as  to 
get  the  metal  on  the  ships  distributed  in 
similar  proportions  between  the  two  styles  of 
cannon),  we  get  as  the  74*5  broadside  592 
Ibs.  from  long  guns,  and  632  from  carronades. 
The  United  States  threw  nominally  360  and 

1  That  this  change  would  leave  the  force  about  as  it 
was,  can  be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  the  Adams  and 
John  Adams,  both  of  which  had  been  aimed  with  42- 
pound  carronades  (which  were  sent  to  Sackett's  Har- 
bor), had  them  replaced  by  long  and  medium  18- 
pounders,  these  being  considered  to  be  more  formi- 
dable ;  so  that  the  substitution  of  42-pound  carronades 
would,  if  anything,  reduce  the  force  of  the  74. 


108  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

486,  and  the  Constitution  nominally  360  and 
352 ;  so  the  74  was  superior  even  to  the 
former  nominally  about  as  three  is  to  two ; 
while  the  Constitution,  if  "a  line-of-battle 
ship,"  was  disguised  to  such  a  degree  that 
she  was  in  reality  of  but  little  more  than  one 
half  the  force  of  one  of  the  smallest  true  liners 
England  possessed  1 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  109 


CHAPTER  IIL 
1812. 

ON    THE    OCEAN. 

Commodore  Rodgers'  cruise  and  unsuccessful  chase 
of  the  Belvidera — Cruise  of  the  Essex — Captain  Hull's 
cruise,  and  escape  from  the  squadron  of  Commodore 
Broke — Constitution  captures  Guerriere — Wasp  cap- 
tures Frolic — Second  unsuccessful  cruise  of  Commo- 
dore Rodgers — United  States  captures  Macedonian- 
Constitution  captures  Java — Essex  starts  on  a  cruise — 
Summary. 

AT  the  time  of  the  declaration  of  war,  June 
18,  1812,  the  American  navy  was  but 
partially  prepared  for  effective  service.  The 
Wasp,  1 8,  was  still  at  sea,  on  her  return 
voyage  from  France  ;  the  Constellation,  38,  was 
lying  in  the  Chesapeake  river,  unable  to  re- 
receive  a  crew  for  several  months  to  come ; 
the  Chesapeake,  38,  was  lying  in  a  similar  con- 
dition in  Boston  harbor;  the  Adams,  28,  was 
at  Washington,  being  cut  down  and  length- 
ened from  a  frigate  into  a  corvette.  These 
three  cruisers  were  none  of  them  fit  to  go  to 
sea  till  after  the  end  of  the  year.  The  Essex, 
32,  was  in  New  York  harbor,  but,  having  some 
repairs  to  make,  was  not  yet  ready  to  put  out. 
The  Constitution,  44,  was  at  Annapolis,  with- 
out all  of  her  stores,  and  engaged  in  shipping 
a  new  crew,  the  time  of  the  old  one  being  up. 


HO  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

The  Nautilus,  14,  was  cruising  off  New  Jersey, 
and  the  other  small  brigs  were  also  off  the 
coast.  The  only  vessels  immediately  avail- 
able were  those  under  the  command  of  Com- 
modore Rodgers,  at  New  York,  consisting  of 
his  own  ship,  the  President,  44,  and  of  the 
United  States,  44,  Commodore  Decatur,  Con- 
gress, 38,  Captain  Smith,  Hornet,  18,  Captain 
Lawrence,  and  Argus,  16,  Lieut.  Sinclair.  It 
seems  marvellous  that  any  nation  should  have 
permitted  its  ships  to  be  so  scattered,  and 
many  of  them  in  such  an  unfit  condition,  at 
the  beginning  of  hostilities.  The  British 
vessels  cruising  off  the  coast  were  not  at  that 
time  very  numerous  or  formidable,  consisting 
of  the  Africa,  64,  Acasta,  40,  Shannon,  38, 
Guerriere,T$,  Belvidera,  ^,^Eolus,  32,  South- 
ampton, 32,  and  Minerva,  32,  with  a  nujnber 
of  corvettes  and  sloops  ;  their  force  was,  how- 
ever, strong  enough  to  render  it  impossible 
for  Commodore  Rodgers  to  make  any  attempt 
on  the  coast  towns  of  Canada  or  the  West 
Indies.  But  the  homeward  bound  plate  fleet 
had  sailed  from  Jamaica  on  May  2oth,  and 
was  only  protected  by  the  Thalia,  36,  Capt. 
Vashon,  and  Reindeer,  18,  Capt.  Manners. 
Its  capture  or  destruction  would  have  been  a 
serious  blow,  and  one  which  there  seemed  a 
good  chance  of  striking,  as  the  fleet  would 
have  to  pass  along  the  American  coast,  run- 
ning with  the  Gulf  Stream.  Commodore 
Rodgers  had  made  every  preparation,  in  ex- 
pectation of  war  being  declared,  and  an  hour 
after  official  intelligence  of  it,  together  with 
his  instructions,  had  been  received,  his  squad- 
ron put  to  sea,  on  June  2ist,  and  ran  off  to- 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  in 

ward  the  south-east '  to  get  at  the  Jamaica 
ships.  Having  learned  from  an  American 
brig  that  she  had  passed  the  plate  fleet  four 
days  before  in  lat.  36°  N.,  long.  67°  W.,  the 
Commodore  made  all  sail  in  that  direction. 
At  6  A.  M.  on  June  23d  a  sail  was  made  out  in 
the  N.  E. ,  which  proved  to  be  the  British  fri- 
gate Belvidera,  36,  Capt.  Richard  Byron."  The 
latter  had  sighted  some  of  Commodore  Rod- 
gers'  squadron  some  time  before,  and  stood 
toward  them,  till  at  6.30  she  made  out  the 
three  largest  ships  to  be  frigates.  Having 
been  informed  of  the  likelihood  of  war  by  a 
New  York  pilot  boat,  the  Belvidera  now  stood 
away,  going  N.  E.  by  E.,  the  wind  being  fresh 
from  the  west.  The  Americans  made  all  sail 
in  chase,  the  President,  a  very  fast  ship  off 
the  wind,  leading,  and  the  Congress  coming 
next."  At  noon  the  President  bore  S.  W.,  dis- 
tant 2  3-4  miles  from  the  Belvidera,  Nan- 
tucket  shoals  bearing  100  miles  N.  and  48 
miles  E.3  The  wind  grew  lighter,  shifting 
more  toward  the  southwest,  while  the  ships 
continued  steadily  in  their  course,  going  N.  E. 
by  E.  As  the  President  kept  gaining,  Captain 
Byron  cleared  his  ship  for  action,  and  shifted 
to  the  stern  ports  two  long  eighteen  pounders 
on  the  main-deck  and  two  thirty-two  pound 
carronades  on  the  quarter-deck. 

At  4. 30  *  the  Presidents  starboard  forecastle 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  John  Rodgers  to  the  Secre- 
tary of  the  Navy,  Sept.  I,  1812. 

2  Brenton,  v.  46 

3  Log  of  Belvidera,  June  23,  1812. 

4  Cooper,  ii,  151.    According  to  James,  vi,  117,  the 
President  was  then  600  yards  distant  from  the  Belv* 
dera  half  a  point  on  her  weather  or  port  quarter. 


112  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

bow-gun  was  fired  by  Commodore  Rodgers 
himself ;  the  corresponding  main-deck  gun 
was  next  discharged,  and  then  Commodore 
Rodgers  fired  again.  These  three  shots  all 
struck  the  stern  of  the  Belvidera,  killing  and 
wounding  nine  men, — one  of  them  went 
through  the  rudder  coat,  into  the  after  gun- 
room, the  other  two  into  the  captain's  cabin. 
A  few  more  such  shots  would  have  rendered 
the  Belvidera's  capture  certain,  but  when  the 
Presidents  main-deck  gun  was  discharged  for 
the  second  time  it  burst,  blowing  up  the  fore- 
castle deck  and  killing  and  wounding  16  men, 
among  them  the  Commodore  himself,  whose 
leg  was  broken.  This  saved  the  British  frig- 
ate. Such  an  explosion  always  causes  a 
half  panic,  every  gun  being  at  once  suspected. 
In  the  midst  of  the  confusion  Captain  Byron's 
stern-chasers  opened  with  spirit  and  effect, 
killing  or  wounding  six  men  more.  Had  the 
President  still  pushed  steadily  on,  only  using 
her  bow-chasers  until  she  closed  abreast, 
which  she  could  probably  have  done,  the  Bel- 
videra  could  still  have  been  taken ;  but,  in- 
stead, the  former  now  bore  up  and  fired  her 
port  broadside,  cutting  her  antagonist's  rig- 
ging slightly,  but  doing  no  other  damage, 
while  the  Belvidera  kept  up  a  brisk  and  gall- 
ing fire,  although  the  long  bolts,  breeching- 
hooks,  and  breechings  of  the  guns  now  broke 
continually,  wounding  several  of  the  men, 
including  Captain  Byron.  The  President  had 
lost  ground  by  yawing,  but  she  soon  regained 
it,  and,  coming  up  closer  than  before,  again 
opened  from  her  bow-chasers  a  well-directed 
fire,  which  severely  wounded  her  opponent's 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  113 

main-top  mast,  cross-jack  yard,  and  one  or 
two  other  spars ; '  but  shortly  afterward  she 
repeated  her  former  tactics  and  again  lost 
ground  by  yawing  to  discharge  another  broad- 
side, even  more  ineffectual  than  the  first. 
Once  more  she  came  up  closer  than  ever,  and 
once  more  yawed ;  the  single  shots  from  her 
bow-chasers  doing  considerable  damage,  but 
her  raking  broadsides  none.8  Meanwhile  the 
active  crew  of  the  Belvidera  repaired  every- 
thing as  fast  as  it  was  damaged,  while  under 
the  superintendence  of  Lieutenants  Sykes, 
Bruce,  and  Campbell,  no  less  than  300  shot 
were  fired  from  her  stern  guns."  Finding 
that  if  the  President  ceased  yawing  she  could 
essily  run  alongside,  Captain  Byron  cut  away 
one  bower,  one  stream,  and  two  sheet  an- 
chors, the  barge,  yawl,  gig,  and  jolly  boat, 
and  started  14  tons  of  water.  The  effect  of 
this  was  at  once  apparent,  and  she  began  to 
gain  ;  meanwhile  the  damage  the  sails  of  the 
combatants  had  received  had  enabled  the 
Congress  to  close,  and  when  abreast  of  his 
consort  Captain  Smith  opened  with  his  bow- 
chasers,  but  the  shot  fell  short.  The  Belvi- 
dera soon  altered  her  course  to  east  by  south, 
set  her  starboard  studding-sails,  and  by  mid- 
night was  out  of  danger  ;  and  three  days 
afterward  reached  Halifax  harbor. 

Lord  Howard  Douglass'  criticisms  on  this 
encounter  seem  very  just.     He  says  that  the 

1  James,  vi,  1 19.     He  says  the  President  was  within 
400  yards. 

2  Lord  Howard  Douglass,  "  Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  419 
(third  edition). 

8  James,  vi,  1 18. 


114  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

President  opened  very  well  with  her  bow 
chasers  (in  fact  the  Americans  seemed  to  have 
aimed  better  and  to  have  done  more  execu- 
tion with  these  guns  than  the  British  with 
their  stern-chasers ;  but  that  she  lost  so 
much  ground  by  yawing  and  delivering  harm- 
less broadsides  as  to  enable  her  antagonist  to 
escape.  Certainly  if  it  had  not  been  for  the 
time  thus  lost  to  no  purpose,  the  Commodore 
would  have  run  alongside  his  opponent,  and 
the  fate  of  the  little  36  would  have  been  sealed. 
On  the  other  hand  it  must  be  remembered 
that  it  was  only  the  bursting  of  the  gun  on 
board  the  President,  causing  such  direful  con- 
fusion and  loss,  and  especially  harmful  in  dis- 
abling her  commander,  that  gave  the  Belvi- 
dera  any  chance  of  escape  at  all.  At  any 
rate,  whether  the  American  frigate  does,  or 
does  not,  deserve  blame,  Captain  Byron  and 
his  crew  do  most  emphatically  deserve  praise 
for  the  skill  with  which  their  guns  were 
served  and  repairs  made,  the  coolness  with 
which  measures  to  escape  were  adopted,  and 
the  courage  with  which  they  resisted  so  supe- 
rior a  force.  On  this  occasion  Captain  Byron 
showed  himself  as  good  a  seaman  and  as 
brave  a  man  as  he  subsequently  proved  a 
humane  and  generous  enemy  when  engaged 
in  the  blockade  of  the  Chesapeake.1 

This  was  not  a  very  auspicious  opening  of 
hostilities  for  America.  The  loss  of  the  Bel- 

1  Even  Niles,  unscrupulously  bitter  as  he  is  toward 
the  British,  does  justice  to  the  humanity  of  Captains 
Byron  and  Hardy — which  certainly  shone  in  compari- 
son to  some  of  the  rather  buccaneering  exploits  of 
Cockburn's  followers  in  Chesapeake  Bay. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  115 

indera  was  not  the  only  thing  to  be  regretted, 
for  the  distance  the  chase  took  the  pur- 
suers out  of  their  course  probably  saved  the 
plate  fleet.  When  the  Belvidera  was  first 
made  out,  Commodore  Rodgers  was  in  lati- 
tude 39°  26'  N.,  and  longitude  71°  10'  W.,  at 
noon  the  same  day  the  Thalia  and  her 
convoy  were  in  latitude  39°  N.,  longitude  62° 
W.  Had  they  not  chased  the  Belvidera  the 
Americans  would  probably  have  run  across 
the  plate  fleet. 

The  American  squadron  reached  the  west- 
ern edge  of  the  Newfoundland  Banks  on  June 
29th,1  and  on  July  ist,  a  little  to  the  east  of 
the  Banks,  fell  in  with  large  quantities  of 
cocoa-nut  shells,  orange  peels,  etc.,  which 
filled  every  one  with  great  hopes  of  overtaking 
the  quarry.  On  July  9th,  the  Hornet  captured 
a  British  privateer,  in  latitude  45°  30'  N.,  and 
longitude  23°  W.,  and  her  master  reported 
that  he  had  seen  the  Jamaica-men  the  pre- 
vious evening ;  but  nothing  further  was  heard 
or  seen  of  them,  and  on  July  i3th,  being 
within  twenty  hours'  sail  of  the  English  Chan- 
nel, Commodore  Rodgers  reluctantly  turned 
southward,  reaching  Madeira  July  2ist. 
Thence  he  cruised  toward  the  Azores  and  by 
the  Grand  Banks  home,  there  being  consider- 
able sickness  on  the  ships.  On  August  3  ist 
he  reached  Boston  after  a  very  unfortunate 
cruise,  in  which  he  had  made  but  seven  prizes, 
all  merchant-men,  and  had  recaptured  one 
American  vessel. 

On  July  3d  the  Essex,  32,  Captain  David 
Porter,  put  out  of  New  York.  As  has  been 
1  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Sept.  ist. 


n6  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

already  explained  she  was  most  inefficiently 
armed,  almost  entirely  with  carronades.  This 
placed  her  at  the  mercy  of  any  frigate  with 
long  guns  which  could  keep  at  a  distance  of  a 
few  hundred  yards ;  but  in  spite  of  Captain 
Porter's  petitions  and  remonstrances  he  was 
not  allowed  to  change  his  armament.  On  the 
nth  of  July  at  2  A.  M.,  latitude  33°  N.,  long- 
itude 66°  W.,  the  Essex  fell  in  with  the  Mi- 
nerva, 32,  Captain  Richard  Hawkins,  convoy- 
ing seven  transports,  each  containing  about 
200  troops,  bound  from  Barbadoes  to  Quebec. 
The  convoy  was  sailing  in  open  order,  and, 
there  being  a  dull  moon,  the  Essex  ran  in  and 
cut  out  transport  No.  299,  with  197  soldiers 
aboard.  Having  taken  out  the  soldiers,  Cap- 
tain Porter  stood  back  to  the  convoy,  expect- 
ing Captain  Hawkins  to  come  out  and  fight 
him ;  but  this  the  latter  would  not  do,  keep- 
ing the  convoy  in  close  order  around  him. 
The  transports  were  all  armed  and  still  con- 
tained in  the  aggregate  1,200  .soldiers.  As 
the  Essex  could  only  fight  at  close  quarters 
these  heavy  odds  rendered  it  hopeless  for  her 
to  try  to  cut  out  the  Minerva.  Her  carron- 
ades would  have  to  be  used  at  short  range  to 
be  effective,  and  it  would  of  course  have  been 
folly  to  run  in  right  among  the  convoy,  and 
expose  herself  to  the  certainty  of  being 
boarded  by  five  times  as  many  men  as  she 
possessed.  The  Minerva  had  three  less  guns 
a  side,  and  on  her  spar-deck  carried  24-pound 
carronades  instead  of  32*5,  and,  moreover, 
had  fifty  men  less  than  the  Essex,  which  had 
about  270  men  this  cruise;  on  the  other  hand, 
her  main-deck  was  armed  with  long  i2's,  so 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  117 

that  it  is  hard  to  say  whether  she  did  right  or 
not  in  refusing  to  fight.  She  was  of  the  same 
force  as  the  Southampton,  whose  captain,  Sir 
James  Lucas  Yeo,  subsequently  challenged 
Porter,  but  never  appointed  a  meeting-place. 
In  the  event  of  a  meeting,  the  advantage,  in 
ships  of  such  radically  different  armaments, 
would  have  been  with  that  captain  who  suc- 
ceeded in  outmanoeuvring  the  other  and  in 
making  the  fight  come  off  at  the  distance  best 
suited  to  himself.  At  long  range  either  the 
Minerva  or  Southampton  would  possess  an 
immense  superiority  ;  but  if  Porter  could  have 
contrived  to  run  up  within  a  couple  of  hundred 
yards,  or  still  better,  to  board,  his  superiority 
in  weight  of  metal  and  number  of  men  would 
have  enabled  him  to  carry  either  of  them. 
Porter's  crew  was  better  trained  for  boarding 
than  almost  any  other  American  commander's ; 
and  probably  none  of  the  British  frigates  on 
the  American  station,  except  the  Shannon  and 
Tenedos,  would  have  stood  a  chance  with  the 
Essex  in  a  hand-to-hand  struggle.  Among 
her  youngest  midshipmen  was  one,  by  name 
David  Glasgow  Farragut,  then  but  thirteen 
years  old,  who  afterward  became  the  first  and 
greatest  admiral  of  the  United  States.  His 
own  words  on  this  point  will  be  read  with  in- 
terest. "  Every  day,"  he  says,1  "  the  crew 
were  exercised  at  the  great  guns,  small  arms, 
and  single  stick.  And  I  may  here  mention 
the  fact  that  I  have  never  been  on  a  ship 
where  the  crew  of  the  old  Essex  was  repre- 

1  "  Life  of  Farragut "  (embodying  his  journal  and 
letters),  p.  31.  By  his  son,  Loyall  Farragut,  New  York, 
1879. 


Ii8  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

sented  but  that  I  found  them  to  be  the  best 
swordsmen  on  board.  They  had  been  so 
thoroughly  trained  as  boarders  that  every 
man  was  prepared  for  such  an  emergency, 
with  his  cutlass  as  sharp  as  a  razor,  a  dirk 
made  by  the  ship's  armorer  out  of  a  file,  and 
a  pistol."  ' 

On  August  i3th  a  sail  was  made  out  to 
windward,  which  proved  to  be  the  British 
ship-sloop  Alert,  16,  Captain  T.  L.  O.  Laug- 
harne,  carrying  20  eighteen-pound  carronades 
and  100  men.2  As  soon  as  the  Essex  dis- 

1  James  says  :  "  Had  Captain  Porter  really  endeav- 
ored to  bring  the  Minerva  to  action  we  do  not  see 
what  could  have  prevented  the  Essex,  with  her  supe- 
riority of  sailing,  from  coming  alongside  of  her.     But 
no  such  thought,  we  are  sure,  entered  into  Captain 
Porter's  head."     What  "prevented   the  Essex"  was 
the  Minerva's  not  venturing  out  of  the  convoy.     Far- 
ragut,  in  his  journal,  writes :  "  The  captured  British 
officers  were  very  anxious  for  us  to  have  a  fight  with 
the  Minerva,  as  they  considered  her  a  good  match  for 
the  Essex,  and  Captain  Porter  replied  that  he  should 
gratify  them  with  pleasure  if  his  majesty's  commander 
was  of  their  taste.     So  we  stood  toward  the  convoy  and 
when  within  gunshot  hove  to,  and  awaited  the  Minerva, 
but  she  tacked  and  stood  in  among  the  convoy,  to  the 
utter  amazement  of  our  prisoners,  who  denounced  the 
commander  as   a  base   coward,  and   expressed   their 
determination  to  report  him  to  the  Admiralty."     An 
incident  of  reported  "  flinching  "  like  this  is  not  worth 
mentioning;  I  allude  to  it  only  to  show  the  value  of 
James'  sneers. 

2  James  (History,  vi,  p.  128)  says  "86  men."     In  the 
Naval   Archives   at    Washington   in   the    "  Captains' 
Letters"  for  1812  (vol.  ii,  No.  182)  can  be  found  en- 
closed in  Porter's  letter  the  parole  of  the  officers  and 
crew  of  the  Alert  signed  by   Captain   Laugharne ;  it 
contains  either  100  or  101  names  of  the  crew  of  the 
Alert  besides  those  of  a  number  of  other  prisoners 
sent  back  in  the  same  cartel. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  119 

covered  the  Alert  she  put  out  drags  astern, 
and  led  the  enemy  to  believe  she  was  trying 
to  escape  by  sending  a  few  men  aloft  to  shake 
out  the  reefs  and  make  sail.  Concluding  the 
frigate  to  be  a  merchant-man,  the  Alert  bore 
down  on  her ;  while  the  Americans  went  to 
quarters  and  cleared  for  action,  although  the 
tompions  were  left  in  the  guns,  and  the  ports 
kept  closed.1  The  Alert  fired  a  gun  and  the 
Essex  hove  to,  when  the  former  passed  under 
her  stern,  and  when  on  her  lee  quarter  poured 
in  a  broadside  of  grape  and  canister ;  but  the 
sloop  was  so  far  abaft  the  frigate's  beam  that 
her  shot  did  not  enter  the  ports  and  caused 
no  damage.  Thereupon  Porter  put  up  his 
helm  and  opened  as  soon  as  his  guns  would 
bear,  tompions  and  all.  The  Alert  now  dis- 
covered her  error  and  made  off,  but  too  late, 
for  in  eight  minutes  the  Essex  was  alongside, 
and  the  Alert  fired  a  musket  and  struck,  three 
men  being  wounded  and  several  feet  of  water 
in  the  hold.  She  was  disarmed  and  sent  as  a 
cartel  into  St.  Johns.  It  has  been  the  fashion 
among  American  writers  to  speak  of  her  as  if 
she  were  "  unworthily  "  given  up,  but  such  an 
accusation  is  entirely  groundless.  The  Essex 
was  four  times  her  force,  and  all  that  could 
possibly  be  expected  of  her  was  to  do  as  she 
did — exchange  broadsides  and  strike,  having 
suffered  some  loss  and  damage.  The  Essex 
returned  to  New  York  on  September  yth,  hav- 
ing made  10  prizes,  containing  423  men.2 

1  "  Life  of  Farragut,"  p.  16. 

2  Before  entering  New  York  the  Essex  fell  in  with 
a  British  force  which,  in  both  Porter's  and  Farragut 's 
works,  is  said  to  have  been  composed  of  the  Acasta 


120  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

The  Belvidera,  as  has  been  stated,  carried 
the  news  of  the  war  to  Halifax.  On  July  5th 
Vice-Admiral  Sawyer  despatched  a  squadror 
to  cruise  against  the  United  States,  com- 
manded by  Philip  Vere  Broke,  of  the  Shan- 
non, 38,  having  under  him  the  Belvidera,  36, 
Captain  Richard  Byron,  Africa,  64,  Captain 
John  Bastard,  and  sEolns,  32,  Captain  Lord 
James  Townsend.  On  the  gth,  while  off  Nan- 
tucket,  they  were  joined  by  the  Guerriere,  38, 
Captain  James  Richard  Dacres.  On  the  i6th 
the  squadron  fell  in  with  and  captured  the 
United  States  brig  Nautilus,  14,  Lieutenant 
Crane,  which,  like  all  the  little  brigs,  was 
overloaded  with  guns  and  men.  She  threw 
her  lee  guns  overboard  and  made  use  of  every 
expedient  to  escape,  but  to  no  purpose.  At 
3  P.  M.  of  the  following  day,  when  the  British 
ships  were  abreast  of  Barnegat,  about  four 
leagues  off  shore,  a  strange  sail  was  seen  and 
immediately  chased,  in  the  south  by  east,  or 
windward  quarter,  standing  to  the  northeast. 
This  was  the  United  States  frigate  Constitu- 
tion, 44,  Captain  Isaac  Hull.1  When  the  war 
broke  out  he  was  in  the  Chesapeake  River 

and  Shannon,  each  of  fifty  guns,  and  Ringdove,  of 
twenty.  James  says  it  was  the  Shannon,  accompanied 
by  a  merchant  vessel.  It  is  not  a  point  of  much  im- 
portance, as  nothing  came  of  the  meeting,  and  the 
Shannon,  alone.with  her  immensely  superior  armament, 
ought  to  have  been  a  match  twice  over  for  the  Essex  ; 
although,  if  James  is  right,  as  seems  probable,  it  gives 
rather  a  comical  turn  to  Porter's  account  of  his  "  ex- 
traordinary escape." 

1  For  the  ensuing  chase  I  have  relied  mainly  on 
Cooper;  see  also  "  Memoir  of  Admiral  Broke,"  p.  240; 
James,  vi,  133;  and  Marshall's  "Naval  Biography" 
(London,  1825),  ii,  625. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  12 1 

getting  a  new  crew  aboard.  Having  shipped 
over  450  men  (counting  officers),  he  put  out 
of  harbor  on  the  i2th  of  July.  His  crew  was 
entirely  new,  drafts  of  men  coming  on  board 
up  to  the  last  moment.1  On  the  i7th,  at  2 
p.  M.  ,  Hull  discovered  four  sail,  in  the  north- 
ern board,  heading  to  the  westward.  At  3, 
the  wind  being  very  light,  the  Constitution 
made  sail  and  tacked,  in  i8X  fathoms.  At  4, 
in  the  N.  E.,  a  fifth  sail  appeared,  which  after- 
ward proved  to  be  the  Guerriere.  The  first 
four  ships  bore  N.  N.  W.,  and  were  all  on  the 
starboard  tack ;  while  by  6  o'clock  the  fifth 
bore  E.  N.  E  At  6. 15  the  wind  shifted  and 
blew  lightly  from  the  south,  bringing  the 
American  ship  to  windward.  She  then  wore 
round  with  her  head  to  the  eastward,  set  her 
light  studding-sails  and  stay-sails,  and  at  7.30 
beat  to  action,  intending  to  speak  the  nearest 
vessel,  the  Guerriere.  The  two  frigates  neared 
one  another  gradually  and  at  10  the  Constitu- 
tion began  making  signals,  which  she  continued 
for  over  an  hour.  At  3.30  A.  M.  on  the  i8th 
the  Guerriere,  going  gradually  toward  the  Con- 
stitution on  the  port  tack,  and  but  one  half 
mile  distant,  discovered  on  her  lee  beam  the 
Belvidera  and  the  other  British  vessels,  and 
signalled  to  them.  They  did  not  answer  the 

1  In  a  letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  ("  Captains' 
Letters,"  1812,  ii,  No.  85),  Hull,  after  speaking  of  the 
way  his  men  were  arriving,  says :  "  The  crew  are  as  yet 
unacquainted  with  a  ship  of  war,  as  many  have  but 
lately  joined  and  have  never  been  on  an  armed  ship 
before.  *  *  *  We'  are  doing  all  that  we  can  to 
make  them  acquainted  with  their  duty,  and  in  a  few 
days  we  shall  have  nothing  to  fear  from  any  single- 
decked  ship." 


122  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

signals,  thinking  she  must  know  who  they 
were — a  circumstance  which  afterward  gave 
rise  to  sharp  recriminations  among  the  cap- 
tains— and  Dacres,  concluding  them  to  be 
Commodore  Rodgers'  squadron,  tacked,  and 
then  wore  round  and  stood  away  from  the 
Constitution  for  some  time  before  discovering 
his  mistake. 

At  5  A.  M.  Hull  had  just  enough  steerage 
way  on  to  keep  his  head  to  the  east,  on  the 
starboard  tack;  on  his  lee  quarter,  bearing 
N.  E.  by  N.,  were  the  Belvidera  and  Guerriere 
and  astern  the  Shannon,  dEolus,  and  Africa. 
At  5.30  it  fell  entirely  calm,  and  Hull  put  out 
his  boats  to  tow  the  ship,  always  going  south- 
ward. At  the  same  time  he  whipped  up  a  24 
from  the  main-deck,  and  got  the  forecastle- 
chaser  aft,  cutting  away  the  taffrail  to  give 
the  two  guns  more  freedom  to  work  in  and 
also  running  out,  through  the  cabin  windows, 
two  of  the  long  main-deck  24's.  The  British 
boats  were  towing  also.  At  6  A.  M.  a  light 
breeze  sprang  up,  and  the  Constitution  set 
studding-sails  and  stay-sails ;  the  Shannon 
opened  at  her  with  her  bow  guns,  but  ceased 
when  she  found  she  could  not  reach  her.  At 
6.30,  the  wind  having  died  away,  the  Shannon 
began  to  gain,  almost  all  the  boats  of  the 
squadron  towing  her.  Having  sounded  in  26 
fathoms,  Lieutenant  Charles  Morris  suggested 
to  Hull  to  try  kedging.  All  the  spare  rope 
was  bent  on  to  the  cables,  payed  out  into  the 
cutters,  and  a  kedge  run  out  half  a  mile  ahead 
and  let  go ;  then  the  crew  clapped  on  and 
walked  away  with  the  ship,  overrunning  and 
tripping  the  kedge  as  she  came  up  with  the 


,  NAVAL   WAR  OF  igl2.  123 

end  of  the  line.  Meanwhile,  fresh  lines  and 
another  kedge  were  carried  ahead,  and  the 
frigate  glided  away  from  her  pursuers.  At 
7.30  A.  M.  a  little  breeze  sprang  up,  when  the 
Constitution  set  her  ensign  and  fired  a  shot  at 
the  Shannon.  It  soon  fell  calm  again  and  the 
Shannon  neared.  At  9.10  a  light  air  from  the 
southward  struck  the  ship,  bringing  her  to 
windward.  As  the  breeze  was  seen  coming, 
her  sails  were  trimmed,  and  as  soon  as  she 
obeyed  her  helm  she  was  brought  close  up  on 
the  port  tack.  The  boats  dropped  in  along- 
side ;  those  that  belonged  to  the  davits  were 
run  up,  while  the  others  were  just  lifted  clear 
of  the  water,  by  purchases  on  the  spare  spars, 
stowed  outboard,  where  they  could  be  used 
again  at  a  minute's  notice.  Meanwhile,  on 
her  lee  beam  the  Guerriere  opened  fire ;  but 
her  shot  fell  short,  and  the  Americans  paid 
not  the  slightest  heed  to  it.  Soon  it  again  fell 
calm,  when  Hull  had  2000  gallons  of  water 
started,  and  again  put  out  his  boats  to  tow. 
The  Shannon,  with  some  of  the  other  boats  of 
the  squadron  helping  her,  gained  on  the  Con- 
stitution, but  by  severe  exertion  was  again  left 
behind.  Shortly  afterward,  a  slight  wind 
springing  up,  the  Belvidera  gained  on  the 
other  British  ships,  and  when  it  fell  calm  she 
was  nearer  to  the  Constitution  than  any  of  her 
consorts,  their  boats  being  put  on  to  her.1  At 

1  Cooper  speaks  as  if  this  was  the  Shannon ;  but 
from  Marshall's  "  Naval  Biography  "  we  learn  that  it 
was  the  Belvidera.  At  other  times  he  confuses  the 
Belvidera  with  the  Guerriere.  Captain  Hull,  of  course, 
could  not  accurately  distinguish  the  names  of  his  pur- 
suers, My  account  is  drawn  from  a  careful  comparison 
of  Marshall,  Cooper,  and  James. 


124  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

10.30,  observing  the  benefit  that  the  Constitu- 
tion, had  derived  from  warping,  Captain  Byron 
did  the  same,  bending  all  his  hawsers  to  one 
another,  and  working  two  kedge  anchors  at 
the  same  time  by  paying  the  warp  out  through 
one  hawse-hole  as  it  was  run  in  through  the 
other  opposite.  Having  men  from  the  other 
frigates  aboard,  and  a  lighter  ship  "to  work, 
Captain  Byron,  at  2  P.  M.,  was  near  enough  to 
exchange  bow-  and  stern-chasers  with  the  Con- 
stitution, out  of  range  however.  Hull  expected 
to  be  overtaken,  and  made  every  arrangement 
to  try  in  such  case  to  disable  the  first  frigate 
before  her  consorts  could  close.  But  neither 
the  Belvidera  nor  the  Shannon  dared  to  tow 
very  near  for  fear  of  having  their  boats  sunk 
by  the  American's  stern-chasers. 

The  Constittition's  crew  showed  the  most  ex- 
cellent spirit.  Officers  and  men  relieved  each 
other  regularly,  the  former  snatching  their 
rest  any  where  on  deck,  the  latter  sleeping  at 
the  guns.  Gradually  the  Constitution  drew 
ahead,  but  the  situation  continued  most  critical. 
All  through  the  afternoon  the  British  frigates 
kept  towing  and  kedging,  being  barely  out  of 
gunshot.  At  3  p.  M.  a  light  breeze  sprung  up, 
and  blew  fitfully  at  intervals ;  every  puff  was 
watched  closely  and  taken  advantage  of  to  the 
utmost.  At  7  in  the  evening  the  wind  almost 
died  out,  and  for  four  more  weary  hours  the 
worn-out  sailors  towed  and  kedged.  At  10.45 
a  little  breeze  struck  the  frigate,  when  the 
boats  dropped  alongside  and  were  hoisted  up, 
excepting  the  first  cutter.  Throughout  the 
night  the  wind  continued  very  light,  the  Belvi- 
dera  forging  ahead  till  she  was  off  the  Consti- 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  125 

tutiorfs  lee  beam  ;  and  at  4  A.  M.  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  igth,  she  tacked  to  the  eastward, 
the  breeze  being  light  from  the  south  by  east. 
At  4.20  the  Constittition  tacked  also  ;  and  at 
5.15  the  sEolus,  which  had  drawn  ahead, 
passed  on  the  contrary  tack.  Soon  afterward 
the  wind  freshened  so  that  Captain  Hull  took 
in  his  cutter.  The  Africa  was  now  so  far  to 
leeward  as  to  be  almost  out  of  the  race  ;  while 
the  five  frigates  were  all  running  on  the  star- 
board tack  with  every  stitch  of  canvas  set.  At 
9  A.  M.  an  American  merchant-man  hove  in 
sight  and  bore  down  toward  the  squadron. 
The  Belvidera,  by  way  of  decoy,  hoisted 
American  colors,  when  the  Constitution  hoisted 
the  British  flag,  and  the  merchant  vessel 
hauled  off.  The  breeze  continued  light  till 
noon,  when  Hull  found  he  had  dropped  the 
British  frigates  well  behind ;  the  nearest  was 
the  Belvidera,  exactly  in  his  wake,  bearing  W. 
N.  W.  zYz  miles  distant.  The  Shannon  was 
on  his  lee,  bearing  N.  by  W.  Yz  W.  distant  3^ 
miles.  The  other  two  frigates  were  five  miles 
off  on  the  lee  quarter.  Soon  afterward  the 
breeze  freshened,  and  "  old  Ironsides  "  drew 
slowly  ahead  from  her  foes,  her  sails  being 
watched  and  tended  with  the  most  consum- 
mate skill.  At  4  P.  M.  the  breeze  again  light- 
ened, but  even  the  Belvidera  was  now  four 
miles  astern  and  to  leeward.  At  6.45  there 
were  indications  of  a  heavy  rain  squall,  which 
once  more  permitted  Hull  to  show  that  in  sea, 
manship  he  excelled  even  the  able  captains 
against  whom  he  was  pitted.  The  crew  were 
stationed  and  everything  kept  fast  till  the  last 
minute,  when  all  was  clewed  up  just  before 
14—5 


126  NA  VAL   WAR  OF  1 8 12. 

the  squall  struck  the  ship.  The  light  canvas 
was  furled,  a  second  reef  taken  in  the  mizzen 
top-sail,  and  the  ship  almost  instantly  brought 
under  short  sail.  The  British  vessels  seeing 
this  began  to  let  go  and  haul  down  without 
•waiting  for  the  wind,  and  were  steering  on 
different  tacks  when  the  first  gust  struck  them. 
But  Hull  as  soon  as  he  got  the  weight  of  the 
wind  sheeted  home,  hoisted  his  fore  and  main- 
top gallant  sails,  and  went  off  on  an  easy  bow- 
line at  the  rate  of  n  knots.  At  7.40  sight 
was  again  obtained  of  the  enemy,  the  squall 
having  passed  to  leeward  ;  the  Belvidera,  the 
nearest  vessel,  had  altered  her  bearings  two 
points  to  leeward,  and  was  a  long  way  astern. 
Next  came  the  Shannon;  the  Guerriere  and 
sEolus  were  hull  down,  and  the  Africa  barely 
visible.  The  wind  now  kept  light,  shifting 
occasionally  in  a  very  baffling  manner,  but  the 
Constitution  gained  steadily,  wetting  her  sails 
from  the  sky-sails  to  the  courses.  At  6  A.  M. 
on  the  morning  of  the  aoth  the  pursuers  were 
almost  out  of  sight;  and  at  8.15  A.  M.  they 
abandoned  the  chase.  Hull  at  once  stopped 
to  investigate  the  character  of  two  strange 
vessels,  but  found  them  to  be  only  Americans ; 
then,  at  midday,  he  stood  toward  the  east, 
and  went  into  Boston  on  July  26th. 

In  this  chase  Captain  Isaac  Hull  was 
matched  against  five  British  captains,  two  of 
whom,  Broke  and  Byron,  were  fully  equal  to 
any  in  their  navy ;  and  while  the  latter  showed 
great  perseverance,  good  seamanship,  and 
ready  imitation,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that 
the  palm  in  every  way  belongs  to  the  cool  old 
Yankee.  Every  daring  expedient  known  to 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  127 

the  most  perfect  seamanship  was  tried,  and 
tried  with  success ;  and  no  victorious  fight 
could  reflect  more  credit  on  the  part  of  the 
conqueror  than  this  three  days'  chase  did  on 
Hull.  Later,  on  two  occasions,  the  Constitu- 
tion proved  herself  far  superior  in  gunnery  to 
the  average  British  frigate;  this  time  her 
officers  and  men  showed  that  they  could  han- 
dle the  sails  as  well  as  they  could  the  guns. 
Hull  out-manoeuvred  Broke  and  Byron  as 
cleverly  as  a  month  later  he  out-fought  Dacres. 
His  successful  escape  and  victorious  fight 
were  both  performed  in  a  way  that  place  him 
above  any  single  ship  captain  of  the  war. 

On  Aug.  2d  the  Constitution  made  sail  from 
Boston  *  and  stood  to  the  eastward,  in  hopes 
of  falling  in  with  some  of  the  British  cruisers. 
She  was  unsuccessful,  however,  and  met  noth- 
ing. Then  she  ran  down  to  the  Bay  of  Fundy, 
steered  along  the  coast  of  Nova  Scotia,  and 
thence  toward  Newfoundland,  and  finally  took 
her  station  off  Cape  Race  in  the  Gulf  of  St. 
Lawrence,  where  she  took  and  burned  two 
brigs  of  little  value.  On  the  i5th  she  recap- 
tured an  American  brig  from  the  British  ship- 
sloop  Avenger,  though  the  latter  escaped ; 
Capt.  Hull  manned  his  prize  and  sent  her  in. 
He  then  sailed  southward,  and  on  the  night 
of  the  i8th  spoke  a  Salem  privateer  which 
gave  him  news  of  a  British  frigate  to  the 
south;  thither  he  stood,  and  at  2  p.  M.  on  the 
igth,  in  lat.  41°  30'  N.  and  55°  W.,  made  out 
a  large  sail  bearing  E.  S.  E.  and  to  leeward,* 
which  proved  to  be  his  old  acquaintance,  the 

1  Letter  of  Capt.  Isaac  Hull,  Aug.  28,  1812. 
8  Do.,  Aug.  30th. 


128  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

frigate  Guerrttre,  Captain  Dacres.  It  was  a 
cloudy  day  and  the  wind  was  blowing  fresh 
from  the  northwest.  The  Guerriere  was  stand- 
ing by  the  wind  on  the  starboard  tack,  under 
easy  canvas ; '  she  hauled  up  her  courses, 
took  in  her  top-gallant  sails,  and  at  4.30 
backed  her  main-top  sail.  Hull  then  very  de- 
liberately began  to  shorten  sail,  taking  in  top- 
gallant sails,  stay-sails,  and  flying-jib,  sending 
down  the  royal  yards  and  putting  another  reef 
in  the  top-sails.  Soon  the  Englishman  hoisted 
three  ensigns,  when  the  American  also  set  his 
colors,  one  at  each  mast-head,  and  one  at  the 
mizzen  peak. 

The  Constitution  now  ran  down  with  the 
wind  nearly  aft.  The  Guerriere  was  on  the 
starboard  tack,  and  at  five  o'clock  opened  with 
her  weather-guns,8  the  shot  falling  short,  then 
wore  round  and  fired  her  port  broadside,  of 
which  two  shots  struck  her  opponent,  the  rest 
passing  over  and  through  her  rigging.3  As 
the  British  frigate  again  wore  to  open  with 
her  starboard  battery,  the  Constitution  yawed 
a  little  and  fired  two  or  three  of  her  port  bow- 
guns.  Three  or  four  times  the  Guerriere 
repeated  this  manoeuvre,  wearing  and  firing 

1  Letter  of  Capt.  James  R.  Dacres,  Sept.  7,  1812. 

2  Log  of  Guerrtire. 

8  See  in  the  Naval  Archives  (Bureau  of  Navigation) 
the  Constitution's  Log-Book  (vol.  ii,  from  Feb.  I,  1812, 
to  Dec.  13,  1813).  The  point  is  of  some  little  impor- 
tance because  Hull,  in  his  letter,  speaks  as  if  both  the 
first  broadsides  fell  short,  whereas  the  log  distinctly 
says  that  the  second  went  over  the  ship,  except  two 
shot,  which  came  home.  The  hypothesis  of  the 
Gucrrttre  having  damaged  powder  was  founded  purely 
on  this  supposed  falling  short  of  the  first  two  broad- 
sides. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  129 

alternate  broadsides,  but  with  little  or  no 
effect,  while  the  Constitution  yawed  as  often  to 
avoid  being  raked,  and  occasionally  fired  one 
of  her  bow  guns.  This  continued  nearly  an 
hour,  as  the  vessels  were  very  far  apart  when 
the  action  began,  hardly  any  loss  or  damage 
being  inflicted  by  either  party.  At  6.00  the 
Guerriere  bore  up  and  ran  off  under  her  top- 
sails and  jib,  with  the  wind  almost  astern,  a 
little  on  her  port  quarter ;  when  the  Constitution 
set  her  main-top  gallant  sail  and  foresail,  and 
at  6. 05  closed  within  half  pistol-shot  distance 
on  her  adversary's  port  beam.1  Immediately 
a  furious  cannonade  opened,  each  ship  firing 
as  the  guns  bore.  By  the  time  the  ships  were 
fairly  abreast,  at  6.20,  the  Constitution  shot 
away  the  Guerriere's  mizzen-mast,  which  fell 
over  the  starboard  quarter,  knocking  a  large 
hole  in  the  counter,  and  bringing  the  ship 
round  against  her  helm.  Hitherto  she  had 
suffered  very  greatly  and  the  Constitution 
hardly  at  all.  The  latter,  finding  that  she  was 
ranging  ahead,  put  her  helm  aport  and  then 
luffed  short  round  her  enemy's  bows,2  deliver- 
ing a  heavy  raking  fire  with  the  starboard  guns 
and  shooting  away  the  Guerriere's  main-yard. 
Then  she  wore  and  again  passed  her  adver- 
sary's bows,  raking  with  her  port  guns.  The 
mizzen-mast  of  the  Guerriere,  dragging  in  the 
water,  had  by  this  time  pulled  her  bow  round 
till  the  wind  came  on  her  starboard  quarter ; 
and  so  near  were  two  ships  that  the  English- 
man's bowsprit  passed  diagonally  over  the 

1  "  Autobiography  of  Commodore  Morris  "  ( Annapo- 
lis, 1880),  p.  164. 

a  Log  of  Constitution. 


I30 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 


Constitution's  quarter-deck,  and  as  the  latter 
ship  fell  off  it  got  foul  of  her  mizzen-rigging, 
and  the  vessels  then  lay  with  the  Guerriere' s 
starboard-bow  against  the  Constitution's  port, 
or  lee  quarter-gallery.1  The  Englishman's 
bow  guns  played  havoc  with  Captain  Hull's 
cabin,  setting  fire  to  it ;  but  the  flames  were 
soon  extinguished  by  Lieutenant  Hoffmann. 
On  both  sides  the  boarders  were  called  away ; 
the  British  ran  forward,  but  Captain  Dacres 
relinquished  the  idea  of  attacking a  when  he 
saw  the  crowds  of  men  on  the  American's 
decks.  Meanwhile,  on  the  Constitution,  the 
boarders  and  marines  gathered  aft,  but  such  a 
heavy  sea  was  running  that  they  could  not  get 
on  the  Guerriere.  Both  sides  suffered  heavily 
from  the  closeness  of  the  musketry  fire; 
indeed,  almost  the  entire  loss  on  the  Constitu- 
tion occurred  at  this  juncture.  As  Lieutenant 
Bush,  of  the  marines,  sprang  upon  the  taffrail 
to  leap  on  the  enemy's  decks,  a  British  marine 
shot  him  dead ;  Mr.  Morris,  the  first  Lieuten- 
ant, and  Mr.  Alwyn,  the  master,  had  also  both 
leaped  on  the  taffrail,  and  both  were  at  the 
same  moment  wounded  by  the  musketry  fire. 
On  the  Guerriere  the  loss  was  far  heavier, 
almost  all  the  men  on  the  forecastle  being 
picked  off.  Captain  Dacres  himself  was  shot 
in  the  back  and  severely  wounded  by  one  of 
the  American  mizzen  topmen,  while  he  was 
standing  on  the  starboard  forecastle  ham- 
mocks cheering  on  his  crew ; 8  two  of  the  lieu- 

1  Cooper,  in  Putnam's  Magazine,  i,  475. 

2  Address  of  Captain  Dacres  to  the  court-martial  at 
Halifax. 

8  James,  vi,  144. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  131 

tenants  and  the  master  were  also  shot  down. 
The  ships  gradually  worked  round  till  the 
wind  was  again  on  the  port  quarter,  when  they 
separated,  and  the  Guerriere's  foremast  and 
main-mast  at  once  went  by  the  board,  and  fell 
over  on  the  starboard  side,  leaving  her  a 
defenceless  hulk,  rolling  her  main-deck  guns 
into  the  water.1  At  6.30  the  Constitution 
hauled  aboard  her  tacks,  ran  off  a  little  distance 
to  the  eastward,  and  lay  to.  Her  braces  and 
standing  and  running  rigging  were  much  cut 
up  and  some  of  the  spars  wounded,  but  a  few 
minutes  sufficed  to  repair  damages,  when 
Captain  Hull  stood  under  his  adversary's  lee, 
and  the  latter  at  once  struck,  at  7.  oo  p.  M.,2  just 
two  hours  after  she  had  fired  the  first  shot. 
On  the  part  of  the  Constitution,  however,  the 
actual  fighting,  exclusive  of  six  or  eight  guns 
fired  during  the  first  hour,  while  closing, 
occupied  less  than  30  minutes. 

The  tonnage  and  metal  of  the  combatants 
have  already  been  referred  to.  The  Constitu- 
tion had,  as  already  said,  about  456  men 
aboard,  while  of  the  Guerriere's  crew,  267 
prisoners  were  received  aboard  the  Constitu- 
tion ;  deducting  10  who  were  Americans  and 
would  not  fight,  and  adding  the  15  killed  out- 
right, we  get  272  ;  28  men  were  absent  in 
prizes. 

COMPARATIVE   FORCE. 

Cpmpara- 

Broad-  Compara-    tive  loss 

Tons.  Guns.  side.     Men.   Loss,    tive  f  orce.    Inflicted. 
Constitution  1576     27     684       456        14  i.oo  i.oo 

Gnerrilre      1338      25      556       272        79  .70  .18 

The  loss  of  the  Constitution  included  Lieu- 
v,  51.  2Log  of  the  Constitution, 


132  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

tenant  William  S.  Bush,  of  the  marines,  and 
six  seamen  killed,  and  her  first  lieutenant, 
Charles  Morris,  Master,  John  C.  Alwyn,  four 
seamen,  and  one  marine,  wounded.  Total, 
seven  killed  and  seven  wounded.  Almost  all 
this  loss  occurred  when  the  ships  came  foul, 
and  was  due  to  the  Guerriere's  musketry  and 
the  two  guns  in  her  bridle-ports. 

The  Guerriere  lost  23  killed  and  mortally 
wounded,  including  her  second  lieutenant, 
Henry  Ready,  and  56  wounded  severely  and 
slightly,  including  Captain  Dacres  himself,  the 
first  lieutenant,  Bartholomew  Kent,  Master, 
Robert  Scott,  two  master's  mates,  and  one 
midshipman. 

The  third  lieutenant  of  the  Constitution,  Mr. 
George  Campbell  Read,  was  sent  on  board 
the  prize,  and  the  Constitution  remained  by 
her  during  the  night;  but  at  daylight  it  was 
found  that  she  was  in  danger  of  sinking. 
Captain  Hull  at  once  began  removing  the 
prisoners,  and  at  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
set  the  Guerriere  on  fire,  and  in  a  quarter  of  an 
hour  she  blew  up.  He  then  set  sail  for  Bos- 
ton, where  he  arrived  on  August  3oth.  "  Cap- 
tain Hull  and  his  officers,"  writes  Captain 
Dacres  in  his  official  letter,  "  have  treated  us 
like  brave  and  generous  enemies  ;  the  greatest 
care  has  been  taken  that  we  should  not  lose 
the  smallest  trifle." 

The  British  laid  very  great  stress  on  the 
rotten  and  decayed  condition  of  the  Guerriere  \ 
mentioning  in  particular  that  the  main-mast 
fell  solely  because  of  the  weight  of  the  falling 
foremast.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that 
until  the  action  occurred  she  was  considered 
a  very  fine  ship.  Thus,  in  Brighton's  "  Me- 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 


133 


COHCTlTUTtON 


Thfs  diagram  is  taken  from  Commo- 
dore Morris'  autobiography  and  th« 
log  of  the  Guerrtire ;  the  official 
accounts  apparently  consider  "  lar- 
board "  and  "  starboard "  as  inter- 
changeable terms. 


SJS 


14—5  B 


134  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

moir  of  Admiral  Broke,"  it  is  declared  that 
Dacres  freely  expressed  the  opinion  that  she 
could  take  a  ship  in  half  the  time  the  Shannon 
could.  The  fall  of  the  main-mast  occurred 
when  the  fight  was  practically  over ;  it  had  no 
influence  whatever  on  the  conflict.  It  was 
also  asserted  that  her  powder  was  bad,  but  on 
no  authority  ;  her  first  broadside  fell  short, 
but  so,  under  similar  circumstances,  did  the 
first  broadside  of  the  United  States.  None  of 
these  causes  account  for  the  fact  that  her  shot 
did  not  hit.  Her  opponent  was  of  such  su- 
perior force — nearly  in  the  proportion  of  3  to 
2 — that  success  would  have  been  very  difficult 
in  any  event,  and  no  one  can  doubt  the  gal- 
lantry and  pluck  with  which  the  British  ship 
was  fought ;  but  the  execution  was  very 
greatly  disproportioned  to  the  force.  The 
gunnery  of  the  Guerriere  was  very  poor,  and 
that  of  the  Constitution  excellent ;  during  the 
few  minutes  the  ships  were  yard-arm  and 
yard-arm,  the  latter  was  not  hulled  once, 
while  no  less  than  30  shot  took  effect  on  the 
former's  engaged  side,1  five  sheets  of  copper 
beneath  the  bends.  The  Guerriere,  moreover, 
was  out-manoeuvred ;  "  in  wearing  several 
times  and  exchanging  broadsides  in  such  rapid 
and  continual  changes  of  position,  her  fire  was 
much  more  harmless  than  it  would  have  been 
if  she  had  kept  more  steady."  J  The  Consti- 
tution was  handled  faultlessly ;  Captain  Hull 
displayed  the  coolness  and  skill  of  a  veteran 
in  the  way  in  which  he  managed,  first  to  avoid 
being  raked,  and  then  to  improve  the  advan- 

1  Captain  Dacres'  address  to  the  couit-martial. 

2  Lord  Howard  Douglass'  "  Treatise  on  Naval  Gun- 
nery "  (London  1851),  p,  454 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  135 

tage  which  the  precision  and  rapidity  of  his 
fire  had  gained.  "  After  making  every  allow- 
ance claimed  by  the  enemy,  the  character  of 
this  victory  is  not  essentially  altered.  Its 
peculiarities  were  a  fine  display  of  seamanship 
in  the  approach,  extraordinary  efficiency  in 
the  attack,  and  great  readiness  in  repairing 
damages  ;  all  of  which  denote  cool  and  cap- 
able officers,  with  an  expert  and  trained  crew  ; 
in  a  word,  a  disciplined  man-of-war."  '  The 
disparity  of  force,  10  to  7,  is  not  enough  to 
account  for  the  disparity  of  execution,  loto  2. 
Of  course,  something  must  be  allowed  for  the 
decayed  state  of  the  Englishman's  masts,  al- 
though I  really  do  not  think  it  had  any  influ- 
ence on  the  battle,  for  he  was  beaten  when 
the  main-mast  fell ;  and  it  must  be  remem- 
bered, on  the  other  hand,  that  the  American 
crew  was  absolutely  new,  while  the  Guerriere 
was  manned  by  old  hands.  So  that,  while 
admitting  and  admiring  the  gallantry,  and,  on 
the  whole,  the  seamanship,  of  Captain  Dacres 
and  his  crew,  and  acknowledging  that  he 
fought  at  a  great  disadvantage,  especially  in 
being  short-handed,  yet  all  must  acknowledge 
that  the  combat  showed  a  marked  superiority, 
particularly  in  gunnery,  on  the  part  of  the 
Americans.  Had  the  ships  not  come  foul, 
Captain  Hull  would  probably  not  have  lost 
more  than  three  or  four  men  ;  as  it  was,  he 
suffered  but  slightly.  That  the  Guerriere  was 
not  so  weak  as  she  was  represented  to  be  can 
be  gathered  from  the  fact  that  she  mounted 
two  more  main-deck  guns  than  the  rest  of  her 
class  ;  thus  carrying  on  her  main-deck  30  long 
i8-pounders  in  battery  to  oppose  to  the  30  long 
1  Cooper,  ii,  173. 


136  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

24's,  or  rather  (allowing  for  the  short  weight 
of  shot)  long  22!s,  of  the  Constitution.  Char- 
acteristically enough,  James,  though  he  care- 
fully reckons  in  the  long  bow-chasers  in  the 
bridle-ports  of  the  Argus  and  Enterprise,  yet 
refuses  to  count  the  two  long  eighteens 
mounted  through  the  bridle-ports  on  the 
Guerriere's  main-deck.  Now,  as  it  turned 
out,  these  two  bow  guns  were  used  very  effect- 
ively, when  the  ships  got  foul,  and  caused 
more  damage  and  loss  than  all  of  the  other 
main-deck  guns  put  together. 

Captain  Dacres,  very  much  to  his  credit, 
allowed  the  ten  Americans  on  board  to  go  be- 
low, so  as  not  to  fight  against  their  flag  ;  and 
in  his  address  to  the  court-martial  mentions, 
among  the  reasons  for  his  defeat,  "  that  he 
was  very  much  weakened  by  permitting  the 
Americans  on  board  to  quit  their  quarters." 
Coupling  this  with  the  assertion  made  by 
James  and  most  other  British  writers  that  the 
Constitution  was  largely  manned  by  English- 
men, we  reach  the  somewhat  remarkable  con- 
clusion, that  the  British  ship  was  defeated 
because  the  Americans  on  board  would  not 
fight  against  their  country,  and  that  the  Amer- 
ican was  victorious  because  the  British  on 
board  would.  However,  as  I  have  shown,  in 
reality  there  were  probably  not  a  score  of 
British  on  board  the  Constitution. 

In  this,  as  well  as  the  two  succeeding  frig- 
ate actions,  every  one  must  admit  that  there 
was  a  great  superiority  in  force  on  the  side  of 
the  victors,  and  British  historians  have  in- 
sisted that  this  superiority  was  so  great  as  to 
preclude  any  hopes  of  a  successful  resistance. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 


'37 


That  this  was  not  true,  and  that  the  disparity 
between  the  combatants  was  not  as  great  as 
had  been  the  case  in  a  number  of  encounters 
in  which  English  frigates  had  taken  French 
ones,  can  be  best  shown  by  a  few  accounts 
taken  from  the  French  historian  Troude,  who 
would  certainly  not  exaggerate  the  difference. 
Thus  on  March  i,  1799,  the  English  38-gun 
i8-pounder  frigate  Sybil,  captured  the  French 
44-gun  24-pounder  frigate  Forte,  after  an  ac- 
tion of  two  hours  and  ten  minutes.1  In  actual 
weight  the  shot  thrown  by  one  of  the  main- 
deck  guns  of  the  defeated  Forte  was  over  six 
pounds  heavier  than  the  shot  thrown  by  one 
of  the  main-deck  guns  of  the  victorious  Con- 
stitution or  United  States? 

There  are  later  examples  than  this.  But  a 
very  few  years  before  the  declaration  of  war 
by  the  United  States,  and  in  the  same  struggle 
that  was  then  still  raging,  there  had  been  at 
least  two  victories  gained  by  English  frigates 
over  French  foes  as  superior  to  themselves  as 
the  American  44*5  were  to  the  British  ships  they 
captured.  On  Aug.  10,  1805,  the  Phoenix,  36, 
captured  the  Didon,  40,  after  3^  hours'  fight- 
ing, the  comparative  broadside  force  being:8 


PHCENIX. 

I3XI8 

2X    9 

6X32 


DIDON. 

I4XI8 
2X  8 
7X36 


21  guns,  444  Ibs. 


23  guns,  522  Ibs. 
(nominal ;  about 
600,  real). 
de  la   France."      O.   Troude 


1  "  Batailles   Navales 
(Paris,  1868),  iv,  171. 

2  See  Appendix  B,  for  actual  weight  of  French  shot. 
8  Ibid.,  iii,  425. 


138  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

On  March  8,  1808,  the  San  Florenzo,  36, 
captured  the  Piedmontaise,  40.  the  force  being 
exactly  what  it  was  in  the  case  of  the  Phoenix 
and  Didon?  Comparing  the  real,  not  the 
nominal,  weight  of  metal,  we  find  that  the 
Didon  and  Piedmontaise  were  proportionately 
of  greater  force  compared  to  the  Phoenix  and 
San  Florenzo,  than  the  Constitution  was  com- 
pared to  the  Guerriere  or  Java,  The  French 
i8's  threw  each  a  shot  weighing  but  about 
two  pounds  less  than  that  thrown  by  an 
American  24  of  1812,  while  their  36-pound 
carronades  each  threw  a  shot  over  10  pounds 
heavier  than  that  thrown  by  one  of  the  Con- 
stitution's spar-deck  32's. 

That  a  24-pounder  cannot  always  whip  an 
i8-pounder  frigate  is  shown  by  the  action  of 
the  British  frigate  Eurotas  with  the  French 
frigate  Chlorinde,  on  Feb.  25,  i8i4.3  The 
first  with  a  crew  of  329  men  threw  625  pounds 
of  shot  at  a  broadside,  the  latter  carrying  344 
men  and  throwing  463  pounds  ;  yet  the  re- 
sult was  indecisive.  The  French  lost  90  and 
the  British  60  men.  The  action  showed  that 
heavy  metal  was  not  of  much  use  unless  used 
well. 

To  appreciate  rightly  the  exultation  Hull's 
victory  caused  in  the  United  States,  and  the 
intense  annoyance  it  created  in  England,  it 
must  be  remembered  that  during  the  past 
twenty  years  the  Island  Power  had  been  at 
war  with  almost  every  state  in  Europe,  at  one 
time  or  another,  and  in  the  course  of  about 
two  hundred  single  conflicts  between  ships  of 

1  "  Batailles  Navales  de  la  France,"  iii,  199. 

2  James,  vi,  391. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  139 

approximately  equal  force  (that  is,  where  the 
difference  was  less  than  one-half),  waged 
against  French,  Spanish,  Italian,  Turkish, 
Algerine,  Russian,  Danish,  and  Dutch  an- 
tagonists, her  ships  had  been  beaten  and  cap- 
tured in  but  five  instances.  Then  war  broke 
out  with  America,  and  in  eight  months  five 
single-ship  actions  occurred,  in  every  one  of 
which  the  British  vessel  was  captured. 

Even  had  the  victories  been  due  solely  to 
superior  force  this  would  have  been  no  mean 
triumph  for  the  United  States. 

On  October  13,  1812,  the  American  i8-gun 
ship-sloop  Wasp,  Captain  Jacob  Jones,  with 
137  men  aboard,  sailed  from  the  Delaware 
and  ran  off  south-east  to  get  into  the  track  of 
the  West  India  vessels  ;  on  the  i6th  a  heavy 
gale  began  to  blow,  causing  the  loss  of  the 
jib-boom  and  two  men  who  were  on  it.  The 
next  day  the  weather  moderated  somewhat, 
and  at  11.30  P.  M.,  in  latitude  37°  N.,  longi- 
tude 65°  W.,  several  sail  were  descried.1 
These  were  part  of  a  convoy  of  14  merchant- 
men which  had  quitted  the  bay  of  Honduras  on 
September  i2th,  bound  for  England,"  under  the 
convoy  of  the  British  iS-gun  brig-sloop  Frolic, 
of  19  guns  and  no  men,  Captain  Thomas 
Whinyates.  They  had  been  dispersed  by  the 
gale  of  the  i6th,  during  which  the  Frolic's 
main-yard  was  carried  away  and  both  her 
top-sails  torn  to  pieces  ; 3  next  day  she  spent 
in  repairing  damages,  and  by  dark  six  of  the 
missing  ships  had  joined  her.  The  day  broke 

1  Capt.  Jones'  official  letter,  Nov.  24,  1812. 

2  James'  History,  vi,  1 58. 

3  Capt.  Whinyates' official  letter,  Oct.  18,  1812. 


I4o  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

almost  cloudless  on  the  i8th  (Sunday),  show- 
ing the  convoy,  ahead  and  to  leeward  of  the 
American  ship,  still  some  distance  off,  as 
Captain  Jones  had  not  thought  it  prudent  to 
close  during  the  night,  while  he  was  ignorant 
of  the  force  of  his  antagonists.  The  Wasp 
now  sent  down  her  top-gallant  yards,  close 
reefed  her  top-sails,  and  bore  down  under 
short  fighting  canvas  ;  while  the  Frolic  re- 
moved her  main-yard  from  the  casks,  lashed 
it  on  deck,  and  then  hauled  to  the  wind  under 
her  boom  main-sail  and  close-reefed  foretop- 
sail,  hoisting  Spanish  colors  to  decoy  the 
stranger  under  her  guns,  and  permit  the  con- 
voy to  escape.  At  11.32  the  action  began — 
the  two  ships  running  parallel  on  the  star- 
board tack,  not  60  yards  apart,  the  Wasp 
firing  her  port,  and  the  Frolic  her  starboard 
guns.  The  latter  fired  very  rapidly,  deliver- 
ing three  broadsides  to  the  Wasp's  two,1  both 
crews  cheering  loudly  as  the  ships  wallowed 
through  the  water.  There  was  a  very  heavy 
sea  running,  which  caused  the  vessels  to  pitch 
and  roll  heavily.  The  Americans  fired  as  the 
engaged  side  of  their  ship  was  going  down, 
aiming  at  their  opponent's  hull ; "  while  the 
British  delivered  their  broadsides  while  on 
the  crests  of  the  seas,  the  shot  going  high. 
The  water  dashed  in  clouds  of  spray  over 
both  crews,  and  the  vessels  rolled  so  that  the 
muzzles  of  the  guns  went  under.3  But  in 
spite  of  the  rough  weather,  the  firing  was  not 
only  spirited  but  well  directed.  At  11.36  the 
Wasp's  maintop-mast  was  shot  away  and  fell, 

1  Cooper,  182.     2  Niles'  Register,  iii,  p.  324.      3  Do. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  1-4.1 

with  its  yard,  across  the  port  fore  and  foretop- 
sail  braces,  rendering  the  head  yards  unman- 
ageable ;  at  11.46  the  gaff  and  mizzentop- 
gallant  mast  came  down,  and  by  11.52  every 
brace  and  most  of  the  rigging  was  shot  away.1 
It  would  now  have  been  very  difficult  to  brace 
any  of  the  yards.  But  meanwhile  the  Frolic 
suffered  dreadfully  in  her  hull  and  lower 
masts,  and  had  her  gaff  and  head  braces  shot 
away.'  The  slaughter  among  her  crew  was 
very  great,  but  the  survivors  kept  at  their 
work  with  the  dogged  courage  of  their  race. 
At  first  the  two  vessels  ran  side  by  side,  but 
the  American  gradually  forged  ahead,  throw- 
ing in  her  fire  from  a  position  in  which  she  her- 
self received  little  injury  ;  by  degrees  the  ves- 
sels got  so  close  that  the  Americans  struck  the 
Frolic's  side  with  her  rammers  in  loading,3  and 
the  British  brig  was  raked  with  dreadful  effect. 
The  Frolic  then  fell  aboard  her  antagonist, 
her  jib-boom  coming  in  between  the  main 
and  mizzen-riggmg  of  the  Wasp  and  passing 
over  the  heads  of  Captain  Jones  and  Lieutenant 
Biddle,  who  were  standing  near  the  capstan. 
This  forced  the  Wasp  up  in  the  wind,  and 
she  again  raked  her  antagonist,  Captain  Jones 
trying  to  restrain  his  men  from  boarding  till 
he  could  put  in  another  broadside.  But  they 
could  no  longer  be  held  back,  and  Jack  Lang, 
a  New  Jersey  seaman,  leaped  on  the  Frolic's 
bowsprit.  Lieutenant  Biddle  then  mounted 
on  the  hammock  cloth  to  board,  but  his  feet 
got  entangled  in  the  rigging,  and  one  of  the 
midshipmen  seizing  his  coat-tails  to  help  him- 

1  Capt.  Jones'  letter.        2  Capt.  Whinyates'  letter. 
8  Capt.  Jones'  letter. 


I42  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

self  up,  the  lieutenant  tumbled  back  on  the 
deck.  At  the  next  swell  he  succeeded  in 
getting  on  the  bowsprit,  on  which  there  were 
already  two  seamen  whom  he  passed  on  the 
forecastle.  But  there  was  no  one  to  oppose 
him  ;  not  twenty  Englishmen  were  left  un- 
hurt.1 The  man  at  the  wheel  was  still  at  his 
post,  grim  and  undaunted,  and  two  or  three 
more  were  on  deck,  including  Captain  Whin- 
yates  and  Lieutenant  Wintle,  both  so  severely 
wounded  that  they  could  not  stand  without 
support.*  There  could  be  no  more  resistance, 
and  Lieutenant  Biddle  lowered  the  flag  at 
12.15 — Jus*  43  minutes  after  the  beginning 
of  the  fight.3  A  minute  or  two  afterward  both 
the  Frolic's  masts  went  by  the  board — the 
foremast  about  fifteen  feet  above  the  deck, 
the  other  short  off.  Of  her  crew,  as  already 
said,  not  twenty  men  had  escaped  unhurt. 
Every  officer  was  wounded  ;  two  of  them,  the 
first  lieutenant,  Charles  McKay,  and  master, 
John  Stephens,  soon  died.  Her  total  loss 
was  thus  over  90  ; 4  about  30  of  whom  were 
killed  outright  or  died  later.  The  Wasp  suf- 
fered very  severely  in  her  rigging  and  aloft 
generally,  but  only  two  or  three  shots  struck 
her  hull ;  five  of  her  men  were  killed — two  in 
her  mizzen-top  and  one  in  her  maintop-mast 
rigging — and  five  wounded,5  chiefly  while  aloft. 
The  two  vessels  were  practically  of  equal 

1  Capt.  Whinyates'  letter. 

z  James,  vi,  loi. 

8  Capt.  Jones'  letter. 

4  Capt.  Whinyates'  official  letter  thus  states  it,  and 
is,  of  course,  to  be  taken  as  authority ;  the  Bermuda 
account  makes  it  69,  and  James  only  62. 

6  Capt.  Jones'  letter. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  143 

force.  The  loss  of  the  Frolic's  main-yard  had 
merely  converted  her  into  a  brigantine,  and, 
as  the  roughness  of  the  sea  made  it  necessary 
to  fight  under  very  short  canvas,  her  inferior- 
ity in  men  was  fully  compensated  for  by  her 
superiority  in  metal.  She  had  been  desper- 
ately defended  ;  no  men  could  have  fought 
more  bravely  than  Captain  Whinyates  and 
his  crew.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans 


DIAGRAM.1 


WASP 


1  It  is  difficult  to  reconcile  the  accounts  of  the  ma- 
noeuvres in  this  action.  James  says  "  larboard  "  where 
Cooper  says  'starboard";  one  says  the  Wasp  wore, 
the  other  says  that  she  could  not  do  so,  etc. 


144  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

had  done  their  work  with  a  coolness  and  skill 
that  could  not  be  surpassed  ;  the  contest  had 
been  mainly  one  of  gunnery,  and  had  been 
decided  by  the  greatly  superior  judgment  and 
accuracy  with  which  they  fired.  Both  officers 
and  crew  had  behaved  well ;  Captain  Jones 
particularly  mentions  Lieutenant  Claxton, 
who,  though  too  ill  to  be  of  any  service,  per- 
sisted in  remaining  on  deck  throughout  the 
engagement. 

The  Wasp  was  armed  with  2  long  la's  and 
1 6  32-pound  carronades  ;  the  Frolic  with  2 
long  6's,  1 6  32-pound  carronades,  and  i  shift- 
ing i2-pound  carronade. 

COMPARATIVE  FORCE. 

Tons.      No.  Guns.         Weight  Metal.       Grews      Loss. 
Wasp    450  9  250  135         10 

Frolic  467  IO  274  no         90 

Vice- Admiral  Jurien  de  la  Graviere  com- 
ments on  this  action  as  follows  ' : 

"  The  American  fire  showed  itself  to  be  as 
accurate  as  it  was  rapid.  On  occasions  when 
the  roughness  of  the  sea  would  seem  to  render 
all  aim  excessively  uncertain,  the  effects  of 
their  artillery  were  not  less  murderous  than 
under  more  advantageous  conditions.  The 
corvette  Wasp  fought  the  brig  Frolic  in  an 
enormous  sea,  under  very  short  canvas,  and 
yet,  forty  minutes  after  the  beginning  of  the 
action,  when  the  two  vessels  came  together, 
the  Americans  who  leaped  aboard  the  brig 
found  on  the  deck,  covered  with  dead  and 

1  "  Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  287  (Septieme  Edition, 
Paris,  1881). 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  145 

dying,  but  one  brave  man,  who  had  not  left 
the  wheel,  and  three  officers,  all  wounded, 
who  threw  down  their  swords  at  the  feet  of 
the  victors."  Admiral  de  la  Graviere's  criti- 
cisms are  especially  valuable,  because  they 
are  those  of  an  expert,  who  only  refers  to  the 
war  of  1812  in  order  to  apply  to  the  French 
navy  the  lessons  which  it  teaches,  and  who  is 
perfectly  unprejudiced.  He  cares  for  the 
lesson  taught,  not  the  teacher,  and  is  quite  as 
willing  to  learn  from  the  defeat  of  the  Chesa- 
peake as  from  the  victories  of  the  Constitution 
— while  most  American  critics  only  pay  heed 
to  the  latter. 

The  characteristics  of  the  action  are  the 
practical  equality  of  the  contestants  in  point 
of  force  and  the  enormous  disparity  in  the 
damage  each  suffered  ;  numerically,  the  Wasp 
was  superior  by  5  per  cent.,  and  inflicted  a 
ninefold  greater  loss. 

Captain  Jones  was  not  destined  to  bring 
his  prize  into  port,  for  a  few  hours  afterward 
the  Poictiers,  a  British  74,  Captain  John  Poer 
Beresford,  hove  in  sight.  Now  appeared  the 
value  of  the  Frolics  desperate  defence ;  if 
she  could  not  prevent  herself  from  being  cap- 
tured, she  had  at  least  ensured  her  own  re- 
capture, and  also  the  capture  of  the  foe. 
When  the  Wasp  shook  out  her  sails  they 
were  found  to  be  cut  into  ribbons  aloft,  and 
she  could  not  make  off  with  sufficient  speed. 
As  the  Poictiers  passed  the  Frolic,  rolling  like 
a  log  in  the  water,  she  threw  a  shot  over  her, 
and  soon  overtook  the  Wasp.  Both  vessels 
were  carried  into  Bermuda.  Captain  Whin- 
yates  was  again  put  in  command  of  the  Frolic. 


146  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Captain  Jones  and  his  men  were  soon  ex- 
changed; 25,000  dollars  prize-money  was 
voted  them  by  Congress,  and  the  Captain  and 
Lieutenant  Biddle  were  both  promoted,  the 
former  receiving  the  captured  ship  Macedonian. 
Unluckily  the  blockade  was  too  close  for  him 
to  succeed  in  getting  out  during  the  remainder 
of  the  war. 

On  Oct.  8th  Commodore  Rodgers  left 
Boston  on  his  second  cruise,  with  the  Pres- 
ident, United  States,  Congress,  and  Argus? 
leaving  the  Hornet  in  port.  Four  days  out, 
the  United  States  and  Argus  separated,  while 
the  remaining  two  frigates  continued  their 
cruise  together.  The  Argus?  Captain  Sinclair, 
cruised  to  the  eastward,  making  prizes  of  6 
valuable  merchant-men,  and  returned  to  port 
on  January  3d.  During  the  cruise  she  was 
chased  for  three  days  and  three  nights  (the 
latter  being  moonlight)  by  a  British  squadron, 
and  was  obliged  to  cut  away  her  boats  and 
anchors  and  start  some  of  her  water.  But  she 
saved  her  guns,  and  was  so  cleverly  handled 
that  during  the  chase  she  actually  succeeded 
in  taking  and  manning  a  prize,  though  the 
enemy  got  near  enough  to  open  fire  as  the 
vessels  separated.  Before  relating  what  be- 
fell the  United  States,  we  shall  bring  Commo- 
dore Rodgers'  cruise  to  an  end. 

On  Oct.  loth  the  Commodore  chased,  but 
failed  to  overtake,  the  British  frigate  Nymphe, 
38,  Captain  Epworth.  On  the  i8th,  off  the 
great  Bank  of  Newfoundland,  he  captured  the 
Jamaica  packet  Swallow,  homeward  bound, 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Jan.  r,  1813. 

2  Letter  of  Capt.  Arthur  Sinclair,  Jan.  4,  1813. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  X8i2.  147 

with  200,000  dollars  in  specie  aboard.  On 
the  3ist.  at  9  A.  M.,  lat.  33°  N.,  long.  32' 
W.,  his  two  frigates  fell  in  with  the  British 
frigate  Galatea,  36,  Captain  Woodley  Losack, 
convoying  two  South  Sea  ships,  to  windward. 
The  Galatea  ran  down  to  reconnoitre,  and  at 
10  A.  M.,  recognizing  her  foes,  hauled  up  on 
the  starboard  tack  to  escape.  The  American 
frigates  made  all  sail  in  chase,  and  continued 
beating  to  windward,  tacking  several  times, 
for  about  three  hours.  Seeing  that  she  was 
being  overhauled,  the  Galatea  now  edged  away 
to  get  on  her  best  point  of  sailing ;  at  the 
same  moment  one  of  her  convoy,  the  Argo, 
bore  up  to  cross  the  hawse  of  her  foes,  but 
was  intercepted  by  the  Congress,  who  lay  to 
to  secure  her.  Meanwhile  the  President  kept 
after  the  Galatea  ;  she  set  her  top-mast,  top- 
gallant mast  and  lower  studding-sails,  and 
when  it  was  dusk  had  gained  greatly  upon  her. 
But  the  night  was  very  dark,  the  President  lost 
sight  of  the  chase,  and,  toward  midnight, 
hauled  to  the  wind  to  rejoin  her  consort. 
The  two  frigates  cruised  to  the  east  as  far  as 
22°  W..  and  then  ran  down  to  17°  N. ;  but 
during  the  month  of  November  they  did  not 
see  a  sail.  They  had  but  slightly  better  luck 
on  their  return  toward  home.  Passing  120 
miles  north  of  Bermuda,  and  cruising  a  little 
while  toward  the  Virginia  capes,  they  re- 
entered  Boston  on  Dec.  3ist,  having  made 
9  prizes,  most  of  them  of  little  value. 

When  four  days  out,  on  Oct.  i2th,  Com- 
modore Decatur  had  separated  from  the  rest 
of  Rodgers'  squadron  and  cruised  east ;  on 
the  25th,  in  lat.  29°  N.,  and  long.  29°  30',  W. 


1 48        .       NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

while  going  close-hauled  on  the  port  tack, 
with  the  wind  fresh  from  the  S.  S.  E.,  a  sail 
was  descried  on  the  weather  beam,  about  12 
miles  distant.1  This  was  the  British  38-gun 
frigate  Macedonian,  Captain  John  Surnam 
Garden.  She  was  not,  like  the  Gtterriere,  an 
old  ship  captured  from  the  French,  but  newly 
built  of  oak,  and  larger  than  any  American 
i8-pounder  frigate ;  she  was  reputed  (very 
wrongfully)  to  be  a  "  crack  ship."  According 
to  Lieut.  David  Hope,  "  the  state  of  discipline 
on  board  was  excellent ;  in  no  British  ship 
was  more  attention  paid  to  gunnery.  Before 
this  cruise  the  ship  had  been  engaged  almost 
every  day  with  the  enemy;  and  in  time  of 
peace  the  crew  were  constantly  exercised  at 
the  great  guns."*  How  they  could  have 
practised  so  much  and  learned  so  little  is 
certainly  marvellous. 

The  Macedonian  set  her  foretop-mast  and 
top-gallant  studding-sails  and  bore  away  in 
chase,*  edging  down  with  the  wind  a  little  aft 
the  starboard  beam.  Her  first  lieutenant 
wished  to  continue  on  this  course  and  pass 
down  ahead  of  the  United  States,*  but  Captain 
Garden's  over-anxiety  to  keep  the  weather- 
gage  lost  him  this  opportunity  of  closing.5 
Accordingly  he  hauled  by  the  wind  and  passed 
way  to  windward  of  the  American.  As  Com- 
modore Decatur  got  within  range,  he  eased 

1  Official  letter  of  Commodore  Decatur,  Oct.  30, 1812. 

2  Marshall's  "Naval  Biography,"  vol.  iv,  p.  1018. 
8  Capt.  Carden  to  Mr.  Croker,  Oct.  28,  1812. 

*  James,  vi,  166. 

6  Sentence  of  Court-martial  held  on  the  San  Domingo, 
74,  at  the  Bermudas,  May  27,  1812. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  149 

off  and  fired  a  broadside,  most  of  which  fell 
short ;  '  he  then  kept  his  luff,  and,  the  next 
time  he  fired,  his  long  24's  told  heavily,  while 
he  received  very  little  injury  himself.3  The 
fire  from  his  main-deck  (for  he  did  not  use 
his  carronades  at  all  for  the  first  half-hour)3 
was  so  very  rapid  that  it  seemed  as  if  the  ship 
was  on  fire  ;  his  broadsides  were  delivered 
with  almost  twice  the  rapidity  of  those  of  the 
Englishman.4  The  latter  soon  found  he  could 
not  play  at  long  bowls  with  any  chance  of 
success ;  and,  having  already  erred  either 
from  timidity  or  bad  judgment,  Captain  Car- 
den  decided  to  add  rashness  to  the  catalogue 
of  his  virtues.  Accordingly  he  bore  up,  and 
came  down  end  on  toward  his  adversary,  with 
the  wind  on  his  port  quarter.  The  States 
now  (10.15)  laid  her  main-topsail  aback  and 
made  heavy  play  with  her  long  guns,  and,  as 
her  adversary  came  nearer,  with  her  carron- 
ades also.  The  British  ship  would  reply  with 
her  starboard  guns,  hauling  up  to  do  so  ;  as 
she  came  down,  the  American  would  ease  off, 
run  a  little  way  and  again  come  to,  keeping 
up  a  terrific  fire.  As  the  Macedonian  bore 
down  to  close,  the  chocks  of  all  her  forecastle 
guns  (which  were  mounted  on  the  outside) 
were  cut  away  ; b  her  fire  caused  some  damage 
to  the  American's  rigging,  but  hardly  touched 
her  hull,  while  she  herself  suffered  so  heavily 
both  alow  and  aloft  that  she  gradually  dropped 

1  Marshall,  iv,  1080. 

2  Cooper,  ii,  178. 

8  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur. 

4  James,  vi,  169. 

6  Letter  of  Captain  Garden. 


150  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

to  leeward,  while  the  American  forereached 
on  her.  Finding  herself  ahead  and  to  wind- 
ward, the  States  tacked  and  ranged  up  under 
her  adversary's  lee,  when  the  latter  struck  her 
colors  at  11.15,  just  an  hour  and  a  half  after 
the  beginning  of  the  action.1 

The  United  States  had  suffered  surprisingly 
little  ;  what  damage  had  been  done  was  aloft. 
Her  mizzen  top-gallant  mast  was  cut  away, 
some  of  the  spars  were  wounded,  and  the  rig- 
ging a  good  deal  cut ;  the  hull  was  only  struck 
two  or  three  times.  The  ships  were  never 
close  enough  to  be  within  fair  range  of  grape 
and  musketry,2  and  the  wounds  were  mostly 
inflicted  by  round  shot  and  were  thus  apt 
to  be  fatal.  Hence  the  loss  of  the  Amer- 
icans amounted  to  Lieutenant  John  Messer 
Funk  (5th  of  the  ship)  and  six  seamen  killed 
or  mortally  wounded,  and  only  five  severely 
and  slightly  wounded. 

The  Macedonian,  on  the  other  hand,  had  re- 
ceived over  a  hundred  shot  in  her  hull,  several 
between  wind  and  water ;  her  mizzen-mast 
had  gone  by  the  board ;  her  fore-  and  main- 
top-masts had  been  shot  away  by  the  caps, 
and  her  main-yard  in  the  slings  ;  almost  all 
her  rigging  was  cut  away  (only  the  foresail 
being  left)  ;  on  the  engaged  side  all  of  her 
carronades  but  two,  and  two  of  her  main-deck 
guns,  were  dismounted.  Of  her  crew  43  were 
killed  and  mortally  wounded,  and  61  (includ- 
ing her  first  and  third  lieutenants)  severely  and 
slightly  wounded.3  Among  her  crew  were 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur. 
3  Letter  of  Commodore  Decatur. 
8  Letter  of  Captain  Garden. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  151 


152  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

eight  Americans  (as  shown  by  her  muster- 
roll)  ;  these  asked  permission  to  go  below  be- 
fore the  battle,  but  it  was  refused  by  Captain 
Garden,  and  three  were  killed  during  the  ac- 
tion. James  says  that  they  were  allowed  to 
go  below,  but  this  is  untrue ;  for  if  they  had 
the  three  would  not  have  been  slain.  The 
others  testified  that  they  had  been  forced  to 
fight,  and  they  afterward  entered  the  Ameri- 
can service — the  only  ones  of  the  Macedonian's 
crew  who  did,  or  who  were  asked  to. 

The  Macedonian  had  her  full  complement  of 
301  men ;  the  States  had,  by  her  muster-roll 
of  October  2oth,  428  officers,  petty  officers, 
seamen,  and  boys,  and  50  officers  and  privates 
of  marines,  a  total  of  478  (instead  of  509  as 
Marshall  in  his  "Naval  Biography"  makes 
it). 

COMPARATIVE  FORCE. 

Broadside    Weight 
Size.          Guns.        Metal.          Men.       Loss. 

United  States         1576  27  786          478  12 

Macedonian  1325  25  547          301         104 

Comparative  Comparative  Loss 

Force.  Inflicted. 

States  i  oo  100 

Macedonian  66  1 1 

That  is,  the  relative  force  being  about  as 
three  is  to  two,1  the  damage  done  was  as  nine 
to  one  ! 

1  I  have  considered  the  United  States  as  mounting 
her  full  allowance  of  54  guns ;  but  it  is  possible  that 
she  had  no  more  than  49.  In  Decatur's  letter  of  chal- 
lenge of  Jan.  17,  1814  (which  challenge,  by  the  way, 
was  a  most  blustering  affair,  reflecting  credit  neither  on 
Decatur,  nor  his  opponent,  Captain  Hope,  nor  on  any 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  153 

Of  course,  it  would  have  been  almost  im- 
possible for  the  Macedonian  to  conquer  with 
one  third  less  force  ;  but  the  disparity  was  by 
no  means  sufficient  to  account  for  the  nine- 
fold greater  loss  suffered,  and  the  ease  and 
impunity  with  which  the  victory  was  won. 
The  British  sailors  fought  with  their  accus- 
tomed courage,  but  their  gunnery  was  exceed- 
ingly poor ;  and  it  must  be  remembered  that 
though  the  ship  was  bravely  lought,  still  the 
defence  was  by  no  means  so  desperate  as  that 
made  by  the  Essex  or  even  the  Chesapeake,  as 
witnessed  by  their  respective  losses.  The 
Macedonian,  moreover,  was  surrendered  when 
she  had  suffered  less  damage  than  either  the 
Guerriere  or  Java.  The  chief  cause  of  her 
loss  lay  in  the  fact  that  Captain  Garden  was  a 
poor  commander.  The  gunnery  of  the/ava, 
Guerriere,  and  Macedonian  was  equally  bad; 
but  while  Captain  Lambert  proved  himself  to 
be  as  able  as  he  was  gallant,  and  Captain 
Dacres  did  nearly  as  well,  Captain  Carden,  on 
the  other  handj  was  first  too  timid,  and  then 
too  rash,  and  showed  bad  judgment  at  all 
times.  By  continuing  his  original  course  he 
could  have  closed  at  once ;  but  he  lost  his 

one  else,  excepting  Captain  Stackpole  of  H.  M.  S. 
Sta(ira),  she  is  said  to  have  had  that  number ;  her 
broadside  would  then  be  15  long  24*8  below,  I  long  24, 
i  12-pound,  and  8  42-pound,  carronades  above.  Her 
real  broadside  weight  of  metal  would  thus  be  about 
680  Ibs.,  and  she  would  be  superior  to  the  Macedotiian 
in  the  proportion  of  5  to  4.  But  it  is  possible  that  De- 
catur  had  landed  some  of  his  guns  in  1813,  as  James 
asserts ;  and  though  I  am  not  at  all  sure  of  this,  I  have 
thought  it  best  to  be  on  the  safe  side  in  describing  his 
force. 


154  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812, 

chance  by  over-anxiety  to  keep  the  weather- 
gage,  and  was  censured  by  the  court-martial 
accordingly.  Then  he  tried  to  remedy  one 
error  by  another,  and  made  a  foolishly  rash 
approach.  A  very  able  and  fair-minded  Eng- 
lish writer  says  of  this  action  :  "  As  a  display 
of  courage  the  character  of  the  service  was 
nobly  upheld,  but  we  would  be  deceiving  our- 
selves were  we  to  admit  that  the  comparative 
expertness  of  the  crews  in  gunnery  was  equally 
satisfactory.  Now,  taking  the  difference  of 
effect  as  given  by  Captain  Garden,  we  must 
draw  this  conclusion — that  the  comparative 
loss  in  killed  and  wounded  (104  to  12),  to- 
gether with  the  dreadful  account  he  gives  of 
the  condition  of  his  own  ship,  while  he  admits 
that  the  enemy's  vessel  was  in  comparatively 
good  order,  must  have  arisen  from  inferiority 
in  gunnery  as  well  as  in  force." ' 

On  the  other  hand,  the  American  crew,  even 
according  to  James,  were  as  fine  a  set  of  men 
as  ever  were  seen  on  shipboard.  Though  not 
one-fourth  were  British  by  birth,  yet  many  of 
them  had  served  on  board  British  ships  of 
war,  in  some  cases  voluntarily,  but  much  more 
often  because  they  were  impressed.  They  had 
been  trained  at  the  guns  with  the  greatest 
care  by  Lieutenant  Allen.  And  finally  Com- 
modore Decatur  handled  his  ship  with  abso- 
1ute  faultlessness.  To  sum  up :  a  brave  and 
skilful  crew,  ably  commanded,  was  matched 
against  an  equally  brave  but  unskilful  one, 
with  an  incompetent  leader ;  and  this  accounts 
for  the  disparity  of  loss  being  so  much  greater 
than  the  disparity  in  force. 

1  Lord  Howard  Douglass,  "  Naval  Gunnery,"  p.  515. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  155 

At  the  outset  of  this  battle  the  position  of 
the  parties  was  just  the  reverse  of  that  in 
the  case  of  the  Constitution  and  Guerriere; 
the  Englishman  had  the  advantage  of  the 
wind,  but  he  used  it  in  a  very  different  man- 
ner from  that  in  which  Captain  Hull  had  done. 
The  latter  at  once  ran  down  to  close,  but 
manoeuvred  so  cautiously  that  no  damage 
could  be  done  him  till  he  was  within  pistol 
shot.  Captain  Garden  did  not  try  to  close 
till  after  fatal  indecision,  and  then  made  the 
attempt  so  heedlessly  that  he  was  cut  to  pieces 
before  he  got  to  close  quarters.  Commodore 
Decatur,  also,  manoeuvred  more  skilfully  than 
Captain  Dacres,  although  the  difference  was 
less  marked  between  these  two.  The  combat 
was  a  plain  cannonade  ;  the  States  derived  no 
advantage  from  the  superior  number  of  her 
men,  for  they  were  not  needed.  The  marines 
in  particular  had  nothing  whatever  to  do, 
while  they  had  been  of  the  greatest  service 
against  the  Guerriere.  The  advantage  was 
simply  in  metal,  as  10  is  to  7.  Lord  Howard 
Douglass'  criticisms  on  these  actions  seem  to 
me  only  applicable  in  part.  He  says  (p.  524): 
"  The  Americans  would  neither  approach  nor 
permit  us  to  join  in  close  battle  until  they  had 
gained  some  extraordinary  advantage  from  the 
superior  faculties  of  their  long  guns  in  distant 
cannonade,  and  from  the  intrepid,  uncircum- 
spect,  and  often  very  exposed  approach  of 
assailants  who  had  long  been  accustomed  to 
contemn  all  manoeuvring.  Our  vessels  were 
crippled  in  distant  cannonade  from  encoun- 
tering rashly  the  serious  disadvantage  of  mak- 
ing direct  attacks ;  the  uncircumspect  gal- 


156  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

lantry  of  our  commanders  led  our  ships 
unguardedly  into  the  snares  which  wary  cau- 
tion had  spread." 

These  criticisms  are  very  just  as  regards 
the  Macedonian,  and  I  fully  agree  with  them 
(possibly  reserving  the  right  to  doubt  Captain 
Garden's  gallantry,  though  readily  admitting 
his  uncircumspection).  But  the  case  of  the 
Guerriere  differed  widely.  There  the  Ameri- 
can ship  made  the  attack,  while  the  British  at 
first  avoided  close  combat ;  and,  so  far  from 
trying  to  cripple  her  adversary  by  a  distant 
cannonade,  the  Constitution  hardly  fired  a 
dozen  times  until  within  pistol  shot.  This 
last  point  is  worth  mentioning,  because  in  a 
work  on  "  Heavy  Ordnance,"  by  Captain  T. 
F.  Simmons,  R.  A.  (London,  1837),  it  is  stated 
that  the  Guerriere  received  her  injuries  before 
the  closing,  mentioning  especially  the  "  thirty 
shot  below  the  water-line  "  ;  whereas,  by  the 
official  accounts  of  both  commanders,  the 
reverse  was  the  case.  Captain  Hull,  in  his 
letter,  and  Lieutenant  Morris  (in  his  auto- 
biography) say  they  only  fired  a  few  guns  be- 
fore closing ;  and  Captain  Dacres,  in  his  letter, 
and  Captain  Brenton,  in  his  "  History,"  say 
that  not  much  injury  was  received  by  the 
Guerriere  until  about  the  time  the  mizzen-mast 
fell,  which  was  three  or  four  minutes  after 
close  action  began. 

Lieutenant  Allen  was  put  aboard  the  Mace- 
donian as  prize-master ;  he  secured  the  fore- 
and  main-masts  and  rigged  a  jury  mizzen-mast, 
converting  the  vessel  into  a  bark.  Commo- 
dore Decatur  discontinued  his  cruise  to  con- 
voy his  prize  back  to  America  ;  they  reached 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  157 

New  London  Dec.  4th.  Had  it  not  been  for 
the  necessity  of  convoying  the  Macedonian, 
the  States  would  have  continued  her  cruise, 
for  the  damage  she  suffered  was  of  the  most 
trifling  character. 

Captain  Garden  stated  (in  Marshall's 
"Naval  Biography")  that  the  States  meas- 
ured 1,670  tons,  was  manned  by  509  men, 
suffered  so  from  shot  under  water  that  she 
had  to  be  pumped  out  every  watch  and  that 
two  eighteen-pound  shot  passed  in  a  horizontal 
line  through  her  main-masts ;  all  of  which 
statements  were  highly  creditable  to  the  vivid- 
ness of  his  imagination.  The  States  measured 
but  1,576  tons  (and  by  English  measurement 
very  much  less),  had  478  men  aboard,  had  not 
been  touched  by  a  shot  under  water-line  and 
her  lower  masts  were  unwounded.  James 
states  that  most  of  her  crew  were  British, 
which  assertion  I  have  already  discussed ; 
and  that  she  had  but  one  boy  aboard,  and  that 
he  was  seventeen  years  old, — in  which  case 
29  others,  some  of  whom  (as  we  learn  from 
the  "  Life  of  Decatur")  were  only  twelve, 
must  have  grown  with  truly  startling  rapidity 
during  the  hour  and  a  half  that  the  combat 
lasted. 

During  the  twenty  years  preceding  1812, 
there  had  been  almost  incessant  warfare  on 
the  ocean,  and  although  there  had  been  innu- 
merable single  conflicts  between  French  and 
English  frigates,  there  had  been  but  one  case 
in  which  the  French  frigate,  single-handed, 
was  victorious.  This  was  in  the  year  1805, 
when  the  Milan  captured  the  Cleopatra.  Ac- 
cording to  Troude,  the  former  threw  at  a 


158  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

broadside  574  pounds  (actual),  the  latter  but 
334;  and  the  former  lost  35  men  out  of  her 
crew  of  350;  the  latter  58  out  of  200.  Or, 
the  forces  being  as  100  to  58,  the  loss  inflicted 
was  as  100  to  60;  while  the  States'  force  com- 
pared to  the  Macedonian's  being  as  100  to  66, 
the  loss  she  inflicted  was  as  100  to  u. 

British  ships,  moreover,  had  often  con- 
quered against  odds  as  great ;  as,  for  instance, 
when  the  Sea  Horse  captured  the  great  Turk- 
ish frigate  Badere-Zaffer ;  when  the  Astrea 
captured  the  French  frigate  Gloire,  which 
threw  at  a  broadside  286  pounds  of  shot, 
while  she  threw  but  174;  and  when,  most 
glorious  of  all,  Lord  Dundonald,  in  the  gallant 
little  Speedy,  actually  captured  the  Spanish 
xebec  Gamo,  of  over  five  times  her  own  force  ! 
Similarly,  the  corvette  Comus  captured  the 
Danish  frigate  Fredrickscoarn,  the  brig  Onyx 
captured  the  Dutch  sloop  Manly,  the  little 
cutter  Thorn  captured  the  French  Courier- 
National,  and  the  Pasley  the  Spanish  Virgin  ; 
while  there  had  been  many  instances  of  drawn 
battles  between  English  1 2-pound,  frigates 
and  French  or  Spanish  i8-pounders. 

Captain  Hull  having  resigned  the  com- 
mand of  the  Constitution  she  was  given  to 
Captain  Bainbridge,  of  the  Constellation,  who 
was  also  entrusted  with  the  command  of  the 
Essex  and  Hornet,  The  latter  ship  was  in  the 
port  of  Boston  with  the  Constitution,  under 
the  command  of  Captain  Lawrence.  The 
Essex  was  in  the  Delaware,  and  accordingly 
orders  were  sent  to  Captain  Porter  to  rendez- 
vous at  the  Island  of  San  Jago  ;  if  that  failed 
several  other  places  were  appointed,  and  if, 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  159 

after  a  certain  time,  he  did  not  fall  in  with 
his  commodore  he  was  to  act  at  his  own 
discretion. 

On  October  26th  the  Constitution  and  Hor- 
net sailed,  touched  at  the  different  rendezvous, 
and  on  December  i3th  arrived  off  San 
Salvador,  where  Captain  Lawrence  found  the 
Bonne  Citoyenne,  18,  Captain  Pitt  Barnaby 
Greene.  The  Bonne  Citoyenne  was  armed 
with  18  32-pound  carronades  and  2  long  nines, 
and  her  crew  of  150  men  was  exactly  equal  in 
number  to  that  of  the  Hornet ;  the  latter's 
short  weight  in  metal  made  her  antagonist 
superior  to  her  in  about  the  same  proportion 
that  she  herself  was  subsequently  superior  to 
the  Penguin,  or,  in  other  words,  the  ships 
were  practically  equal.  Captain  Lawrence 
now  challenged  Captain  Greene  to  single  fight, 
giving  the  usual  pledges  that  the  Constitution 
should  not  interfere.  The  challenge  was  not 
accepted  for  a  variety  of  reasons ;  among 
others  the  Bonne  Citoyenne  was  carrying 
home  half  a  million  pounds  in  specie.1  Leav- 
ing the  Hornet  to  blockade  her,  Commodore 
Bainbridge  ran  off  to  the  southward,  keeping 
the  land  in  view. 

1  Brenton  and  James  both  deny  that  Captain  Greene 
was  blockaded  by  the  Hornet,  and  claim  that  he  feared 
the  Constitution.  James  says  (p.  275)  that  the  occur- 
rence was  one  which  "  the  characteristic  cunning  of 
Americans  turned  greatly  to  their  advantage " ;  and 
adds  that  Lawrence  only  sent  the  challenge  because  "  it 
could  not  be  accepted,"  and  so  he  would  "  suffer  no 
personal  risk."  He  states  that  the  reason  it  was  sent,  as 
well  as  the  reason  that  it  was  refused,  was  because  the 
Constitution  was  going  to  remain  in  the  offing  and  cap- 
ture the  British  ship  if  she  proved  conqueror.  It  is 
somewhat  surprising  that  even  James  should  have  had 


160  NArAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

At  9  A.  M.,  Dec.  29,  1812,  while  the  Consti- 
tution was  running  along  the  coast  of  Brazil, 
about  thirty  miles  off  shore  in  latitude  13°  6' 
S.,  and  longitude  31°  W.,  two  strange  sail  were 
made,1  inshore  and  to  windward.  These  were 
H.  B.  M.  frigate  Java,  Captain  Lambert,  forty- 
eight  days  out  of  Spithead,  England,  with  the 
captured  ship  William  in  company.  Direct- 
ing the  latter  to  make  for  San  Salvador,  the 
Java  bore  down  in  chase  of  the  Constitution? 
The  wind  was  blowing  light  from  the  N.N.E., 
and  there  was  very  little  sea  on.  At  10  the 
Java  made  the  private  signals,  English,  Span- 
ish, and  Portuguese  in  succession,  none  being 
answered ;  meanwhile  the  Constitution  was 
standing  up  toward  the  Java  on  the  starboard 
tack;  a  little  after  n  she  hoisted, her  private 
signal,  and  then,  being  satisfied  that  the 
strange  sail  was  an  enemy,  she  wore  and  stood 

the  temerity  to  advance  such  arguments.  According 
to  his  own  account  (p.  277)  the  Constitution  left  for 
Boston  on  Jan.  6th,  and  the  Hornet  remained  blockad- 
ing the  Bonne  Cito)>enne  till  the  24th,  when  the  Montagu, 
74,  arrived.  During  these  eighteen  days  there  could 
have  been  no  possible  chance  of  the  Constitution  or  any 
other  ship  interfering,  and  it  is  ridiculous  to  suppose 
that  any  such  fear  kept  Captain  Greene  from  sailing 
out  to  attack  his  foe.  No  doubt  Captain  Greene's 
course  was  perfectly  justifiable,  but  it  is  curious  that 
with  all  the  assertions  made  by  James  as  to  the  coward- 
ice of  the  Americans,  this  is  the  only  instance  through- 
out the  war  in  which  a  ship  of  either  party  declined  a 
contest  with  an  antagonist  of  equal  force  (the  cases  of 
Commodore  Rodgers  and  Sir  George  Collier  being 
evidently  due  simply  to  an  overestimate  of  the  oppos- 
ing ships.) 

*  Official  letter  of  Commodore  Bainbridge,  Jan.  3, 
1813. 

2  Official  letter  of  Lieutenant  Chads,  Dec.  31,  1812. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  161 

off  toward  the  S.  E. ,  to  draw  her  antagonist 
away  from  the  land,1  which  was  plainly  visible. 
The  Java  hauled  up,  and  made  sail  in  a  paral- 
lel course,  the  Constitution  bearing  about  three 
points  on  her  lee  bow.  The  Java  gained  rap- 
idly, being  much  the  swifter. 

At  1.30  the  Constitution  luffed  up,  shortened 
her  canvas  to  top-sails,  top-gallant  sails,  jib, 
and  spanker,  and  ran  easily  off  on  the  port 
tack,  heading  toward  the  southeast ;  she  car- 
ried her  commodore's  pendant  at  the  main, 
national  ensigns  at  the  mizzen-peak  and  main 
top-gallant  mast-head,  and  a  Jack  at  the  fore. 
The  Java  also  had  taken  in  the  main-sail  and 
royals,  and  came  down  in  a  lasking  course  on 
her  adversary's  weather-quarter,*  hoisting  her 
ensign  at  th.e  mizzen-peak,  a  union  Jack  at 
the  mizzen  top-gallant  mast-head,  and  another 
lashed  to  the  main-rigging.  At  2  p.  M.,  the 
Constitution  fired  a  shot  ahead  of  her,  follow- 
ing it  quickly  by  a  broadside,3  and  the  two 
ships  began  at  long  bowls,  the  English  firing 
the  lee  or  starboard  battery  while  the  Ameri- 
cans replied  with  their  port  guns.  The  can- 
nonade was  very  spirited  on  both  sides,  the 
ships  suffering  about  equally.  The  first  broad- 
side of  the  Java  was  very  destructive,  killing 
and  wounding  several  of  the  Constitution's 
crew.  The  Java  kept  edging  down,  and  the 
action  continued,  with  grape  and  musketry  in 
addition ;  the  swifter  British  ship  soon  fore- 
reached  and  kept  away,  intending  to  wear 

1  Log  of  the  Constitution. 

a  Lieutenant  Chads'  Address  to  the  Court-martial, 
April  23,  1813. 
8  Commodore  Bainbridge's  letter. 


162  NAVAL   WAR  OF  18 1 2. 

across  her  slower  antagonist's  bow  and  rake 
her;  but  the  latter  wore  in  the  smoke,  and 
the  two  combatants  ran  off  to  the  westward, 
the  Englishman  still  a-weather  and  steering 
freer  than  the  Constitution,  which  had  luffed 
to  close.1  The  action  went  on  at  pistol-shot 
distance.  In  a  few  minutes,  however,  the 
Java  again  forged  ahead,  out  of  the  weight  of 
her  adversary's  fire,  and  then  kept  off,  as 
before,  to  cross  her  bows  ;  and,  as  before,  the 
Constitution  avoided  this  by  wearing,  both 
ships  again  coming  round  with  their  heads  to 
the  east,  the  American  still  to  leeward.  The 
Java  kept  the  weather-gage  tenaciously,  fore- 
reaching  a  little,  and  whenever  the  Consti- 
tution luffed  up  to  close,"  the  former  tried  to 
rake  her.  But  her  gunnery  was  now  poor, 
little  damage  being  done  by  it ;  most  of  the 
loss  the  Americans  suffered  was  early  in  the 
action.  By  setting  her  foresail  and  main-sail 
the  Constitution  got  up  close  on  the  enemy's 
lee  beam,  her  fire  being  very  heavy  and  carry- 
ing away  the  end  of  the  Java's  bowsprit  and 
her  jib-boom."  The  Constitution  forged  ahead 
and  repeated  her  former  manoeuvre,  wearing 
in  the  smoke.  The  Java  at  once  hove  in 
stays,  but  owing  to  the  loss  of  headsail  fell  off 
very  slowly,  and  the  American  frigate  poured 
a  heavy  raking  broadside  into  her  stern,  at 
about  two  cables'  length  distance.  The  Java 
replied  with  her  port  guns  as  she  fell  off/ 
Both  vessels  then  bore  up  and  ran  off  free, 
with  the  wind  on  the  port  quarter ;  the  Java 
being  abreast  and  to  windward  of  her  antago- 

1  Log  of  the  Constitution.    2  Log  of  the  Constito4tion. 
8  Lieutenant  Chads'  letter.    *  Lieut.  Chads'  letter. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  rf>3 

nist,  both  with  their  heads  a  little  east  of 
south.  The  ships  were  less  than  a  cable's 
length  apart,  and  the  Constitution  inflicted 
great  damage  while  suffering  very  little  her- 
self. The  British  lost  many  men  by  the  mus- 
ketry of  the  American  topmen,  and  suffered 
still  more  from  the  round  and  grape,  especially 
on  the  forecastle,1  many  marked  instances  of 
vabr  being  shown  on  both  sides.  The  Java's 
masts  were  wounded  and  her  rigging  cut  to 
pieces,  and  Captain  Lambert  then  ordered  her 
to  be  laid  aboard  the  enemy,  who  was  on  her 
lee  beam.  The  helm  was  put  a-weather,  and 
the  Java  came  down  for  the  Constitution's 
main-chains.  The  boarders  and  marines 
gathered  in  the  gangways  and  on  the  fore- 
castle, the  boatswain  having  been  ordered  to 
cheer  them  up  with  his  pipe  that  they  might 
make  a  clean  spring.*  The  Americans,  how- 
ever, raked  the  British  with  terrible  effect, 
cutting  off  their  main  top-mast  above  the  cap, 
and  their  foremast  near  the  cat  harpings.* 
The  stump  of  the  Java's  bowsprit  got  caught 
in  the  Constitution's  mizzen-rigging,  and  be- 
fore it  got  clear  the  British  suffered  still  more. 
Finally  the  ships  separated,  the  Java's  bow- 
sprit passing  over  the  taffrail  of  the  Constitu- 
tion; the  latter  at  once  kept  away  to  avoid 
being  raked.  The  ships  again  got  nearly 
abreast,  but  the  Constitution,  in  her  turn,  fore- 
reached;  whereupon  Commodore  Bainbridge 

1  Testimony  of  Christopher  Speedy,  in  minutes  of 
the   Court-martial   on  board   H.  M.  S.    Gladiatort  at 
Portsmouth,  April  23,  1813. 

2  Testimony  of  James  Humble,  in  do.t  do. 
8  Log  of  Constitution. 


164  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

wore,  passed  his  antagonist,  luffed  up  under 
his  quarter,  raked  him  with  the  starboard 
guns,  then  wore,  and  recommenced  the  action 
with  his  port  broadside  at  about  3.10.  Again 
the  vessels  were  abreast,  and  the  action  went 
on  as  furiously  as  ever.  The  wreck  of  the  top 
hamper  on  the  Java  lay  over  her  starboard 
side,  so  that  every  discharge  of  her  guns  set 
heron  fire,1  and  in  a  few  minutes  her  able  and 
gallant  commander  was  mortally  wounded  by 
a  ball  fired  by  one  of  the  American  main-top- 
men.1'  The  command  then  devolved  on  the 
first  lieutenant,  Chads,  himself  painfully 
wounded.  The  slaughter  had  been  terrible, 
yet  the  British  fought  on  with  stubborn  reso- 
lution, cheering  lustily.  But  success  was  now 
hopeless,  for  nothing  could  stand  against  the 
cool  precision  of  the  Yankee  fire.  The  stump 
of  the  Java's  foremast  was  carried  away  by  a 
double-headed  shot,  the  mizzen-mast  fell,  the 
gaff  and  spanker  boom  were  shot  away,  also 
the  main-yard,  and  finally  the  ensign  was  cut 
down  by  a  shot,  and  all  her  guns  absolutely 
silenced ;  when  at  4. 05  the  Constitution,  think- 
ing her  adversary  had  struck,8  ceased  firing, 
hauled  aboard  her  tacks,  and  passed  across 
her  adversary's  bows  to  windward,  with  her 
top-sails,  jib,  and  spanker  set.  A  few  minutes 
afterward  the  Java's  main-mast  fell,  leaving 
her  a  sheer  hulk.  The  Constitution  assumed 
a  weatherly  position,  and  spent  an  hour  in 
repairing  damages  and  securing  her  masts; 

1  Lieut.  Chads'  Address. 
a  Surgeon  J.  C.  Jones'  Report. 
8  Log  of  the  Constitution  (as  given  in  Bainbridge's 
letter). 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  165 

then  she  wore  and  stood  toward  her  enemy, 
whose  flag  was  again  flying,  but  only  for 
bravado,  for  as  soon  as  the  Constitution  stood 
across  her  forefoot  she  struck.  At  5.25  she 
was  taken  possession  of  by  Lieutenant  Parker, 
ist  of  the  Constitution^  in  one  of  the  latter's 
only  two  remaining  boats. 

The  American  ship  had  suffered  compara- 
tively little.  But  a  few  round  shot  had  struck 
her  hull,  one  of  which  carried  away  the  wheel ; 
one  i8-pounder  went  through  the  mizzen- 
mast ;  the  foremast,  main-top-mast,  and  a  few 
other  spars  were  slightly  wounded,  and  the 
running  rigging  and  shrouds  were  a  good 
deal  cut ;  but  in  an  hour  she  was  again  in  good 
fighting  trim.  Her  loss  amounted  to  8  sea- 
men and  i  marine  killed ;  the  5th  lieutenant, 
John  C.  Aylwin,  and  2  seamen,  mortally,  Com- 
modore Bainbridge  and  12  seamen,  severely, 
and  7  seamen  and  2  marines,  slightly  wound- 
ed ;  in  all  12  killed  and  mortally  wounded, 
and  22  wounded  severely  and  slightly.1 

"  The  Java  sustained  unequally  injuries 
beyond  the  Constitution,"  says  the  British  ac- 
count." These  have  already  been  given  in 
detail ;  she  was  a  riddled  and  entirely  dis- 
masted hulk.  Her  loss  (for  discussion  of 
which  see  farther  on)  was  48  killed  (including 
Captain  Henry  Lambert,  who  died  soon  after 
the  close  of  the  action,  and  five  midshipmen), 
and  102  wounded,  among  them  Lieutenant 
Henry  Ducie  Chads,  Lieutenant  of  Marines 
David  Davies,  Commander  John  Marshall, 
Lieut.  James  Saunders,  the  boatswain,  James 

1  Report  of  Surgeon  Amos  A.  Evans. 
3  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  xxix,  452. 
14— 6  • 


166  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

Humble,  master,  Batty  Robinson,  and  four 
midshipmen. 

In  this  action  both  ships  displayed  equal 
gallantry  and  seamanship.  "  The  Java" 
says  Commodore  Bainbridge,  "  was  exceed- 
ingly well  handled  and  bravely  fought.  Poor 
Captain  Lambert  was  a  distinguished  and 
gallant  officer,  and  a  most  worthy  man,  whose 
death  I  sincerely  regret."  The  manoeuvring 
on  both  sides  was  excellent ;  Captain  Lambert 
used  the  advantage  which  his  ship  possessed 
in  her  superior  speed  most  skilfully,  always 
endeavoring  to  run  across  his  adversary's 
bows  and  rake  him  when  he  had  forereached, 
and  it  was  only  owing  to  the  equal  skill  which 
his  antagonist  displayed  that  he  was  foiled, 
the  length  of  the  combat  being  due  to  the 
number  of  evolutions.  The  great  superiority 
of  the  Americans  was  in  their  gunnery.  The 
fire  of  ihefava  was  both  less  rapid  and  less 
well-directed  than  that  of  her  antagonist ;  the 
difference  of  force  against  her  was  not  heavy, 
being  about  as  ten  is  to  nine,  and  was  by  no 
means  enough  to  account  for  the  almost  five- 
fold greater  loss  she  suffered. 

On  next  page  is  a  diagram  of  the  battle.  It 
differs  from  both  of  the  official  accounts,  as 
these  conflict,  greatly  both  as  to  time  and  as 
regards  some  of  the  evolutions.  I  generally 
take  the  mean  in  cases  of  difference ;  for  ex- 
ample, Commodore  Bainbridge's  report  makes 
the  fight  endure  but  i  hour  and  55  minutes, 
Lieutenant  Chad's  2  hours  and  25  minutes  ; 
I  have  made  it  2  hours  and  10  minutes,  etc., 
etc. 

The   tonnage  and   weight  of  metal  of  the 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  iSl2. 


1 68  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

combatants  have  already  been  stated  ;  I  will 
give  the  complements  shortly.  The  following 
is  the 

COMPARATIVE  FORCE  AND  LOSS. 

Tons.        Weight  Metal.        No.  Men.        Loss. 
Constitution       1576  654  475  34 

Java  1340  576  426  150 

Relative  Relative  Loss 

Force.  Inflicted. 

Constitution  100  100 

Java  89  23 

In  hardly  another  action  of  the  war  do  the 
accounts  of  the  respective  forces  differ  so 
widely ;  the  official  British  letter  makes  their 
total  of  men  at  the  beginning  of  the  action 
377,  of  whom  Commodore  Bainbridge  official- 
ly reports  that  he  paroled  378  !  The  British 
state  their  loss  in  killed  and  mortally  wounded 
at  24;  Commodore  Bainbridge  reports  that 
the  dead  alone  amounted  to  nearly  60  ! 
Usually  I  have  taken  each  commander's  ac- 
count of  his  own  force  and  loss,  and  I  should 
do  so  now  if  it  were  not  that  the  British  ac- 
counts differ  among  themselves,  and  whenever 
they  relate  to  the  Americans,  are  flatly  contra- 
dicted by  the  affidavits  of  the  latter's  officers. 
The  British  first  handicap  themselves  by  the 
statement  that  the  surgeon  of  the  Constitution 
was  an  Irishman  and  lately  an  assistant 
surgeon  in  the  British  navy  ("  Naval  Chron- 
icle," xxix,  452);  which  draws  from  Surgeon 
Amos  A.  Evans  a  solemn  statement  in  the 
Boston  Gazette  that  he  was  born  in  Maryland 
and  was  never  in  the  British  navy  in  his  life. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  169 

Then  Surgeon  Jones  of  the  Java,  in  his  official 
report,  after  giving  his  own  killed  and  mor- 
tally wounded  at  24,  says  that  the  Americans 
lost  in  all  about  60,  and  that  4  of  their  am- 
putations perished  under  his  own  eyes ;  where- 
upon Surgeon  Evans  makes  the  statement 
(Ari7es*  Register,  vi,  p.  35),  backed  up  by  af- 
fidavits of  his  brother  officers,  that  in  all  he 
had  but  five  amputations,  of  whom  only  one 
died,  and  that  one,  a  month  after  Surgeon 
Jones  had  left  the  ship.  To  meet  the  asser- 
tions of  Lieutenant  Chads  that  he  began  action 
with  but  377  men,  the  Constitution's  officers 
produced  the  /ava's  muster-roll,  dated  Nov. 
1 7th,  or  five  days  after  she  had  sailed,  which 
showed  446  persons,  of  whom  20  had  been 
put  on  board  a  prize.  The  presence  of  this 
large  number  of  supernumeraries  on  board  is 
explained  by  the  fact  that  the  Java  was  car- 
rying out  Lieutenant-General  Hislop,  the 
newly-appointed  Governor  of  Bombay,  and  his 
suite,  together  with  part  of  the  crews  for  the 
Cornwallis,  74,  and  gun-sloops  Chameleon  and 
Icarus ;  she  also  contained  stores  for  those 
two  ships. 

Besides  conflicting  with  the  American 
reports,  the  British  statements  contradict 
one  another.  The  official  published  report 
gives  but  two  midshipmen  as  killed ;  while  one 
of  the  volumes  of  the  "  Naval  Chronicle  " 
(vol.  xxix,  p.  452)  contains  a  letter  from  one 
of  the  Java's  lieutenants,  in  which  he  states 
that  there  were  five.  Finally,  Commodore 
Bainbridge  found  on  board  the  Constitution, 
after  the  prisoners  had  left,  a  letter  from 
Lieutenant  H.  D.  Cornick,  dated  Jan.  i,  1813, 


170  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

and  addressed  to  Lieutenant  Peter  V.  Wood, 
22d  Regiment,  foot,  in  which  he  states  that 
65  of  their  men  were  killed.  James  ("  Naval 
Occurrences ")  gets  around  this  by  stating 
that  it  was  probably  a  forgery ;  but  aside  from 
the  improbability  of  Commodore  Bainbridge 
being  a  forger,  this  could  not  be  so,  for  noth- 
ing would  have  been  easier  than  for  the  British 
lieutenant  to  have  denied  having  written  it, 
which  he  never  did.  On  the  other  hand,  it 
would  be  very  likely  that  in  the  heat  of  the 
action,  Commodore  Bainbridge  and  the  Java's 
own  officers  should  overestimate  the  latter's 
loss.1 

Taking  all  these  facts  into  consideration, 
we  find  446  men  on  board  the  Java  by  her  own 
muster-list;  378  of  these  were  paroled  by 
Commodore  Bainbridge  at  San  Salvador ;  24 
men  were  acknowledged  by  the  enemy  to  be 
killed  or  mortally  wounded;  20  were  absent  in 
a  prize,  leaving  24  unaccounted  for,  who  were 
undoubtedly  slain. 

The  British  loss  was  thus  48  men  killed  and 
mortally  wounded,  102  wounded  severely  and 
slightly.  The  Java  was  better  handled  and 
more  desperately  defended  than  the  Mace- 
donian or  even  the  Guertiere,  and  the  odds 
against  her  were  much  smaller ;  so  she  caused 

1  For  an  account  of  the  shameless  corruption  then 
existing  in  the  Naval  Administration  of  Great  Britain, 
see  Lord  Dundonald's  "Autobiography  of  a  seaman." 
The  letters  of  the  commanders  were  often  garbled, 
as  is  mentioned  by  Brenton  Among  numerous 
cases  that  he  gives,  may  be  mentioned  the  cutting  out 
of  the  Ckevrette,  where  he  distinctly  says,  "our  loss 
was  much  greater  than  was  ever  acknowledged."  (Vol. 
i,  p.  505,  edition  of  1837.) 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  171 

her  opponent  greater  loss,  though  her  gunnery 
was  no  better  than  theirs. 

Lieutenant  Parker,  prize-master  of  thefava, 
removed  all  the  prisoners  and  baggage  to  the 
Constitution,  and  reported  the  prize  to  be  in  a 
very  disabled  state  ;  owing  partly  to  this,  but 
more  to  the  long  distance  from  home  and  the 
great  danger  there  was  of  recapture,  Com- 
modore Bainbridge  destroyed  heron  the  3151, 
and  then  made  sail  for  San  Salvador.  "Our 
gallant  enemy,"  reports  Lieutenant  Chads, 
"  has  treated  us  most  generously " ;  and 
Lieutenant-General  Hislop  presented  the 
Commodore  with  a  very  handsome  sword  as 
a  token  of  gratitude  for  the  kindness  with 
which  he  had  treated  the  prisoners. 

Partly  in  consequence  of  his  frigate's  in- 
juries, but  especially  because  of  her  decayed 
condition,  Commodore  Bainbridge  sailed  from 
San  Salvador  on  Jan.  6, 1813,  reaching  Boston 
Feb.  27th,  after  his  four  months'  cruise.  At 
San  Salvador  he  left  the  Hornet  still  block- 
ading the  Bonne  Citoyenne, 

In  order  "  to  see  ourselves  as  others  see 
us,"  I  shall  again  quote  from  Admiral  Jurien 
de  la  Graviere,1  as  his  opinions  are  certainly 
well  worthy  of  attention  both  as  to  these  first 
three  battles,  and  as  to  the  lessons  they  teach. 
"  When  the  American  Congress  declared  war 
on  England  in  1812,"  he  says,  "  it  seemed  as 
if  this  unequal  conflict  would  crush  her  navy 
in  the  act  of  being  born  ;  instead,  it  but  fertil- 
ized the  germ.  It  is  only  since  that  epoch 
that  the  United  States  has  taken  rank  among 
maritime  powers.  Some  combats  of  frigates, 

1<(Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  284  (Paris,  1881). 


172  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

corvettes,  and  brigs,  insignificant  without 
doubt  as  regards  material  results,  sufficed  to 
break  the  charm  which  protected  the  standard 
of  St.  George,  and  taught  Europe  what  she 
could  have  already  learned  from  some  of  our 
combats,  if  the  louder  noise  of  our  defeats 
had  not  drowned  the  glory,  that  the  only 
invincibles  on  the  sea  are  good  seamen  and 
good  artillerists. 

"  The  English  covered  the  ocean  with  their 
cruisers  when  this  unknown  navy,  composed 
of  six  frigates  and  a  few  small  craft  hitherto 
hardly  numbered,  dared  to  establish  its 
cruisers  at  the  mouth  of  the  Channel,  in  the 
very  centre  of  the  British  power.  But  already 
the  Constitution  had  captured  the  Guerriere 
andfava,  the  United  States  had  made  a  prize 
of  the  Macedonian,  the  Wasp  of  the  Frolic,  and 
the  Hornet  of  the  Peacock.  The  honor  of  the 
new  flag  was  established.  England,  humili- 
ated, tried  to  attribute  her  multiplied  reverses 
to  the  unusual  size  of  the  vessels  which  Con- 
gress had  had  constructed  in  1799,  and  which 
did  the  fighting  in  1812.  She  wished  to  refuse 
them  the  name  of  frigates,  and  called  them, 
not  without  some  appearance  of  reason,  dis- 
guised line-of-battle  ships.  Since  then  all 
maritime  powers  have  copied  these  gigantic 
models,  as  the  result  of  the  war  of  1812 
obliged  England  herself  to  change  her  naval 
material ;  but  if  they  had  employed,  instead  of 
frigates,  cut-down  74'$  (vaisseaux  rases),  it 
would  still  be  difficult  to  explain  the  prodigious 
success  of  the  Americans.  *  *  * 

"  In  an  engagement  which  terminated  in 
less  than  half  an  hour,  the  English  frigate 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  173 

Gnerriere,  completely  dismasted,  had  fifteen 
men  killed,  sixty-three  wounded,  and  more 
than  thirty  shot  below  the  water-line.  She 
sank  twelve  hours  after  the  combat.  The 
Constitution,  on  the  contrary,  had  but  seven 
men  killed  and  seven  wounded,  and  did  not 
lose  a  mast.  As  soon  as  she  had  replaced  a 
few  cut  ropes  and  changed  a  few  sails,  she 
was  in  condition,  even  by  the  testimony  of  the 
British  historian,  to  take  another  Guerriere. 
The  United  States  took  an  hour  and  a  half  to 
capture  the  Macedonian^  and  the  same  differ- 
ence made  itself  felt  in  the  damage  suffered 
by  the  two  ships.  The  Macedonian  had  her 
mast  shattered,  two  of  her  main-deck  and  all 
her  spar-deck  guns  disabled ;  more  than  a 
hundred  shot  had  penetrated  the  hull,  and 
over  a  third  of  the  crew  had  suffered  by  the 
hostile  fire.  The  American  frigate,  on  the 
contrary,  had  to  regret  but  five  men  killed  and 
seven  wounded  ;  her  guns  had  been  fired  each 
sixty-six  times  to  the  Macedonian's  thirty-six. 
The  combat  of  the  Constitution  and  the  Java 
lasted  two  hours,  and  was  the  most  bloody  of 
these  three  engagements.  The  Java  only 
struck  when  she  had  been  razed  like  a  sheer 
hulk  ;  she  had  twenty-two  men  killed  and  one 

hundred  and  two  wounded. 

****** 

"  This  war  should  be  studied  with  unceas- 
ing diligence  ;  the  pride  of  two  peoples  to 
whom  naval  affairs  are  so  generally  familiar 
has  cleared  all  the  details  and  laid  bare  all 
the  episodes,  and  through  the  sneers  which 
the  victors  should  have  spared,  merely  out  of 
care  for  their  own  glory,  at  every  step  can  be 


174  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

seen  that  great  truth,  that  there  is  only  suc- 
cess for  those  who  know  how  to  prepare  it. 

****** 

"  It  belongs  to  us  to  judge  impartially  these 
marine  events,  too  much  exalted  perhaps  by  a 
national  vanity  one  is  tempted  to  excuse. 
The  Americans  showed,  in  the  War  of  1812,  a 
great  deal  of  skill  and  resolution.  But  if,  as 
they  have  asserted,  the  chances  had  always 
been  perfectly  equal  between  them  and  their 
adversaries,  if  they  had  only  owed  their  tri- 
umphs to  the  intrepidity  of  Hull,  Decatur, 
and  Bainbridge,  there  would  be  for  us  but 
little  interest  in  recalling  the  struggle.  We 
need  not  seek  lessons  in  courage  outside  of 
our  own  history.  On  the  contrary,  what  is  to 
be  well  considered  is  that  the  ships  of  the 
United  States  constantly  fought  with  the 
chances  in  their  favor,  and  it  is  on  this  that 
the  American  government  should  found  its 
true  title  to  glory.  *  *  *  The  Americans 
in  1812  had  secured  to  themselves  the  advan- 
tage of  a  better  organization  [than  the  Eng- 
lish]." 

The  fight  between  the  Constitution  and  the 
Java  illustrates  best  the  proposition,  "  that 
there  is  only  success  for  those  who  know  how 
to  prepare  it."  Here  the  odds  in  men  and 
metal  were  only  about  as  10  to  9  in  favor  of 
the  victors,  and  it  is  safe  to  say  that  they 
might  have  been  reversed  without  vitally  af- 
fecting the  result.  In  the  fight  Lambert 
handled  his  ship  as  skilfully  as  Bainbridge 
did  his  ;  and  the  Java's  men  proved  by  their 
indomitable  courage  that  they  were  excellent 
material.  The  Java's  crew  was  new  shipped 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  175 

for  the  voyage,  and  had  been  at  sea  but  six 
weeks ;  in  the  Constitution ' s  first  fight  her 
crew  had  been  aboard  of  her  but  five  weeks. 
So  the  chances  should  have  been  nearly  equal, 
and  the  difference  in  fighting  capacity  that 
was  shown  by  the  enormous  disparity  in  the 
loss,  and  still  more  in  the  damage  inflicted, 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  the  officers  of  one 
ship  had,  and  the  officers  of  the  other  had  not, 
trained  their  raw  crews.  The  Constitution  s 
men  were  not  "picked,"  but  simply  average 
American  sailors,  as  the  Java's  were  average 
British  sailors.  The  essential  difference  was 
in  the  training. 

During  the  six  weeks  the  Java  was  at  sea, 
her  men  had  fired  but  six  broadsides,  of  blank 
cartridges;  during  the  first  five  weeks  the 
Constitution  cruised,  her  crew  were  incessantly 
practised  at  firing  with  blank  cartridge,  and 
also  at  a  target.1  The  Java's  crew  had  only 
been  exercised  occasionally,  even  in  pointing 
the  guns,  and  when  the  captain  of  a  gun  was 
killed  the  effectiveness  of  the  piece  was  tem- 
porarily ruined,  and,  moreover,  the  men  did 
not  work  together.  The  Constitution  s  crew 
were  exercised  till  they  worked  like  machines, 
and  yet  with  enough  individuality  to  render  it 
impossible  to  cripple  a  gun  by  killing  one 
man.  The  unpractised  British  sailors  fired  at 
random ;  the  trained  Americans  took  aim. 

1  In  looking  through  the  logs  of  the  Constitution^ 
Hornet,  etc.,  we  continually  find  such  entries  as  "  beat 
to  quarters,  exercised  the  men  at  the  great  guns,"  "  ex- 
ercised with  musketry,"  "  exercised  the  boarders," 
"  exercised  the  great  guns,  blank  cartridges,  and  after- 
ward firing  at  mark." 


176  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

The  British  marines  had  not  been  taught  any 
thing  approximating  to  skirmishing  or  sharp- 
shooting  ;  the  Americans  had.  The  British 
sailors  had  not  even  been  trained  enough  in 
the  ordinary  duties  of  seamen ;  while  the 
Americans  in  five  weeks  had  been  rendered 
almost  perfect.  The  former  were  at  a  loss 
what  to  do  in  an  emergency  at  all  out  of  their 
own  line  of  work ;  they  were  helpless  when 
the  wreck  fell  over  their  guns,  when  the  Amer- 
icans would  have  cut  it  away  in  a  jiffy.  As 
we  learn  from  Commodore  Morris'  "  Autobio- 
graphy," each  Yankee  sailor  could,  at  need, 
do  a  little  carpentering  or  sail-mending1,  and 
so  was  more  self-reliant.  The  crew  had  been 
trained  to  act  as  if  guided  by  one  mind,  yet 
each  man  retained  his  own  individuality.  The 
petty  officers  were  better  paid  than  in  Great 
Britain,  and  so  were  of  a  better  class  of  men, 
thoroughly  self-respecting;  the  Americans 
soon  got  their  subordinates  in  order,  while  the 
British  did  not.  To  sum  up  :  one  ship's  crew 
had  been  trained  practically  and  thoroughly, 
while  the  other  crew  was  not  much  better  off 
than  the  day  it  sailed  ;  and,  as  far  as  it  goes,  this 
is  a  good  test  of  the  efficiency  of  the  two  navies. 

The  U.  S.  brig  Vixen,  12,  Lieutenant  George 
U.  Read,  had  been  cruising  off  the  southern 
coast;  on  Nov.  22d  she  fell  in  with  the  South- 
ampton, 32,  Captain  Sir  Tames  Lucas  Yeo,  and 
was  captured  after  a  short  but  severe  trial  of 
speed.  Both  vessels  were  wrecked  soon  after- 
ward. 

The  Essex,  32,  Captain  David  Porter,  left 
the  Delaware  on  Oct.  28th,  two  days  afte* 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  177 

Commodore  Bainbridge  had  left  Boston.  She 
expected  to  make  a  very  long  cruise  and  so 
carried  with  her  an  unusual  quantity  of  stores 
and  sixty  more  men  than  ordinarily,  so  that 
her  muster-roll  contained  319  names.  Being 
deep  in  the  water  she  reached  San  lago  after 
Bainbridge  had  left.  Nothing  was  met  with 
until  after  the  Essex  had  crossed  the  equator 
in  latitude  30°  W.  on  Dec.  nth.  On  the 
afternoon  of  the  next  day  a  sail  was  made  out 
to  windward,  and  chased.  At  nine  in  the 
evening  it  was  overtaken,  and  struck  after 
receiving  a  volley  of  musketry  which  killed 
one  man.  The  prize  proved  to  be  the  British 
packet  Norton,  of  10  guns  and  31  men,  with 
$55,000  in  specie  aboard.  The  latter  was 
taken  out,  and  the  Norton  sent  home  with 
Lieutenant  Finch  and  a  prize  crew  of  17  men, 
but  was  recaptured  by  a  British  frigate. 

The  next  appointed  rendezvous  was  the 
Island  of  Fernando  de  Noronha,  where  Cap- 
tain Porter  found  a  letter  from  Commodore 
Bainbridge,  informing  him  that  the  other  ves- 
sels were  off  Cape  Frio.  Thither  cruised 
Porter,  but  his  compatriots  had  left.  On  the 
2gth  he  captured  an  English  merchant  vessel ; 
and  he  was  still  cruising  when  the  year  closed. 

The  year  1812,  on  the  ocean,  ended  as 
gloriously  as  it  had  begun.  In  four  victorious 
fights  the  disparity  in  loss  had  been  so  great 
as  to  sink  the  disparity  of  force  into  insig- 
nificance. Our  successes  had  been  unaccom- 
panied by  any  important  reverse.  Nor  was 
it  alone  by  the  victories,  but  by  the  cruises, 
that  the  year  was  noteworthy.  The  Yankee 


178  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

men-of-war  sailed  almost  in  sight  of  the  Brit- 
ish coast  and  right  in  the  track  of  the  mer- 
chant fleets  and  their  armed  protectors.  Our 
vessels  had  shown  themselves  immensely 
superior  to  their  foes. 

The  reason  of  these  striking  and  unexpected 
successes  was  that  our  navy  in  1812  was  the 
exact  reverse  of  what  our  navy  is  now,  in 
1882.  I  am  not  alluding  to  the  personnel, 
which  still  remains  excellent ;  but,  whereas 
we  now  have  a  large  number  of  worthless  ves- 
sels, standing  very  low  down  in  their  respective 
classes,  we  then  possessed  a. few  vessels,  each 
unsurpassed  by  any  foreign  ship  of  her  class. 
To  bring  up  our  navy  to  the  condition  in 
which  it  stood  in  1812  it  would  not  be  neces- 
sary (although  in  reality  both  very  wise  and 
in  the  end  very  economical)  to  spend  any 
more  money  than  at  present ;  only  instead  of 
using  it  to  patch  up  a  hundred  antiquated 
hulks,  it  should  be  employed  in  building  half 
a  dozen  ships  on  the  most  effective  model. 
If  in  1812  our  ships  had  borne  the  same  rela- 
tion to  the  British  ships  that  they  do  now,  not 
all  the  courage  and  skill  of  our  sailors  would 
have  won  us  a  single  success.  As  it  was,  we 
could  only  cope  with  the  lower  rates,  and  had 
no  vessels  to  oppose  to  the  great  "  liners  "  ; 
but  to-day  there  is  hardly  any  foreign  ship, 
no  matter  how  low  its  rate,  that  is  not  supe- 
rior to  the  corresponding  American  ones. 
It  is  too  much  to  hope  that  our  political  short- 
sightedness will  ever  enable  us  to  have  a  navy 
that  is  first-class  in  point  of  size  ;  but  there 
certainly  seems  no  reason  why  what  ships  we 
have  should  not  be  of  the  very  best  quality. 
The  effect  of  a  victory  is  twofold,  moral  and 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 


material.  Had  we  been  as  roughly  handled 
on  water  as  we  were  on  land  during  the  first 
year  of  the  war,  such  a  succession  of  disasters 
would  have  had  a  most  demoralizing  effect  on 
the  nation  at  large.  As  it  was,  our  victorious 
sea-fights,  while  they  did  not  inflict  any  ma- 
terial damage  upon  the  colossal  sea-might  of 
England,  had  the  most  important  results  in 
the  feelings  they  produced  at  home  and  even 
abroad.  Of  course  they  were  magnified  ab- 
surdly by  most  of  our  writers  at  the  time; 
but  they  do  not  need  to  be  magnified,  for  as 
they  are  any  American  can  look  back  upon 
them  with  the  keenest  national  pride.  For  a 
hundred  and  thirty  years  England  had  had 
no  equal  on  the  sea ;  and  now  she  suddenly 
found  one  in  the  untried  navy  of  an  almost 
unknown  power. 

BRITISH   VESSELS    CAPTURED    OR    DE- 
STROYED IN  1812. 

Remarks. 


Recaptured. 


4,807 
477     Deducting  Frolic. 


Name. 

Guns. 

Tonnage. 

Guerritre 

49 

1,340 

Macedonian 

49 

1,325 

Java 

49 

1,340 

Frolic 

19 

477 

Alert 

20 

325 

186 
19 


167  4,33° 

AMERICAN  VESSELS  CAPTURED  OR 
DESTROYED. 

Name.  Guns.  Tonnage. 

Wasp  18 

Nautilus  14 

Vixen  14 


450 

'85 
185 


46 


820 


l8o  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

VESSELS  BUILT  IN  1812. 

Name.  Rig.    Guns.  Tonnage.    Where  Built        Cost. 

Nonsuch     Schooner  14        148      Charleston     $15,000 
Carolina     Schooner  14        230  "  8,743 

Louisiana  Ship          16        341      New  Orleans    15,500 

PRIZES  MADE,' 

Ship  No.  of  Prizes. 

President  J 

United  States  2 

Constitution  9 

Congress  2 

Chesapeake  I 

Essex  II 

Wasp  2 

Hornet  I 

Argus  6 

Small  Craft  5 

46 

1  These  can  only  be  approximately  given ;  the  rec- 
ords are  often  incomplete  or  contradictory,  especially 
as  regards  the  small  craft.  Most  accounts  do  not  give 
by  any  means  the  full  number. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  181 


CHAPTER  IV. 

1812. 

ON  THE  LAKES. 

PRELIMINARY — The  combatants  starting  nearly  on 
an  equality — Difficulties  of  creating  a  naval  force — 
Difficulty  of  comparing  the  force  of  the  rival  squad- 
rons— Meagreness  of  the  published  accounts — Unre- 
liability of  James — ONTARIO — Extraordinary  nature  of  • 
the  American  squadron — Canadian  squadron  forming 
only  a  kind  of  water  militia — Sackett's  Harbor  feebly 
attacked  by  Commodore  Earle — Commodore  Chauncy 
bombards  York— ERIE — Lieutenant  Elliott  captures 
the  Detroit  andiCaledoma — Unsuccessful  expedition  of 
Lieutenant  Angus- 

AT  the  time  we  are  treating  of,  the  State 
of  Maine  was  so  sparsely  settled,  and 
covered  with  such  a  dense  growth  of  forest, 
that  it  was  practically  impossible  for  either 
of  the  contending  parties  to  advance  an  army 
through  its  territory.  A  continuation  of  the 
same  wooded  and  mountainous  district  pro- 
tected the  northern  parts  of  Vermont  and 
New  Hampshire,  while  in  New  York  the 
Adirondack  region  was  an  impenetrable  wilder- 
ness. It  thus  came  about  that  the  northern 
boundary  was  formed,  for  military  purposes, 
by  Lake  Huron,  Lake  Erie,  the  Niagara,  Lake 
Ontario,  the  St.  Lawrence,  and,  after  an 
interval,  by  Lake  Champlain.  The  road  into 


182  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

the  States  by  the  latter  ran  close  along  shore, 
and  without  a  naval  force  the  invader  would 
be  wholly  unable  to  protect  his  flanks,  and 
would  probably  have  his  communications  cut. 
This  lake,  however,  was  almost  wholly  within 
the  United  States,  and  did  not  become  of 
importance  till  toward  the  end  of  the  war. 
Upon  it  were  two  American  gunboats,  reg- 
ularly officered  and  manned,  and  for  such 
smooth  water  sufficiently  effective  vessels. 

What  was  at  that  time  the  western  part  of 
the  northern  frontier  became  the  main  theatre 
of  military  operations,  and  as  it  presented 
largely  a  water  front,  a  naval  force  was  an  in- 
dispensable adjunct,  the  command  of  the 
lakes  being  of  the  utmost  importance.  As 
these  lakes  were  fitted  for  the  manoeuvring  of 
ships  of  the  largest  size,  the  operations  upon 
them  were  of  the  same  nature  as  those  on  the 
ocean,  and  properly  belong  to  naval  and  not 
to  military  history.  But  while  on  the  ocean 
America  started  with  too  few  ships  to  enable 
her  really  to  do  any  serious  harm  to  her  an- 
tagonist, on  the  inland  waters  the  two  sides 
began  very  nearly  on  an  equality.  The  chief 
regular  forces  either  belligerent  possessed 
were  on  Lake  Ontario.  Here  the  United 
States  had  a  man-of-war  brig,  the  Onetda,  of 
240  tons,  carrying  16  24-pound  carronades, 
manned  by  experienced  seamen,  and  com- 
manded by  Lieutenant  M.  T.  Woolsey. 
Great  Britain  possessed  the  Royal  George,  22, 
Prince  Regent,  16,  Earl  of  Moira,  14,  Glouces- 
ter, 10,  Seneca,  8,  and  Simco,  8,  all  under  the 
command  of  a  Commodore  Earle  ;  but  though 
this  force  was  so  much  the  more  powerful  it 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  iSl2.  183 

was  very  inefficient,  not  being  considered  as 
belonging  to  the  regular  navy,  the  sailors 
being  undisciplined,  and  the  officers  totally 
without  experience,  never  having  been  really 
trained  in  the  British  service.  From  these 
causes  it  resulted  that  the  struggle  on  the 
lakes  was  to  be  a  work  as  much  of  creat- 
ing as  of  using  a  navy.  On  the  seaboard 
success  came  to  those  who  made  best  use  of 
the  ships  that  had  already  been  built ;  on  the 
lakes  the  real  contest  lay  in  the  building. 
And  building  an  inland  navy  was  no  easy 
task.  The  country  around  the  lakes,  espe- 
cially on  the  south  side,  was  still  very  sparsely 
settled,  and  all  the  American  naval  supplies 
had  to  be  brought  from  the  seaboard  cities 
through  the  valley  of  the  Mohawk.  There 
was  no  canal  or  other  means  of  communica- 
tion, except  very  poor  roads  intermittently  re- 
lieved by  transportation  on  the  Mohawk  and 
on  Oneida  Lake,  when  they  were  navigable. 
Supplies  were  thus  brought  up  at  an  enormous 
cost,  with  tedious  delays  and  great  difficulty; 
and  bad  weather  put  a  stop  to  all  travel. 
Very  little  indeed,  beyond  timber,  could  be 
procured  at  the  stations  on  the  lakes.  Still  a 
few  scattered  villages  and  small  towns  had 
grown  up  on  the  shores,  whose  inhabitants 
were  largely  engaged  in  the  carrying  trade. 
The  vessels  used  for  the  purpose  were  gener- 
ally small  sloops  or  schooners,  swift  and  fairly 
good  sailors,  but  very  shallow  and  not  fitted 
for  rough  weather.  The  frontiersmen  them- 
selves, whether  Canadian  or  American,  were 
bold,  hardy  seamen,  and  when  properly 
trained  and  led  made  excellent  man-of-war's 


184  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

men  ;  but  on  the  American  side  they  were  too 
few  in  number,  and  too  untrained  to  be  made 
use  of,  and  the  seamen  had  to  come  from  the 
coast.  But  the  Canadian  shores  had  been 
settled  longer,  the  inhabitants  were  more 
numerous,  and  by  means  of  the  St.  Lawrence 
the  country  was  easy  of  access  to  Great 
Britain  ;  so  that  the  seat  of  war,  as  regards 
getting  naval  supplies,  and  even  men,  was 
nearer  to  Great  Britain  than  to  us.  Our 
enemies  also  possessed  in  addition  to  the 
squadron  on  Lake  Ontario  another  on  Lake 
Erie,  consisting  of  the  Queen  Charlotte,  17,  Lady 
Prevost,  13,  Hunter,  10,  Caledonia,  2,  Little 
Belt)  2,  and  Chippeway,  2.  These  two  squad- 
rons furnished  training  schools  for  some  five 
hundred  Canadian  seamen,  whom  a  short 
course  of  discipline  under  experienced  officers 
sufficed  to  render  as  good  men  as  their  British 
friends  or  American  foes.  Very  few  British 
seamen  ever  reached  Lake  Erie  (according  to 
James,  not  over  fifty)  ;  but  on  Lake  Ontario, 
and  afterward  on  Lake  Champlain,  they 
formed  the  bulk  of  the  crews,  "  picked  seamen, 
sent  out  by  government  expressly  for  service 
on  the  Canada  lakes."1  As  the  contrary  has 
sometimes  been  asserted  it  may  be  as  well  to 
mention  that  Admiral  Codrington  states  that 
no  want  of  seamen  contributed  to  the  British 
disasters  on  the  lakes,  as  their  sea-ships  at 
Quebec  had  men  drafted  from  them  for  that 
service  till  their  crews  were  utterly  depleted.2 
I  am  bound  to  state  that  while  I  think  that 

1  James,  vi,  353. 

2  Memoirs,  i,   322,   referring  especially  to  battle  of 
Lake  Champlain. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  185 

on  the  ocean  our  sailors  showed  themselves 
superior  to  their  opponents,  especially  in  gun 
practice,  on  the  lakes  the  men  of  the  rival 
fleets  were  as  evenly  matched,  in  skill  and 
courage,  as  could  well  be.  The  difference, 
when  there  was  any,  appeared  in  the  officers, 
and,  above  all,  in  the  builders  ;  which  was  the 
more  creditable  to  us,  as  in  the  beginning  we 
were  handicapped  by  the  fact  that  the  British 
already  had  a  considerable  number  of  war 
vessels,  while  we  had  but  one. 

The  Falls  of  Niagara  interrupt  navigation 
between  Erie  and  Ontario  ;  so  there  were  three 
independent  centres  of  naval  operations  on 
the  northern  frontier.  The  first  was  on  Lake 
Champlain,  where  only  the  Americans  pos- 
sessed any  force,  and,  singularly  enough,  this 
was  the  only  place  where  the  British  showed 
more  enterprise  in  ship-building  than  we  did. 
Next  came  Lake  Ontario,  where  both  sides 
made  their  greatest  efforts,  but  where  the  re- 
sult was  indecisive,  though  the  balance  of  suc- 
cess was  slightly  inclined  toward  us.  Our 
naval  station  was  at  Sackett's  Harbor ;  that 
of  our  foes  at  Kingston.  The  third  field  of 
operations  was  Lake  Erie  and  the  waters  above 
it.  Here  both  sides  showed  equal  daring  and 
skill  in  the  fighting,  and  our  advantage  must 
be  ascribed  to  the  energy  and  success  with 
which  we  built  and  equipped  vessels.  Orig- 
inally we  had  no  force  at  all  on  these  waters, 
while  several  vessels  were  opposed  to  us.  It 
is  a  matter  of  wonder  that  the  British  and 
Canadian  governments  should  have  been  so 
supine  as  to  permit  their  existing  force  to  go 
badly  armed,  and  so  unenterprising  as  to  build 


lS6  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

but   one   additional   ship,    when   they   could 
easily  have  preserved  their  superiority. 

It  is  very  difficult  to  give  a  full  and  fair  ac- 
count of  the  lake  campaigns.  The  inland  na- 
vies were  created  especially  for  the  war,  and, 
after  it  were  allowed  to  decay,  so  that  the  rec- 
ords of  the  tonnage,  armament,  and  crews  are 
hard  to  get  at.  Of  course,  where  everything 
had  to  be  created,  the  services  could  not  have 
the  regular  character  of  those  on  the  ocean. 
The  vessels  employed  were  of  widely  different 
kinds,  and  this  often  renders  it  almost  impos- 
sible to  correctly  estimate  the  relative  force 
of  two  opposing  squadrons.  While  the  Amer- 
icans were  building  their  lake  navy,  they,  as 
make-shifts,  made  use  of  some  ordinary  mer- 
chant schooners,  which  were  purchased  and 
fitted  up  with  one  or  two  long,  heavy  guns 
each.  These  gun-vessels  had  no  quarters,  and 
suffered  under  all  the  other  disadvantages 
which  make  a  merchant  vessel  inferior  to  a 
regularly  constructed  man-of-war.  The  chief 
trouble  was  that  in  a  heavy  sea  they  had  a 
strong  tendency  to  capsize,  and  were  so  un- 
steady that  the  guns  could  not  be  aimed  when 
any  wind  was  blowing.  Now,  if  a  few  of  these 
schooners,  mounting  long  32's,  encountered 
a  couple  of  man-of-war  brigs,  armed  with  car- 
ronades,  which  side  was  strongest  ?  In  smooth 
water  the  schooners  had  the  advantage,  and 
in  rough  weather  they  were  completely  at 
the  mercy  of  the  brigs  ;  so  that  it  would  be 
very  hard  to  get  at  the  true  worth  of  such  a 
contest  as  each  side  would  be  tolerably  sure 
to  insist  that  the  weather  was  such  as  to  give 
a  great  advantage  to  the  other.  In  all 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  I&I2.  187 

the  battles  and  skirmishes  on  Champlain, 
Erie,  and  Huron,  at  least  there  was  no  room 
left  for  doubt  as  to  who  were  the  victors.  But 
on  Lake  Ontario  there  was  never  any  decisive 
struggle,  and  whenever  an  encounter  occurred, 
each  commodore  always  claimed  that  his  ad- 
versary had  "  declined  the  combat "  though 
"  much  superior  in  strength. "  It  is,  of  course, 
almost  impossible  to  find  out  which  really 
did  decline  the  combat,  for  the  official  letters 
flatly  contradict  each  other  ;  and  it  is  often 
almost  as  difficult  to  discover  where  the  supe- 
riority in  force  lay,  when  the  fleets  differed  so 
widely  in  character  as  was  the  case  in  1813. 
Then  Commodore  Chauncy's  squadron  con- 
sisted largely  of  schooners  ;  their  long,  heavy 
guns  made  his  total  foot  up  in  a  very  imposing 
manner,  and  similar  gun-vessels  did  very  good 
work  on  Lake  Erie ;  so  Commodore  Yeo,  and 
more  especially  Commodore  Yeo's  admirers, 
exalted  these  schooners  to  the  skies,  and  con- 
veyed the  impression  that  they  were  most 
formidable  craft,  by  means  of  which  Chauncy 
ought  to  have  won  great  victories.  Yet  when 
Yeo  captured  two  of  them  he  refused  to  let 
them  even  cruise  with  his  fleet,  and  they  were 
sent  back  to  act  as  coast  gunboats  and  trans- 
ports, which  certainly  would  not  have  been 
done  had  they  been  fitted  to  render  any  effec- 
tual assistance.  Again,  one  night  a  squall 
came  on  and  the  two  largest  schooners  went 
to  the  bottom,  which  did  not  tend  to  increase 
the  confidence  felt  in  the  others.  So  there 
can  be  no  doubt  that  in  all  but  very  smooth 
water  the  schooners  could  almost  be  counted 
out  of  the  fight.  Then  the  question  arises  in 


i88  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

any  given  case,  was  the  water  smooth  ?     And 
the  testimony  is  as  conflicting  as  ever. 

It  is  not  too  easy  to  reconcile  the  official 
letters  of  the  commanders,  and  it  is  still  harder 
to  get  at  the  truth  from  either  the  American 
or  British  histories.  Cooper  is  very  inexact, 
and,  moreover,  paints  everything  couleur  de 
rose,  paying  no  attention  to  the  British  side  of 
the  question,  and  distributing  so  much  praise 
to  everybody  that  one  is  at  a  loss  to  know 
where  it  really  belongs.  Still,  he  is  very  use- 
ful, for  he  lived  at  the  time  of  the  events  he 
narrates,  and  could  get  much  information 
about  them  at  first  hand,  from  the  actors  them- 
selves. James  is  almost  the  only  British 
authority  on  the  subject ;  but  he  is  not  nearly 
as  reliable  as  when  dealing  with  the  ocean 
contests,  most  of  this  part  of  his  work  being 
being  taken  up  with  a  succession  of  acrid 
soliloquies  on  the  moral  defects  of  the  Amer- 
ican character.  The  British  records  for  this 
extraordinary  service  on  the  lakes  were  not  at 
all  carefully  kept,  and  so  James  is  not  ham- 
pered by  the  necessity  of  adhering  more  or  less 
closely  to  official  documents,  but  lets  his  im- 
agination run  loose.  On  the  ocean  and  sea- 
board his  account  of  the  British  force  can 
generally  be  relied  upon  ;  but  on  the  lakes  his 
authority  is  questionable  in  every  thing  relat- 
ing either  to  friends  or  foes.  This  is  the  more 
exasperating  because  it  is  done  wilfully,  when, 
if  he  had  chosen,  he  could  have  written  an 
invaluable  history;  he  must  of  ten  have  known 
the  truth  when,  as  a  matter  of  preference,  he 
chose  either  to  suppress  or  alter  it.  Thus  he 
ignores  all  the  small  "  cutting  out "  expedi- 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  189 

tions  in  which  the  Americans  were  successful, 
and  where  one  would  like  to  hear  the  British 
side.  For  example,  Captain  Yeo  captured  two 
schooners,  \h&  Julia  and  Growler,  but  Chaun- 
cy  recaptured  both.  We  have  the  American 
account  of  this  recapture  in  full,  but  James 
does  not  even  hint  at  it,  and  blandly  puts 
down  both  vessels  in  the  total  "American 
loss  "  at  the  end  of  his  smaller  work.  Worse 
still,  when  the  Growler  again  changed  hands, 
he  counts  it  in  again,  in  the  total,  as  if  it  were 
an  entirely  different  boat,  although  he  inva- 
riably rules  out  of  the  American  list  all  recap- 
tured vessels.  A  more  serious  perversion  of 
facts  are  his  statements  about  comparative 
tonnage.  This  was  at  that  time  measured  ar- 
bitrarily, the  depth  of  hold  being  estimated  at 
half  the  breadth  of  beam ;  and  the  tonnage  of 
our  lake  vessels  was  put  down  exactly  as  if 
they  were  regular  ocean  cruisers  of  the  same 
dimensions  in  length  and  breadth.  But  on 
these  inland  seas  the  vessels  really  did  not 
draw  more  than  half  as  much  water  as  on  the 
ocean,  and  the  depth  would  of  course  be  much 
less.  James,  in  comparing  the  tonnage,  gives 
that  of  the  Americans  as  if  they  were  regular 
ocean  ships,  but  in  the  case  of  the  British  ves- 
sels, carefully  allows  for  their  shallowness, 
although  professing  to  treat  the  two  classes  in 
the  same  way  ;  and  thus  he  makes  out  a  most 
striking  and  purely  imaginary  difference.  The 
best  example  is  furnished  by  his  accounts  of 
the  fleets  on  Lake  Erie.  The  captured  vessels 
were  appraised  by  two  captains  and  the  ship- 
builder, Mr.  Henry  Eckford ;  their  tonnage 
being  computed  precisely  as  the  tonnage  of 
14—7 


igo  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

the  American  vessels.  The  appraisement  was 
recorded  in  the  Navy  Department,  and  was 
first  made  public  by  Cooper,  so  that  it  could 
not  have  been  done  for  effect.  Thus  meas- 
ured it  was  found  that  the  tonnage  was  in  round 
numbers  as  follows :  Detroit,  490  tons ; 
Queen  Charlotte,  400 ;  Lady  Prevost,  230 ; 
Hunter,  180;  Little  Belt,  90  ;  Chippeway,  70. 
James  makes  them  measure  respectively  305, 
280,  120,  74,  54,  and  32  tons,  but  carefully 
gives  the  American  ships  the  regular  sea  ton- 
nage. So  also  he  habitually  deducts  about 
25  per  cent,  from  the  real  number  of  men  on 
board  the  British  ships  ;  as  regards  Lake  Erie 
he  contradicts  himself  so  much  that  he  does 
not  need  to  be  exposed  from  outside  sources. 
But  the  most  glaring  and  least  excusable  mis- 
statements  are  made  as  to  the  battle  of  Lake 
Champlain,  where  he  gives  the  American  as 
greatly  exceeding  the  British  force.  He 
reaches  this  conclusion  by  the  most  marveJ- 
lous  series  of  garblings  and  misstatements. 
First,  he  says  that  the  Confiance  and  the 
Saratoga  were  of  nearly  equal  tonnage.  The 
Confiance  being  captured  was  placed  on  our 
naval  lists,  where  for  years  she  ranked  as  a 
36-gun  frigate,  while  the  Saratoga  ranked 
among  the  24-gun  corvettes;  and  by  actual 
measurement  the  former  was  half  as  large 
again  as  the  latter.  He  gives  the  Confiance 
but  270  men ;  one  of  her  officers,  in  a  letter 
published  in  the  London  Naval  Chronicle? 
gives  her  over  300;  more  than  that  number 
of  dead  and  prisoners  were  taken  out  of  her. 

1  Vol.  xxxii,  p.  272.     The  letter  also  says  that  hard- 
ly five  of  her  men  remained  unhurt. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  191 

J3e  misstates  the  calibre  of  her  guns,  and 
councs  out  two  of  them  because  they  were 
used  through  the  bow-ports ;  whereas,  from 
the  method  in  which  she  made  her  attack, 
these  would  have  been  peculiarly  effective. 
The  guns  are  given  accurately  by  Cooper,  on 
the  authority  of  an  officer  '  who  was  on  board 
the  Confiance  within  15  minutes  after  the  Lin- 
net struck,  and  who  was  in  charge  of  her  for 
two  months. 

Then  James  states  that  there  were  but  10 
British  gallies,  while  Sir  George  Prevost's  of- 
ficial account,  as  well  as  all  the  American 
authorities,  state  the  number  to  be  12.  He 
says  that  the  Finch  grounded  opposite  an 
American  battery  before  the  engagement 
began,  while  in  reality  it  was  an  hour  after- 
ward, and  because  she  had  been  disabled  by 
the  shot  of  the  American  fleet.  The  gallies 
were  largely  manned  by  Canadians,  and 
James,  anxious  to  put  the  blame  on  these 
rather  than  the  British,  says  that  they  acted 
in  the  most  cowardly  way,  whereas  in  reality 
they  caused  the  Americans  more  trouble  than 
Downie's  smaller  sailing  vessels  did.  His  ac- 
count of  the  armament  of  these  vessels  dif- 
fers widely  from  the  official  reports.  He  gives 
the  Linnet  and  Chubb  a  smaller  number  of  men 
than  the  number  of  prisoners  that  were  actually 
taken  out  of  them,  not  including  the  dead. 
Even  misstating  Downie's  force  in  guns, 
underestimating  the  number  of  his  men, 
and  leaving  out  two  of  his  gunboats,  did  not 
content  James  ;  and  to  make  the  figures  show 
a  proper  disproportion,  he  says  (vol.  vi,  p. 

1  Lieutenant  E.  A.  F.  Lavallette. 


192  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

504)  that  he  shall  exclude  the  Finch  from  the 
estimate,  because  she  grounded,  and  half  of 
the  gunboats,  because  he  does  not  think  they 
acted  bravely.  Even  were  these  assertions 
true,  it  would  be  quite  as  logical  for  an  Amer- 
ican writer  to  put  the  Chesapeake 's  crew  down 
as  only  200,  and  say  he  should  exclude  the 
other  men  from  the  estimate  because  they 
flinched ;  and  to  exclude  all  the  guns  that 
were  disabled  by  shot,  would  be  no  worse  than 
to  exclude  the  Finch.  James'  manipulation  of 
the  figures  is  a  really  curious  piece  of  audacity. 
Naturally,  subsequent  British  historians  have 
followed  him  without  inquiry.  James'  ac- 
count of  this  battle,  alone,  amply  justifies  our 
rejecting  his  narrative  entirely,  as  far  as  af- 
fairs on  the  lakes  go,  whenever  it  conflicts 
with  any  other  statement,  British  or  Amer- 
ican. Even  when  it  does  not  conflict,  it  must 
be  followed  with  extreme  caution,  for  when- 
ever he  goes  into  figures  the  only  thing  certain 
about  them  is  that  they  are  wrong.  He  gives 
no  details  at  all  of  most  of  the  general  actions. 
Of  these,  however,  we  already  possess  ex- 
cellent accounts,  the  best  being  those  in  the 
"  Manual  of  Naval  Tactics, "'  by  Commander 
J.  H.  Ward,  U.  S.  N.  (1859),  and  in  Lossing's 
"Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  and 
Cooper's  "  Naval  History."  The  chief  dif- 
ficulty occurs  in  connection  with  matters  on 
Lake  Ontario,1  where  I  have  been  obliged  to 

1  The  accounts  of  the  two  commanders  on  Lake 
Ontario  are  as  difficult  to  reconcile  as  are  those  of  the 
contending  admirals  in  the  battles  which  the  Dutch 
waged  against  the  English  and  French  during  the  years 
1672-1675.  In  every  one  of  De  Ruyter's  last  six  bat- 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  193 

have  recourse  to  a  perfect  patchwork  of 
authors  and  even  newspapers,  for  the  details, 
using  Nile's  Register  and  James  as  mutual  cor- 
rectives. The  armaments  and  equipments 
being  so  irregular  I  have  not,  as  in  other 
cases,  made  any  allowance  for  the  short  weight 
of  the  American  shot,  as  here  the  British  may 
have  suffered  under  a  similar  disadvantage ; 
and  it  may  be  as  well  to  keep  in  mind  that  on 
these  inland  waters  the  seamen  of  the  two 
navies  seem  to  have  been  as  evenly  matched 
in  courage  and  skill  as  was  possible.  They 
were  of  exactly  the  same  stock,  with  the  sole 
exception  that  among  and  under,  but  entirely 
distinct  from,  the  Canadian- English,  fought 
the  descendants  of  the  conquered  Canadian- 
French  ;  and  even  these  had  been  trained  by 
Englishmen,  were  led  by  English  captains, 
fought  on  ships  built  by  English  gold,  and 
with  English  weapons  and  discipline. 

ON    LAKE    ONTARIO. 

There  being,  as  already  explained,  three 
independent  centres  of  inland  naval  opera- 
tions, the  events  at  each  will  be  considered 
separately. 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  Lieutenant  Wool- 
sey,  with  the  Oneidat  was  stationed  at  Sackett's 

ties  each  side  regularly  claimed  the  victory,  although 
there  can  be  but  little  doubt  that  on  the  whole  the 
strategical,  and  probably  the  tactical,  advantage  re- 
mained with  De  Ruyter.  Every  historian  ought  to 
feel  a  sense  of  the  most  lively  gratitude  toward  Nelson ; 
in  his  various  encounters  he  never  left  any  possible 
room  for  dispute  as  to  which  side  had  come  out  first 
best. 


194  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Harbor,  which  was  protected  at  the  entrance 
by  a  small  fort  with  a  battery  composed  of 
one  long  32.  The  Canadian  squadron  of  six 
ships,  mounting  nearly  80  guns,  was  of  course 
too  strong  to  be  meddled  with.  Indeed,  had 
the  Royal  George,  22,  the  largest  vessel,  been 
commanded  by  a  regular  British  sea-officer, 
she  would  have  been  perfectly  competent  to 
take  both  the  Oneida  and  Sackett's  Harbor ; 
but  before  the  Canadian  commodore,  Earle, 
made  up  his  mind  to  attack,  Lieut.  Woolsey 
had  time  to  make  one  or  two  short  cruises, 
doing  some  damage  among  the  merchant  ves- 
sels of  the  enemy. 

On  the  igth  of  July  Earle's  ships  appeared 
off  the  Harbor ;  the  Oneida  was  such  a  dull 
sailor  that  it  was  useless  for  her  to  try  to  es- 
cape, so  she  was  hauled  up  under  a  bank 
where  she  raked  the  entrance,  and  her  off 
guns  landed  and  mounted  on  the  shore,  while 
Lieut.  Woolsey  took  charge  of  the  "battery," 
or  long  32,  in  the  fort.  The  latter  was  the 
only  gun  that  was  of  much  use,  for  after  a 
desultory  cannonade  of  about  an  hour,  Earle 
withdrew,  having  suffered  very  little  damage, 
inflicted  none  at  all,  and  proved  himself  and 
his  subordinates  to  be  grossly  incompetent. 

Acting  under  orders,  Lieut.  Woolsey  now 
set  about  procuring  merchant  schooners  to  be 
fitted  and  used  as  gun-vessels  until  more 
regular  cruisers  could  be  built.  A  captured 
British  schooner  was  christened  the  Ji/tia, 
armed  with  a  long  32  and  two  6's,  manned 
with  30  men,  under  Lieut.  Henry  Wells,  and 
sent  down  to  Ogdensburg.  "  On  her  way 
thither  she  encountered  and  actually  beat  off, 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  195 

without  losing  a  man,  the  Moira,  of  14,  and 
Gloucester,  of  10  guns."  '  Five  other  schooners 
were  also  purchased ;  the  Hamilton,  of  10 
guns,  being  the  largest,  while  the  other  four, 
the  Governor  Tompkins,  Growler,  Conquest, 
and  Pert  had  but  n  pieces  between  them. 
Nothing  is  more  difficult  than  to  exactly  de- 
scribe the  armaments  of  the  smaller  lake  ves- 
sels. The  American  schooners  were  mere 
make-shifts,  and  their  guns  were  frequently 
changed ; 2  as  soon  as  they  could  be  dispensed 
with  they  were  laid  up,  or  sold,  and  forgotten. 

It  was  even  worse  with  the  British,  who 
manifested  the  most  indefatigable  industry  in 
intermittently  changing  the  armament,  rig, 
and  name  of  almost  every  vessel,  and,  the 
records  being  very  loosely  kept,  it  is  hard  to 
find  what  was  the  force  at  any  one  time.  A 
vessel  which  in  one  conflict  was  armed  with 
long  i8's,  in  the  next  would  have  replaced 
some  of  them  with  68-pound  carronades ;  or, 
beginning  life  as  a  ship,  she  would  do  most  of 
her  work  as  a  schooner,  and  be  captured  as  a 
brig,  changing  her  name  even  oftener  than 
anything  else. 

On  the  first  of  September  Commodore  Isaac 
Chauncy  was  appointed  commander  of  the 
forces  on  the  lakes  (except  of  those  on  Lake 

1  James,  vi,  350. 

2  They  were  always  having  accidents  happen  to  them 
that  necessitated  some  alteration.     If  a  boat  was  armed 
with  a  long  32,  she  rolled  too  much,  and  they  substi- 
tuted a  14;  if  she  also  had  an  i8-pound  carronade,  it 
upset  down  the  hatchway  in  the  middle  of  a  fight,  and 
made  way  for  a  long  12,  which  burst  as  soon  as  it  was 
used,  and  was  replaced  by  two  medium  6's.     So  a  regu- 
lar gamut  of  changes  would  be  rung. 


196  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Champlain),  and  he  at  once  bent  his  energies 
to  preparing  an  effective  flotilla.  A  large 
party  of  ship-carpenters  were  immediately 
despatched  to  the  Harbor ;  and  they  were 
soon  followed  by  about  a  hundred  officers  and 
seamen,  with  guns,  stores,  etc.  The  keel  of  a 
ship  to  mount  24  32-pound  carronades,  and  to 
be  called  the  Madison,  was  laid  down,  and  she 
was  launched  on  the  26th  of  November,  just 
when  navigation  had  closed  on  account  of  the 
ice.  Late  in  the  autumn,  four  more  schooners 
were  purchased,  and  named  the  Ontario, 
Scourge,  Fair  American,  and  Asp,  but  these 
were  hardly  used  until  the  following  spring. 
The  cruising  force  of  the  Americans  was  com- 
posed solely  of  the  Oneida  and  the  six 
schooners  first  mentioned.  The  British  squad- 
ron was  of  nearly  double  this  strength,  and  had 
it  been  officered  and  trained  as  it  was  during 
the  ensuing  summer,  the  Americans  could  not 
have  stirred  out  of  port.  But  as  it  was,  it 
merely  served  as  a  kind  of  water  militia,  the 
very  sailors,  who  subsequently  did  well,  being 
then  almost  useless,  and  unable  to  oppose 
their  well-disciplined  foes,  though  the  latter 
were  so  inferior  in  number  and  force.  For 
the  reason  that  it  was  thus  practically  a  con- 
test of  regulars  against  militia,  I  shall  not 
give  numerical  comparisons  of  the  skirmishes 
in  the  autumn  of  1812,  and  shall  touch  on 
them  but  slightly.  They  teach  the  old  lesson 
that,  whether  by  sea  or  land,  a  small,  well- 
officered,  and  well-trained  force,  can  not,  ex- 
cept very  rarely,  be  resisted  by  a  greater 
number  of  mere  militia;  and  that  in  the  end 
it  is  true  economy  to  have  the  regular  force 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  197 

prepared  beforehand,  without  waiting  until  we 
have  been  forced  to  prepare  it  by  the  disasters 
happening  to  the  irregulars.  The  Canadian 
seamen  behaved  badly,  but  no  worse  than  the 
American  land-forces  did  at  the  same  time  ; 
later,  under  regular  training,  both  nations  re- 
trieved their  reputations. 

Commodore  Chauncy  arrived  at  Sackett's 
Harbor  in  October,  and  appeared  on  the  lake 
on  Nov.  8th,  in  the  Oneida,  Lieutenant  Wool- 
sey,  with  the  six  schooners  Conquest,  Lieu- 
tenant Elliott ;  Hamilton,  Lieutenant  McPher- 
son ;  Tompkint)  Lieutenant  Brown ;  Pert, 
Sailing-master  Arundel ;  Julia,  Sailing-master 
Trant;  Growler,  Sailing-master  Mix.  The 
Canadian  vessels  were  engaged  in  conveying 
supplies  from  the  westward.  Commodore 
Chauncy  discovered  the  Royal  George  off  the 
False  Duck  Islands,  and  chased  her  under 
the  batteries  of  Kingston,  on  the  gth. 
Kingston  was  too  well  defended  to  be  taken 
by  such  a  force  as  Chauncy's ;  but  the  latter 
decided  to  make  a  reconnaissance,  to  discover 
the  enemy's  means  of  defence  and  see  if  it 
was  possible  to  lay  the  Royal  George  aboard. 
At  3  P.M.  the  attack  was  made.  The  Hamilton 
and  Tompkins  were  absent  chasing,  and  did 
not  arrive  until  the  fighting  had  begun.  The 
other  four  gunboats,  Conquest,  Julia,  Pert, 
and  Growler,  led,  in  the  order  named,  to  open 
the  attack  with  their  heavy  guns,  and  prepare 
the  way  for  the  Oneida,  which  followed.  At 
the  third  discharge  the  Perfs  gun  burst,  put- 
ting her  nearly  hors  de  combat,  badly  wound- 
ing her  gallant  commander,  Mr.  Arundel 
(who  shortly  afterward  fell  overboard  and  was 
14—78 


198  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

drowned),  and  slightly  wounding  four  of  her 
crew.  The  other  gunboats  engaged  the  five 
batteries  of  the  enemy,  while  the  Oneida 
pushed  on  without  firing  a  shot  till  at  3.40  she 
opened  on  the  Royal  George,  and  after  20 
minutes'  combat  actually  succeeded  in  com- 
pelling her  opponent,  though  of  double  her 
force,  to  cut  her  cables,  run  in,  and  tie  herself 
to  a  wharf,  where  some  of  her  people  de- 
serted her ;  here  she  was  under  the  protection 
of  a  large  body  of  troops,  and  the  Americans 
could  not  board  her  in  face  of  the  land  forces. 
It  soon  began  to  grow  dusk,  and  Chauncy's 
squadron  beat  out  through  the  channel, 
against  a  fresh  head-wind.  In  this  spirited 
attack  the  American  loss  had  been  confined 
to  half  a  dozen  men,  and  had  fallen  almost 
exclusively  on  the  Oneida.  The  next  day 
foul  weather  came  on,  and  the  squadron  sailed 
for  Sackett's  Harbor.  Some  merchant  vessels 
were  taken,  and  the  Simco,  8,  was  chased,  but 
unsuccessfully. 

The  weather  now  became  cold  and  tempes- 
tuous, but  cruising  continued  till  the  middle 
of  November.  The  Canadian  commanders, 
however,  utterly  refused  to  fight  ;  the  Royal 
George  even  fleeing  from  the  Oneida,  when 
the  latter  was  entirely  alone,  and  leaving  the 
American  commodore  in  undisputed  command 
of  the  lake.  Four  of  the  schooners  continued 
blockading  Kingston  till  the  middle  of  No- 
vember ;  shortly  afterward  navigation  closed.1 

1  These  preliminary  events  were  not  very  important, 
and  the  historians  on  both  sides  agree  almost  exactly, 
sc  that  I  have  not  considered  it  necessary  to  quote 
authorities. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  199 

LAKE   ERIE. 

ON  Lake  Erie  there  was  no  American  naval 
force ;  but  the  army  had  fitted  out  a  small 
brig,  armed  with  six  6-pounders.  This  fell  into 
the  hands  of  the  British  at  the  capture  of 
Detroit,  and  was  named  after  that  city,  so 
that  by  the  time  a  force  of  American  officers 
and  seamen  arrived  at  the  lake  there  was  not 
a  vessel  on  it  for  them  to  serve  in,  while  their 
foes  had  eight.  But  we  only  have  to  deal 
with  two  of  the  latter  at  present.  The  Detroit, 
still  mounting  six  6-pounders,  and  with  a 
crew  of  56  men,  under  the  command  of  Lieu- 
tenant of  Marines  Rolette,  of  the  Royal  Navy, 
assisted  by  a  boatswain  and  gunner,  and  con- 
taining also  30  American  prisoners,  and 
the  Caledonia,  a  small  brig  mounting  two 
4-pounders  on  pivots,  with  a  crew  of  12  men, 
Canadian-English,  under  Mr.  Irvine,  and 
having  aboard  also  10  American  prisoners, 
and  a  very  valuable  cargo  of  furs  worth  about 
$200,000,  moved  down  the  lake,  and  on  Oct. 
7th  anchored  under  Fort  Erie.1 

Commander  Jesse  D.  Elliott  had  been  sent 
up  to  Erie  some  time  before  with  instructions 
from  Commodore  Chauncy  to  construct  a 
naval  force,  partly  by  building  two  brigs  of 
300  tons  each,8  and  partly  by  purchasing 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Jesse  D.  Elliott  to  Secretary  of 
Navy,  Black  Rock,  Oct.  5,  1812. 

3  That  is,  of  300  tons  actual  capacity ;  measured  as 
if  they  had  been  ordinary  sea  vessels  they  each  tonned 
480.  Their  opponent,  the  ship  Detroit,  similarly 
tonned  30$,  actual  measurement,  or  490,  computing  it 
in  the  ordinary  manner. 


200  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

schooners  to  act  as  gunboats.  No  sailors 
had  yet  arrived ;  but  on  the  very  day  on 
which  the  two  brigs  moved  down  and  an- 
chored under  Fort  Erie,  Captain  Elliott  re- 
ceived news  that  the  first  detachment  of  the 
promised  seamen,  51  in  number,  including 
officers,1  was  but  a  few  miles  distant.  He  at 
once  sent  word  to  have  these  men  hurried  up, 
but  when  they  arrived  they  were  found  to 
have  no  arms,  for  which  application  was 
made  to  the  military  authorities.  The  latter 
not  only  gave  a  sufficiency  of  sabres,  pistols, 
and  muskets  to  the  sailors,  but  also  detailed 
enough  soldiers,  under  Captain  N.  Towson 
and  Lieutenant  Isaac  Roach,  to  make  the 
total  number  of  men  that  took  part  in  the 
expedition  124.  This  force  left  Black  Rock 
at  one  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  in 
two  -large  boats,  one  under  the  command  of 
Commander  Elliott,  assisted  by  Lieutenant 
Roach,  the  other  under  Sailing-master  George 
Watts  and  Captain  Towson.  After  two 
hours'  rowing  they  reached  the  foe,  and  the 
attack  was  made  at  three  o'clock.  Elliott 
laid  his  boat  alongside  the  Detroit  before  he 
was  discovered,  and  captured  her  after  a  very 
brief  struggle,  in  which  he  lost  but  one  man 
killed,  and  Midshipman  J.  C.  Cummings 
wounded  with  a  bayonet  in  the  leg.  The 
noise  of  the  scuffle  roused  the  hardy  provin- 
cials aboard  the  Caledonia,  and  they  were 
thus  enabled  to  make  a  far  more  effectual 

1  The  number  of  men  in  this  expedition  is  taken 
from  Lossing's  "  Field-book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  by 
Benson  L.  Lossing,  New  York,  1869,  P-  $S>  note, 
where  a  complete  list  of  the  names  is  given. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  2OI 

resistance  to  Sailing-master  Watts  than  the 
larger  vessel  had  to  Captain  Elliott.  As 
Watts  pulled  alongside  he  was  greeted  with  a 
volley  of  musketry,  but  at  once  boarded  and 
carried  the  brig,  the  twelve  Canadians  being 
cut  down  or  made  prisoners  ;  one  American 
was  killed  and  four  badly  wounded.  The 
wind  was  too  light  and  the  current  too  strong 
to  enable  the  prizes  to  beat  out  and  reach  the 
lake,  so  the  cables  were  cut  and  they  ran 
down  stream.  The  Caledonia  was  safely 
beached  under  the  protection  of  an  American 
battery  near  Black  Rock.  The  Detroit,  how- 
ever, was  obliged  to  anchor  but  four  hundred 
yards  from  a  British  battery,  which,  together 
with  some  flying  artillery,  opened  on  her. 
Getting  all  his  guns  on  the  port  side,  Elliott 
kept  up  a  brisk  cannonade  till  his  ammunition 
gave  out,  when  he  cut  his  cable  and  soon 
grounded  on  Squaw  Island.  Here  the  Detroit 
was  commanded  by  the  guns  of  both  sides, 
and  which  ever  party  took  possession  of  her 
was  at  once  driven  out  by  the  other.  The 
struggle  ended  in  her  destruction,  most  of  her 
guns  being  taken  over  to  the  American  side. 
This  was  a  very  daring  and  handsome  exploit, 
reflecting  great  credit  on  Commander  Elliott, 
and  giving  the  Americans,  in  the  Caledonia, 
the  nucleus  of  their  navy  on  Lake  Erie  ;  soon 
afterward  Elliott  returned  to  Lake  Ontario,  a 
new  detachment  of  seamen  under  Commander 
S.  Angus  having  arrived. 

On  the  28th  of  November,  the  American 
general,  Smith,  despatched  two  parties  to 
make  an  attack  on  some  of  the  British  bat- 
teries. One  of  these  consisted  of  10  boats, 


202  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

under  the  command  of  Captain  King  of  the 
1 5th  infantry,  with  150  soldiers,  and  with  him 
went  Mr.  Angus  with  82  sailors,  including 
officers.  The  expedition  left  at  one  o'clock  in 
the  morning,  but  was  discovered  and  greeted 
with  a  warm  fire  from  a  field  battery  placed  in 
front  of  some  British  barracks  known  as  the 
Red  House.  Six  of  the  boats  put  back ;  but 
the  other  four,  containing  about  a  hundred 
men,  dashed  on.  While  the  soldiers  were 
forming  line  and  firing,  the  seamen  rushed  in 
with  their  pikes  and  axes,  drove  off  the  British, 
captured  their  commander,  Lieut.  King,  of 
the  Royal  Army,  spiked  and  threw  into  the 
river  the  guns,  and  then  took  the  barracks 
and  burned  them,  after  a  desperate  fight. 
Great  confusion  now  ensued,  which  ended  in 
Mr.  Angus  and  some  of  the  seamen  going  off 
in  the  boats.  Several  had  been  killed  ;  eight, 
among  whom  were  Midshipmen  Wragg,  Dud- 
ley, and  Holdup,  all  under  20  years  old,  re- 
mained with  the  troops  under  Captain  King, 
and  having  utterly  routed  the  enemy  found 
themselves  deserted  by  their  friends.  After 
staying  on  the  shore  a  couple  of  hours  some 
of  them  found  two  boats  and  got  over ;  but 
Captain  King  and  a  few  soldiers  were  taken 
prisoners.  Thirty  of  the  seamen,  including 
nine  of  the  twelve  officers,  were  killed  or 
wounded — among  the  former  being  Sailing- 
masters  Sisson  and  Watts,  and  among  the 
latter  Mr.  Angus,  Sailing-master  Carter,  and 
Midshipmen  Wragg,  Holdup,  Graham,  Brailes- 
ford,  and  Irvine.  Some  twenty  prisoners 
were  secured  and  taken  over  to  the  American 
shore ;  the  enemy's  loss  was  more  severe  than 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  203 

ours,  his  resistance  being  very  stubborn,  and 
a  good  many  cannon  were  destroyed,  but  the 
expedition  certainly  ended  most  disastrously. 
The  accounts  of  it  are  hard  to  reconcile,  but 
it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  Mr.  Angus  acted 
correctly. 

Later  in  the  winter  Captain  Oliver  Hazard 
Perry  arrived  to  take  command  of  the  forces 
on  Lake  Erie. 


204  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 


CHAPTER  V. 
1813. 

ON   THE  OCEAN. 

Blockade  of  the  American  coast — The  Essex  in  the 
South  Pacific — The  Hornet  captures  the  Peacock — 
American  privateers  cut  out  by  British  boats — Unsuc- 
cessful cruise  of  Commodore  Rodgers — The  Chesapeake 
is  captured  by  the  Shannon — Futile  gunboat  actions — 
Defence  of  Craney  Island — Cutting  out  expeditions — 
The  Argus  is  captured  by  the  Pelican — The  Enterprise 
captures  the  Boxer — Summary. 

BY  the  beginning  of  the  year  1813  the  British 
had  been  thoroughly  aroused  by  the 
American  successes,  and  active  measures  were 
at  once  taken  to  counteract  them.  The  force 
on  the  American  station  was  largely  increased, 
and  a  strict  blockade  begun,  to  keep  the 
American  frigates  in  port.  The  British  frigates 
now  cruised  for  the  most  part  in  couples,  and 
orders  were  issued  by  the  Board  of  Admiralty 
that  an  i8-pounder  frigate  was  not  to  engage 
an  American  24-pounder.  Exaggerated  ac- 
counts of  the  American  44*3  being  circulated, 
a  new  class  of  spar-deck  frigates  was  con- 
structed to  meet  them,  rating  50  and  mounting 
60  guns;  and  some  74*5  were  cut  down  for 
the  same  purpose.1  These  new  ships  were  all 
much  heavier  than  their  intended  opponents. 
As  New  England's  loyalty  to  the  Union  was, 

1  James,  vi,  p.  206. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  205 

not  unreasonably,  doubted  abroad,  her  coasts 
were  at  first  troubled  but  little.  A  British 
squadron  was  generally  kept  cruising  off  the 
end  of  Long  Island  Sound,  and  another  off 
Sandy  Hook.  Qf  course  America  had  no 
means  of  raising  a  blockade,  as  each  squadron 
contained  generally  a  74  or  a  razee,  vessels 
too  heavy  for  any  in  our  navy  to  cope  with. 
Frigates  and  sloops  kept  skirting  the  coasts  of 
New  Jersey,  the  Carolinas,  and  Georgia. 
Delaware  Bay  no  longer  possessed  the  impor- 
tance it  had  during  the  Revolutionary  War, 
and  as  the  only  war  vessels  in  it  were  some 
miserable  gunboats,  the  British  generally  kept 
but  a  small  force  on  that  station.  Chesapeake 
Bay  became  the  principal  scene  of  their  opera- 
tions ;  it  was  there  that  their  main  body 
collected,  and  their  greatest  efforts  were 
made.  In  it  a  number  of  line-of-battle  ships, 
frigates,  sloops,  and  cutters  had  been  col- 
lected, and  early  in  the  season  Admiral  Sir 
John  Warren  and  Rear-Admiral  Cockburn 
arrived  to  take  command.  The  latter  made 
numerous  descents  on  the  coast,  and  fre- 
quently came  into  contact  with  the  local  militia, 
who  generally  fled  after  a  couple  of  volleys. 
These  expeditions  did  not  accomplish  much, 
beyond  burning  the  houses  and  driving  off  the 
live-stock  of  the  farmers  along  shore,  and 
destroying  a  few  small  towns — one  of  them, 
Hampton,  being  sacked  with  revolting  brutal- 
ity.1 The  government  of  the  United  States 
was.  in  fact,  supported  by  the  people  in  its 

1  James  (vi,  340)  says  :  The  conduct  of  the  British 
troops  on  this  occasion  was  "  revolting  to  human  na- 
ture "  and  "  disgraceful  to  the  flag." 


206  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

war  policy  very  largely  on  account  of  these 
excesses,  which  were  much  exaggerated  by 
American  writers.  It  was  really  a  species  of 
civil  war,  and  in  such  a  contest,  at  the  begin- 
ning of  this  century,  it  was  impossible  that 
some  outrages  should  not  take  place. 

The  American  frigate  Constellation  had  by 
this  time  got  ready  for  sea,  and,  under  the 
command  of  Captain  Stewart,  she  prepared  to 
put  out  early  in  January.  As  the  number  of 
blockaders  rendered  a  fight  almost  certain 
within  a  few  days  of  her  departure,  her  crew 
were  previously  brought  to  the  highest  state 
of  discipline,  the  men  being  exercised  with 
especial  care  in  handling  the  great  guns  and 
in  firing  at  a  target.1  However,  she  never  got 
out ;  for  when  she  reached  Hampton  Roads 
she  fell  in  with  a  British  squadron  of  line-of- 
battle  ships  and  frigates.  She  kedged  up 
toward  Norfolk,  and  when  the  tide  rose  ran 
in  and  anchored  between  the  forts  ;  and  a  few 
days  later  dropped  down  to  cover  the  forts 
which  were  being  built  at  Craney  Island. 
Here  she  was  exposed  to  attacks  from  the 
great  British  force  still  lying  in  Hampton 
Roads,  and,  fearing  they  would  attempt  to 
carry  her  by  surprise,  Captain  Stewart  made 
every  preparation  for  defence.  She  was 
anchored  in  the  middle  of  the  narrow  channel, 
flanked  by  gunboats,  her  lower  ports  closed, 
not  a  rope  left  hanging  over  the  sides ;  the 
boarding  nettings,  boiled  in  half-made  pitch  till 
they  were  as  hard  as  wire,  were  triced  out- 
board toward  the  yard-arms,  and  loaded  with 

1  Life  of  Commodore  Tatnall,  by  C.  C.  Jones  (Savan- 
nah, 1878),  p.  15. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  207 

kentledge  to  fall  on  the  attacking  boats  when 
the  tricing  lines  were  cut,  while  the  carronades 
were  loaded  to  the  muzzle  with  musket  balls, 
and  depressed  so  as  to  sweep  the  water  near 
the  ship.1  Twice,  a  force  of  British,  estimated 
by  their  foes  to  number  2,000  men,  started  off 
at  night  to  carry  the  Constellation  by  surprise  ; 
but  on  each  occasion  they  were  discovered  and 
closely  watched  by  her  guard-boats,  and  they 
never  ventured  to  make  the  attack.  How- 
ever, she  was  unable  to  get  to  sea,  and  re- 
mained blockaded  to  the  close  of  the  war. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  year  several  frigates 
and  smaller  craft  were  at  sea.  The  Chesa- 
peake, Captain  Evans,  had  sailed  from  Boston 
on  Dec.  13,  1812."  She  ran  down  past  Ma- 
deira, the  Canaries,  and  Cape  de  Verde, 
crossed  the  equator,  and  for  six  weeks  cruised 
to  the  south  of  the  line  between  longitudes 
16°  and  25°.  Thence  she  steered  to  the  west, 
passing  near  Surinam,  over  the  same  spot  on 
which  the  Hornet  had  sunk  the  Peacock  but 
a  day  previous.  Cruising  northward  through 
the  West  Indies,  she  passed  near  the  Ber- 
mudas, where  she  was  chased  by  a  74  and  a 
frigate ;  escaping  from  them  she  got  into 
Boston  on  April  gth,  having  captured  five 
merchantmen,  and  chased  unsuccessfully  for 
two  days  a  brig-sloop.  The  term  of  two 
years  for  which  her  crew  were  enlisted  now 
being  up,  they,  for  the  most  part,  left,  in  con- 
sequence of  some  trouble  about  the  prize- 

1  For  an  admirable  account  of  these  preparations,  as 
well  as  of  the  subsequent  events,  see  Cooper,  ii,  242. 

a  Statistical  "  History  of  the  U.  S.  Navy,"  by  Lieuten- 
ant C.  £.  Emmons. 


208  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

money.  Captain  Evans  being  in  ill  health, 
Captain  James  Lawrence  was  appointed  to 
command  her.  He  reached  Boston  about  the 
middle  of  May  *  and  at  once  set  about  enlist- 
ing a  new  crew,  and  tried,  with  but  partial 
success,  to  arrange  matters  with  the  old 
sailors,  who  were  now  almost  in  open  mutiny. 

When  the  year  1812  had  come  to  an  end, 
the  Essex,  32,  was  in  the  South  Atlantic,  and 
Captain  Porter  shortly  afterward  ran  into  St. 
Catherines  to  water.  Being  at  a  loss  where 
to  find  his  consorts,  he  now  decided  to  adopt 
the  exceedingly  bold  measure  of  doubling  Cape 
Horn  and  striking  at  the  British  whalers  in 
the  Pacific.  This  was  practically  going  into 
the  enemy's  waters,  the  Portuguese  and  Span- 
ish countries  being  entirely  under  the  influence 
of  Britain,  while  there  were  no  stations  where 
Porter  could  revictual  or  repair  in  safety. 
However,  the  Essex  started,  doubled  the  Horn, 
and  on  March  i3th  anchored  in  the  harbor  of 
Valparaiso.  Her  adventurous  cruise  in  the 
Pacific  was  the  most  striking  feature  of  the  war ; 
but  as  it  has  been  most  minutely  described  by 
Commodore  Porter  himself,  by  his  son,  Ad- 
miral Porter,  by  Admiral  Farragut,  and  by 
Cooper,  I  shall  barely  touch  upon  it. 

On  March  2oth  the  Essex  captured  the 
Peruvian  corsair  Nereyda,  16,  hove  her  guns 
and  small  arms  overboard,  and  sent  her  into 

1  He  was  still  on  the  Hornet  at  New  York  on  May 
loth,  as  we  knew  from  a  letter  of  Biddle's,  written  on 
that  date  (in  letters  of  "  Masters'  Commandant,"  1813, 
No.  58),  and  so  could  hardly  have  been  with  the  Chesa- 
peake two  weeks  before  he  put  out ;  and  had  to  get  his 
crew  together  and  train  them  during  that  time. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  209 

port.  She  made  the  island  of  San  Gallan, 
looked  into  Callao,  and  thence  went  to  the 
Gallipagos,  getting  everything  she  wanted 
from  her  prizes.  Then  she  went  to  Tumbez, 
and  returned  to  the  Gallipagos  ;  thence  to  the 
Marquesas,  and  finally  back  to  Valparaiso 
again.  By  this  year's  campaign  in  the  Pacific, 
Captain  Porter  had  saved  all  our  ships  in 
those  waters,  had  not  cost  the  government  a 
dollar,  living  purely  on  the  enemy,  and  had 
taken  from  him  nearly  4,000  tons  of  shipping 
and  400  men,  completely  breaking  up  his 
whaling  trade  in  the  South  Pacific. 

The  cruise  was  something  sui  generis  in 
modern  warfare,  recalling  to  mind  the  cruises 
of  the  early  English  and  Dutch  navigators. 
An  American  ship  was  at  a  serious  disadvan- 
tage in  having  no  harbor  of  refuge  away  from 
home;  while  on  almost  every  sea  there  were 
British,  French,  and  Spanish  ports  into  which 
vessels  of  those  nations  could  run  for  safety. 
It  was  an  unprecedented  thing  for  a  small 
frigate  to  cruise  a  year  and  a  half  in  enemy's 
waters,  and  to  supply  herself  during  that  time, 
purely  from  captured  vessels,  with  everything 
— cordage,  sails,  guns,  anchors,  provisions, 
and  medicines,  and  even  money  to  pay  the 
officers  and  men  !  Porter's  cruise  was  the 
very  model  of  what  such  an  expedition  should 
be,  harassing  the  enemy  most  effectually  at 
no  cost  whatever.  Had  the  Essex  been  de- 
cently armed  with  long  guns,  instead  of  car- 
ronades,  the  end  might  have  been  as  successful 
as  it  was  glorious.  The  whalers  were  many  of 
them  armed  letters-of-marque,  and,  though  of 
course  unable  to  oppose  the  frigate,  several 


2io  NATAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

times  smart  skirmishes  occurred  in  attacking 
them  with  boats,  or  in  captured  ships ;  as  when 
Lieutenant  Downs  and  20  men  in  the  prize 
Georgiana  after  a  short  brush  captured  the 
Hector,  with  25  men,  two  of  whom  were  killed 
and  six  wounded  ;  and  when,  under  similar 
circumstances,  the  prize  Greenwich,  of  25 
men,  captured  the  Seringapatam  of  40.  The 
cruise  of  the  Essex,  the  first  American  man- 
of-war  ever  in  the  Pacific,  a  year  and  a  half 
out  and  many  thousand  miles  away  from  home, 
was  a  good  proof  of  Porter's  audacity  in 
planning  the  trip  and  his  skill  and  resource  in 
carrying  it  out. 

To  return  now  to  the  Hornet.  This  vessel 
had  continued  blockading  the  Bonne  Citoyemie 
until  January  24th,  when  the  Montagu,  74,  ar- 
rived toward  evening  and  chased  her  into 
port.  As  the  darkness  came  on  the  Hornet 
wore,  stood  out  to  sea,  passing  into  the  open 
without  molestation  from  the  74,  and  then 
steered  toward  the  northeast,  cruising  near  the 
coast,  and  making  a  few  prizes,  among  which 
was  a  brig,  the  Resolution,  with  $23,000  in 
specie  aboard,  captured  on  February  i4th. 
On  the  24th  of  February,  while  nearing  the 
mouth  of  the  Demerara  River,  Captain  Law- 
rence discovered  a  brig  to  leeward,  and  chased 
her  till  he  ran  into  quarter  less  five,  when, 
having  no  pilot,  he  hauled  off-shore.  Just 
within  the  bar  a  man-of-war  brig  was  lying  at 
anchor ;  and  while  beating  round  Caroband 
Bank,  in  order  to  get  at  her,  Captain  Law- 
rence discovered  another  sail  edging  down  on 
his  weather-quarter. '  The  brig  at  anchor  was 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence,  March  29,  1813. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  211 

the  Espiegle,  of  18  guns,  32-pound  carronades, 
Captain  John  Taylor  ; '  and  the  second  brig 
seen  was  the  Peacock,  Captain  William  Peake,2 
which,  for  some  unknown  reason,  had  ex- 
changed her  32-pound  carronades  for  24's. 
She  had  sailed  from  the  Espiegle's  anchorage 
the  same  morning  at  10  o'clock.  At  4.20  p.  M. 
the  Peacock  hoisted  her  colors ;  then  the  Hor- 
net beat  to  quarters  and  cleared  for  action. 
Captain  Lawrence  kept  close  by  the  wind,  in 
order  to  get  the  weather-gage ;  when  he  was 
certain  he  could  weather  the  enemy,  he  tacked, 
at  5.10,  and  the  Hornet  hoisted  her  colors. 
The  ship  and  the  brig  now  stood  for  each  other, 
both  on  the  wind,  the  Hornet  being  on  the 
starboard  and  the  Peacock  on  the  port  tack, 
and  at  5.25  they  exchange  broadsides,  at  half 
pistol-shot  distance,  while  going  in  opposite 
directions,  the  Americans  using  their  lee  and 
the  British  their  weather  battery.  The  guns 
were  fired  as  they  bore,  and  the  Peacock  suf- 
fered severely,  while  her  antagonist's  hull  was 
uninjured,  though  she  suffered  slightly  aloft 
and  had  her  pennant  cut  off  by  the  first  shot 
fired.'  One  of  the  men  in  the  mizzen-top  was 
killed  by  a  round  shot,  and  two  more  were 
wounded  in  the  main-top.4  As  soon  as  they 
were  clear,  Captain  Peake  put  his  helm  hard 
up  and  wore,  firing  his  starboard  guns;  but 
the  Hornet  had  watched  him  closely,  bore  up 
as  quickly,  and  coming  down  at  5.35,  ran  him 
close  aboard  on  the  starboard  quarter.  Cap- 

1  James,  vi.  278.        2  Do.        8  Cooper,  p  200. 

*  See  entry  in  her  log  for  the  day  (In  "  Log-Book  of 
Hornet,  Wasp,  and  Argus,  from  July  20,  1809, to  Octo- 
ber 6,  1813,")  in  the  Bureau  of  Navigation,  at  Wash- 
ington. 


212  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

tain  Peake  fell  at  this  moment,  together  with 
many  of  his  crew,  and,  unable  to  withstand 
the  Hornefs  heavy  fire,  the  Peacock  surren- 
dered at  5.39,  just  14  minutes  after  the  first 
shot ;  and  directly  afterward  hoisted  her  en- 
sign union  down  in  the  forerigging  as  a  signal 
of  distress.  Almost  immediately  her  main- 
mast went  by  the  board.  Both  vessels  then 
anchored,  and  Lieutenant  J.  T.  Shubrick, 
being  sent  on  board  the  prize,  reported  her 
sinking.  Lieutenant  D.  Connor  was  then 
sent  in  another  boat  to  try  to  save  the  vessel ; 
but  though  they  threw  the  guns  overboard, 
plugged  the  shot  holes,  tried  the  pumps,  and 
even  attempted  bailing,  the  water  gained  so 
rapidly  that  the  Hornefs  officers  devoted  them- 
selves to  removing  the  wounded  and  other 
prisoners  ;  and  while  thus  occupied  the  short 
tropical  twilight  left  them.  Immediately  after- 
ward the  prize  settled,  suddenly  and  easily,  in 
5>£  fathoms  water,  carrying  with  her  three 
of  the  Hornets  people  and  nine  of  her  own, 
who  were  rummaging  below  ;  meanwhile  four 
others  of  her  crew  had  lowered  her  damaged 
stern  boat,  and  in  the  confusion  got  off  un- 
observed and  made  their  way  to  the  land. 
The  foretop  still  remained  above  water,  and 
four  of  the  prisoners  saved  themselves  by  run- 
ning up  the  rigging  into  it.  Lieutenant  Con- 
nor and  Midshipman  Cooper  (who  had  also 
come  on  board)  saved  themselves,  together 
with  most  of  their  people  and  the  remainder  of 
the  Peacock's  crew,  by  jumping  into  the  launch, 
which  was  lying  on  the  booms,  and  paddling 
her  toward  the  ship  with  pieces  of  boards  in 
default  of  oars. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  213 

The  Hornefs  complement  at  this  time  was 
150,  of  whom  she  had  8  men  absent  in  a  prize 
and  7  on  the  sick  list,1  leaving  135  fit  for  duty 
in  the  action ; a  of  these  one  man  was  killed, 
and  two  wounded,  all  aloft.  Her  rigging  and 
sails  were  a  good  deal  cut,  a  shot  had  gone 
through  the  foremast,  and  the  bowsprit  was 
slightly  damaged ;  the  only  shot  that  touched 
her  hull  merely  glanced  athwart  her  bows, 
indenting  a  plank  beneath  the  cat-head.  The 
Peacock's  crew  had  amounted  to  134,  but  4 
were  absent  in  a  prize,  and  but  122*  fit  for 
action ;  of  these  she  lost  her  captain,  and 
seven  men  killed  and  mortally  wounded,  and 
her  master,  one  midshipman,  and  28  men 
severely  and  slightly  wounded, — in  all  8  killed 
and  30  wounded,  or  about  13  times  her  antago- 
nist's loss.  She  suffered  under  the  disadvan- 
tage of  light  metal,  having  24*3  opposed  to 
32*5 ;  but  judging  from  her  gunnery  this  was 
not  much  of  a  loss,  as  6-pounders  would  have 
inflicted  nearly  as  great  damage.  She  was 
well  handled  and  bravely  fought ;  but  her 
men  showed  a  marvellous  ignorance  of  gun- 
nery. It  appears  that  she  had  long  been 
known  as  "the  yacht,"  on  account  of  the 
tasteful  arrangement  of  her  deck ;  the  breech- 
ings  of  the  carronades  were  lined  with  white 
canvas,  and  nothing  could  exceed  in  brilliancy 
the  polish  upon  the  traversing  bars  and  ele- 
vating screws.4  In  other  words,  Captain 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence. 

2  Letter  of  Lieutenant  D.  Conner,  April  26,  1813. 

3  Letter  of  Lieutenant  F.  W.  Wright  (of  the  Peacock), 
April  17,  1813. 

*  James,  vi,  280. 


214  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Peake  had  confounded  the  mere  incidents  of 
good  discipline  with  the  essentials.1 

The  Hornefs  victory  cannot  be  regarded  in 
any  other  light  than  as  due,  not  to  the  heavier 
metal,  but  to  the  far  more  accurate  firing  of 
the  Americans  ;  "  had  the  guns  of  the  Peacock 
been  of  the  largest  size  they  could  not  have 
changed  the  result,  as  the  weight  of  shot  that 
do  not  hit  is  of  no  great  moment."  Any  mer- 
chant-ship might  have  been  as  well  handled 
and  bravely  defended  as  she  was ;  and  an 
ordinary  letter-of-marque  would  have  made  as 
creditable  a  defence. 

During  the  entire  combat  the  Espiegle  was 
not  more  than  4  miles  distant  and  was  plainly 
visible  from  the  Hornet;  but  for  some  reason 
she  did  not  come  out,  and  her  commander 
reported  that  he  knew  nothing  of  the  action 
till  the  next  day.  Captain  Lawrence  of  course 
was  not  aware  of  this,  and  made  such  exer- 
tions to  bend  on  new  sails,  stow  his  boats, 
and  clear  his  decks  that  by  nine  o'clock  he 
was  again  prepared  for  action,3  and  at  2  p.  M. 
got  under  way  for  the  N.W.  Being  now  over- 
crowded with  people  and  short  of  water  he 
stood  for  home,  anchoring  at  Holmes'  Hole 
in  Martha's  Vineyard  on  the  igth  of  March. 

On  their  arrival  at  New  York  the  officers  of 
the  Peacock  published  a  card  expressing  in  the 
warmest  terms  their  appreciation  of  the  way 
they  and  their  men  had  been  treated.  Say 
they  :  "  We  ceased  to  consider  ourselves  pris- 
oners ;  and  everything  that  friendship  could 

1  Codrington   ("  Memoirs,"  i,  310)   comments   very 
forcibly  on  the  uselessness  of  a  mere  martinet. 

2  Letter  of  Captain  Lawrence. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  215 


216  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

dictate  was  adopted  by  you  and  the  officers  of 
the  Hornet  to  remedy  the  inconvenience  we 
would  otherwise  have  experienced  from  the 
unavoidable  loss  of  the  whole  of  our  property 
and  clothes  owing  to  the  sudden  sinking  of 
the  Peacock."  '  This  was  signed  by  the  first 
and  second  lieutenants,  the  master,  surgeon 
and  purser. 

Weight 
Tonnage.     Guns.      Metal.      Men.        Loss. 

Hornet    480    10    279    135    3 
Peacock    477    10   210   122   38 

Relative  Relative  Loss 

Force.  Inflicted. 

Hornet  i.oo  i.oo 

Peacock  .83  .08 

That  is,  the  forces  standing  nearly  as  13  is 
to  ii,  the  relative  execution  was  about  as  13 
is  to  i. 

The  day  after  the  capture  Captain  Lawrence 
reported  277  souls  aboard,  including  the  crew 
of  the  English  brig  Resolution  which  he  had 
taken,  and  of  the  American  brig  Hunter,  prize 
to  the  Peacock.  As  James,  very  ingeniously, 
tortures  these  figures  into  meaning  what  they 
did  not,  it  may  be  well  to  show  exactly  what 
the  277  included.  Of  the  Hornefs  original 
crew  of  150,  8  were  absent  in  a  prize,  [  killed, 
and  3  drowned,  leaving  (including  7  sick)  138 ; 
of  the  Peacock's  original  134,  4  were  absent  in 
a  prize,  5  killed,  9  drowned,  and  4  escaped, 
leaving  (including  8  sick  and  3  mortally 
wounded)  112;  there  were  also  aboard  16 
other  British  prisoners,  and  the  Hunter's  crew 

1  Quoted  in  full  in  "  Niles'  Register  "  and  Lossing's 
"  Field  Book." 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  217 

of  it  men — making  just  277.'  According  to 
Lieutenant  Connor's  letter,  written  in  response 
to  one  from  Lieutenant  Wright,  there  were  in 
reality  139  in  the  Peacock's  crew  when  she 
began  action  ;  but  it  is,  of  course,  best  to  take 
each  commander's  account  of  the  number  of 
men  on  board  his  ship  that  were  fit  for  duty. 
On  Jan.  i7th  the  Viper,  12,  Lieutenant  J. 
D.  Henly,  was  captured  by  the  British  frigate 
Narcissus,  32,  Captain  Lumly. 

On  Feb.  8th,  while  a  British  squadron,  con- 
sisting of  the  four  frigates  Belvidera  (Captain 
Richard  Byron),  Maidstone,  Junon*  and  Statira, 
were  at  anchor  in  Lynhaven  Bay,  a  schooner 
was  observed  in  the  northeast  standing  down 
Chesapeake  Bay.4  This  was  the  Lottery,  let- 
ter-of-marque,  of  six  i2-pounder  carronades 
and  25  men,  Captain  John  Southcomb,  bound 
from  Baltimore  to  Bombay.  Nine  boats,  with 
200  men,  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant 
Kelly  Nazer  were  sent  against  her,  and,  a 
calm  coming  on,  overtook  her.  The  schooner 
opened  a  well-directed  fire  of  round  and 
grape,  but  the  boats  rushed  forward  and 
boarded  her,  not  carrying  her  till  after  a  most 
obstinate  struggle,  in  which  Captain  South- 
comb  and  19  of  his  men,  together  with  13  of 
the  assailants,  were  killed  or  wounded.  The 
best  war  ship  of  a  regular  navy  might  be 

1  The   277  men  were   thus   divided   into :  Hornet's 
crew,  138;  Peacock's  crew,  112;  Resolution's  crew,  16 ; 
ffwttert  CIW*  11.    James  quotes  "  270"  men,  which 
he  divides  as  follows  :  Hornet,  160,  Peacock,  101,  Hunter, 
9, — leaving  out  the  Resolution's  crew,  1 1  of  the  Peacock's 
and  2  of  the  Hunter's. 

2  James,  vi,  325. 


2i8  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

proud  of  the  discipline  and  courage  displayed 
by  the  captain  and  crew  of  the  little  Lottery. 
Captain  Byron  on  this,  as  well  as  on  many 
another  occasion,  showed  himself  to  be  as 
humane  as  he  was  brave  and  skilful.  Captain 
Southcomb,  mortally  wounded,  was  taken  on 
board  Byron's  frigate,  where  he  was  treated 
with  the  greatest  attention  and  most  delicate 
courtesy,  and  when  he  died  his  body  was  sent 
ashore  with  every  mark  of  the  respect  due  to 
so  brave  an  officer.  Captain  Stewart  (of  the 
Constellation)  wrote  Captain  Byron  a  letter  of 
acknowledgment  for  his  great  courtesy  and 
kindness.1 

On  March  i6th  a  British  division  of  five 
boats  and  105  men,  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
James  Polkinghorne,  set  out  to  attack  the 
privateer  schooner  Dolphin  of  12  guns  and  70 
men,  and  the  letters-of-marque,  Racer,  Arab, 
and  Lynx,  each  of  six  guns  and  30  men. 
Lieutenant  Polkinghorne,  after  pulling  15 
miles,  found  the  four  schooners  all  prepared 
to  receive  him,  but  in  spite  of  his  great  in- 
feriority in  force  he  dashed  gallantly  at  them. 
The  Arab  and  Lynx  surrendered  at  once  ;  the 
Racer  was  carried  after  a  sharp  struggle  in 
which  Lieutenant  Polkinghorne  was  wounded, 
and  her  guns  turned  on  the  Dolphin.  Most 
of  the  latter's  crew  jumped  overboard ;  a  few 
rallied  round  their  captain,  but  they  were  at 
once  scattered  as  the  British  seamen  came 
aboard.  The  assailants  had  13,  and  the  pri- 

1  The  correspondence  between  the  two  captains  is 
given  in  full  in  "  Niles'  Register,"  which  also  contains 
fragmentary  notes  on  the  action,  principally  as  to  the 
loss  incurred. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  219 

vateersmen  16  men  killed  and  wounded  in  the 
fight.  It  was  certainly  one  of  the  most 
brilliant  and  daring  cutting-out  expeditions 
f  that  took  place  during  the  war,  and  the  victors 
well  deserved  their  success.  The  privateers- 
men  (according  to  the  statement  of  the  Dol- 
phin's master,  in  "Niles'  Register,")  were 
panic-struck,  and  acted  in  anything  but  a  brave 
manner.  All  irregular  fighting-men  do  their 
work  by  fits  and  starts.  No  regular  cruisers 
could  behave  better  than  did  the  privateers 
Lottery,  Chasseur,  and  General  Armstrong; 
none  would  behave  as  badly  as  the  Dolphin, 
Lynx,  and  Arab.  The  same  thing  appears 
on  shore.  Jackson's  irregulars  at  New 
Orleans  did  as  well,  or  almost  as  well,  as 
Scott's  troops  at  Lundy's  Lane ;  but  Scott's 
troops  would  never  have  suffered  from  such  a 
panic  as  overcame  the  militia  at  Bladensburg. 

On  April  gth  the  schooner  Norwich,  of  14 
guns  and  61  men,  Sailing-master  James  Monk, 
captured  the  British  privateer  Caledonia,  of 
10  guns  and  41  men,  after  a  short  action  in 
which  the  privateer  lost  7  men. 

On  April  3oth  Commodore  Rodgers,  in  the 
President,  44,  accompanied  by  Captain  Smith 
in  the  Congress,  38,  sailed  on  his  third  cruise.' 
On  May  2d  he  fell  in  with  and  chased  the 
British  sloop  Curlew,  18,  Captain  Michael 
Head,  but  the  latter  escaped  by  knocking 
away  the  wedges  of  her  masts  and  using 
other  means  to  increase  her  rate  of  sailing. 
On  the  8th,  in  latitude  39°  30'  N.,  long.  60° 
W.,  the  Congress  parted  company,  and  sailed 
off  toward  the  southeast,  making  four  prizes, 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Rodgers,  Sept.  30,  1813. 


220  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

of  no  great  value,  in  the  North  Atlantic  ;  ' 
when  about  in  long.  35°  W.  she  steered  south, 
passing  to  the  south  of  the  line.  But  she 
never  saw  a  man-of-war,  and  during  the  latter 
part  of  her  cruise  not  a  sail  of  any  kind  ;  and 
after  cruising  nearly  eight  months  returned  to 
Portsmouth  Harbor  on  Dec.  i4th,  having  cap- 
tured but  four  merchantmen.  Being  unfit  to 
cruise  longer,  owing  to  her  decayed  condition, 
she  was  disarmed  and  laid  up  ;  nor  was  she 
sent  to  sea  again  during  the  war.2 

Meanwhile  Rodgers  cruised  along  the  east- 
ern edge  of  the  Grand  Bank  until  he  reached 
latitude  48°,  without  meeting  anything,  then 
stood  to  the  southeast,  and  cruised  off  the 
Azores  till  June  6th.  Then  he  crowded  sail 
to  the  northeast  after  a  Jamaica  fleet  of  which 
he  had  received  news,  but  which  he  failed  to 
overtake,  and  on  June  i3th,  in  lat.  46°,  long. 
28*,  he  gave  up  the  chase  and  shaped  his 
course  toward  the  North  Sea,  still  without 
any  good  luck  befalling  him.  On  June  27th 
he  put  into  North  Bergen  in  the  Shetlands 
for  water,  and  thence  passed  the  Orkneys  and 
stretched  toward  the  North  Cape,  hoping  to 
intercept  the  Archangel  fleet.  On  July  rgth, 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Smith,  Dec.  15,  1813. 

2  James  states  that  she  was  "  blockaded  "  in  port  by 
the  Tenedos,  during  part  of   1814;  but  was  too  much 
awed  by  the  fate  of  the  Chesapeake  to  come  out  during 
the  "  long  blockade  "  of  Captain  Parker.     Considering 
the  fact  that  she  was  too  decayed  to  put  to  sea,  had  no 
guns  aboard,  no  crew,  and  was,  in  fact,  laid  up,  the  feat 
of   the    Tenedos  was    not   very  wonderful ;  a  row-boat 
could  have  "  blockaded  "  her  quite  as  well.     It  is  worth 
noticing,  as  an  instance  of  the  way  James  alters  a  fact 
by  suppressing  half  of  it. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  221 

when  off  the  North  Cape,  in  lat.  71°  52'  N., 
long  20°  18'  E. ,  he  fell  in  with  two  sail  of  the 
enemy,  who  made  chase ;  after  four  days' 
pursuit  the  commodore  ran  his  opponents  out 
of  sight.  According  to  his  letter  the  two  sail 
were  a  line-of-battle  ship  and  a  frigate ;  accord- 
ing to  James  they  were  the  i2-pounder  frigate 
Alexandria,  Captain  Cathcart,  and  Spitfire, 
16,  Captain  Ellis.  James  quotes  from  the  logs 
of  the  two  British  ships,  and  it  would  seem 
that  he  is  correct,  as  it  would  not  be  possible 
for  him  to  falsify  the  logs  so  utterly.  In  case 
he  is  true,  it  was  certainly  carrying  caution  to 
an  excessive  degree  for  the  commodore  to  re- 
treat before  getting  some  idea  of  what  his 
antagonists  really  were.  His  mistaking  them 
for  so  much  heavier  ships  was  a  precisely 
similar  error  to  that  made  by  Sir  George 
Collier  and  Lord  Stuart  at  a  later  date  about 
the  Cyane  and  Levant.  James  wishes  to 
prove  that  each  party  perceived  the  force  of 
the  other,  and  draws  a  contrast  (p.  312)  be- 
tween the  "  gallantry  of  one  party  and  pusil- 
lanimity of  the  other."  This  is  nonsense, 
and,  as  in  similar  cases,  James  overreaches 
himself  by  proving  too  much.  If  he  had  made 
an  i8-pounder  frigate  like  the  Congress  flee 
from  another  i8-pounder,  his  narrative  would 
be  within  the  bounds  of  possibility  and  would 
need  serious  examination.  But  the  little  12- 
pounder  Alexandria,  and  the  ship-sloop  with 
her  i8-pound  carronades,  would  not  have 
stood  the  ghost  of  a  chance  in  the  contest. 
Any  man  who  would  have  been  afraid  of  them 
would  also  have  been  afraid  of  the  Little  Belt^ 
the  sloop  Rodgers  captured  before  the  war. 


222  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

As  for  Captains  Cathcart  and  Ellis,  had  they 
known  the  force  of  the  President,  and  chased 
her  with  a  view  of  attacking  her,  their  con- 
duct would  have  only  been  explicable  on  the 
ground  that  they  were  afflicted  with  emotional 
insanity. 

The  President  now  steered  southward  and 
got  into  the  mouth  of  the  Irish  Channel ;  on 
August  zd  she  shifted  her  berth  and  almost 
circled  Ireland  ;  then  steered  across  to  New- 
foundland, and  worked  south  along  the  coast. 
On  Sept.  23d,  a  little  south  of  Nantucket,  she 
decoyed  under  her  guns  and  captured  the 
British  schooner  Highflyer,  6,  Lieut.  William 
Hutchinson,  and  45  men ;  and  went  into 
Newport  on  the  2yth  of  the  same  month, 
having  made  some  12  prizes. 

On  May  24th  Commodore  Decatur  in  the 
United  States,  which  had  sent  ashore  six  car- 
ronades,  and  now  mounted  but  48  guns,  ac- 
companied by  Captain  Jones  in  the  Mace.do~ 
nian,  38,  and  Captain  Biddle  in  the  Wasp,  20, 
left  New  York,  passing  through  Hell  Gate,  as 
there  was  a  large  blockading  force  off  the  Hook. 
Opposite  Hunter's  Point  the  main-mast  of  the 
States  was  struck  by  lightning,  which  cut  off 
the  broad  pendant,  shot  down  the  hatchway 
into  the  doctor's  cabin,  put  out  his  candle, 
ripped  up  the  bed,  and  entering  between  the 
skin  and  ceiling  of  the  ship  tore  off  two  or 
three  sheets  of  copper  near  the  water-line,  and 
disappeared  without  leaving  a  trace !  The 
Macedonian,  which  was  close  behind,  hove  all 
aback,  in  expectation  of  seeing  the  States 
blown  up. 

At  the  end  of  the   sound   Commodore  De- 


NAVAL    WAR  OF  1812.  223 

catur  anchored  to  watch  for  a  chance  of  getting 
out.  Early  on  June  ist  he  started  ;  but  in  a 
couple  of  hours  met  the  British  Captain  R.  D. 
Oliver's  squadron,  consisting  of  a  74,  a  razee, 
and  a  frigate.  These  chased  him  back,  and 
all  his  three  ships  ran  into  New  London. 
Here,  in  the  mud  of  the  Thames  river,  the 
two  frigates  remained  blockaded  till  the  close 
of  the  war ;  but  the  little  sloop  slipped  out 
later,  to  the  enemy's  cost. 

We  left  the  Chesapeake,  38,  being  fitted  out 
at  Boston  by  Captain  James  Lawrence,  late  of 
the  Hornet.  Most  of  her  crew,  as  already 
stated,  their  time  being  up,  left,  dissatisfied 
with  the  ship's  ill  luck,  and  angry  at  not  hav- 
ing received  their  due  share  of  prize-money. 
It  was  very  hard  to  get  sailors,  most  of  the 
men  preferring  to  ship  in  some  of  the  numerous 
privateers  where  the  discipline  was  less  strict 
and  the  chance  of  prize-money  much  greater. 
In  consequence  of  this  an  unusually  large 
number  of  foreigners  had  to  be  taken,  includ- 
ing about  forty  British  and  a  number  of  Por- 
tuguese. The  latter  were  peculiarly  trouble- 
some ;  one  of  their  number,  a  boatswain's  mate, 
finally  almost  brought  about  a  mutiny  among 
the  crew,  which  was  only  pacified  by  giving 
the  men  prize-checks.  A  few  of  the  Constitu- 
tions old  crew  came  aboard,  and  these,  together 
with  some  of  the  men  who  had  been  on  the 
Chesapeake  during  her  former  voyage,  made 
an  excellent  nucleus.  Such  men  needed  very 
little  training  at  either  guns  or  sails ;  but  the 
new  hands  were  unpractised,  and  came  on 
board  so  late  that  the  last  draft  that  'arrived 
still  had  their  hammocks  and  bags  lying  in 


224  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

the  boats  stowed  over  the  booms  when  the  ship 
was  captured.  The  officers  were  largely  new 
to  the  ship,  though  the  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  A. 
Ludlow,  had  been  the  third  in  her  former 
cruise  ;  the  third  and  fourth  lieutenants  were 
not  regularly  commissioned  as  such,  but  were 
only  midshipmen  acting  for  the  first  time  in 
higher  positions.  Captain  Lawrence  himself 
was  of  course  new  to  all,  both  officers  and 
crew.1  In  other  words,  the  Chesapeake  pos- 
sessed good  material,  but  in  an  exceedingly 
unseasoned  state. 

Meanwhile  the  British  frigate  Shannon,  38, 
Captain  Philip  Bowes  Vere  Broke,  was  cruising 
off  the  mouth  of  the  harbor.  To  give  some 
idea  of  the  reason  why  she  proved  herself  so 
much  more  formidable  than  her  British  sister 
frigates  it  may  be  well  to  quote,  slightly  con- 
densing, from  James  : 

"There  was  another  point  in  which  the 
generality  of  British  crews,  as  compared  with 
any  one  American  crew,  were  miserably  de- 
ficient ;  that  is,  skill  in  the  art  of  gunnery. 
While  the  American  seamen  were  constantly 
firing  at  marks,  the  British  seamen,  except  in 
particular  cases,  scarcely  did  so  once  in  a  year  ; 
and  some  ships  could  be  named  on  board 

1  On  the  day  on  which  he  sailed  to  attack  the  Shan- 
non, Lawrence  writes  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy  as 
follows  :  "  Lieutenant  Paige  is  so  ill  as  to  be  unable  to  go 
sea  with  the  ship.  At  the  urgent  request  of  Acting- 
Lieutenant  Pierce  I  have  granted  him,  also,  permission 
to  go  on  shore  ;  one  inducement  for  my  granting  his 
request  was  his  being  at  variance  with  every  officer  in 
his  mess."  "  Captains'  Letters,"  vol.  29,  No.  I,  in  the 
Naval  Archives  at  Washington.  Neither  officers  nor 
men  had  shaken  together. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  225 

which  not  a  shot  had  been  fired  in  this  way 
for  upward  of  three  years.  Nor  was  the  fault 
wholly  the  captain's.  The  instructions  under 
which  he  was  bound  to  act  forbade  him  to  use, 
during  the  first  six  months  after  the  ship  had 
received  her  armament,  more  shots  per  month 
than  amounted  to  a  third  in  number  of  the 
upper-deck  guns  ;  and,  after  these  six  months, 
only  half  the  quantity.  Many  captains  never 
put  a  shot  in  the  guns  till  an  enemy  appeared  ; 
they  employed  the  leisure  time  of  the  men  in 
handling  the  sails  and  in  decorating  the  ship." 
Captain  Broke  was  not  one  of  this  kind. 
"  From  the  day  on  which  he  had  joined  her, 
the  1 4th  of  September,  1806,  the  Shannon  be- 
gan to  feel  the  effect  of  her  captain's  profi- 
ciency as  a  gunner  and  zeal  for  the  service. 
The  laying  of  the  ship's  ordnance  so  that  it 
may  be  correctly  fired  in  a  horizontal  direction 
is  justly  deemed  a  most  important  operation, 
as  upon  it  depends  in  a  great  measure  the  true 
aim  and  destructive  effect  of  the  shot;  this 
was  attended  to  by  Captain  Broke  in  person. 
By  draughts  from  other  ships,  and  the  usual 
means  to  which  a  British  man-of-war  is  obliged 
to  resort,  the  Shannon  got  together  a  crew ; 
and  in  the  course  of  a  year  or  two,  by  the 
paternal  care  and  excellent  regulations  of 
Captain  Broke,  the  ship's  company  became  as 
pleasant  to  command  as  it  was  dangerous  to 
meet."  The  Shannon's  guns  were  all  carefully 
sighted,  and,  moreover,  "  every  day,  for  about 
an  hour  and  a  half  in  the  forenoon,  when  not 
prevented  by  chase  or  the  state  of  the  weather, 
the  men  were  exercised  at  training  the  guns, 
and  for  the  same  time  in  the  afternoon  in  the 


226  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

use  of  the  broadsword,  pike,  musket,  etc. 
Twice  a  week  the  crew  fired  at  targets,  both 
with  great  guns  and  musketry ;  and  Captain 
Broke,  as  an  additional  stimulus  beyond  the 
emulation  excited,  gave  a  pound  of  tobacco 
to  every  man  that  put  a  shot  through  the  bull's 
eye. "  He  would  frequently  have  a  cask  thrown 
overboard  and  suddenly  order  some  one  gun 
to  be  manned  to  sink  the  cask.  In  short,  the 
Shannon  was  very  greatly  superior,  thanks  to 
her  careful  training,  to  the  average  British 
frigate  of  her  rate,  while  the  Chesapeake,  owing 
to  her  having  a  raw  and  inexperienced  crew, 
was  decidedly  inferior  to  the  average  American 
frigate  of  the  same  strength. 

In  force  the  two  frigates  compared  pretty 
equally,1  the  American  being  the  superior  in 
just  about  the  same  proportion  that  the  Wasp 
was  to  the  Frolic,  or,  at  a  later  date,  the  Hornet 
to  the  Penguin.  The  Chesapeake  carried  50 
guns  (26  in  broadside  ),  28  long  i8's  on  the 
gun-deck,  and  on  the  spar-deck  two  long  i2's, 
one  long  18,  eighteen  32-pound  carronades, 
and  one  1 2-pound  carronade  (which  was  not 
used  in  the  fight  however).  Her  broadside,  al- 
lowing for  the  short  weight  of  metal,  was  542 
Ibs. ;  her  complement,  379  men.  The  Shannon 
carried  52  guns  (26  in  broadside),  28  long  iS's 
on  the  gun-deck,  and  on  the  spar-deck  four  long 
9*s,  one  long  6,  16  32-pound  carronades,  and 
three  1 2-pound  carronades  (two  of  which  were 
not  used  in  the  fight).  Her  broadside  was  550 
Ibs.  ;  her  crew  consisted  of  330  men,  30  of 
whom  were  raw  hands.  Early  on  the  morning 

1  Taking   each    commander's  account   for   his   own 
force. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  227 

of  June  ist,  Captain  Broke  sent  in  to  Captain 
Lawrence,  by  an  American  prisoner,  a  letter 
of  challenge,  which  for  courteousness,  manli- 
ness, and  candor  is  the  very  model  of  what 
such  an  epistle  should  be.  Before  It  reached 
Boston,  however,  Captain  Lawrence  had 
weighed  anchor,  to  attack  the  Shannon,  which 
frigate  was  in  full  sight  in  the  offing.  It  has 
been  often  said  that  he  engaged  against  his 
judgment,  but  this  may  be  doubted  His  ex- 
perience with  the  Bonne  Citoyenne,  Esptegle 
and  Peac0c6ha.d  not  tended  to  give  him  a  very 
high  idea  of  the  navy  to  which  he  was  opposed, 
and  there  is  no  doubt  that  he  was  confident 
of  capturing  the  Shannon?  It  was  most  un- 
fortunate that  he  did  not  receive  Broke's  letter, 
as  the  latter  in  it  expressed  himself  willing  to 
meet  Lawrence  in  any  latitude  and  longitude 
he  might  appoint ;  and  there  would  thus  have 
been  some  chance  of  the  American  crew  having 
time  enough  to  get  into  shape. 

At  midday  of  June  i,  1813,  the  Chesapeake 
weighed  anchor,  stood  out  of  Boston  Harbor, 
and  at  i  P.  M.  rounded  the  Light-house.  The 
Shannon  stood  off  under  easy  sail,  and  at  3. 40 
hauled  up  and  reefed  top-sails.  At  4  P.  M. 

1  In  his  letter  written  just  before  sailing  (already 
quoted  on  p.  224)  he  says :  "  An  English  frigate  is  now 
in  sight  from  our  deck.  *  *  *  I  am  in  hopes  to  give 
a  good  account  of  her  before  night."  My  account  of 
the  action  is  mainly  taken  from  James'  "  Naval  His- 
tory "  and  Brighton's  "  Memoir  of  Admiral  Broke " 
(according  to  which  the  official  letter  of  Captain  Broke 
was  tampered  with) ;  see  also  the  letter  of  Lieut. 
George  Budd,  June  15,  1813;  the  report  of  the  Court 
of  Inquiry,  Commodore  Bainbridge  presiding,  and  the 
Court-martial  held  on  board  frigate  United  States,  April 
15,  1814,  Commodore  Decatur  presiding. 


228  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

she  again  bore  away  with  her  foresail  brailed 
up,  and  her  main  top-sail  braced  flat  and 
shivering,  that  the  Chesapeake  might  overtake 
her.  An  hour  later,  Boston  Light-house  bear- 
ing west  distant  about  six  leagues,  she  again 
hauled  up,  with  her  head  to  the  southeast,  and 
lay  to  under  top-sails,  top-gallant  sails,  jib, 
and  spanker.  Meanwhile,  as  the  breeze 
freshened  the  Chesapeake  took  in  her  studding- 
sails,  top-gallant  sails,  and  royals,  got  her 
royal  yards  on  deck,  and  came  down  very  fast 
under  top-sails  and  jib.  At  5.30,  to  keep 
under  command  and  be  able  to  wear  if  neces- 
sary, the  Shannon  filled  her  main  top-sail  and 
kept  a  close  luff,  and  then  again  let  the  sail 
shiver.  At  5.25  the  Chesapeake  hauled  up 
her  foresail,  and,  with  three  ensigns  flying, 
steered  straight  for  the  Shannon's  starboard 
quarter.  Broke  was  afraid  that  Lawrence 
would  pass  under  the  Shannon's  stern,  rake 
her,  and  engage  her  on  the  quarter ;  but  either 
overlooking  or  waiving  this  advantage,  the 
American  captain  luffed  up  within  50  yards 
upon  the  Shannon's  starboard  quarter,  and 
squared  his  main-yard.  On  board  the  Shan- 
non the  captain  of  the  I4th  gun,  William 
Mindham,  had  been  ordered  not  to  fire  till  it 
bore  into  the  second  main-deck  port  forward ; 
at  5.50  it  was  fired,  and  then  the  other  guns  in 
quick  succession  from  aft  forward,  the  Ches- 
apeake replying  with  her  whole  broadside.  At 
5.53  Lawrence,  finding  he  was  forging  ahead, 
hauled  up  a  little.  The  Chesapeake 's  broad- 
sides were  doing  great  damage,  but  she  her- 
self was  suffering  even  more  than  her  foe  ; 
the  men  in  the  Shannon's  tops  could  hardly  see 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  229 

the  deck  of  the  American  frigate  through  the 
cloud  of  splinters,  hammocks,  and  other  wreck 
that  was  flying  across  it.  Man  after  man  was 
killed  at  the  wheel ;  the  fourth  lieutenant,  the 
master,  and  the  boatswain  were  slain ;  and  at 
5.56,  having  had  her  jib  sheet  and  foretop-sail 
tie  shot  away,  and  her  spanker  brails  loosened 
so  that  the  sail  blew  out,  the  Chesapeake  came 
up  into  the  wind  somewhat,  so  as  to  expose  her 
quarter  to  her  antagonist's  broadside,  which 
beat  in  her  stern-ports  and  swept  the  men 
from  the  after  guns.  One  of  the  arm  chests 
on  the  quarter-deck  was  blown  up  by  a  hand- 
grenade  thrown  from  the  Shannon.1  The 
Chesapeake  was  now  seen  to  have  stern-way 
on  and  to  be  paying  slowly  off ;  so  the  Shan- 
non put  her  helm  a-starboard  and  shivered  her 
mizzen  top-sail,  so  as  to  keep  off  the  wind  and 
delay  the  boarding.  But  at  that  moment  her 
jib  stay  was  shot  away,  and,  her  headsails 

1  This  explosion  may  have  had  more  effect  than  is 
commonly  supposed  in  the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake. 
Commodore  Bainbridge,  writing  from  Charleston, 
Mass.,  on  June  2,  1813  (see  "Captains'  Letters,"  vol. 
xxix,  No.  10),  says  :  "  Mr.  Knox,  the  pilot  on  board, 
left  the  Chesapeake  at  5  p.  M.,  *  *  *  At  6  P.  M., 
Mr.  Knox  informs  me,  the  fire  opened,  and  at  12 
minutes  past  six  both  ships  were  laying  alongside 
one  another  as  if  in  the  act  of  boarding;  at  that 
moment  an  explosion  took  place  on  board  the  Chesa- 
peake, which  spread  a  fire  on  her  upper  deck  from  the 
foremost  to  the  mizzen-mast,  as  high  as  her  tops,  and 
enveloped  both  ships  in  smoke  for  several  minutes. 
After  it  cleared  away  they  were  seen  separate,  with  the 
British  flag  hoisted  on  board  the  Chesapeake  over  the 
American.  James  denies  that  the  explosion  was 
caused  by  a  hand-grenade,  though  he  says  there  were 
some  of  these  aboard  the  Shannon.  It  is  a  point  of 
no  interest. 

14—8  B 


230  WAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

becoming  becalmed,  she  went  off.  very  slowly. 
In  consequence,  at  6  P.  M.  the  two  frigates  fell 
aboard,  the  Chesapeake 's  quarter  pressing  upon 
the  Shannon's  side  just  forward  the  starboard 
main-chains,  and  the  frigates  were  kept  in  this 
position  by  the  fluke  of  the  Shannon's  anchor 
catching  in  the  Chesapeake  s  quarter  port. 

The  Shannon's  crew  had  suffered  severely, 
but  not  the  least  panic  or  disorder  existed 
among  them.  Broke  ran  forward,  and  seeing 
his  foes  flinching  from  the  quarter-deck  guns, 
he  ordered  the  ships  to  be  lashed  together, 
the  great  guns  to  cease  firing,  and  the  boarders 
to  be  called.  The  boatswain,  who  had  fought 
in  Rodney's  action,  set  about  fastening  the 
vessels  together,  which  the  grim  veteran  suc- 
ceeded in  doing,  though  his  right  arm  was 
literally  hacked  off  by  a  blow  from  a  cutlass. 
All  was  confusion  and  dismay  on  board  the 
Chesapeake.  Lieutenant  Ludlow  had  been 
mortally  wounded  and  carried  below ;  Law- 
rence himself,  while  standing  on  the  quarter- 
deck, fatally  conspicuous  by  his  full-dress 
uniform  and  commanding  stature,  was  shot 
down,  as  the  vessels  closed,  by  Lieutenant  Law 
of  the  British  marines.  He  fell  dying,  and  was 
carried  below,  exclaiming :  "  Don't  give  up  the 
ship  " — a  phrase  that  has  since  become  pro- 
verbial among  his  countrymen.  The  third 
lieutenant,  Mr  W.  S.  Cox,  came  on  deck,  but 
utterly  demoralized  by  the  aspect  of  affairs, 
he  basely  ran  below  without  staying  to  rally 
the  men,  and  was  court-martialled  afterward 
for  so  doing.  At  6. 02  Captain  Broke  stepped 
from  the  Shannon's  gangway  rail  on  to  the 
muzzle  of  the  Chesapeake  s  aftermost  carronade, 


NAVAL  WAR  CF  1812.  231 

and  thence  over  the  bulwark  on  to  her 
quarter-deck,  followed  by  about  20  men.  As 
they  came  aboard,  the  Chesapeake 's  foreign 
mercenaries  and  the  raw  natives  of  the  crew 
deserted  their  quarters ;  the  Portuguese  boat- 
swain's mate  removed  the  gratings  of  the 
berth-deck,  and  he  ran  below,  followed  by 
many  of  the  crew,  among  them  one  of  the 
midshipmen  named  Deforest.  On  the  quarter- 
deck almost  the  only  man  that  made  any  re- 
sistance was  the  chaplain,  Mr.  Livermore,  who 
advanced,  firing  his  pistol  at  Broke,  and  in 
return  nearly  had  his  arm  hewed  off  by  a 
stroke  from  the  latter's  broad  Toledo  blade. 
On  the  upper  deck  the  only  men  who  behaved 
well  were  the  marines,  but  of  their  original 
number  of  44  men,  14,  including  Lieutenant 
James  Broom  and  Corporal  Dixon,  were  dead, 
and  20,  including  Sergeants  Twin  and  Harris, 
wounded,  so  that  there  were  left  but  one 
corporal  and  nine  men,  several  of  whom  had 
been  knocked  down  and  bruised,  though  re- 
ported unwounded.  There  was  thus  hardly 
any  resistance,  Captain  Broke  stopping  his 
men  for  a  moment  till  they  were  joined  by  the 
rest  of  the  boarders  under  Lieutenants  Watt 
and  Falkiner.  The  Chesapeake1*  mizzen-top- 
men  began  firing  at  the  boarders,  mortally 
wounding  a  midshipman,  Mr.  Samwell,  and 
killing  Lieutenant  Watt ;  but  one  of  the  Shan- 
non's long  nines  was  pointed  at  the  top  and 
cleared  it  out,  being  assisted  by  the  English 
main-topmen,  under  Midshipman  Coshnahan. 
At  the  same  time  the  men  in  the  Chesapeake** 
main-top  were  driven  out  of  it  by  the  fire  of 
the  Shannon's  foretopmen,  under  Midshipman 


232  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Smith.  Lieutenant  George  Budd,  who  was  on 
the  main-deck,  now  for  the  first  time  learned 
that  the  English  had  boarded,  as  the  upper- 
deck  men  came  crowding  down,  and  at  once 
called  on  his  people  to  follow  him  ;  but  the 
foreigners  and  novices  held  back,  and  only  a 
few  of  the  veterans  followed  him  up.  As  soon 
as  he  reached  the  spar-deck,  Budd,  followed 
by  only  a  dozen  men,  attacked  the  British  as 
they  came  along  the  gangways,  repulsing  them 
for  a  moment,  and  killing  the  British  purser, 
Aldham,  and  captain's  clerk,  Dunn  ;  but  the 
handful  of  Americans  were  at  once  cut  down 
or  dispersed,  Lieutenant  Budd  being  wounded 
and  knocked  down  the  main  hatchway.  "  The 
enemy,"  writes  Captain  Broke,  "  fought  des- 
perately, but  in  disorder. "  Lieutenant  Ludlow, 
already  mortally  wounded,  struggled  up  on 
deck,  followed  by  two  or  three  men,  but  was 
at  once  disabled  by  a  sabre  cut.  On  the  fore- 
castle a  few  seamen  and  marines  turned  to 
bay.  Captain  Broke  was  still  leading  his  men 
with  the  same  brilliant  personal  courage  he 
had  all  along  shown.  Attacking  the  first 
American,  who  was  armed  with  a  pike,  he 
parried  a  blow  from  it,  and  cut  down  the  man  ; 
attacking  another  he  was  himself  cut  down, 
and  only  saved  by  the  seaman  Mindham, 
already  mentioned,  who  slew  his  assailant. 
One  of  the  American  marines,  using  his 
clubbed  musket,  killed  an  Englishman,  and  so 
stubborn  was  the  resistance  of  the  little  group 
that  for  a  moment  the  assailants  gave  back, 
having  lost  several  killed  and  wounded  ;  but 
immediately  afterward  they  closed  in  and  slew 
their  foes  to  the  last  man.  The  British  fired  a 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  233 

volley  or  two  down  the  hatchway,  in  response 
to  a  couple  of  shots  fired  up;  all  resistance 
was  at  an  end,  and  at  6.05,  just  fifteen  minutes 
after  the  first  gun  had  been  fired,  and  not  five 
after  Captain  Broke  had  come  aboard,  the 
colors  of  the  Chesapeake  were  struck.  Of  her 
crew  of  379  men,  61  were  killed  or  mortally 
wounded,  including  her  captain,  her  first  and 
fourth  lieutenants,  the  lieutenant  of  marines, 
the  master  (White),  boatswain  (Adams),  and 
three  midshipmen,  and  85  severely  and 
slightly  wounded,  including  both  her  other 
lieutenants,  five  midshipmen,  and  the  chap- 
lain ;  total,  148  ;  the  loss  falling  almost  entirely 
upon  the  American  portion  of  the  crew. 

Of  the  Shannon's  men,  33  were  killed  out- 
right or  died  of  their  wounds,  including  her 
first  lieutenant,  purser,  captain's  clerk,  and  one 
midshipman,  and  50  wounded,  including  the 
captain  himself  and  the  boatswain  ;  total,  83. 

The  Chesapeake  was  taken  into  Halifax, 
where  Captain  Lawrence  and  Lieutenant 
Ludlow  were  both  buried  with  military  honors. 
Captain  Broke  was  made  a  baronet,  very 
deservedly,  and  Lieutenants  Wallis  and  Fal- 
kiner  were  both  made  commanders. 

The  British  writers  accuse  some  of  the 
American  crew  of  treachery  ;  the  Americans  in 
turn,  accuse  the  British  of  revolting  brutality. 
Of  course  in  such  a  fight  things  are  not 
managed  with  urbane  courtesy,  and,  more- 
over, writers  are  prejudiced.  Those  who 
would  like  to  hear  one  side  are  referred  to 
James  ;  if  they  wish  to  hear  the  other,  to  the 
various  letters  from  officers  published  in 
"  Niles'  Register,"  especially  vol.  v,  p.  142. 


234  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

Neither  ship  had  lost  a  spar,  but  all  the 
lower  masts,  especially  the  two  mizzen-masts, 
were  badly  wounded.  The  Americans  at  that 
period  were  fond  of  using  bar  shot,  which 
were  of  very  questionable  benefit,  being  useless 
against  a  ship's  hull,  though  said  to  be  some- 
times of  great  help  in  unrigging  an  antagonist 
from  whom  one  was  desirous  of  escaping,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  President  and  Endymion. 


1.10          * 


AM 


"onun/ua"  tntpocjY 

"  SHANNON  '*  STRUCK  »V 

•9  eighteen-pound  shot, 
»5  thirty-two-pound  shot. 
»  nine-pound  shot. 
306  grape, 

j6a  (hot 

iz  eighteen-pound  shot, 
13  thirty-two-pound  shot, 
14  bar  shot, 
119  grape. 

158  shot.                                 v 

It  is  thus  seen  that  the  Shannon  received 
from  shot  alone  only  about  half  the  damage 
the  Chesapeake  did  ;  the  latter  was  thoroughly 
beaten  at  the  guns,  in  spite  of  what  some 
American  authors  say  to  the  contrary.  And 
her  victory  was  not  in  the  slightest  degree  to 
be  attributed  to,  though  it  may  have  been 
slightly  hastened  by,  accident.  Training  and 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  235 

discipline  won  the  victory,  as  often  before , 
only  in  this  instance  the  training  and  disci- 
pline were  against  us. 

It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  Chesa- 
peake battered  the  Shannon's  hull  far  more 
than  either  the  Java,  Guerriere,  or  Macedonian 
did  the  hulls  of  their  opponents,  and  that  she 
suffered  less  in  return  (not  in  loss  but  in 
damage)  than  they  did.  The  Chesapeake  was 
a  better  fighter  than  either  Ihe/ara,  Guerriere, 
or  Macedonian,  and  could  have  captured  any 
one  of  them.  The  Shannon  of  course  did 
less  damage  than  any  of  the  American  44*5, 
probably  just  about  in  the  proportion  of  the 
difference  in  force. 

Almost  all  American  writers  have  treated 
the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake  as  if  it  was  due 
simply  to  a  succession  of  unfortunate  ac- 
cidents ;  for  example,  Cooper,  with  his  usual 
cheerful  optimism,  says  that  the  incidents  of 
the  battle,  excepting  its  short  duration,  are 
"  altogether  the  results  of  the  chances  of  war," 
and  that  it  was  mainly  decided  by  "fortuitous 
events  as  unconnected  with  any  particular 
merit  on  the  one  side  as  they  are  with  any 
particular  demerit  on  the  other."  '  Most 
naval  men  consider  it  a  species  of  treason  to 
regard  the  defeat  as  due  to  anything  but  ex- 
traordinary ill  fortune.  And  yet  no  disin- 
terested reader  can  help  acknowledging  that 

1  The  worth  of  such  an  explanation  is  very  aptly 
gauged  in  General  Alexander  S.  Webb's  "  The  Penin 
sula;  McClellan's  Campaign  of  1862"  (New  York, 
1881),  p.  35,  where  he  speaks  of  "  those  unforeseen  or 
uncontrollable  agencies  which  are  vaguely  described  as 
the  '  fortune  of  war,'  but  which  usually  prove  to  be  the 
superior  ability  or  resources  of  the  antagonist." 


236  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812, 

the  true  reason  of  the  defeat  was  the  very 
simple  one  that  the  Shannon  fought  better 
than  the  Chesapeake.  It  has  often  been  said 
that  up  to  the  moment  when  the  ships  came 
together  the  loss  and  damage  suffered  by 
each  were  about  the  same.  This  is  not  true, 
and  even  if  it  was,  would  not  affect  the  ques- 
tion. The  heavy  loss  on  board  the  Shannon 
did  not  confuse  or  terrify  the  thoroughly 
trained  men  with  their  implicit  reliance  on 
their  leaders ;  and  the  experienced  officers 
were  ready  to  defend  any  point  that  was 
menaced.  An  equal  or  greater  amount  of  loss 
aboard  the  Chesapeake  disheartened  and  con- 
fused the  raw  crew,  who  simply  had  not  had 
the  time  or  chance  to  become  well  disciplined. 
Many  of  the  old  hands,  of  course,  kept  their 
wits  and  their  pluck,  but  the  novices  and  the 
disaffected  did  not.  Similarly  with  the  offi- 
cers ;  some,  as  the  Court  of  Inquiry  found,  had 
not  kept  to  their  posts,  and  all  being  new  to 
each  other  and  the  ship,  could  not  show  to 
their  best.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  Chesa- 
peake was  beaten  at  the  guns  before  she  was 
boarded.  Had  the  ships  not  come  together, 
the  fight  would  have  been  longer,  the  loss 
greater,  and  more  nearly  equal ;  but  the  result 
would  have  been  the  same.  Cooper  says  that 
the  enemy  entered  with  great  caution,  and 
so  slowly  that  twenty  resolute  men  could  have 
repulsed  him.  It  was  no  proof  of  caution 
for  Captain  Broke  and  his  few  followers  to 
leap  on  board,  unsupported,  and  then  they 
only  waited  for  the  main  body  to  come  up ; 
and  no  twenty  men  could  have  repulsed  such 
boarders  as  followed  Broke.  The  fight  was 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  237 

another  lesson,  with  the  parties  reversed,  to 
the  effect  that  want  of  training  and  discipline 
is  a  bad  handicap.  Had  the  Chesapeake^  s 
crew  been  in  service  as  many  months  as  the 
Shannon's  had  been  years,  such  a  captain  as 
Lawrence  would  have  had  his  men  perfectly 
in  hand ;  they  would  not  have  been  cowed  by 
their  losses,  nor  some  of  the  officers  too  de- 
moralized to  act  properly,  and  the  material 
advantages  which  the  Chesapeake  possessed, 
although  not  very  great,  would  probably  have 
been  enough  to  give  her  a  good  chance  of 
victory.  It  is  well  worth  noticing  that  the 
only  thoroughly  disciplined  set  of  men  aboard 
(all  according  to  James  himself,  by  the  way, 
native  Americans),  namely,  the  marines,  did 
excellently,  as  shown  by  the  fact  that  three- 
tourths  of  their  number  were  among  the  killed 
and  wounded.  The  foreigners  aboard  the 
Chesapeake  did  not  do  as  well  as  the  Ameri- 
cans, but  it  is  nonsense  to  ascribe  the  defeat 
in  any  way  to  them ;  it  was  only  rendered 
rather  more  disastrous  by  their  actions.  Most 
of  the  English  authors  give  very  fair  accounts 
of  the  battle,  except  that  they  hardly  allude 
to  the  peculiar  disadvantages  under  which 
the  Chesapeake  suffered  when  she  entered  into 
it.  Thus,  James  thinks  the/ava  was  unpre- 
pared because  she  had  only  been  to  sea  six 
weeks ;  but  does  not  lay  any  weight  on  the 
fact  that  the  Chesapeake  had  been  out  only  as 
many  hours. 

Altogether  the  best  criticism  on  the  fight  is 
that  written  by  M.  de  la  Graviere.1  "It  is 
impossible  to  avoid  seeing  in  the  capture  of 

1  "Guerres  Maritimes,"  ii,  272. 


238  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

the  Chesapeake  a  new  proof  of  the  enormous 
power  of  a  good  organization,  when  it  has 
received  the  consecration  of  a  few  years'  ac- 
tual service  on  the  sea.  On  this  occasion,  in 
effect,  two  captains  equally  renowned,  the 
honor  of  two  navies,  were  opposed  to  each 
other  on  two  ships  of  the  same  tonnage  and 
number  of  guns.  Never  had  the  chances 
seemed  better  balanced,  but  Sir  Philip  Broke 
had  commanded  the  Shannon  for  nearly  seven 
years,  while  Captain  Lawrence  had  only  com- 
manded the  Chesapeake  for  a  few  days.  The 
first  of  these  frigates  had  cruised  for  eighteen 
months  on  the  coast  of  America  ;  the  second 
was  leaving  port.  One  had  a  crew  long  ac- 
customed to  habits  of  strict  obedience ;  the 
other  was  manned  by  men  who  had  just  been 
engaged  in  mutiny.  The  Americans  were 
wrong  to  accuse  fortune  on  this  occasion. 
Fortune  was  not  fickle,  she  was  merely  logical. 
The  Shannon  captured  the  Chesapeake  on  the 
first  of  June,  1813,  but  on  the  i4th  of  Sep- 
tember, 1806,  the  day  when  he  took  command 
of  his  frigate,  Captain  Broke  had  begun  to 
prepare  the  glorious  termination  to  this  bloody 
affair." 

Hard  as  it  is  to  breathe  a  word  against  such 
a  man  as  Lawrence,  a  very  Bayard  of  the  seas, 
who  was  admired  as  much  for  his  dauntless 
bravery  as  he  was  loved  for  his  gentleness 
and  uprightness,  it  must  be  confessed  that  he 
acted  rashly.  And  after  he  had  sailed,  it  was, 
as  Lord  Howard  Douglass  has  pointed  out,  a 
tactical  error,  however  chivalric,  to  neglect 
the  chance  of  luffing  across  the  Shannon's 
stern  to  rake  her ;  exactly  as  it  was  a  tactical 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  239 

error  of  his  equally  chivalrous  antagonist  to 
have  let  him  have  such  an  opportunity.  Hull 
would  not  have  committed  either  error,  and 
would,  for  the  matter  of  that,  have  been  an 
overmatch  for  either  commander.  But  it  must 
always  be  remembered  that  Lawrence's  en- 
counters with  the  English  had  not  been  such 
as  to  give  him  a  high  opinion  of  them.  The 
only  foe  he  had  fought  had  been  inferior  in 
strength,  it  is  true,  but  had  hardly  made  any 
effective  resistance.  Another  sloop,  of  equal, 
if  not  superior  force,  had  tamely  submitted  to 
blockade  for  several  days,  and  had  absolutely 
refused  to  fight.  And  there  can  be  no  doubt 
that  the  Chesapeake,  unprepared  though  she 
was,  would  have  been  an  overmatch  for  the 
Giierriere,  Macedonian,  or  Java.  Altogether  it 
is  hard  to  blame  Lawrence  for  going  out,  and 
in  every  other  respect  his  actions  never  have 
been,  nor  will  be,  mentioned,  by  either  friend 
or  foe,  without  the  warmest  respect.  But 
that  is  no  reason  for  insisting  that  he  was 
ruined  purely  by  an  adverse  fate.  We  will  do 
far  better  to  recollect  that  as  much  can  be 
learned  from  reverses  as  from  victories.  In- 
stead of  flattering  ourselves  by  saying  the  de- 
feat was  due  to  chance,  let  us  try  to  find  out 
what  the  real  cause  was,  and  then  take  care 
that  it  does  not  have  an  opportunity  to  act 
again.  A  little  less  rashness  would  have 
saved  Lawrence's  life  and  his  frigate,  while  a 
little  more  audacity  on  one  occasion  would 
have  made  Commodore  Chauncy  famous  for 
ever.  And  whether  a  lesson  is  to  be  learned 
or  not,  a  historian  should  remember  that  his 
profession  is  not  that  of  a  panegyrist.  The  facts 


240  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

of  the  case  unquestionably  are  that  Captain 
Broke,  in  fair  fight,  within  sight  of  the  enemy's 
harbor,  proved  conqueror  over  a  nominally 
equal  and  in  reality  slightly  superior  force ; 
and  that  this  is  the  only  single-ship  action  of 
the  war  in  which  the  victor  was  weaker  in 
force  than  his  opponent.  So  much  can  be 
gathered  by  reading  only  the  American  ac- 
counts. Moreover  accident  had  little  or  noth- 
ing to  do  with  the  gaining  of  the  victory. 
The  explanation  is  perfectly  easy ;  Lawrence 
and  Broke  were  probably  exactly  equal  in 
almost  everything  that  goes  to  make  up  a  first- 
class  commander,  but  one  had  trained  his 
crew  for  seven  years,  and  the  other  was  new 
to  the  ship,  to  the  officers,  and  to  the  men, 
and  the  last  to  each  other.  The  Chesapeake 's 
crew  must  have  been  of  fine  material,  or  they 
would  not  have  fought  so  well  as  they  did. 

So  much  for  the  American  accounts.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  capture  of  the  Chesapeake 
was,  and  is,  held  by  many  British  historians 
to  "conclusively  prove"  a  good  many  differ- 
ent things;  such  as,  that  if  the  odds  were 
anything  like  equal,  a  British  frigate  could 
always  whip  an  American,  that  in  a  hand-to- 
hand  conflict  such  would  invariably  be  the 
case,  etc. ;  and  as  this  was  the  only  single- 
ship  action  of  the  war  in  which  the  victor  was 
the  inferior  in  force,  most  British  writers 
insist  that  it  reflected  more  honor  on  them 
than  all  the  frigate  actions  of  1812  put  to- 
gether did  on  the  Americans. 

These  assertions  can  be  best  appreciated 
by  reference  to  a  victory  won  by  the  French 
in  the  year  of  the  Battle  of  the  Nile.  On 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  241 

the  1 4th  of  December,  1798,  after  two  hours' 
conflict,  the  French  24-gun  corvette  Bayon- 
naise  captured,  by  boarding,  the  English  32-gun 
frigate  Ambuscade.  According  to  James  the 
Ambuscade  threw  at  a  broadside  262  pounds 
of  shot,  and  was  manned  by  190  men,  while 
the  Bayonnaise  threw  150  pounds,  and  had  on 
board  supernumeraries  and  passenger  soldiers 
enough  to  make  in  all  250  men.  According 
to  the  French  historian  Rouvier '  the  broad- 
side force  was  246  pounds  against  80  pounds  ; 
according  to  Troude8  it  was  270  pounds 
against  112.  M.  Ldon  GueVin,  in  his  volu- 
minous but  exceedingly  prejudiced  and  one- 
sided work,8  makes  the  difference  even  greater. 
At  any  rate  the  English  vessel  was  vastly  the 
superior  in  force,  and  was  captured  by  board- 
ing, after  a  long  and  bloody  conflict  in  which 
she  lost  46,  and  her  antagonist  over  50,  men. 
During  all  the  wars  waged  with  the  Republic 
and  the  Empire,  no  English  vessel  captured  a 
French  one  as  much  superior  to  itself  as  the 
Ambuscade  was  to  the  Bayonnaise,  precisely 
as  in  the  war  of  1812  no  American  vessel 
captured  a  British  opponent  as  much  superior 
to  itself  as  the  Chesapeake  was  to  the  Shannon. 
Yet  no  sensible  man  can  help  acknowledging, 
in  spite  of  these  and  a  few  other  isolated  in- 
stances, that  at  that  time  the  French  were 


1 "  Histoire  des  Marins  Fran^ais  sous  la  Republique," 
par  Charles  Rouvier,  Lieutenant  de  Vaisseau,  Paris, 
1868. 

2  "  Batailles  Navales." 

8  "  Histoire  Maritime  de  France  "  (par  Leon  Guerin, 
Historien  titulaire  de  la  Marine,  Membre  de  la  Legion 
d'  Honneur),  vi,  142  (Paris,  1852). 


242  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

inferior  to  the  English,  and  the  latter  to  the 
Americans. 

It  is  amusing  to  compare  the  French  his- 
tories of  the  English  with  the  English  histories 
of  the  Americans,  and  to  notice  the  similar- 
ity of  the  arguments  they  use  to  detract  from 
their  opponents'  fame.  Of  course  I  do  not 
allude  to  such  writers  as  Lord  Howard  Doug- 
lass or  Admiral  de  la  Graviere,  but  to  men 
like  William  James  and  Le'on  Guerin,  or  even 
O.  Troude.  James  is  always  recounting  how 
American  ships  ran  away  from  British  ones, 
and  Gudrin  tells  as  many  anecdotes  of  British 
ships  who  fled  from  French  foes.  James  re- 
proaches the  Americans  for  adopting  a  "  Par- 
thian "  mode  of  warfare,  instead  of  "  bringing 
to  in  a  bold  and  becoming  manner."  Pre- 
cisely the  same  reproaches  are  used  by  the 
French  writers,  who  assert  that  the  English 
would  not  fight  "  fairly,"  but  acquired  an  ad- 
vantage by  manoeuvring.  James  lays  great 
stress  on  the  American  long  guns  ;  so  does 
Lieutenant  Rouvier  on  the  British  carronades. 
James  always  tells  how  the  Americans  avoided 
the  British  ships,  when  the  crews  of  the  latter 
demanded  to  be  led  aboard ;  Troude  says  the 
British  always  kept  at  long  shot,  while  the 
French  sailors  "  demanderent  a  grands  cris, 
1'abordage."  James  says  the  Americans  "  hes- 
itated to  grapple "  with  their  foes  "  unless 
they  possessed  a  twofold  superiority ; "  Guerin 
that  the  English  "  never  dared  attack  "  except 
when  they  possessed  "  une  superioritd 
enorme."  The  British  sneer  at  the  "  mighty 
dollar  "  ;  the  French  at  the  "  eternal  guinea." 
The  former  consider  Decatur's  name  as 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  243 

w  sunk "  to  the  level  of  Porter's  or  Bain- 
bridge's;  the  latter  assert  that  the  "pre- 
sumptuous Nelson  "  was  inferior  to  any  of 
the  French  admirals  of  the  time  preceding 
the  Republic.  Says  James  :  "  The  Americans 
only  fight  well  when  they  have  the  superiority 
of  force  on  their  side  ;  "  and  Lieutenant  Rou- 
vier  :  "  Never  have  the  English  vanquished 
us  with  an  undoubted  inferiority  of  force." 

On  June  12,  1813,  the  small  cutter  Surveyor, 
of  six  i2-pound  carronades,  was  lying  in 
York  River,  in  the  Chesapeake,  under  the 
command  of  Mr.  William  S.  Travis  ;  her  crew 
consisted  of  but  15  men.1  At  nightfall  she 
was  attacked  by  the  boats  of  the  Narcissus 
frigate,  containing  about  50  men,  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant  John  Creerie.  *  None 
of  the  carronades  could  be  used  ;  but  Mr. 
Travis  made  every  preparation  that  he  could 
for  defence.  The  Americans  waited  till  the 
British  were  within  pistol  shot  before  they 
opened  their  fire  ;  the  latter  dashed  gallantly 
on,  however,  and  at  once  carried  the  cutter. 
But  though  brief,  the  struggle  was  bloody  ;  5 
of  the  Americans  were  wounded,  and  of  the 
British  3  were  killed  and  7  wounded.  Lieu- 
tenant Creerie  considered  his  opponents  to 
have  shown  so  much  bravery  that  he  returned 
Mr.  Travis  his  sword,  with  a  letter  as  com- 
plimentary to  him  as  it  was  creditable  to  the 
writer.' 

1  Letter  of  W.  S.  Travis,  June  16,  1813. 

2  James,  vi,  334. 

3  The  letter,  dated  June  i3th,  is  as  follows  :  "  Your 
gallant  and  desperate  attempt  to  defend  your  vessel 


244  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

As  has  been  already  mentioned,  the  Amer- 
icans possessed  a  large  force  of  gunboats  at 
the  beginning  of  the  war.  Some  of  these 
were  fairly  seaworthy  vessels,  of  90  tons 
burden,  sloop  or  schooner-rigged,  and  armed 
with  one  or  two  long,  heavy  guns,  and  some- 
times with  several  light  carronades  to  repel 
boarders.1  Gunboats  of  this  kind,  together 
with  the  few  small  cutters  owned  by  the  gov- 
ernment, were  serviceable  enough.  They 
were  employed  all  along  the  shores  of  Georgia 
and  the  Carolinas,  and  in  Long  Island  Sound, 
in  protecting-  the  coasting  trade  by  convoying 
parties  of  small  vessels  from  one  port  to  an- 
other, and  preventing  them  from  being  mo- 
lested by  the  boats  of  any  of  the  British  frig- 
ates. They  also  acted  as  checks  upon  the 
latter  in  their  descents  upon  the  towns  and 

against  more  than  double  your  number,  on  the  night 
of  the  1 2th  instant,  excited  such  admiration  on  the 
part  of  your  opponents  as  I  have  seldom  witnessed, 
and  induced  me  to  return  you  the  sword  you  had  so 
nobly  used,  in  testimony  of  mine.  Our  poor  fellows 
have  suffered  severely,  occasioned  chiefly,  if  not  solely, 
by  the  precautions  you  had  taken  to  prevent  sur- 
prise. In  short,  I  am  at  a  loss  which  to  admire  most, 
the  previous  arrangement  aboard  the  Surveyor,  or  the 
determined  manner  in  which  her  deck  was  disputed  inch 
by  inch.  I  am,  sir,"  etc. 

1  According  to  a  letter  from  Captain  Hugh  G.  Camp- 
bell (in  the  Naval  Archives,  "  Captains'  Letters,"  1812, 
vol.  ii,  Nos.  21  and  192),  the  crews  were  distributed  as 
follows :  ten  men  and  a  boy  to  a  long  32,  seven  men 
and  a  boy  to  a  long  9,  and  five  men  and  a  boy  to  a  car- 
ronade,  exclusive  of  petty  officers.  Captain  Campbell 
complains  of  the  scarcity  of  men,  and  rather  naively  re- 
marks that  he  is  glad  the  marines  have  been  withdrawn 
from  the  gunboats,  as  this  may  make  the  commanders 
of  the  latter  keep  a  brighter  lookout  than  formerly. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  245 

plantations,  occasionally  capturing  their  boats 
and  tenders,  and  forcing  them  to  be  very 
cautious  in  their  operations.  They  were  very 
useful  in  keeping  privateers  off  the  coast,  and 
capturing  them  when  they  came  too  far  in. 
The  exploits  of  those  on  the  southern  coast 
will  be  mentioned  as  they  occurred.  Those 
in  Long  Island  Sound  never  came  into  col- 
lision with  the  foe,  except  for  a  couple  of 
slight  skirmishes  at  very  long  range;  but  in 
convoying  little  fleets  of  coasters,  and  keep- 
ing at  bay  the  man-of-war  boats  sent  to  molest 
them,  they  were  invaluable ;  and  they  also 
kept  the  Sound  clear  of  hostile  privateers. 

Many  of  the  gunboats  were  much  smaller 
than  those  just  mentioned,  trusting  mainly  to 
their  sweeps  for  motive  power,  and  each  re- 
lying for  offence  on  one  long  pivot  gun,  a  12 
or  i8-pounder.  In  the  Chesapeake  there  was. 
quite  a  large  number  of  these  small  gallies, 
with  a  few  of  the  larger  kind,  and  here  it  was 
thought  that  by  acting  together  in  flotillas  the 
gunboats  might  in  fine  weather  do  consider- 
able damage  to  the  enemy's  fleet  by  destroy- 
ing detached  vessels,  instead  of  confining 
themselves  to  the  more  humble  tasks  in 
which  their  brethren  elsewhere  were  fairly 
successful.  At  this  period  Denmark,  having 
lost  all  her  larger  ships  of  war,  was  confining 
herself  purely  to  gun-brigs.  These  were  stout 
little  crafts,  with  heavy  guns,  which,  acting 
together,  and  being  handled  with  spirit  and 
skill,  had  on  several  occasions  in  calm 
weather  captured  small  British  sloops,  and 
had  twice  so  injured  frigates  as  to  make  their 
return  to  Great  Britain  necessary  ;  while  they 


246  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

themselves  had  frequently  been  the  object  of 
successful  cutting-out  expeditions.  Congress 
hoped  that  our  gunboats  would  do  as  well  as 
the  Danish  ;  but  for  a  variety  of  reasons  they 
failed  utterly  in  every  serious  attack  that 
they  made  on  a  man-of-war,  and  were  worse 
than  useless  for  all  but  the  various  subordi- 
nate employments  above  mentioned.  The 
main  reason  for  this  failure  was  in  the  gun- 
boats themselves.  They  were  utterly  useless 
except  in  perfectly  calm  weather,  for  in  any 
wind  the  heavy  guns  caused  them  to  careen 
over  so  as  to  make  it  difficult  to  keep  them 
right  side  up,  and  impossible  to  fire.  Even 
in  smooth  water  they  could  not  be  fought  at 
anchor,  requiring  to  be  kept  in  position  by 
means  of  sweeps ;  and  they  were  very  un- 
stable, the  recoil  of  the  guns  causing  them  to 
roll  so  as  to  make  it  difficult  to  aim  with  any 
accuracy  after  the  first  discharge,  while  a 
single  shot  hitting  one  put  it  hors  de  combat. 
This  last  event  rarely  happened,  however,  for 
they  were  not  often  handled  with  any  approach 
to  temerity,  and,  on  the  contrary,  usually 
made  their  attacks  at  a  range  that  rendered  it 
as  impossible  to  inflict  as  to  receive  harm.  It 
does  not  seem  as  if  they  were  very  well  man- 
aged ;  but  they  were  such  ill-conditioned 
craft  that  the  best  officers  might  be  pardoned 
for  feeling  uncomfortable  in  them.  Their 
operations  throughout  the  war  offer  a  pain- 
fully ludicrous  commentary  on  Jefferson's  re- 
markable project  of  having  our  navy  com- 
posed exclusively  of  such  craft. 

The  first  aggressive  attempt  made  with  the 
gunboats    was    characteristically   futile.     On 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  247 

June  2oth  15  of  them,  under  Captain  Tarbell, 
attacked  the  Junon,  38,  Captain  Sanders,  then 
lying  becalmed  in  Hampton  Roads,  with  the 
Barossa,  36,  and  Laurestinus,  24,  near  her. 
The  gunboats,  while  still  at  very  long  range, 
anchored,  and  promptly  drifted  round  so  that 
they  couldn't  shoot.  Then  they  got  under 
way,  and  began  gradually  to  draw  nearer  to 
the  Juno7i.  Her  defence  was  very  feeble ; 
after  some  hasty  and  ill-directed  vollies  she 
endeavored  to  beat  out  of  the  way.  But 
meanwhile,  a  slight  breeze  having  sprung  up, 
the  Barossa,  Captain  Sherriff,  approached 
near  enough  to  take  a  hand  in  the  affair,  and 
at  once  made  it  evident  that  she  was  a  more 
dangerous  foe  than  the  .///«<?«,  though  a  lighter 
ship.  As  soon  as  they  felt  the  effects  of  the 
breeze  the  gunboats  became  almost  useless, 
and,  the  Barossa?s  fire  being  animated  and 
well  aimed,  they  withdrew.  They  had  suffered 
nothing  from  the  Junon,  but  during  the  short 
period  she  was  engaged,  the  Bctrossa  had 
crippled  one  boat  and  slightly  damaged  an- 
other; one  man  was  killed  and  two  wounded. 
The  Barossa  escaped  unscathed  and  the  Junon 
was  but  slightly  injured.  Of  the  combatants, 
the  Barossa  was  the  only  one  that  came  off 
with  credit,  the  Junon  behaving,  if  anything, 
rather  worse  than  the  gunboats.  There  was 
no  longer  any  doubt  as  to  the  amount  of  reli- 
ance to  be  placed  on  the  latter.1 

-  Though  the  flotilla  men  did  nothing  in  the  boats, 
they  acted  with  the  most  stubborn  bravery  at  the  bat- 
tle of  Bladensburg.  The  British  Lieutenant  Graig 
himself  a  spectator,  thus  writes  of  their  deeds  on  that 
occasion  ("Campaign  at  Washington,"  p.  119).  "Of 


248  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

On  June  20,  1813,  a  British  force  of  three 
74's,  one  64,  four  frigates,  two  sloops,  and 
three  transports  was  anchored  off  Craney 
Island.  On  the  northwest  side  of  this  island 
was  a  battery  of  i8-pounders,  to  take  charge 
of  which  Captain  Cassin,  commanding  the 
naval  forces  at  Norfolk,  sent  ashore  one  hun- 
dred sailors  of  the  Constellation,  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenants  Neale,  Shubrick, 
and  Saunders,  and  fifty  marines  under  Lieu- 
tenant Breckenridge.1  On  the  morning  of  the 
22d  they  were  attacked  by  a  division  of  15 
boats,  containing  700  men,2  seamen,  marines, 
chasseurs,  and  soldiers  of  the  load  regiment, 
the  whole  under  the  command  of  Captain 
Pechell,  of  the  San  Domingo,  74.  Captain 
Hanchett  led  the  attack  in  the  Diadem's 
launch.  The  battery's  guns  were  not  fired 
till  the  British  were  close  in,  when  they 
opened  with  destructive  effect.  While  still 
some  seventy  yards  from  the  guns  the  Dia- 
detn's  launch  grounded,  and  the  attack  was 
checked.  Three  of  the  boats  were  now  sunk 
by  shot,  but  the  water  was  so  shallow  that 
they  remained  above  water;  and  while  the 

the  sailors,  however,  it  would  be  injustice  not  to  speak 
in  the  terms  which  their  conduct  merits.  They  were 
employed  as  gunners,  and  not  only  did  they  serve  their 
guns  with  a  quickness  and  precision  which  astonished 
their  assailants,  but  they  stood  till  some  of  them  were 
actually  bayoneted  with  fuses  in  their  hands  ;  nor  was 
it  till  their  leader  was  wounded  and  taken,  and  they 
saw  themselves  deserted  on  all  sides  by  the  soldiers, 
that  they  quitted  the  field."  Certainly  such  men  could 
not  be  accused  of  lack  of  courage.  Something  else  is 
needed  to  account  for  the  failure  of  the  gunboat  system. 

1  Letter  of  Captain  John  Cassin,  June  23,  1813. 

2  James,  vi,  337. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  249 

fighting  was  still  at  its  height,  some  of  the 
Constellation's  crew,  headed  by  Midshipman 
Tatnall,  waded  out  and  took  possession  of 
them. '  A  few  of  their  crew  threw  away  their 
arms  and  came  ashore  with  their  captors ; 
others  escaped  to  the  remaining  boats,  and 
immediately  afterward  the  flotilla  made  off  in 
disorder,  having  lost  91  men.  The  three  cap- 
tured barges  were  large,  strong  boats,  one 
called  the  Centipede  being  fifty  feet  long,  and 
more  formidable  than  many  of  the  American 
gun-vessels.  The  Constellation's  men  deserve 
great  credit  for  their  defence,  but  the  British 
certainly  did  not  attack  with  their  usual  obsti- 
nacy. When  the  foremost  boats  were  sunk, 
the  water  was  so  shallow  and  the  bottom  so 
good  that  the  Americans  on  shore,  as  just 
stated,  at  once  waded  out  to  them ;  and  if  in 
the  heat  of  the  fight  Tatnall  and  his  seamen 
could  get  out  to  the  boats,  the  700  British 
ought  to  have  been  able  to  get  in  to  the  bat- 
tery, whose  150  defenders  would  then  have 
stood  no  chance.* 

1  "  Life  of  Commodore  Josiah  Tatnall,"  by  Charles 
C.  Jones,  Jr.  (Savannah,  1878),  p.  17. 

2  James  comments  on  this  repulse  as  "  a  defeat  as 
discreditable  to  those  that  caused  it  as  honorable  to 
those  that  suffered  in  it."    "  Unlike  most  other  nations, 
the  Americans  in  particular,  the  British,  when  engaged 
in  expeditions  of  this  nature,  always  rest  their  hopes  of 
success  upon  valor  rather  than  on  numbers."    These 
Comments  read  particularly  well  when  it  is  remembered 
that  the  assailants   outnumbered  the  assailed  in  the 
proportion  of  5  to  I.     It  is  monotonous  work  to  have 
to  supplement  a  history  by  a  running  commentary  on 
James'  mistakes  and  inventions  ;  but  it  is  worth  while 
to  prove  once  for  all  the  utter  unreliability  of  the  author 
who  is  accepted  in  Great  Britain  as  the  great  authority 


250  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

On  July  14,  1813,  the  two  small  vessels 
Scorpion  and  Asp,  the  latter  commanded  by 
Mr.  Sigourney,  got  under  way  from  out  of  the 
Yeocomico  Creek,1  and  at  10  A.  M.,  discovered 
in  chase  the  British  brig-sloops  Contest,  Cap- 
tain James  Rattray,  and  Mohawk,  Captain 
Henry  D.  Byng.2  The  Scorpion  beat  up  the 
Chesapeake,  but  the  dull-sailing  Asp  had  to 
re-enter  the  creek ;  the  two  brigs  anchored  off 
the  bar  and  hoisted  out  their  boats,  under  the 
command  of  Lieutenant  Rodger  C.  Curry  ; 
whereupon  the  Asp  cut  her  cable  and  ran  up 
the  creek  some  distance.  Here  she  was  at- 
tacked by  three  boats,  which  Mr.  Sigourney 
and  his  crew  of  twenty  men,  with  two  light 
guns,  beat  off ;  but  they  were  joined  by  two 
others,  and  the  five  carried  the  Asp,  giving  no 
quarter.  Mr.  Sigourney  and  10  of  his  men 
were  killed  or  wounded,  while  the  British  also 
suffered  heavily,  having  4  killed  and  7  (includ- 
ing Lieutenant  Curry)  wounded.  The  surviv- 
ing Americans  reached  the  shore,  rallied  under 
Midshipman  H.  McClintock  (second  in  com- 
mand), and  when  the  British  retired  after  set- 
ting the  Asp  on  fire,  at  once  boarded  her,  put 
out  the  flames,  and  got  her  in  fighting  order ; 
but  they  were  not  again  molested. 

On  July  29th,  while  the  Junon,  38,  Captain 
Sanders,  and  Martin,  18,  Captain  Senhouse, 
were  in  Delaware  Bay,  the  latter  grounded  on 

about  the  war.  Still,  James  is  no  worse  than  his  com- 
peers. In  the  American  Coggeshall's  "  History  of 
Privateers,"  the  misstatements  are  as  gross  and  the 
sneers  in  as  poor  taste — the  British,  instead  of  the 
Americans,  being  the  objects. 

1  Letter  of  Midshipman  McClintock,  July  15, 1813. 

2  James,  vi,  343. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  251 

the  outside  of  Crow's  Shoal ;  the  frigate 
anchored  within  supporting  distance,  and 
while  in  this  position  the  two  ships  were 
attacked  by  the  American  flotilla  in  those 
waters,  consisting  of  eight  gunboats,  carrying 
each  25  men  and  one  long  32,  and  two  heavier 
block-sloops,1  commanded  by  Lieutenant 
Samuel  Angus.  The  flotilla  kept  at  such  a 
distance  that  an  hour's  cannonading  did  no 
damage  whatever  to  anybody ;  and  during 
that  time  gunboat  No.  121,  Sailing-master 
Shead,  drifted  a  mile  and  a  half  away  from 
her  consorts.  Seeing  this  the  British  made  a 
dash  at  her  in  7  boats,  containing  140  men, 
led  by  Lieutenant  Philip  Westphal.  Mr. 
Shead  anchored  and  made  an  obstinate  de- 
fence, but  at  the  first  discharge  the  gun's 
pintle  gave  way,  and  the  next  time  it  was  fired 
the  gun-carriage  was  almost  torn  to  pieces. 
He  kept  up  a  spirited  fire  of  small  arms,  in 
reply  to  the  boat-carronades  and  musketry  of 
the  assailants  ;  but  the  latter  advanced  steadily 
and  carried  the  gunboat  by  boarding,  7  of  her 
people  being  wounded,  while  7  of  the  British 
were  killed  and  13  wounded."  The  defence  of 
No.  121  was  very  creditable,  but  otherwise 
the  honor  of  the  day  was  certainly  with  the 
British ;  whether  because  the  gunboats  were 
themselves  so  worthless  or  because  they  were 
not  handled  boldly  enough,  they  did  no  dam- 
age, even  to  the  grounded  sloop,  that  would 
seem  to  have  been  at  their  mercy.8 

1  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Angus,  July  30,  1813. 

2  Letter  of  Mr.  Shead,  Aug.  5,  1813. 

3  The  explanation  possibly  lies  in  the  fact  that  the 
gun-boats  had  worthless  powder.     In  the  Naval  Ar- 


252  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

On  June  i8th  the  American  brig-sloop 
Argus,  commanded  by  Lieutenant  William 
Henry  Allen,  late  first  of  the  United  States, 
sailed  from  New  York  for  France,  with  Mr. 
Crawford,  minister  for  that  country,  aboard, 
and  reached  L'Orieut  on  July  nth,  having 
made  one  prize  on  the  way.  On  July  i4th 
she  again  sailed,  and  cruised  in  the  chops  of 
the  Channel,  capturing  and  burning  ship 
after  ship,  and  creating  the  greatest  conster- 
nation among  the  London  merchants ;  she 
then  cruised  along  Cornwall  and  got  into  St. 
George's  Channel,  where  the  work  of  destruc- 
tion went  on.  The  labor  was  very  severe  and 
harassing,  the  men  being  able  to  get  very 
little  rest.1  On  the  night  of  August  i3th,  a 
brig  laden  with  wine  from  Oporto  was  captured 
and  burnt,  and  unluckily  many  of  the  crew 
succeeded  in  getting  at  some  of  the  cargo. 
At  5  A.  M.  on  the  i4th  a  large  brig-of-war  was 
discovered  standing  down  under  a  cloud  of 
canvas.*  This  was  the  British  brig-sloop 
Pelican,  Captain  John  Fordyce  Maples,  which, 
from  information  received  at  Cork  three  days 
previous,  had  been  cruising  especially  after 
the  Argus,  and  had  at  last  found  her;  St. 
David's  Head  bore  east  five  leagues  (lat.  52° 
15°  N.  and  5°  50'  W.). 

chives  there  is  a  letter  from  Mr.  Angus  ("  Masters'  Com- 
mandant Letters,"  1813,  No.  3;  see  also  No.  91),  in 
which  he  says  that  the  frigate's  shot  passed  over  them, 
while  theirs  could  not  even  reach  the  sloop.  He  also 
encloses  a  copy  of  a  paper,  signed  by  the  other  gun- 
boat officers,  which  runs  :  "  We,  the  officers  of  the  ves- 
sels comprising  the  Delaware  flotilla,  protest  against 
the  powder  as  being  unfit  for  service." 

1  Court  of  Inquiry  into  loss  of  Argus,  1815. 

2  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Watson,  March  2,  1815. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  253 

The  small,  fine-lined  American  cruiser,  with 
her  lofty  masts  and  long  spars,  could  easily 
have  escaped  from  her  heavier  antagonist ; 
but  Captain  Allen  had  no  such  intention,  and, 
finding  he  could  not  get  the  weather-gage, 
he  shortened  sail  and  ran  easily  along  on  the 
starboard  tack,  while  the  Pelican  came  down 
on  him  with  the  wind  (which  was  from  the 
south)  nearly  aft.  At  6  A.  M.  the  Argus  wore 
and  fired  her  port  guns  within  grape  distance, 
the  Pelican  responded  with  her  starboard 
battery,  and  the  action  began  with  great  spirit 
on  both  sides.1  At  6.04  a  round  shot  carried 
off  Captain  Allen's  leg,  inflicting  a  mortal 
wound,  but  he  stayed  on  deck  till  he  fainted 
from  loss  of  blood.  Soon  the  British  fire 
carried  away  the  main-braces,  mainspring-stay, 
gaff,  and  try-sail  mast  of  the  Argus ;  the  first 
lieutenant,  Mr.  Watson,  was  wounded  in  the 
head  by  a  grape-shot  and  carried  below ;  the 
second  lieutenant,  Mr.  U.  H.  Allen  (no  rela- 
tion of  the  captain),  continued  to  fight  the 
ship  with  great  skill.  The  Pelican's  fire  con- 
tinued very  heavy,  the  Argus  losing  her 
spritsail-yard  and  most  of  the  standing  rig- 
ging on  the  port  side  of  the  foremast.  At 
6.14  Captain  Maples  bore  up  to  pass  astern 
of  his  antagonist,  but  Lieutenant  Allen  luffed 
into  the  wind  and  threw  the  main-top-sail 
aback,  getting  into  a  beautiful  raking  posi- 
tion8; had  the  men  at  the  guns  done  their 
duty  as  well  as  those  on  the  quarter-deck  did 
theirs,  the  issue  of  the  fight  would  have  been 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Maples  to  Admiral  Thornborough, 
Aug.  14,  1813. 

a  Letter  of  Lieutenant  Watson. 
14—9 


254  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

very  different ;  but,  as  it  was,  in  spite  of  her 
favorable  position,  the  raking  broadside  of  the 
Argus  did  little  damage.  Two  or  three 
minutes  afterward  the  Argus  lost  the  use  of 
her  after-sails  through  having  her  preventer- 
main-braces  and  top-sail  tie  shot  away,  and 
fell  off  before  the  wind,  when  the  Pelican  at 
6.18  passed  her  stern,  raking  her  heavily,  and 
then  ranged  up  on  her  starboard  quarter.  In 
a  few  minutes  the  wheel-ropes  and  running- 
rigging  of  every  description  were  shot  away, 
and  the  Argus  became  utterly  unmanageable. 
The  Pelican  continued  raking  her  with  perfect 
impunity,  and  at  6.35  passed  her  broadside 
and  took  a  position  on  her  starboard  bow, 
when  at  6.45  the  brigs  fell  together,  and  the 
British  "  were  in  the  act  of  boarding  when  the 
Argus  struck  her  colors,"  '  at  6.45  A.  M.  The 
Pelican  carried,  besides  her  regular  armament, 
two  long  6's  as  stern-chasers,  and  her  broad- 
side weight  of  metal  was  thus  : 9 

1x6 
1x6 

I   X   12 

8  x  32 

or  280  Ibs.  against  the  Argus'/ 

I    X    12 

9  x  24 

or,  subtracting  as  usual  7  per  cent,  for  light 
weight  of  metal,  210  Ibs.  The  Pelican's  crew 
consisted  of  but  116  men,  according  to  the 
British  account,  though  the  American  reports 
make  it  much  larger.  The  Argushzd  started 

1  Letter  of  Captain  Maples. 
1  James,  vi,  320. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  255 

from  New  York  with  137  men,  but  having 
manned  and  sent  in  several  prizes,  her  crew 
amounted,  as  near  as  can  be  ascertained,  to 
104.  Mr.  Low  in  his  "Naval  History,"  pub- 
lished just  after  the  event,  makes  it  but  99. 
James  makes  it  121 ;  as  he  placed  the  crew  of 
the  Enterprise  at  125,  when  it  was  really  102  ; 
that  of  the  Hornet  at  162,  instead  of  135  ;  of 
the  Peacock  at  185,  instead  of  166;  of  the 
Nautilus  at  106  instead  of  95,  etc.,  etc.,  it  is 
safe  to  presume  that  he  has  over-estimated  it 
by  at  least  20,  which  brings  the  number  pretty 
near  to  the  American  accounts.  The  Pelican 
lost  but  two  men  killed  and  five  wounded. 
Captain  Maples  had  a  narrow  escape,  a  spent 
grape-shot  striking  him  in  the  chest  with  some 
force,  and  then  falling  on  the  deck.  One  shot 
had  passed  through  the  boatswain's  and  one 
through  the  carpenter's  cabin ;  her  sides  were 
filled  with  grape-shot,  and  her  rigging  and 
sails  much  injured ;  her  foremast,  main-top- 
mast, and  royal  masts  were  slightly  wounded, 
and  two  of  her  carronades  dismounted. 

The  injuries  of  the  Argus  have  already  been 
detailed  ;  her  hull  and  lower  masts  were  also 
tolerably  well  cut  up.  Of  her  crew,  Captain 
Allen,  two  midshipmen,  the  carpenter,  and 
six  seamen  were  killed  or  mortally  wounded  ; 
her  first  lieutenant  and  13  seamen  severely 
and  slightly  wounded  ;  total,  10  killed  and  14 
wounded. 

In  reckoning  the  comparative  force,  I 
include  the  Englishman's  six-pound  stern- 
chaser,  which  could  not  be  fired  in  broadside 
with  the  rest  of  the  guns,  because  I  include 
the  Argus'  1 2-pound  bow-chaser,  which  also 


256 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 


could  not  be  fired  in  broadside,  as  it  was 
crowded  into  the  bridle-port.  James,  of 
course,  carefully  includes  the  latter,  though 
leaving  out  the  former. 


Argiis 
Pelican 


COMPARISON. 

Tons. 

No.  Guns. 

Weight 

Metal. 

Men.       Loss. 

298 
467 

IO 
II 

2IO 
280 

104          24 

116         7 

Comparative 
Force. 

Comparative  Loss 
Inflicted. 

Argus 
Pelican 

.82 
I.OO 

.29 
I.OO 

Ut 


Of  all  the  single-ship  actions  fought  in  the 
war  this  is  the  least  creditable  to  the  Amer- 
icans. The  odds  in  force,  it  is  true,  were 
against  the  Argus,  about  in  the  proportion  of 
10  to  8,  but  this  is  neither  enough  to  account 
for  the  loss  inflicted  being  as  10  to  3,  nor  for 
her  surrendering  when  she  had  been  so  little 
ill  used.  It  was  not  even  as  if  her  antagonist 
had  been  an  unusually  fine  vessel  of  her  class. 
The  Pelican  did  not  do  as  well  as  either  the 
frolic  previously,  or  the  Reindeer  afterward, 
though  perhaps  rather  better  than  the  Avon, 
Penguin,  or  Peacock.  With  a  comparatively 
unmanageable  antagonist,  in  smooth  water, 
she  ought  to  have  sunk  her  in  three  quarters 
of  an  hour.  But  the  Pelican's  not  having  done 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  257 

particularly  well  merely  makes  the  conduct  of 
the  Americans  look  worse ;  it  is  just  the 
reverse  of  the  Chesapeake 's  case,  where,  paying 
the  highest  credit  to  the  British,  we  still  thought 
the  fight  no  discredit  to  us.  Here  we  can 
indulge  no  such  reflection.  The  officers  did 
well,  but  the  crew  did  not.  Cooper  says  : 
"  The  enemy  was  so  much  heavier  that  it  may 
be  doubted  whether  the  Argus  would  have 
captured  her  antagonist  under  any  ordinary 
circumstances."  This  I  doubt;  such  a  crew 
as  the  Wasp's  or  Hornefs  probably  would 
have  been  successful.  The  trouble  with  the 
guns  of  the  Argus  was  not  so  much  that  they 
were  too  small,  as  that  they  did  not  hit ;  and 
this  seems  all  the  more  incomprehensible 
when  it  is  remembered  that  Captain  Allen  is 
the  very  man  to  whom  Commodore  Decatur, 
in  his  official  letter,  attributed  the  skilful  gun- 
practice  of  the  crew  of  the  frigate  United 
States.  Cooper  says  that  the  powder  was  bad  ; 
and  it  has  also  been  said  that  the  men  of  the 
Argus  were  over-fatigued  and  were  drunk,  in 
which  case  they  ought  not  to  have  been 
brought  into  action.  Besides  unskilfulness, 
there  is  another  very  serious  count  against  the 
crew.  Had  the  Pelican  been  some  distance 
from  the  Argus,  and  in  a  position  where  she 
could  pour  in  her  fire  with  perfect  impunity 
to  herself,  when  the  surrender  took  place,  it 
would  have  been  more  justifiable.  But,  on  the 
contrary,  the  vessels  were  touching,  and  the 
British  boarded  just  as  the  colors  were  hauled 
down  ;  it  was  certainly  very  disgraceful  that 
the  Americans  did  not  rally  to  repel  them,  for 
they  had  still  four  fifths  of  their  number 


258  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

absolutely  untouched.  They  certainly  ought 
to  have  succeeded,  for  boarding  is  a  difficult 
and  dangerous  experiment ;  and  if  they  had 
repulsed  their  antagonists  they  might  in  turn 
have  carried  the  Pelican.  So  that,  in  summing 
up  the  merits  of  this  action,  it  is  fair  to  say 
that  both  sides  showed  skilful  seamanship 
and  unskilful  gunnery  ;  that  the  British  fought 
bravely  and  that  the  Americans  did  not. 

It  is  somewhat  interesting  to  compare  this 
fight,  where  a  weaker  American  sloop  was 
taken  by  a  stronger  British  one,  with  two  or 
three  others,  where  both  the  comparative  force 
and  the  result  .were  reversed.  Comparing  it, 
therefore,  with  the  actions  between  the 
Hornet  and  Peacock  (British),  the  Wasp  and 
Avon,  and  the  Peacock  (American)  and  Eper- 
•vier,  we  get  four  actions,  in  one  of  which,  the 
first-named,  the  British  were  victorious,  and 
in  the  other  three  the  Americans. 

Comparative        Comparative        Per  cent. 
Force.  Loss  Inflicted.         Loss. 

Pelican  (British)  I.oo  2.OO  .06 

Argus  (American)  .82  .29  .23 

Hornet  (American)        I.oo  l,oo  .02 

Peacock  (British)  .83  .07  .81 

Wasp  (American)          I.oo  I.oo  .02 

Avon  (British)  .80  .07  .33 

Peacock  (American)      I.oo  I.oo  .01 

Efervier  (British)          .81  .08  .20 

It  is  thus  seen  that  in  these  sloop  actions 
the  superiority  of  force  on  the  side  of  the 
victor  was  each  time  about  the  same.  The 
Argus  made  a  much  more  effectual  resistance 
than  did  either  the  Peacock,  Avon,  or  Epervier, 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  259 

while  the  Pelican  did  her  work  in  poorer  form 
than  either  of  the  victorious  American  sloops  ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  resistance  of  the 
Argus  did  not  by  any  means  show  as  much 
bravery  as  was  shown  in  the  defence  of  the 
Peacock  or  Avon,  although  rather  more  than  in 
the  case  of  the  Epervier. 

This  is  the  only  action  of  the  war  where  it 
is  almost  impossible  to  find  out  the  cause  of 
the  inferiority  of  the  beaten  crew.  In  almost 
all  other  cases  we  find  that  one  crew  had  been 
carefully  drilled,  and  so  proved  superior  to  a 
less-trained  antagonist ;  but  it  is  incredible 
that  the  man,  to  whose  exertions  when  first 
lieutenant  of  the  States  Commodore  Decatur 
ascribes  the  skilfulness  of  that  ship's  men, 
should  have  neglected  to  train  his  own  crew ; 
and  this  had  the  reputation  of  being  composed 
of  a  fine  set  of  men.  Bad  powder  would  not 
account  for  the  surrender  of  the  Argus  when 
so  little  damaged.  It  really  seems  as  if  the 
men  must  have  been  drunk  or  over-fatigued, 
as  has  been  so  often  asserted.  Of  course 
drunkenness  would  account  for  the  defeat,  al- 
though not  in  the  least  altering  its  humiliating 
character. 

"  Et  tu  quoque  "  is  not  much  of  an  argument ; 
still  it  may  be  as  well  to  call  to  mind  here  two 
engagements  in  which  British  sloops  suffered 
much  more  discreditable  defeats  than  the 
Argus  did.  The  figures  are  taken  from  James ; 
as  given  by  the  French  historians  they  make 
even  a  worse  showing  for  the  British. 

A  short  time  before  our  war  the  British  brig 
Carnation,  18,  had  been  captured,  by  boarding, 
by  the  French  brig  Palinure,  16,  and  the  British 


260  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

brig  Alacrity,  18,  had  been  captured,  also  by 
boarding,  by  the  corvette  Abeille,  20. 

The  following  was  the  comparative  force, 
etc.,  of  the  combatants  : 

Weight  Metal.        No.  Crew.        Lois. 
Carnation  262  117  40 

Palinure  174  100  20 

Alacrity  262  100  18 

Abeille  260  130  19 

In  spite  of  the  pride  the  British  take  in  their 
hand-to-hand  prowess  both  of  these  ships  were 
captured  by  boarding.  The  Carnation  was 
captured  by  a  much  smaller  force,  instead  of 
by  a  much  larger  one,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Argus  ;  and  if  the  Argus  gave  up  before  she 
had  suffered  greatly,  the  Alacrity  surrendered 
when  she  had  suffered  still  less.  French  his- 
torians asserted  that  the  capture  of  the  two 
brigs  proved  that  "  French  valor  could  conquer 
British  courage  "  ;  and  a  similar  opinion  was 
very  complacently  expressed  by  British  histo- 
rians after  the  defeat  of  the  Argus.  All  that 
the  three  combats  really  "proved"  was,  that 
in  eight  encounters  between  British  and 
American  sloops  the  Americans  were  defeated 
once :  and  in  a  far  greater  number  of  en- 
counters between  French  and  British  sloops 
the  British  were  defeated  twice.  No  one 
pretends  that  either  navy  was  invincible ;  the 
question  is,  which  side  averaged  best  ? 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  we  possessed 
several  small  brigs  ;  these  had  originally  been 
fast,  handy  little  schooners,  each  armed  with 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  261 

12  long  sixes,  and  with  a  crew  of  60  men.  As 
such  they  were  effective  enough  ;  but  when 
afterward  changed  into  brigs,  each  armed  with 
a  couple  of  extra  guns,  and  given  40  additional 
men,  they  became  too  slow  to  run,  without 
becoming  strong  enough  to  fight.  They  car- 
ried far  too  many  guns  and  men  for  their  size, 
and  not  enough  to  give  them  a  chance  with 
any  respectable  opponent ;  and  they  were  al- 
most all  ignominiously  captured.  The  single 
exception  was  the  brig  Enterprise,  She  man- 
aged to  escape  capture,  owing  chiefly  to  good 
luck,  and  once  fought  a  victorious  engagement, 
thanks  to  the  fact  that  the  British  possessed  a 
class  of  vessels  even  worse  than  our  own.  She 
was  kept  near  the  land  and  finally  took  up 
her  station  off  the  eastern  coast,  where  she 
did  good  service  in  chasing  away  or  capturing 
the  various  Nova  Scotian  or  New  Brunswick 
privateers,  which  were  smaller  and  less  for- 
midable vessels  than  the  privateers  of  the 
United  States,  and  not  calculated  for  fighting. 
By  crowding  guns  into  her  bridle-ports,  and 
over-manning  herself,  the  Enterprise,  now  un- 
der the  command  of  Lieutenant  William  Bur- 
rows, mounted  14  eighteen-pound  carronades 
and  2  long  g's,  with  102  men.  On  September 
5th,  while  standing  along  shore  near  Penguin 
Point,  a  few  miles  to  the  eastward'of  Portland, 
Me.,  she  discovered,  at  anchor  inside,  a  man- 
of-war  brig1  which  proved  to  be  H.  M.  S.  Boxer, 
Captain  Samuel  Blyth,  of  12  carronades, 
eighteen-pounders  and  two  long  sixes,  with 
but  66  men  aboard,  12  of  her  crew  being 

1  Letter  from  Lieutenant  Edward  R.  McCall  to  Com- 
modore Hull,  September  5,  1813. 
14—9  B 


262  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

absent.1  The  Boxer  at  once  hoisted  three 
British  ensigns  and  bore  up  for  the  Enterprise, 
then  standing  in  on  the  starboard  tack ;  but 
when  the  two  brigs  were  still  4  miles  apart  it 
fell  calm.  At  midday  a  breeze  sprang  up  from 
the  southwest,  giving  the  American  the  weath- 
er-gage, but  the  latter  manoeuvred  for  some 
time  to  windward  to  try  the  comparative  rates 
of  sailing  of  the  vessels.  At  3  P.  M.  Lieutenan  t 
Burrows  hoisted  three  ensigns,  shortened  sail 
and  edged  away  toward  the  enemy,  who  came 
gallantly  on.  Captain  Blyth  had  nailed  his 
colors  to  the  mast,  telling  his  men  they  should 
never  be  struck  while  he  had  life  in  his  body." 
Both  crews  cheered  loudly  as  they  neared  each 
other,  and  at  3.15,  the  two  brigs  being  on  the 
starboard  tack  not  a  half  pistol-shot  apart, 
they  opened  fire,  the  American  using  the  port, 
and  the  English  the  starboard,  battery.  Both 
broadsides  were  very  destructive,  each  of  the 
commanders  falling  at  the  very  beginning  of 
the  action.  Captain  Blyth  was  struck  by  an 
eighteen-pound  shot  while  he  was  standing  on 
the  quarter-deck ;  it  passed  completely  through 
his  body,  shattering  his  left  arm  and  killing 
him  on  the  spot.  The  command,  thereupon, 
devolved  on  Lieutenant  David  McCreery.  At 
almost  the  same  time  his  equally  gallant  an- 
tagonist fell.  Lieutenant  Burrows,  while  en- 
couraging his  men,  laid  hold  of  a  gun-tackle 

1  James,  "  Naval  Occurrences,"  264.     The  American 
accounts  give  the  Boxer  104  men,  on  very  insufficient 
grounds.     Similarly,  James   gives  the  Enterprise   123 
men.     Each  side  will  be  considered  authority  for  its 
own  force  and  loss. 

2  "  Naval  Chronicle,"  vol.  xxxii,  p.  462. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  263 

fall  to  help  the  crew  of  a  carronade  run  out 
the  gun  ;  in  doing  so  he  raised  one  leg  against 
the  bulwark,  when  a  canister  shot  struck  his 
thigh,  glancing  into  his  body  and  inflicting  a 
fearful  wound.1  In  spite  of  the  pain  he  re- 
fused to  be  carried  below,  and  lay  on  the  deck, 
crying  outthat  the  colors  must  never  be  struck. 
Lieutenant  Edward  McCall  now  took  com- 
mand. At  3.30  the  Enterprise  ranged  ahead, 
rounded  to  on  the  starboard  tack,  and  raked 
the  Boxer  with  the  starboard  guns.  At  3.35 
the  Boxer  lost  her  main-top-mast  and  top-sail 
yard,  but  her  crew  still  kept  up  the  fight  bravely 
with  the  exception  of  four  men  who  deserted 
their  quarters  and  were  afterward  court-mar- 
tialed for  cowardice.9  The  Enterprise  now 


vuf 


set  her  fore-sail  and  took  position  on  the  ene- 
my's starboard  bow,  delivering  raking  fires ; 
and  at  3.45  the  latter  surrendered,  when  en- 
tirely unmanageable  and  defenceless.  Lieu- 
tenant Burrows  would  not  go  below  until  he 
had  received  the  sword  of  his  adversary,  when 
he  exclaimed,  "I  am  satisfied,  I  die  con- 
tented." 

1  Cooper,  "  Naval  History,"  vol.  ii,  p.  259. 

2  Minutes  of  court-martial  held  aboard  H.M.S.  Sur- 
prise, January  8,  1814. 


264  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

Both  brigs  had  suffered  severely,  especially 
the  Boxer,  which  had  been  hulled  repeatedly, 
had  three  eighteen-pound  shot  through  her 
foremast,  her  top-gallant  forecastle  almost  cut 
away,  and  several  of  her  guns  dismounted. 
Three  men  were  killed  and  seventeen  wounded, 
four  mortally.  The  Enterprise  had  been  hulled 
by  one  round  and  many  grape ;  one  i8-pound 
ball  had  gone  through  her  foremast,  and  an- 
other through  her  main-mast,  and  she  was 
much  cut  up  aloft.  Two  of  her  men  were 
killed  and  ten  wounded,  two  of  them  (her 
commander  and  Midshipman  Kervin  Waters) 
mortally.  The  British  court-martial  attributed 
the  defeat  of  the  Boxer  "  to  a  superiority  in 
the  enemy's  force,  principally  in  the  number 
of  men,  as  well  as  to  a  greater  degree  of  skill 
in  the  direction  of  her  fire,  and  to  the  destrut- 
tive  effects  of  the  first  broadside."  But  the 
main  element  was  the  superiority  in  force,  the 
difference  in  loss  being  very  nearly  propor- 
tional to  it;  both  sides  fought  with  equal 
bravery  and  equal  skill.  This  fact  was  ap- 
preciated by  the  victors,  for  at  a  naval  dinner 
given  in  New  York  shortly  afterward,  one  of 
the  toasts  offered  was :  "  The  crew  of  the 
Boxer;  enemies  by  law,  but  by  gallantry 
brothers."  The  two  commanders  were  both 
buried  at  Portland,  with  all  the  honors  of  war. 
The  conduct  of  Lieutenant  Burrows  needs  no 
comment.  He  was  an  officer  greatly  beloved 
and  respected  in  the  service.  Captain  Blyth, 
on  the  other  side,  had  not  only  shown  himself 
on  many  occasions  to  be  a  man  of  distin- 
guished personal  courage,  but  was  equally 
noted  for  his  gentleness  and  humanity.  He 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  265 

had  been  one  of  Captain  Lawrence's  pall- 
bearers, and  but  a  month  previous  to  his 
death  had  received  a  public  note  of  thanks 
from  an  American  colonel,  for  an  act  of  great 
kindness  and  courtesy.1 

The  Enterprise,  under  Lieut. -Com.  Ren- 
shaw,  now  cruised  off  the  southern  coast, 
where  she  made  several  captures.  One  of 
them  was  a  heavy  British  privateer,  the  Mars, 
of  14  long  nines  and  75  men,  which  struck 
after  receiving  a  broadside  that  killed  and 
wounded  4  of  her  crew.  The  Enterprise  was 
chased  by  frigates  on  several  occasions ;  being 
once  forced  to  throw  overboard  all  her  guns 
but  two,  and  escaping  only  by  a  shift  in  the 
wind.  Afterward,  as  she  was  unfit  to  cruise, 
she  was  made  a  guardship  at  Charlestown ; 
for  the  same  reason  the  Boxer  was  not  pur- 
chased into  the  service. 

On  October  4th  some  volunteers  from  the 
Newport  flotilla  captured,  by  boarding,  the 
British  privateer  Dart?  after  a  short  struggle 
in  which  two  of  the  assailants  were  wounded 
and  several  of  the  privateersmen,  including 
the  first  officer,  were  killed. 

On  December  4th,  Commodore  Rodgers, 
still  in  command  of  the  President,  sailed  again 
from  Providence,  Rhode  Island.  On  the  25th, 
in  lat.  19°  N.  and  long.  35°  W.,  the  President, 
during  the  night,  fell  in  with  two  frigates,  and 
came  so  close  that  the  headmost  fired  at  her, 
when  she  made  off.  These  were  thought  to 
be  British,  but  were  in  reality  the  two  French 

1  "  Xaval  Chronicle,"  xxxii.  466. 

2  Letter  of  Mr.  Joseph  Nicholson,  Oct.  5,  1813. 


266  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

4o-gun  frigates  Nymphe  and  Medtise,  one 
month  out  of  Brest.  After  this  little  encoun- 
ter Rodgers  headed  toward  the  Barbadoes, 
and  cruised  to  windward  of  them. 

On  the  whole  the  ocean  warfare  of  1813 
was  decidedly  in  favor  of  the  British,  except 
during  the  first  few  months.  The  Hornefs 
fight  with  the  Peacock  was  an  action  similar  to 
those  that  took  place  in  1812,  and  the  cruise 
of  Porter  was  unique  in  our  annals,  both  for 
the  audacity  with  which  it  was  planned,  and 
the  success  with  which  it  was  executed.  Even 
later  in  the  year  the  Argus  and  the  President 
made  bold  cruises  in  sight  of  the  British 
coasts,  the  former  working  great  havoc  among 
the  merchant-men.  But  by  that  time  the  tide 
had  turned  strongly  in  favor  of  our  enemies. 
From  the  beginning  of  summer  the  blockade 
was  kept  up  so  strictly  that  it  was  with  diffi- 
culty any  of  our  vessels  broke  through  it; 
they  were  either  chased  back  or  captured.  In 
the  three  actions  that  occurred,  the  British 
showed  themselves  markedly  superior  in  two, 
and  in  the  third  the  combatants  fought  equally 
well,  the  result  being  fairly  decided  by  the 
fuller  crew  and  slightly  heavier  metal  of  the 
Enterprise.  The  gunboats,  to  which  many 
had  looked  for  harbor  defence,  proved  nearly 
useless,  and  were  beaten  off  with  ease  when- 
ever they  made  an  attack. 

The  lessons  taught  by  all  this  were  the 
usual  ones.  Lawrence's  victory  in  the  Hornet 
showed  the  superiority  of  a  properly  trained 
crew  to  one  that  had  not  been  properly 
trained ;  and  his  defeat  in  the  Chesapeake 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  267 

pointed  exactly  the  same  way,  demonstrating 
in  addition  the  folly  of  taking  a  raw  levy  out 
of  port,  and,  before  they  have  had  the  slight- 
est chance  of  getting  seasoned,  pitting  them 
against  skilled  veterans.  The  victory  of  the 
Enterprise  showed  the  wisdom  of  having  the 
odds  in  men  and  metal  in  our  favor,  when  our 
antagonist  was  otherwise  our  equal ;  it  proved, 
what  hardly  needed  proving,  that,  whenever 
possible,  a  ship  should  be  so  constructed  as 
to  be  superior  in  force  to  the  foes  it  would  be 
likely  to  meet.  As  far  as  the  capture  of  the 
Argus  showed  anything,  it  was  the  advantage 
of  heavy  metal  and  the  absolute  need  that  a 
crew  should  fight  with  pluck.  The  failure  of 
the  gunboats  ought  to  have  taught  the  lesson 
(though  it  did  not)  that  too  great  economy  in 
providing  the  means  of  defence  may  prove 
very  expensive  in  the  end,  and  that  good  offi- 
cers and  men  are  powerless  when  embarked 
in  worthless  vessels.  A  similar  point  was 
emphasized  by  the  strictness  of  the  blockade, 
and  the  great  inconvenience  it  caused ; 
namely,  that  we  ought  to  have  had  ships 
powerful  enough  to  break  it. 

We  had  certainly  lost  ground  during  this 
year;  fortunately  we  regained  it  during  the 
next  two. 

BRITISH  VESSELS  SUNK  OR  TAKEN. 


Name.  Guns. 

Peacock  2O 

Boxer  14 

Highflyet  6 

40 


268  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

AMERICAN  VESSELS  SUNK  OR  TAKEN. 

Name.  Guns.  Tonnage. 

Chesapeake  50  1,265 

Argus  20  298 

Viper  10  148 

So  1,711 

VESSELS  BUILT  OR  PURCHASED. 
Name.  Rig.      Guns.    Tonnage.    Where  Built.       Cost. 

Rattlesnake  Brig         14         278     Medford,  Pa.  #18,000 

Alligator       Sch'r         4          80 

Asp  Sloop        3          56  2,600 

PRIZES  MADE. 
Name  of  Ship.  No.  of  Prizes. 

President  13 

Congress  4 

Chesapeake  6 

Essex  14 

Hornet  3 

Argus  21 

Small  craft  18 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  269 


CHAPTER  VI. 
1813. 

ON   THE    LAKES. 

ONTARIO — Comparison  of  the  rival  squadrons— 
Chauncy  takes  York  and  Fort  George — Yeo  is  repulsed 
at  Sackett's  Harbor,  but  keeps  command  of  the  lake 
— Chauncy  sails — Yeo's  partial  victory  off  Niagara — 
Indecisive  action  off  the  Genesee — Chauncy's  partial 
victory  off  Burlington,  which  gives  him  the  command 
of  the  lake — ERIE — Perry's  success  in  creating  a  fleet 
— His  victory — CHAMPLAIN — Loss  of  the  Growler  and 
Eagle — Summary, 

ONTARIO. 

WINTER  had  almost  completely  stopped 
preparations  on  the  American  side.  Bad 
weather  put  an  end  to  all  communication  with 
Albany  or  New  York,  and  so  prevented  the 
transit  of  stores,  implements,  etc.  It  was 
worse  still  with  the  men,  for  the  cold  and  ex- 
posure so  thinned  them  out  that  the  new  ar- 
rivals could  at  first  barely  keep  the  ranks 
filled.  It  was,  moreover,  exceedingly  diffi- 
cult to  get  seamen  to  come  from  the  coast  to 
serve  on  the  lakes,  where  work  was  hard, 
sickness  prevailed,  and  there  was  no  chance 
of  prize-money.  The  British  government 
had  the  great  advantage  of  being  able  to  move 
its  sailors  where  it  pleased,  while  in  the 
American  service,  at  that  period,  the  men  en- 
listed for  particular  ships,  and  the  only  way 


270  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

to  get  them  for  the  lakes  at  all  was  by  induc- 
ing portions  of  crews  to  volunteer  to  follow 
their  officers  thither.1  However,  the  work 
went  on  in  spite  of  interruptions.  Fresh 
gangs  of  shipwrights  arrived,  and,  largely 
owing  to  the  energy  and  capacity  of  the  head 
builder,  Mr.  Henry  Eckford  (who  did  as 
much  as  any  naval  officer  in  giving  us  an  ef- 
fective force  on  Ontario)  the  Madison  was 
equipped,  a  small  despatch  sloop,  The  Lady 
of  the  Lake  prepared,  and  a  large  new  ship, 
the  General  Pike,  28,  begun,  to  mount  13 
guns  in  each  broadside  and  2  on  pivots. 

Meanwhile  Sir  George  Prevost,  the  British 
commander  in  Canada,  had  ordered  two  24- 
gun  ships  to  be  built,  and  they  were  begun ; 
but  he  committed  the  mistake  of  having  one 
laid  down  in  Kingston  and  the  other  in  York, 
at  the  opposite  end  of  the  lake.  Earle,  the 
Canadian  commodore,  having  proved  himself 
so  incompetent,  was  removed ;  and  in  the  be- 
ginning of  May  Captain  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo 
arrived,  to  act  as  commander-in-chief  of  the 
naval  forces,  together  with  four  captains,  eight 
lieutenants,  twenty -four  midshipmen,  and 
about  450  picked  seamen,  sent  out  by  the 

1  Cooper,  ii,  357.  One  of  James'  most  comical  mis- 
statements  is  that  on  the  lakes  the  American  sailors 
were  all  "  picked  men."  On  p.  367,  for  example,  in 
speaking  of  the  battle  of  Lake  Erie  he  says  :  "  Com- 
modore Perry  had  picked  crews  to  all  his  vessels." 
As  a  matter  of  fact  Perry  had  once  sent  in  his  resigna- 
tion solely  on  account  of  the  very  poor  quality  of  his 
crews,  and  had  with  difficulty  been  induced  to  with- 
draw it.  Perry's  crews  were  of  hardly  average  excel- 
lence, but  then  the  average  American  sailor  was  a  very 
good  specimen, 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  271 

home  government   especially  for   service  on 
the  Canada  lakes.1 

The  comparative  force  of  the  two  fleets  or 
squadrons  it  is  hard  to  estimate.  I  have  al- 
ready spoken  of  the  difficulty  in  finding  out 
what  guns  were  mounted  on  any  given  ship  at 
a  particular  time,  and  it  is  even  more  perplex- 
ing with  the  crews.  A  schooner  would  make 
one  cruise  with  but  thirty  hands ;  on  the  next 
it  would  appear  with  fifty,  a  number  of  militia 
having  volunteered  as  marines.  Finding  the 
militia  rather  a  nuisance,  they  would  be  sent 
ashore,  and  on  her  third  cruise  the  schooner 
would  substitute  half  a  dozen  frontier  seamen 
in  their  place.  It  was  the  same  with  the 
larger  vessels.  The  Madison  might  at  one 
time  have  her  full  complement  of  200  men  ;  a 
month's  sickness  would  ensue,  and  she  would 
sail  with  butc«5o  effectives.  The  Pike's  crew 
of  300  men  at  one  time  would  shortly  after- 
ward be  less  by  a  third  in  consequence  of  a 
draft  of  sailors  being  sent  to  the  upper  lakes. 
So  it  is  almost  impossible  to  be  perfectly  ac- 
curate ;  but,  making  a  comparison  of  the  vari- 
ous authorities  from  Lieutenant  Emmons  to 
James,  the  following  tables  of  the  forces  may 
be  given  as  very  nearly  correct.  In  broad- 
side force  I  count  every  pivot  gun,  and  half 
of  those  that  were  not  on  pivots. 

CHAUNCY'S  SQUADRON. 

Broadside 

Name.             Rig.     Tonnage.  Crew.  Metal;  Ibs.  Armament. 

Pike,                     ship            875         300         360  a8  long  24*3 

Madison,                                  593          200          364  24  short  32'* 

Oneida.                   brig             243           joo           172  16     "      84*3 

1  James,  vi,  353. 


272  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Broadside 


Name.             Rig.     Tonnage 
Hamilton,            schooner    112 
Scourge,                       "           1  10 

.  Crew. 
5° 
5° 

Metal;  Ibs.    Armament. 
(    i  long  32 
80        •{    i      "    24 
(    8     ;       6's 

80        1    8shorti2's 

Cvngjieit, 

82 

40 

!i  long  32 
I      "         12 
4    |'        6's 

Tompkins,                   " 

96 

4" 

62         \    i 

'        12 

1    6 

'        6's 

Julia,                            " 

82 

35 

«   I: 

'      32 

12 

Growler, 

81 

35 

44         {    I 

'        32 
12 

Ontario, 

53 

35 

«   i: 

'        32 
12 

Fair  A  merican,          " 

53 

30 

3'   j  ;  :  3 

Pert,                             " 

So 

25 

24          i  "    24 

Asp, 

57 

25 

24          i   "    24 

Lady  of  the  Lake, 

89 

15 

9               i     "        9 

14  2,576          980        1,399  "2 

This  is  not  materially  different  from  James' 
account  (p.  356),  which  gives  Chauncy  114 
guns,  1,193  men,  and  2,121  tons.  The  Lady 
of  the  Lake,  however,  was  never  intended  for 
anything  but  a  despatch  boat,  and  the  Scourge 
and  Hamilton  were  both  lost  before  Chauncy 
actually  came  into  collision  with  Yeo.  De- 
ducting these,  in  order  to  compare  the  two 
foes,  Chauncy  had  left  n  vessels  of  2,265 
tons,  with  865  men  and  92  guns  throwing  a 
broadside  of  1,230  pounds. 

YEQ'S  SQUADRON. 

Broadside 
Name.  Rig.      Tonnag*.    Crew.  Metal;  Ibs.    Armament. 

fi  long  24 
4  short  68's 
10    "      32*8 
3  long  i8's 
Royal  Georff,         "  510         zoo         360 


i  3  long  i8's 
<  2  short  68's 
(16  "  32's 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  27.'* 

Broadside 

Name.  Rig.      Tonnage.  Crew.  Metal;  Ibs.  Armament. 

JfeMHr,  brig  279          ,00         2,0  »» 


Sydney  Smith,     schooner    216  80          172         |  ,o  short  "'s 

I    i  long  24 

Beresford,  187  70  87         •<    i    "        9 

6  short  i8's 


2,091 


This  differs  but  slightly  from  James,  who 
gives  Yeo  92  guns  throwing  a  broadside  of 
1,374  pounds,  but  only  717  men.  As  the 
evidence  in  the  court-martial  held  on  Captain 
Barclay,  and  the  official  accounts  (on  both 
sides)  of  Macdonough's  victory,  convict  him 
of  very  much  underrating  the  force  in  men  of 
the  British  on  Erie  and  Champlain,  it  can  be 
safely  assumed  that  he  has  underestimated 
the  force  in  men  on  Lake  Ontario.  By  com- 
paring the  tonnage  he  gives  to  Barclay's  and 
Dovvnie's  squadrons  with  what  it  really  was, 
we  can  correct  his  account  of  Yeo's  tonnage. 

The  above  figures  would  apparently  make 
the  two  squadrons  about  equal,  Chauncy  hav- 
ing 95  men  more,  and  throwing  at  a  broadside 
144  pounds  shot  less  than  his  antagonist. 
But  the  figures  do  not  by  any  means  show  all 
the  truth.  The  Americans  greatly  excelled 
in  the  number  and  calibre  of  their  long  guns. 
Compared  thus,  they  threw  at  one  discharge 
694  pounds  of  long-gun  metal  and  536  pounds 
of  carronade  metal ;  while  the  British  only 
threw  from  their  long  guns  180  pounds,  and 
from  their  carronades  1,194.  This  unequal 
distribution  of  metal  was  very  much  in  favor 
of  the  Americans.  Nor  was  this  all.  The 


274  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Pike,  with  her  15  long  24*5  in  battery,  was  an 
overmatch  for  any  one  of  the  enemy's  vessels, 
and  bore  the  same  relation  to  them  that  the 
Confiance,  at  a  later  date,  did  to  Macdonough's 
squadron.  She  should  certainly  have  been  a 
match  for  the  Wolfe  and  Melville  together, 
and  the  Madison  and  Oneida  for  the  Royal 
George  and  Sydney  Smith.  In  fact,  the  three 
heavy  American  vessels  ought  to  have  been 
an  overmatch  for  the  four  heaviest  of  the 
British  squadron,  although  these  possessed 
the  nominal  superiority.  And  in  ordinary 
cases  the  eight  remaining  American  gun-ves- 
sels would  certainly  seem  to  be  an  overmatch 
for  the  two  British  schooners,  but  it  is  just 
here  that  the  difficulty  of  comparing  the  forces 
comes  in.  When  the  water  was  very  smooth 
and  the  wind  light,  the  long  32's  and  24'$  of 
the  Americans  could  play  havoc  with  the 
British  schooners,  at  a  distance  which  would 
render  the  carronades  of  the  latter  useless. 
But  the  latter  were  built  for  war,  possessed 
quarters  and  were  good  cruisers,  while 
Chauncy's  schooners  were  merchant  vessels, 
without  quarters,  crank,  and  so  loaded  down 
with  heavy  metal  that  whenever  it  blew  at  all 
hard  they  could  with  difficulty  be  kept  from 
upsetting,  and  ceased  to  be  capable  even  of 
defending  themselves.  When  Sir  James  Yeo 
captured  two  of  them  he  would  not  let  them 
cruise  with  his  other  vessels  at  all,  but  sent 
them  back  to  act  as  gunboats,  in  which  capa- 
city they  were  serving  when  recaptured ;  this 
is  a  tolerable  test  of  their  value  compared  to 
their  opponents.  Another  disadvantage  that 
Chauncy  had  to  contend  with,  was  the  differ- 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  275 

ence  in  the  speed  of  the  various  vessels.  The 
Pike  and  Madison  were  fast,  weatherly  ships ; 
but  the  Oneida  was  a  perfect  slug,  even  going 
free,  and  could  hardly  be  persuaded  to  beat 
to  windward  at  all.  In  this  respect  Yeo  was 
much  better  off;  his  six  ships  were  regular 
men-of-war,  with  quarters,  all  of  them  sea- 
worthy, and  fast  enough  to  be  able  to  act 
with  uniformity,  and  not  needing  to  pay  much 
regard  to  the  weather.  His  force  could  act 
as  a  unit ;  but  Chauncy's  could  not.  Enough 
wind  to  make  a  good  working  breeze  for  his 
larger  vessels  put  all  his  smaller  ones  hors  de 
combat ;  and  in  weather  that  suited  the  latter, 
the  former  could  not  move  about  at  all.  When 
speed  became  necessary  the  two  ships  left  the 
brig  hopelessly  behind,  and  either  had  to  do 
without  her,  or  else  perhaps  let  the  critical 
moment  slip  by  while  waiting  for  her  to  come 
up.  Some  of  the  schooners  sailed  quite  as 
slowly ;  and  finally  it  was  found  out  that  the 
only  way  to  get  all  the  vessels  into  action  at 
once  was  to  have  one  half  the  fleet  tow  the 
other  half.  It  was  certainly  difficult  to  keep 
the  command  of  the  lake  when,  if  it  came  on 
to  blow,  the  commodore  had  to  put  into  port 
under  penalty  of  seeing  a  quarter  of  his  fleet 
founder  before  his  eyes.  These  conflicting 
considerations  render  it  hard  to  pass  judg- 
ment ;  but  on  the  whole  it  would  seem  as  if 
Chauncy  was  the  superior  in  force,  for  even 
if  his  schooners  were  not  counted,  his  three 
square-rigged  vessels  were  at  least  a  match 
for  the  four  square-rigged  British  vessels,  and 
the  two  British  schooners  would  not  have 
counted  very  much  in  such  a  conflict.  In  calm 


276  A'AVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

weather  he  was  certainly  the  superior.  This 
only  solves  one  of  the  points  in  which  the 
official  letters  of  the  two  commanders  differ : 
after  every  meeting  each  one  insists  that  he 
was  inferior  in  force,  that  the  weather  suited 
his  antagonist,  and  that  the  latter  ran  away, 
and  got  the  worst  of  it ;  all  of  which  will  be 
considered  further  on. 

In  order  to  settle  toward  which  side  the 
balance  of  success  inclined,  we  must  remember 
that  there  were  two  things  the  combatants 
were  trying  to  do,  viz.  : 

(1)  To  damage  the  enemy  directly  by  cap- 
turing or  destroying  his  vessels.     This  was 
the  only  object  we  had  in  view  in  sending  out 
ocean  cruisers,  but  on  the  lakes  it  was  subor- 
dinated to  : — 

(2)  Getting   the    control   of   the   lake,  by 
which  invaluable  assistance  could  be  rendered 
to   the   army.     The   most   thorough    way   of 
accomplishing  this,  of  course,  was  by  destroy- 
ing the  enemy's  squadron ;  but  it  could  also 
be  done  by  building  ships  too   powerful  for 
him  to  face,  or  by  beating  him  in  some  en- 
gagement which,  although  not  destroying  his 
fleet,  would  force  him  to  go  into  port.     If  one 
side  was  stronger,  then  the  weaker  party  by 
skilful   manoeuvring  might  baffle  the  foe,  and 
rest  satisfied  by  keeping  the  sovereignty  of  the 
lake  disputed  ;  for,  as  long   as  one  squadron 
was  not  undisputed  master  it  could  not  be  of 
much  assistance  in  transporting  troops,  attack- 
ing forts,  or  otherwise  helping  the  military. 

In  1813  the  Americans  gained  the  first  point 
by  being  the  first  to  begin  operations.  They 
were  building  a  new  ship,  afterward  the  Pike% 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  277 

at  Sackett's  Harbor ;  the  British  were  building 
two  new  ships,  each  about  two  thirds  the  force 
of  the  Pike,  one  at  Toronto  (then  called  YorK), 
one  at  Kingston.  Before  these  were  built  the 
two  fleets  were  just  on  a  par ;  the  destruction 
of  the  Pike  would  give  the  British  the  suprem- 
acy ;  the  destruction  of  either  of  the  British 
ships,  provided  the  Pike  were  saved,  would 
give  the  Americans  the  supremacy.  Both 
sides  had  already  committed  faults.  The 
Americans  had  left  Sackett's  Harbor  so  poorly 
defended  and  garrisoned  that  it  invited  attack, 
while  the  British  had  fortified  Kingston  very 
strongly,  but  had  done  little  for  York,  and, 
moreover,  ought  not  to  have  divided  their 
forces  by  building  ships  in  different  places. 

Commodore  Chauncy's  squadron  was  ready 
for  service  on  April  igth,  and  on  the  25th  he 
made  sail  with  the  Madison,  Lieutenant- 
Commander  Elliott,  floating  his  own  broad 
pennant,  Oneida,  Lieutenant  Woolsey,  Hamil- 
ton, Lieutenant  McPherson,  Scourge,  Mr. 
Osgood,  Tompkins,  Lieutenant  Brown,  Con- 
quest, Lieutenant  Pettigrew,  Growler,  Mr. 
Mix,  Julia,  Mr.  Trant,  Asp,  Lieutenant  Smith, 
Pert,  Lieutenant  Adams,  American,  Lieutenant 
Chauncy,  Ontario,  Mr.  Stevens,  Lady  of  the 
Lake,  Mr.  Hinn,  and  Raven,  transport,  having 
on  board  General  Dearborn  and  1700  troops, 
to  attack  York,  which  was  garrisoned  by 
about  700  British  regulars  and  Canadian 
militia  under  Major-General  Sheafe.  The 
new  24-gun  ship  was  almost  completed,  and 
the  Gloucester  lo-gun  brig  was  in  port;  the 
guns  of  both  vessels  were  used  in  defence  of 
the  port.  The  fleet  arrived  before  York  early 


278  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

on  April  27th,  and  the  debarkation  began  at 
about  8  A.  M.  The  schooners  beat  up  to  the 
fort  under  a  heavy  cannonade,  and  opened  a 
spirited  fire  from  their  long  guns ;  while  the 
troops  went  ashore  under  the  command  of 
Brigadier-General  Pike.  The  boats  were 
blown  to  leeward  by  the  strong  east  wind,  and 
were  exposed  to  a  galling  fire,  but  landed  the 
troops  under  cover  of  the  grape  thrown  by 
the  vessels.  The  schooners  now  beat  up  to 
within  a  quarter  of  a  mile  from  the  principal 
work,  and  opened  heavily  upon  it,  while  at 
the  same  time  General  Pike  and  the  main 
body  of  the  troops  on  shore  moved  forward  to 
the  assault,  using  their  bayonets  only.  The 
British  regulars  and  Canadian  militia,  out- 
numbered three  to  one  (including  the  American 
sailors)  and  with  no  very  good  defensive 
works,  of  course  had  to  give  way,  having  lost 
heavily,  especially  from  the  fire  of  the  vessels. 
An  explosion  immediately  afterward  killed  or 
wounded  250  of  the  victors,  including  General 
Pike.  The  Americans  lost,  on  board  the 
fleet,  4  killed,  including  midshipmen  Hatfield 
and  Thompson,  and  8  wounded  * ;  and  of  the 
army,"  14  killed  and  32  wounded  by  the 
enemy's  fire,  and  52  killed  and  180  wounded 
by  the  explosion :  total  loss,  288.  The 
British  regulars  lost  130  killed  and  wounded, 
including  40  by  the  explosion  3 ;  together  with 
50  Canadians  and  Indians,  making  a  total  of 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  April  28,  1813. 

2  James,  "  Military  Occurrences  "  (London,  1818)  vol. 
i,  p.  151. 

3Lossing's  "  Field-Book  of  the  War  of  1812,"  p.  581. 
Th'e  accounts  vary  somewhat. 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  279 

180,  besides  290  prisoners.  The  24-gun  ship 
was  burned,  her  guns  taken  away,  and  the 
Gloucester  sailed  back  to  Sackett's  Harbor 
with  the  fleet.  Many  military  and  naval 
stores  were  destroyed,  and  much  more  shipped 
to  the  Harbor.  The  great  fault  that  the 
British  had  committed  was  in  letting  the 
defences  of  so  important  a  place  remain  so 
poor,  and  the  force  in  it  so  small.  It  was 
impossible  to  resist  very  long  when  Pike's 
troops  were  landed,  and  the  fleet  in  position. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Americans  did  the 
work  in  good  style ;  the  schooners  were  finely 
handled,  firing  with  great  precision  and  com- 
pletely covering  the  troops,  who,  in  turn,  were 
disembarked  and  brought  into  action  very 
handsomely. 

After  being  detained  in  York  a  week  by 
bad  weather  the  squadron  got  out,  and  for 
the  next  fortnight  was  employed  in  convey- 
ing troops  and  stores  to  General  Dearborn. 
Then  it  was  determined  to  make  an  at- 
tack on  Fort  George,  where  the  British 
General  Vincent  was  stationed  with  from 
1,000'  to  i, 800"  regulars,  600  militia,  and 
about  100  Indians.  The  American  troops 
numbered  about  4,500,  practically  under  the 
command  of  Colonel  Scott.  On  May  26th 
Commodore  Chauncy  carefully  reconnoitred 
the  place  to  be  attacked,  and  in  the  night 
made  soundings  along  the  coast,  and  laid 
buoys  so  as  to  direct  the  small  vessels,  who 
were  to  do  the  fighting.  At  3  A.  M.  on  the 
27th  the  signal  was  made  to  weigh,  the  heavy 

1  James,  "  Military  Occurrences,"  i,  p.  151. 

2  Lossing,  596. 


i>So  NAVAL   WAR  OF  \%\2. 

land  artillery  being  on  the  Madison,  and  the 
other  troops  on  the  Oneida,  the  Lady  of  the 
Lake,  and  in  batteaux,  many  of  which  had 
been  captured  at  York.  The  Julia,  Growler, 
and  Ontario  moved  in  and  attacked  a  battery 
near  the  light-house,  opening  a  cross-fire 
which  silenced  it.  The  troops  were  to  be 
disembarked  farther  along  the  lake,  near  a 
battery  of  one  long  24,  managed  by  Canadian 
militia.  The  Conquest  and  Tompkins  swept 
in  under  fire  to  this  battery,  and  in  10  minutes 
killed  or  drove  off  the  artillerymen,  who  left 
the  gun  spiked,  and  then  opened  on  the 
British.  "  The  American  ships  with  their 
heavy  discharges  of  round  and  grape  too  well 
succeeded  in  thinning  the  British  ranks." ' 
Meanwhile  the  troop-boats,  under  Captain 
Perry  and  Colonel  Scott  dashed  in,  com- 
pletely covered  by  a  heavy  fire  of  grape 
directed  point-blank  at  the  foe  by  the  Ham- 
ilton, Scourge,  and  Asp.  "The  fire  from  the 
American  shipping  committed  dreadful  havoc 
among  the  British,  and  rendered  their  ef- 
forts to  oppose  the  landing  of  the  enemy 
ineffectual." "  Colonel  Scott's  troops,  thus 
protected,  made  good  their  landing  and 
met  the  British  regulars;  but  the  latter 
were  so  terribly  cut  up  by  the  tremendous 
discharges  of  grape  and  canister  from  the 
schooners,  that  in  spite  of  their  gallantry  and 
discipline  they  were  obliged  to  retreat,  blow- 
ing up  and  abandoning  the  fort.  One  sailor 
was  killed  and  two  wounded ;  *  seventeen  sol- 

1  James,  "  Military  Occurrences,"  i,  p.  151. 

*Loc.cit. 

8  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  May  29,  1813, 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  281 

tilers  were  killed  and  forty-five  wounded;1 
making  the  total  American  loss  sixty-five.  Of 
the  British  regulars  52  were  killed,  44  wounded 
and  262  "  wounded  and  missing," a  in  addition 
to  about  forty  Canadians  and  Indians  hors  de 
combat  and  nearly  500  militia  captured ;  so 
that  in  this  very  brilliant  affair  the  assailants 
suffered  hardly  more  than  a  fifth  of  the  loss 
in  killed  and  wounded  that  the  assailed  did ; 
which  must  be  attributed  to  the  care  with 
which  Chauncy  had  reconnoitred  the  ground 
and  prepared  the  attack,  the  excellent  hand- 
ling of  the  schooners,  and  the  exceedingly 
destructive  nature  of  their  fire.  The  British 
batteries  were  very  weak,  and,  moreover, 
badly  served.  Their  regular  troops  fought 
excellently,  it  was  impossible  for  them  to 
stand  against  the  fire  of  the  schooners,  which 
should  have  been  engaged  by  the  batteries  on 
shore  ;  and  they  were  too  weak  in  numbers  to 
permit  the  American  army  to  land  and  then 
attack  it  when  away  from  the  boats.  The 
Americans  were  greatly  superior  in  force,  and 
yet  deserve  very  much  credit  for  achieving 
their  object  so  quickly,  with  such  slight  loss 
to  themselves,  and  at  such  a  heavy  cost  to  the 
foe.  The  effect  of  the  victory  was  most  im- 
portant, the  British  evacuating  the  whole 
Niagara  frontier,  and  leaving  the  river  in 
complete  possession  of  the  Americans  for  the 
time  being.  This  offered  the  opportunity  for 
despatching  Captain  Perry  up  above  the  falls 
to  take  out  one  captured  brig  (the  Caledonia) 
and  four  purchased  schooners,  which  had 

1  Letter  of  General  Dearborn,  May  27,  1813. 

2  Letter  of  Brig.-Gen.  Vincent,  May  28,  1813. 


282  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

been  lying  in  the  river  unable  to  get  past  the 
British  batteries  into  Lake  Erie.  These  five 
vessels  were  now  carried  into  that  lake,  being 
tracked  up  against  the  current  by  oxen,  to 
become  a  most  important  addition  to  the 
American  force  upon  it. 

While  Chauncy's  squadron  was  thus  absent 
at  the  west  end  of  the  lake  the  Wolfe,  24, 
was  launched  and  equipped  at  Kingston, 
making  the  British  force  on  the  lake  superior 
to  that  of  the  Americans.  Immediately  Sir 
George  Prevost,  and  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo, 
the  commanders-in-chief  of  the  land  and  water 
forces  in  the  Canadas,  decided  to  strike  a 
blow  at  Sackett's  Harbor  and  destroy  the 
General  Pike,  28,  thus  securing  to  themselves 
the  superiority  for  the  rest  of  the  season. 
Accordingly  they  embarked  on  May  27th,  in 
the  Wolfe,  Royal  George,  Moira,  Prince  Regent, 
Simco,  and  Seneca,  with  a  large  number  of 
gunboats,  barges,  and  batteaux;  and  on  the 
next  day  saw  and  attacked  a  brigade  of  19 
boats  transporting  troops  to  Sackett's  Harbor, 
under  command  of  Lieutenant  Aspinwall. 
Twelve  boats  were  driven  ashore,  and  70  of 
the  men  in  them  captured ;  but  Lieutenant 
Aspinwall  and  100  men  succeeded  in  reaching 
the  Harbor,  bringing  up  the  total  number  of 
regulars  there  to  500  men,  General  Brown 
having  been  summoned  to  take  the  chief  com- 
mand. About  400  militia  also  came  in,  but 
were  of  no  earthly  service.  There  were,  how- 
ever, 200  Albany  volunteers,  under  Colonel 
Mills,  who  could  be  relied  on.  The  defences 
were  miserably  inadequate,  consisting  of  a  bat- 
tery of  one  long  gun,  and  a  block-house. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  283 

On  the  2gth  Sir  George  Prevost  and  800 
regulars  landed,  being  covered  by  the  gun- 
boats under  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo.  The 
American  militia  fled  at  once,  but  the  regulars 
and  volunteers  held  their  ground  in  and  around 
the  block-house.  "  At  this  point  the  further 
energies  of  the  [British]  troops  became  un- 
availing. The  [American]  block-house  and 
stockade  could  not  be  carried  by  assault  nor 
reduced  by  field-pieces,  had  we  been  provided 
with  them  ;  the  fire  of  the  gunboats  proved 
insufficient  to  attain  that  end ;  light  and  ad- 
verse winds  continued,  and  our  larger  vessels 
were  still  far  off."  '  The  British  reembarked 
precipitately.  The  American  loss  amounted 
to  23  killed  and  114  wounded;  that  of  the 
British  to  52  killed  and  211  wounded,*  most 
of  the  latter  being  taken  prisoners.  During 
the  fight  some  of  the  frightened  Americans 
set  fire  to  the  store-houses,  the  Pike  and 
Gloucester ;  the  former  were  consumed,  but 
the  flames  were  extinguished  before  they  did 
any  damage  to  either  of  the  vessels.  This 
attack  differed  especially  from  those  on  Fort 
George  and  York,  in  that  the  attacking  force 
was  relatively  much  weaker  ;  still  it  ought  to 
have  been  successful.  But  Sir  George  could 
not  compare  as  a  leader  with  Col.  Scott  or 
Gen.  Pike ;  and  Sir  James  did  not  handle  the 
gunboats  by  any  means  as  well  as  the  Ameri- 
cans did  their  schooners  in  similar  attacks. 
The  admirers  of  Sir  James  lay  the  blame  on 
Sir  George,  and  vice  versa;  but  in  reality 
neither  seems  to  have  done  particularly  well. 

1  Letter  of  Adj.-Gen.  Baynes,  May  30,  1813. 

2  James,  "Military  Occurrences,"  p.  173. 


284  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

At  any  rate  the  affair  was  the  reverse  of  credit- 
able to  the  British. 

The  British  squadron  returned  to  Kingston, 
and  Chauncy,  having  heard  that  they  were 
out,  came  down  the  lake  and  went  into  port 
about  June  2d.  So  far  the  Americans  had  had 
all  the  success,  and  had  controlled  the  lake  ; 
but  now  Yeo's  force  was  too  formidable  to  be 
encountered  until  the  Pike  was  built,  and  the 
supremacy  passed  undisputed  into  his  hands, 
while  Chauncy  lay  in  Sackett's  Harbor.  Of 
course  with  the  Pike  soon  to  be  built,  Yeo's 
uncontested  superiority  could  be  of  but  short 
duration ;  but  he  used  his  time  most  actively. 
He  sailed  from  Kingston  on  the  3d  of  June, 
to  cooperate  with  the  British  army  at  the  head 
of  the  lake,  and  intercept  all  supplies  going  to 
the  Americans.  On  the  8th  he  discovered  a 
small  camp  of  the  latter  near  Forty  Mile  Creek, 
and  attacked  it  with  the  Beresford,  Sydney 
Smith,  and  gunboats,  obliging  the  Americans 
to  leave  their  camp,  while  their  equipages, 
provisions,  stores,  and  batteaux  fell  into  the 
hands  of  the  British,  whose  troops  occupied 
the  post,  thus  assisting  in  the  series  of  en- 
gagements which  ended  in  the  humiliating 
repulse  of  General  Wilkinson's  expedition  into 
Canada.  On  the  i3th  two  schooners  and 
some  boats  bringing  supplies  to  the  Amer- 
icans were  captured,  and  on  the  i6th  a  depot 
of  provisions  at  the  Genesee  River  shared  the 
same  fate.  On  the  iQth  a  party  of  British 
soldiers  were  landed  by  the  fleet  at  Great 
Sodas,  and  took  off  600  barrels  of  flour.  Yeo 
then  returned  to  Kingston,  where  he  anchored 
on  the  27th,  having  done  good  service  in 


NATAL   WAR  OF  1812.  285 

assisting  the  land  forces.1  As  a  small  compen- 
sation, on  the  i8th  of  the  same  month  the 
Lady  of  the  Lake,  Lieut.  Wolcott  Chauncy, 
captured  off  Presqu'  Isle  the  British  schooner 
Lady  Murray ',  containing  i  ensign,  15  soldiers, 
and  6  sailors,  together  with  stores  and  am- 
munition.* 

During  the  early  part  of  July  neither  squad- 
ron put  out  in  force  ;  although  on  the  first  of 
the  month  Commodore  Yeo  made  an  abortive 
attempt  to  surprise  Sackett's  Harbor,  but 
abandoned  it  when  it  was  discovered.  Mean- 
while the  Americans  were  building  a  new 
schooner,  the  Sylph,  and  the  formidable  cor- 
vette Pike  was  made  ready  to  sail  by  July 
zist.  On  the  same  day  the  entire  American 
squadron,  or  fleet,  sailed  up  to  the  head  of  the 
lake,  and  reached  Niagara  on  theayth.  Here 
Col.  Scott  and  some  of  his  regulars  were 
embarked,  and  on  the  3oth  a  descent  was  made 
upon  York,  where  n  transports  were  des- 
troyed, 5  cannon,  a  quantity  of  flour,  and  some 
ammunition  carried  off,  and  the  barracks 
burned.  On  the  3d  of  August  the  troops  were 
disembarked  at  the  Niagara,  and  in  officers 
and  men  were  sent  up  to  join  Perry  on  Lake 
Erie.  As  this  left  the  squadron  much  deranged 
150  militia  were  subsequently  lent  it  by  Gen- 
eral Boyd,  but  they  proved  of  no  assistance 
(beyond  swelling  the  number  of  men  Yeo 
captured  in  the  Growler  and  Julia  from  70 
individuals  to  80),  and  were  again  landed. 

1  Letter  of  Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo  to  Mr.  Croker,  June 
29,  1813. 

2  Letter  of  Lieut.  Wolcott  Chauncy  to  Com.  Chauncy, 
June  18,  1813. 

14 — 10 


286  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

Commodore  Yeo  sailed  with  his  squadron 
from  Kingston  on  Aug.  2d,  and  on  the  yth  the 
two  fleets  for  the  first  time  came  in  sight  of 
one  another,  the  Americans  at  anchor  off  Fort 
Niagara,  the  British  six  miles  to  windward,  in 
the  W.  N.  W.  Chauncy's  squadron  contained 
one  corvette,  one  ship  sloop,  one  brig  sloop, 
and  ten  schooners,  manned  by  about  965  men, 
and  throwing  at  a  broadside,  1,390  Ibs.  of  shot, 
nearly  800  of  which  were  from  long  guns. 
Yeo's  included  two  ship  sloops,  two  brig 
sloops,  and  two  schooners,  manned  by  770 
men,  and  throwing  at  a  broadside,  1,374  Ibs., 
but  180  being  from  long  guns.  But  Yeo's 
vessels  were  all  built  with  bulwarks,  while  ten 
of  Chauncy's  had  none ;  and,  moreover,  his 
vessels  could  all  sail  and  manoeuvre  together, 
while,  as  already  remarked,  one  half  of  the 
American  fleet  spent  a  large  part  of  its  time 
towing  the  other  half.  The  Pike  would  at 
ordinary  range  be  a  match  for  the  Wolfe  and 
Melville  together ;  yet  in  actual  weight  of 
metal  she  threw  less  than  the  former  ship 
alone.  In  calm  weather  the  long  guns  of  the 
American  schooners  gave  them  a  great  ad- 
vantage; in  rough  weather  they  could  not  be 
used  at  all.  Still,  on  the  whole,  it  could  fairly 
be  said  that  Yeo  was  advancing  to  attack  a 
superior  fleet. 

All  through  the  day  of  the  7th  the  wind 
blew  light  and  variable,  and  the  two  squadrons 
went  through  a  series  of  manoeuvres,  nominal- 
ly to  bring  on  an  action.  As  each  side  flatly 
contradicts  the  other  it  is  hard  to  tell  pre- 
cisely what  the  manoeuvres  were  ;  each  captain 
says  the  other  avoided  him  and  that  he  made 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  287 

all  sail  in  chase.  At  any  rate  it  was  just  the 
weather  for  Chauncy  to  engage  in. 

That  night  the  wind  came  out  squally;  and 
about  i  A.  M.  on  the  morning  of  the  8th  a 
heavy  gust  struck  the  Hamilton  and  Scourge, 
forcing  them  to  careen  over  till  the  heavy 
guns  broke  loose,  and  they  foundered,  but  16 
men  escaping, — which  accident  did  not  open 
a  particularly  cheerful  prospect  to  the  remain- 
der of  the  schooners.  Chauncy's  force  was, 
by  this  accident,  reduced  to  a  numerical 
equality  with  Yeo's,  having  perhaps  a  hundred 
more  men,1  and  throwing  144  Ibs.  less  shot  at 
a  broadside,  All  through  the  two  succeeding 
days  the  same  manoeuvring  went  on ;  the 
question  as  to  which  avoided  the  fight  is 
simply  one  of  veracity  between  the  two  com- 
manders, and  of  course  each  side,  to  the  end 
of  time,  will  believe  its  own  leader.  But  it  is 
not  of  the  least  consequence,  as  neither  ac- 
complished anything. 

On  the  loth  the  same  tedious  evolutions 
were  continued,  but  at  7  P.  M.  the  two  squad- 
rons were  tolerably  near  one  another,  Yeo  to 
windward,  the  breeze  being  fresh  from  the  S. 
W.  Commodore  Chauncy  formed  his  force  in 

1  This  estimate  as  to  men  is  a  mere  balancing  of  pro- 
babilities. If  James  underestimates  the  British  force 
on  Ontario  as  much  as  he  has  on  Erie  and  Champlain, 
Yeo  had  as  many  men  as  his  opponent.  Chauncy,  in 
one  of  his  letters  (preserved  with  the  other  manuscript 
letters  in  the  Naval  Archives),  says :  "  I  enclose  the 
muster-rolls  of  all  my  ships,"  but  I  have  not  been  able 
to  find  them,  and  in  any  event  the  complements  were 
continually  changing  completely.  The  point  is  not 
important,  as  each  side  certainly  had  plenty  of  men  on 
this  occasion. 


288  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

two  lines  on  the  port  tack,  while  Commodore 
Yeo  approached  from  behind  and  to  wind- 
ward, in  single  column,  on  the  same  tack. 
Commodore  Chauncy's  weather  line  was 
formed  of  the  Julia,  Growler,  Pert,  Ash,  On- 
tario, and  American,  in  that  order,  and  the 
lee  line  of  the  Pike,  Oneida,  Madison,  Tornp- 
kins,  and  Conquest.  Chauncy  formed  his 
weather  line  of  the  smaller  vessels,  directing 
them,  when  the  British  should  engage,  to 
edge  away  and  form  to  leeward  of  the  second 
line,  expecting  that  Sir  James  would  follow 
them  down.  At  n  the  weather  line  opened 
fire  at  very  long  range;  at  11.15  ^  was 
returned,  and  the  action  became  general  and 
harmless;  at  11.30  the  weather  line  bore  up 
and  passed  to  leeward,  except  the/#//<z  and 
Growler,  which  tacked.  The  British  ships 
kept  their  luff  and  cut  off  the  two  that  had 
tacked  ;  while  Commodore  Chauncy's  lee  line 
"  edged  away  two  points,  to  lead  the  enemy 
down,  not  only  to  engage  him  to  more  ad- 
vantage, but  to  lead  him  from  the  Julia  and 
Growler" '  Of  course  the  enemy  did  not 
come  down,  and  the  Julia  and  Growler  were 
not  saved.  Yeo  kept  on  till  he  had  cut  off  the 
two  schooners,  fired  an  ineffectual  broadside  at 
the  other  ships,  and  tacked  after  the  Growler 
and  Julia.  Then,  when  too  late,  Chauncy 
tacked  also,  and  stood  after  him.  The 
schooners,  meanwhile,  kept  clawing  to  wind- 
ward till  they  were  overtaken,  and,  after 
making  a  fruitless  effort  to  run  the  gauntlet 
through  the  enemy's  squadron  by  putting 
before  the  wind,  were  captured.  Yeo's  ac- 
1  Letter  of  Commodore  Isaac  Chauncy,  Aug.  13, 1813. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  289 


290  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

count  is  simple  :  "  Came  within  gunshot  of 
Pike  and  Madison,  when  they  immediately 
bore  up,  fired  their  stern-chase  guns,  and  made 
all  sail  for  Niagara,  leaving  two  of  their 
schooners  astern,  which  we  captured. "  '  The 
British  had  acted  faultlessly,  and  the  honor 
and  profit  gained  by  the  encounter  rested  en- 
tirely with  them.  On  the  contrary,  neither 
Chauncy  nor  his  subordinates  showed  to  ad- 
vantage. 

Cooper  says  that  -the  line  of  battle  was 
"  singularly  well  adapted  to  draw  the  enemy 
down,"  and  "  admirable  for  its  advantages  and 
ingenuity. "  In  the  first  place  it  is  an  open 
question  whether  the  enemy  needed  drawing 
down ;  on  this  occasion  he  advanced  boldly 
enough.  The  formation  may  have  been  in- 
genious, but  it  was  the  reverse  of  advanta- 
geous. It  would  have  been  far  better  to  have 
had  the  strongest  vessels  to  windward,  and 
the  schooners,  with  their  long  guns,  to  lee- 
ward, where  they  would  not  be  exposed  to 
capture  by  any  accident  happening  to  them. 
Moreover,  it  does  not  speak  well  for  the  dis- 
cipline of  the  fleet,  that  two  commanders 
should  have  directly  disobeyed  orders.  And 
when  the  two  schooners  did  tack,  and  it 
was  evident  that  Sir  James  would  cut  them 
off,  it  was  an  extraordinary  proceeding  for 
Chauncy  to  "  edge  away  two  points  *  *  * 
to  lead  the  enemy  from  the  Growler  and 
Julia"  It  is  certainly  a  novel  principle,  that 
if  part  of  a  force  is  surrounded  the  true  way 
to  rescue  it  is  to  run  away  with  the  balance, 
in  hopes  that  the  enemy  will  follow.  Had 
1  Letter  of  Sir  James  Lucas  Veo,  Aug.  10,  1813. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  291 

Chauncy  tacked  at  once,  Sir  James  would 
have  been  placed  between  two  fires,  and  it 
would  have  been  impossible  for  him  to  cap- 
ture the  schooners.  As  it  was,  the  British 
commander  had  attacked  a  superior  force  in 
weather  that  had  just  suited  it,  and  yet  had 
captured  two  of  its  vessels  without  suffering 
any  injury  beyond  a  few  shot  holes  in  the 
sails.  The  action,  however,  was  in  no  way 
decisive.  All  next  day,  the  nth,  the  fleets 
were  in  sight  of  one  another,  the  British  to 
windward,  but  neither  attempted  to  renew 
the  engagement.  The  wind  grew  heavier,  and 
the  villainous  little  American  schooners 
showed  such  strong  tendencies  to  upset,  that 
two  had  to  run  into  Niagara  Bay  to  anchor. 
With  the  rest  Chauncy  ran  down  the  lake  to 
Sackett's  Harbor,  which  he  reached  on  the 
1 3th,  provisioned  his  squadron  for  five  weeks, 
and  that  same  evening  proceeded  up  the  lake 
again. 

The  advantage  in  this  action  had  been 
entirely  with  the  British,  but  it  is  simply  non- 
sense to  say,  as  one  British  historian  does, 
that  "  on  Lake  Ontario,  therefore,  we  at  last 
secured  a  decisive  predominance,  which  we 
maintained  until  the  end  of  the  war." '  This 
"decisive  "  battle  left  the  Americans  just  as 
much  in  command  of  the  lake  as  the  British ; 
and  even  this  very  questionable  "predomi- 

1 "  History  of  the  British  Navy,"  by  Charles  Duke 
Yonge  (London,  1866),  vol.  iii,  p.  24,  It  is  apparently 
r  a  work  of  any  authority,  but  I  quote  it  as  showing 
probably  the  general  feeling  of  British  writers  about  the 
action  and  its  results,  which  can  only  proceed  from  ex- 
treme  partizanship  and  ignorance  of  the  subject. 


292  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

nance  "  lasted  but  six  weeks,  after  which  the 
British  squadron  was  blockaded  in  port  most 
of  the  time.  The  action  has  a  parallel  in  that 
fought  on  the  22d  of  July,  1805,  by  Sir 
Robert  Calder's  fleet  of  15  sail  of  the  line 
against  the  Franco-Spanish  fleet  of  20  sail  of 
the  line,  under  M.  Villeneuve.1  The  two 
fleets  engaged  in  a  fog,  and  the  English  cap- 
tured two  ships,  when  both  sides  drew  off, 
and  remained  in  sight  of  each  other  the  next 
day  without  either  renewing  the  action. 
"  A  victory  therefore  it  was  that  Sir  Robert 
Calder  had  gained,  but  not  a  '  decisive ' 
nor  a  '  brilliant '  victory."  a  This  is  ex- 
actly the  criticism  that  should  be  passed  on 
Sir  James  Lucas  Yeo's  action  of  the  loth  of 
August. 

From  the  i3th  of  August  to  the  icth  of 
September  both  fleets  were  on  the  lake  most 
of  the  time,  each  commodore  stoutly  main- 
taining that  he  was  chasing  the  other ;  and 
each  expressing  in  his  letters  his  surprise  and 
disgust  that  his  opponent  should  be  afraid  of 
meeting  him  "though  so  much  superior  in 
force. "  The  facts  are  of  course  difficult  to 
get  at,  but  it  seems  pretty  evident  that  Yeo 
was  determined  to  engage  in  heavy,  and 
Chauncy  in  light,  weather  ;  and  that  the  party 

1 "  Batailles  Navales  de  la  France,"  par  O.  Troude, 
iii,  352,  It  seems  rather  ridiculous  to  compare  these 
lake  actions,  fought  between  small  flotillas,  with  the 
gigantic  contests  which  the  huge  fleets  of  Europe 
waged  in  contending  for  the  supremacy  of  the  ocean  ; 
but  the  difference  is  one  of  degree  and  not  of  kind,  and 
they  serve  well  enough  for  purposes  of  illustration  or 
comparison. 

3  James'  "  Naval  History,"  iv,  14. 


JVAFAL   WAR  OF  1812.  293 

to  leeward  generally  made  off.  The  Americans 
had  been  reinforced  by  the  Sylph  schooner,  of 
300  tons  and  70  men,  carrying  four  long  32*3 
on  pivots,  and  six  long  6's.  Theoretically  her 
armament  would  make  her  formidable ;  but 
practically  her  guns  were  so  crowded  as  to  be 
of  little  use,  and  the  next  year  she  was  con- 
verted into  a  brig,  mounting  24-pound  car- 
ronades. 

On  the  nth  of  September  a  partial  engage- 
ment, at  very  long  range,  in  light  weather, 
occurred  near  the  mouth  of  the  Genesee 
River ;  the  Americans  suffered  no  loss  what- 
ever, while  the  British  had  one  midshipman 
and  three  seamen  killed  and  seven  wounded, 
and  afterward  ran  into  Amherst  Bay.  One  of 
their  brigs,  the  Melville,  received  a  shot  so 
far  under  water  that  to  get  at  and  plug  it,  the 
guns  had  to  be  run  in  on  one  side  and  out  on 
the  other.  Chauncy  describes  it  as  a  running 
fight  of  3^  hours,  the  enemy  then  escaping 
into  Amherst  Bay.1  James  (p.  38)  says  that 
"  At  sunset  a  breeze  sprang  up  from  the 
westward,  when  Sir  James  steered  for  the 
American  fleet ;  but  the  American  commodore 
avoided  a  close  action,  and  thus  the  affair 
ended."  This  is  a  good  sample  of  James' 
trustworthiness  ;  his  account  is  supposed  to  be 
taken  from  Commodore  Yeo's  letter,*  which 
says  :  "  At  sunset  a  breeze  sprang  up  from 
the  westward,  when  I  steered  for  the  False 
Duck  Islands,  under  which  the  enemy  could 
not  keep  the  weather-gage,  but  be  obliged  to 

1  Letter  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Sept.  13,  1813. 

2  Letter  to  Admiral  Warren,  Sept.  12,  1813. 

14 — IO  B 


294  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

meet  us  on  equal  terms.  This,  however,  he 
carefully  avoided  doing."  In  other  words 
Yeo  did  not  steer^r  but  away  from  Chauncy. 
Both  sides  admit  that  Yeo  got  the  worst  of  it 
and  ran  away,  and  it  is  only  a  question  as  to 
whether  Chauncy  followed  him  or  not.  Of 
course  in  such  light  weather  Chauncy's  long 
guns  gave  him  a  great  advantage.  He  had 
present  10  vessels  ;  the /%?,  Madison,  Oneida, 
Sylph,  Tompkins,  Conquest,  Ontario,  Pert,  Amer- 
ican, and  Asp,  throwing  1,288  Ibs.  of  shot, 
with  a  total  of  98  guns.  Yeo  had  92  guns, 
throwing  at  a  broadside  1,374  Ibs.  Neverthe- 
less, Chauncy  told  but  part  of  the  truth  in 
writing  as  he  did  :  "  I  was  much  disappointed 
at  Sir  James  refusing  to  fight  me,  as  he  was 
so  much  superior  in  point  of  force,  both  in 
guns  and  men,  having  upward  of  20  guns 
more  than  we  have,  and  heaves  a  greater 
weight  of  shot."  His  inferiority  in  long  guns 
placed  Yeo  at  a  great  disadvantage  in  such 
a  very  light  wind ;  but  in  his  letter  he  makes 
a  marvellous  admission  of  how  little  able  he 
was  to  make  good  use  of  even  what  he  had. 
He  says:  "I  found  it  impossible  to  bring 
them  to  close  action.  We  remained  in  this 
mortifying  situation  five  hours,  having  only 
six  guns  in  all  the  squadron  that  would  reach 
the  enemy  (not  a  carronade  being  fired)." 
Now  according  to  James  himself  ("Naval 
Occurrences,"  p.  297)  he  had  in  his  squadron 
2  long  24's,  13  long  i8's,  2  long  i2's,  and  3 
long  g's,  and,  in  a  fight  of  five  hours,  at  very 
long  range,  in  smooth  water,  it  was  a  proof  of 
culpable  incompetency  on  his  part  that  he  did 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  295 

not  think  of  doing  what  Elliott  and  Perry  did 
in  similar  circumstances  on  Lake  Erie — sub- 
stitute all  his  long  guns  for  some  of  the  car- 
ronades  on  the  engaged  side.  Chauncy  could 
place  in  broadside  7  long  32*3,  18  long  24's,  4 
long  I2's,  8  long  6's;  so  he  could  oppose  37 
long  guns,  throwing  752  Ibs.  of  shot,  to  Yeo's 
20  long  guns,  throwing  333  Ibs.  of  shot.  The 
odds  were  thus  more  than  two  to  one  against 
the  British  in  any  case ;  and  their  comman- 
der's lack  of  resource  made  them  still  greater. 
But  it  proved  a  mere  skirmish,  with  no  decisive 
results. 

The  two  squadrons  did.  not  come  in  con- 
tact again  till  on  the  28th,  in  York  Bay.  The 
Americans  had  the  weather-gage,  the  wind 
being  fresh  from  the  east.  Yeo  tacked  and 
stretched  out  into  the  lake,  while  Chauncy 
steered  directly  for  his  centre.  When  the 
squadrons  were  still  a  league  apart  the  British 
formed  on  the  port  tack,  with  their  heavy 
vessels  ahead ;  the  Americans  got  on  the 
same  tack  and  edged  down  toward  them,  the 
Pike  ahead,  towing  the  Asp;  the  Tompkins. 
under  Lieut.  Bolton  Finch,  next ;  the  Madi- 
son next,  being  much  retarded  by  having  a 
schooner  in  tow  ;  then  the  Sylph,  with  another 
schooner  in  tow,  the  Oneida,  and  the  two 
other  schooners.  The  British,  fearing  their 
sternmost  vessels  would  be  cut  off,  at  12.10 
came  round  on  the  starboard  tack,  beginning 
with  the  Wolfe,  Commodore  Yeo,  and  Royal 
George,  Captain  William  Howe  Mulcaster, 
which  composed  the  van  of  the  line.  They 
opened  with  their  starboard  guns  as  soon 


296  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

as  they  came  round.  When  the  Pike  was 
a-beam  of  the  Wolfe,  which  was  past  the  centre 
of  the  British  line,  the  Americans  bore  up  in 
succession  for  their  centre. 

The  Madison  was  far  back,  and  so  was  the 
Sylph,  neither  having  cast  off  their  tows ;  so 


ASP 


P1KC 


crogee 


\ 
* 


the  whole  brunt  of  the  action  fell  on  the  Pike, 
Asp,  and  Tompkins.  The  latter  kept  up  a 
most  gallant  and  spirited  fire  till  her  foremast 
was  shot  away.  But  already  the  Pike  had 
shot  away  the  Wolfe's  main-top-mast  and 
main  yard,  and  inflicted  so  heavy  a  loss  upon 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  297 

her  that  Commodore  Yeo,  not  very  heroically, 
put  dead  before  the  wind,  crowding  all  the 
canvas  he  could  on  her  forward  spars,  and 
she  ran  completely  past  all  her  own  vessels, 
who  of  course  crowded  sail  after  her.  The  re- 
treat of  the  commodore  was  most  ably  covered 
by  the  Royal  George,  under  Captain  Mulcaster, 
who  was  unquestionably  the  best  British  of- 
ficer on  the  lake.  He  luffed  up  across  the 
commodore's  stern,  and  delivered  broadsides 
in  a  manner  that  won  the  admiration  even  of 
his  foes.  The  Madison  and  Sylph,  having 
the  schooners  in  tow,  could  not  overtake  the 
British  ships,  though  the  Sylph  opened  a  dis- 
tant fire ;  the  Pike  kept  on  after  them,  but  did 
not  cast  off  the  Asp,  and  so  did  not  gain ; 
and  at  3.15  the  pursuit  was  relinquished,1 
when  the  enemy  were  running  into  the  entirely 
undefended  port  of  Burlington  Bay,  whence 
escape  would  have  been  impossible.  The 
Tompkins  had  lost  her  foremast,  and  the  Pike 
her  foretop- gallant  mast,  with  her  bowsprit 
and  main-mast  wounded ;  and  of  her  crew  five 
men  were  killed  or  wounded,  almost  all  by 
the  guns  of  the  Royal  George,  These  were 
the  only  injuries  occasioned  by  the  enemy's 
fire,  but  the  Pike's  starboard  bow-chaser 
burst,  killing  or  wounding  22  men,  besides 
blowing  up  the  top-gallant  forecastle,  so  that 
the  bow  pivot  gun  could  not  be  used.  Among 
the  British  ships,  the  Wolfe  lost  her  main- 
top-mast, mizzen-top-mast,  and  main-yard, 
and  the  Royal  George  her  foretop-mast ;  both 
suffered  a  heavy  loss  in  killed  and  wounded, 
1  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  Sept.  28,  1813. 


298  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

according  to  the  report  of  the  British  officers 
captured  in  the  transports  a  few  days  after- 
ward. 

As  already  mentioned,  the  British  authori- 
ties no  longer  published  accounts  of  their 
defeats,  so  Commodore  Yeo's  report  on  the 
action  was  not  made  public.  Brenton  merely 
alludes  to  it  as  follows  (vol.  ii,  p.  503)  :  "  The 
action  of  the  28th  of  September,  1813,  in 
which  Sir  James  Yeo  in  the  Wolfe  had  his 
main-  and  mizzen-top-masts  shot  away,  and 
was  obliged  to  put  before  the  wind,  gave 
Mulcaster  an  opportunity  of  displaying  a  trait 
of  valor  and  seamanship  which  elicited  the 
admiration  of  friends  and  foes,  when  he  gal- 
lantly placed  himself  between  his  disabled 
commodore  and  a  superior  enemy."  James 
speaks  in  the  vaguest  terms.  He  first  says, 
"  Commodore  Chauncy,  having  the  weather- 
gage,  kept  his  favorite  distance,"  which  he 
did  because  Commodore  Yeo  fled  so  fast  that 
he  could  not  be  overtaken  ;  then  James  men- 
tions the  injuries  the  Wolfe  received,  and  says 
that  "  it  was  these  and  nor,  as  Mr.  Clark  says, 
'  a  manoeuvre  of  the  commodore's'  that  threw 
the  British  in  confusion."  In  other  words,  it 
was  the  commodore's  shot  and  not  his  ma- 
noeuvring that  threw  the  British  into  confusion 
— a  very  futile  distinction.  Next  he  says  that 
"  Commodore  Chauncy  would  not  venture 
within  carronade  range,"  whereas  he  was 
within  carronade  range  of  the  Wolfe  and 
Royal  George,  but  the  latter  did  not  wait  for 
the  Madison  and  Oneida  to  get  within  range 
with  their  carronades.  The  rest  of  his  article 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  299 

Js  taken  up  with  exposing  the  absurdities  of 
some  of  the  American  writings,  miscalled  his- 
tories, which  appeared  at  the  close  of  the  war. 
His  criticisms  on  these  are  very  just,  but 
afford  a  funny  instance  of  the  pot  calling  the 
kettle  black.  This  much  is  clear,  that  the 
British  were  beaten  and  forced  to  flee,  when 
but  part  of  the  American  force  was  engaged. 
But  in  good  weather  the  American  force  was 
so  superior  that  being  beaten  would  have 
been  no  disgrace  to  Yeo,  had  it  not  been  for 
the  claims  advanced  both  by  himself  and  his 
friends,  'that  on  the  whole  he  was  victorious 
over  Chauncy.  The  Wolfe  made  anything 
but  an  obstinate  fight,  leaving  almost  all  the 
work  to  the  gallant  Mulcaster,  in  the  Royal 
George,  who  shares  with  Lieutenant  Finch  of 
the  Tompkins  most  of  the  glory  of  the  day. 
The  battle,  if  such  it  may  be  called,  com- 
pletely established  Chauncy's  supremacy,  Yeo 
spending  most  of  the  remainder  of  the  season 
blockaded  in  Kingston.  So  Chauncy  gained 
a  victory  which  established  his  control  over 
the  lakes;  and,  moreover,  he  gained  it  by 
fighting  in  succession,  almost  single-handed, 
the  two  heaviest  ships  of  the  enemy.  But 
gaining  the  victory  was  only  what  should  have 
been  expected  from  a  superior  force.  The 
question  is,  did  Chauncy  use  his  force  to  the 
best  advantage  ?  And  it  cannot  be  said  that 
he  did.  When  the  enemy  bore  up  it  was  a 
great  mistake  not  to  cast  off  the  schooners 
which  were  being  towed.  They  were  small 
craft,  not  of  much  use  in  the  fight,  and  they 
entirely  prevented  the  Madison  from  taking 


300  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

any  part  in  the  contest,  and  kept  the  Sylph 
at  a  great  distance  ;  and  by  keeping  the  Asp  in 
tow  the  Pike,  which  sailed  faster  than  any  of 
Yeo's  ships,  was  distanced  by  them.  Had 
she  left  the  Asp  behind  and  run  in  to  engage 
the  Royal  George  she  could  have  mastered,  or 
at  any  rate  disabled,  her ;  and  had  the  swift 
Madison  cast  off  her  tow  she  could  also  have 
taken  an  effective  part  in  the  engagement.  If 
the  Pike  could  put  the  British  to  flight  almost 
single-handed,  how  much  more  could  she  not 
have  done  when  assisted  by  the  Madison  and 
Oneida  ?  The  cardinal  error,  however,  was 
made  in  discontinuing  the  chase.  The  British 
were  in  an  almost  open  roadstead,  from  which 
they  could  not  possibly  escape.  Commodore 
Chauncy  was  afraid  that  the  wind  would  come 
up  to  blow  a  gale,  and  both  fleets  would  be 
thrown  ashore  ;  and,  moreover,  he  expected 
to  be  able  to  keep  a  watch  over  the  enemy, 
and  to  attack  him  at  a  more  suitable  time. 
But  he  utterly  failed  in  this  last ;  and  had  the 
American  squadron  cast  off  their  tows  and 
gone  boldly  in,  they  certainly  ought  to  have 
been  able  to  destroy  or  capture  the  entire 
British  force  before  a  gale  could  blow  up. 
Chauncy  would  have  done  well  to  keep  in 
mind  the  old  adage,  so  peculiarly  applicable 
to  naval  affairs  :  "  L'audace  !  toujours  1'au- 
dace !  et  encore  1'audace  ! "  Whether  the 
fault  was  his  or  that  of  his  subordinates,  it  is 
certain  that  while  the  victory  of  the  28th  of 
September  definitely  settled  the  supremacy  of 
the  lake  in  favor  of  the  Americans,  yet  this 
victory  was  by  no  means  so  decided  as  it 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  '  301 

should  have  been,  taking  into  account  his 
superiority  in  force  and  advantage  in  position, 
and  the  somewhat  spiritless  conduct  of  his  foe. 

Next  day  a  gale  came  on  to  blow,  which 
lasted  till  the  evening  of  the3ist.  There  was 
no  longer  any  apprehension  of  molestation 
from  the  British,  so  the  troop  transports  were 
sent  down  the  lake  by  themselves,  while  the 
squadron  remained  to  watch  Yeo.  On  Oct. 
2d  he  was  chased,  but  escaped  by  his  better 
sailing;  and  next  day  false  information  in- 
duced Chauncy  to  think  Yeo  had  eluded  him 
and  passed  down  the  lake,  and  he  accordingly 
made  sail  in  the  direction  of  his  supposed 
flight.  On  the  5th,  at  3  P.  M.,  while  near  the 
False  Ducks,  seven  vessels  were  made  out 
ahead,  which  proved  to  be  British  gunboats, 
engaged  in  transporting  troops.  All  sails  was 
made  after  them ;  one  was  burned,  another 
escaped,  and  five  were  captured,  the  Mary, 
Dmmmond,  Lady  Gore,  Confiance,  and  Ham- 
ilton?— the  two  latter  being  the  rechristened 
Julia  and  Growler.  Each  gun-vessel  had  from 
one  to  three  guns,  and  they  had  aboard  in  all 
264  men,  including  seven  naval  (three  royal 
and  four  provincial)  and  ten  military  officers. 
These  prisoners  stated  that  in  the  action  of 
the  28th  the  Wolfe  and  Royal  George  had  lost 
very  heavily. 

After  this  Yeo  remained  in  Kingston, 
blockaded  there  by  Chauncy  for  most  of  the 
time;  on  Nov.  roth  he  came  out  and  was  at 
once  chased  back  into  port  by  Chauncy,  leav- 
ing the  latter  for  the  rest  of  the  season 

1  Letter  of  Commodore  Chauncy,  Oct.  8,  1813. 


302  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

entirely  undisturbed.  Accordingly,  Chauncy 
was  able  to  convert  his  small  schooners  into 
transports.  On  the  iyth  these  transports 
were  used  to  convey  1,100  men  of  the  army  of 
General  Harrison  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Genesee  to  Sackett's  Harbor,  while  Chauncy 
blockaded  Yeo  in  Kingston.  The  duty  of 
transporting  troops  and  stores  went  on  till 
the  zyth,  when  everything  had  been  accom- 
plished ;  and  a  day  or  two  afterward  naviga- 
tion closed. 

As  between  the  Americans  and  British,  the 
success  of  the  season  was  greatly  in  favor  of 
the  former.  They  had  uncontested  control 
over  the  lake  from  April  i9th  to  June  3d,  and 
from  Sept.  28th  to  Nov.  29th,  in  all  107  days ; 
while  their  foes  only  held  it  from  June  3d  to 
July  2ist,  or  for  48  days;  and  from  that  date 
to  Sept.  28th,  for  69  days,  the  two  sides  were 
contending  for  the  mastery.  York  and  Fort 
George  had  been  taken,  while  the  attack  on 
Sackett's  Harbor  was  repulsed.  The  Amer- 
icans lost  but  two  schooners,  both  of  which 
were  recaptured ;  while  the  British  had  one 
24-gun-ship  nearly  ready  for  launching  des- 
troyed, and  one  lo-gun  brig  taken,  and  the 
loss  inflicted  upon  each  other  in  transports, 
gunboats,  store-houses,  stores,  etc.,  was 
greatly  in  favor  of  the  former.  Chauncy's  fleet, 
moreover,  was  able  to  co-operate  with  the 
army  for  over  twice  the  length  of  time  Yeo's 
could  (107  days  to  48). 

It  is  more  difficult  to  decide  between  the 
respective  merits  of  the  two  commanders. 
We  had  shown  so  much  more  energy  than  the 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  301 

Anglo-Canadians  that  at  the  beginning  of  the 
year  we  had  overtaken  them  in  the  building 
race,  and  the  two  fleets  were  about  equally 
formidable.  The  Madison  and  Oneida  were 
not  quite  a  match  for  the  Royal  George  and 
Sydney  Smith  (opposing  12  32-pound  and  8 
24-pound  carronades  to  2  long  iS's,  i  long  12, 
i  68-pound  and  13  32-pound  carronades)  ; 
and  our  ten  gun-schooners  would  hardly  be 
considered  very  much  of  an  overmatch  for 
the  Melville,  Moira,  and  Beresford.  Had  Sir 
James  Yeo  been  as  bold  and  energetic  as 
Barclay  or  Mulcaster  he  would  certainly  not 
have  permitted  the  Americans,  when  the  forces 
were  so  equal,  to  hold  uncontested  sway  over 
the  lake,  and  by  reducing  Fort  George,  to 
cause  disaster  to  the  British  land  forces.  It 
would  certainly  have  been  better  to  risk  a 
battle  with  equal  forces,  than  to  wait  till  each 
fleet  received  an  additional  ship,  which  ren- 
dered Chauncy's  squadron  the  superior  by  just 
about  the  superiority  of  the/Wr  to  the  Wolfe. 
Again,  Yeo  did  not  do  particularly  well  in  the 
repulse  before  Sackett's  Harbor ;  in  the  skir- 
mish off  Genesee  river  he  showed  a  marked 
lack  of  resource  ;  and  iathe  action  of  the  28th 
of  September  (popularly  called  the  "  Burling- 
ton Races  "  from  the  celerity  of  his  retreat)  he 
evinced  an  amount  of  caution  that  verged 
toward  timidity,  in  allowing  the  entire  brunt 
of  the  fighting  to  fall  on  Mulcaster  in  the 
Royal  George,  a  weaker  ship  than  the  Wolfe. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  gave  able  co-operation 
to  the  army  while  he  possessed  control  of  the 
lake  ;  he  made  a  most  gallant  and  successful 


304  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

attack  on  a  superior  force  on  the  loth  of 
August ;  and  for  six  weeks  subsequently  by 
skilful  manoeuvring  he  prevented  this  same 
superior  force  from  acquiring  the  uncontested 
mastery.  It  was  no  disgrace  to  be  subse- 
quently blockaded  ;  but  it  is  very  ludicrous  in 
his  admirers  to  think  that  he  came  out  first  best. 
Chauncy  rendered  able  and  invaluable  as- 
sistance to  the  army  all  the  while  that  he  had 
control  of  the  water  ;  his  attacks  on  York  and 
Fort  George  were  managed  with  consummate 
skill  and  success,  and  on  the  28th  of  Septem- 
ber he  practically  defeated  the  opposing  force 
with  his  own  ship  alone.  Nevertheless  he 
can  by  no  means  be  said  to  have  done  the 
best  he  could  with  the  materials  he  had.  His 
stronger  fleet  was  kept  two  months  in  check  by 
a  weaker  British  fleet.  When  he  first  encoun- 
tered the  foe,  on  August  loth,  he  ought  to  have 
inflicted  such  a  check  upon  him  as  would  at 
least  have  confined  him  to  port  and  given  the 
Americans  immediate  superiority  on  the  lake ; 
instead  of  which  he  suffered  a  mortifying,  al- 
though not  at  all  disastrous,  defeat,  which 
allowed  the  British  to  contest  the  supremacy 
with  him  for  six  weeks  longer.  On  the  28th 
of  September,  when  he  only  gained  a  rather 
barren  victory,  it  was  nothing  but  excessive 
caution  that  prevented  him  from  utterly  des- 
troying his  foe.  Had  Perry  on  that  day  com- 
manded the  American  fleet  there  would  have 
been  hardly  a  British  ship  left  on  Ontario. 
Chauncy  was  an  average  commander  ;  and 
the  balance  of  success  inclined  to  the  side  of 
the  Americans  only  because  they  showed 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  305 

greater  energy  and  skill  irt»  shipbuilding,  the 
crews  and  commanders  on  both  sides  being 
very  nearly  equal. 

LAKE   ERIE. 

Captain  Oliver  Hazard  Perry  had  assumed 
command  of  Erie  and  the  upper  lakes,  acting 
under  Commodore  Chauncy.  With  intense 
energy  he  at  once  began  creating  a  naval  force 
which  should  be  able  to  contend  successfully 
•with  the  foe.  As  already  said,  the  latter  in 
the  beginning  had  exclusive  control  of  Lake 
Erie  ;  but  the  Americans  had  captured  the 
Caledonia,  brig,  and  purchased  three  schooners, 
afterward  named  the  Somers,  Tigress,  and 
Ohio,  and  a  sloop,  the  Trippe.  These  at  first 
were  blockaded  in  the  Niagara,  but  after  the 
fall  of  Fort  George  and  retreat  of  the  British 
forces,  Captain  Perry  was  enabled  to  get 
them  out,  tracking  them  up  against  the  cur- 
rent by  the  most  arduous  labor.  They  ran  up 
to  Presque  Isle  (now  called  Erie),  where  two 
ao-gun  brigs  were  being  constructed  under 
the  directions  of  the  indefatigable  captain. 
Three  other  schooners,  the  Ariel,  Scorpion,  and 
Porcupine,  were  also  built. 

The  harbor  of  Erie  was  good  and  spacious, 
but  had  a  bar  on  which  there  was  less  than 
seven  feet  of  water.  Hitherto  this  had  pre- 
vented the  enemy  from  getting  in ;  now  it 
prevented  the  two  brigs  from  getting  out. 
Captain  Robert  Heriot  Barclay  had  been  ap- 
pointed commander  of  the  British  forces 
on  Lake  Erie ;  and  he  was  having  built  at 


306  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Amherstburg  a  2o-gun  ship.  Meanwhile  he 
blockaded  Perry's  force,  and  as  the  brigs  could 
not  cross  the  bar  with  their  guns  in,  or  except 
in  smooth  water,  they  of  course  could  not  do 
so  in  his  presence.  He  kept  a  close  blockade 
for  some  time  ;  but  on  the  2d  of  August  he 
disappeared.  Perry  at  once  hurried  forward 
everything ;  and  on  the  4th,  at  2  P.  M.,  one 
brig,  the  Lawrence,  was  towed  to  that  point  of 
the  bar  where  the  water  was  deepest.  Her 
guns  were  whipped  out  and  landed  on  the 
beach,  and  the  brig  got  over  the  bar  by  a  has- 
tily improvised  "  camel." 

"  Two  large  scows,  prepared  for  the  purpose, 
were  hauled  alongside,  and  the  work  of  lift- 
ing the  brig  proceeded  as  fast  as  possible. 
Pieces  of  massive  timber  had  been  run  through 
the  forward  and  after  ports,  and  when  the 
scows  were  sunk  to  the  water's  edge,  the  ends 
of  the  timbers  were  blocked  up,  supported  by 
these  floating  foundations.  The  plugs  were 
now  put  in  the  scows,  and  the  water  was 
pumped  out  of  them.  By  this  process  the 
brig  was  lifted  quite  two  feet,  though  when 
she  was  got  on  the  bar  it  was  found  that  she 
still  drew  too  much  water.  It  became  neces- 
sary, in  consequence,  to  cover  up  everything, 
sink  the  scows  anew,  and  block  up  the  timbers 
afresh.  This  duty  occupied  the  whole  night."  ' 

Just  as  the  Lawrence  had  passed  the  bar,  at 
8  A.  M.  on  the  5th,  the  enemy  reappeared,  but 
too  late ;  Captain  Barclay  exchanged  a  few 
shots  with  the  schooners  and  then  drew  off. 

1  Cooper,  ii,  389.  Perry's  letter  of  Aug.  5th  is  very 
brief. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  307 

The  Niagara  crossed  without  difficulty.  There 
were  still  not  enough  men  to  man  the  vessels, 
but  a  draft  arrived  from  Ontario,  and  many  of 
the  frontiersmen  volunteered,  while  soldiers 
also  were  sent  on  board.  The  squadron 
sailed  on  the  i8th  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy, 
whose  ship  was  now  ready.  After  cruising 
about  some  time  the  Ohio  was  sent  down  the 
lake,  and  the  other  ships  went  into  Put-in  Bay. 
On  the  gth  of  September  Captain  Barclay 
put  out  from  Amherstburg,  being  so  short  of 
provisions  that  he  felt  compelled  to  risk  an 
action  with  the  superior  force  opposed.  On 
the  loth  of  September  his  squadron  was  dis- 
covered from  the  mast-head  of  the  Lawrence 
in  the  northwest.  Before  going  into  details  of 
the  action  we  will  examine  the  force  of  the  two 
squadrons,  as  the  accounts  vary  considerably. 
The  tonnage  of  the  British  ships,  as  already 
stated,  we  know  exactly,  they  having  been  all 
carefully  appraised  and  measured  by  the 
builder  Mr.  Henry  Eckford,  and  two  sea-cap- 
tains. We  also  know  the  dimensions  of  the 
American  ships.  The  Lawrence  and  Niagara. 
measured  480  tons  apiece.  The  Caledonia, 
brig,  was  about  the  size  of  the  Hunter,  or  180 
tons.  The  Tigress,  Somers,  and  Scorpio? 
were  subsequently  captured  by  the  foe  am 
were  then  said  to  measure,  respectively, 
94,  and  86  tons  ;  in  which  case  they  werl 
larger  than  similar  boats  on  Lake  Ontario. 
The  Ariel  was  about  the  size  of  the  Hamilton; 
the  Porcupine  and  Trippe  about  the  size  of  the 
Asp  and  Pert.  As  for  the  guns,  Captain  Bar- 
clay in  his  letter  gives  a  complete  account  of 


308  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

those  on  board  his  squadron.  He  has  also 
given  a  complete  account  of  the  American 
guns,  which  is  most  accurate,  and,  if  any 
thing,  underestimates  them.  At  least  Emmons 
in  his  "  History  "  gives  the  Trippe  a  long  32, 
while  Barclay  says  she  had  only  a  long  24; 
and  Lossing  in  his  "  Field-Book  "  says  (but  I 
do  not  know  on  what  authority)  that  the  Cal- 
edonia had  3  long  24*8,  while  Barclay  gives  her 
2  long  24*3  and  one  32-pound  carronade  ;  and 
that  the  Somers  had  two  long  32*3,  while  Bar- 
clay gives  her  one  long  32  and  one  24-pound 
carronade.  I  shall  take  Barclay's  account, 
which  corresponds  with  that  of  Emmons  ;  the 
only  difference  being  that  Emmons  puts  a  24- 
pounder  on  the  Scorpion  and  a  32  on  the  Trippe 
while  Barclay  reverses  this.  I  shall  also  fol- 
low Emmons  in  giving  the  Scorpion  a  32-pound 
carronade  instead  of  a  24. 

It  is  more  difficult  to  give  the  strength  of 
the  respective  crews.  James  says  the  Amer- 
icans had  580,  all  "picked  men."  They 
were  just  as  much  picked  men  as  Barclay's 
were,  and  no  more ;  that  is,  the  ships  had 
"scratch "  crews.  Lieutenant  Emmons  gives 
Perry  490  men  ;  and  Lossing  says  he  "  had  up- 
on his  muster-roll  490  names."  In  vol.  xiv,  p. 
566,  of  the  American  State  Papers,  is  a  list  of 
the  prize-monies  owing  to  each  man  (or  to  the 
survivors  of  the  killed),  which  gives  a  grand 
total  of  532  men,  including  136  on  the 
Lawrence  and  155  on  the  Niagara,  45  of  whom 
were  volunteers — frontiersmen.  Deducting 
these  we  get  487  men,  which  is  pretty  near 
Lieutenant  Emmons'  490.  Possibly  Lieu- 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  309 

tenant  Emmons  did  not  include  these  volun- 
teers ;  and  it  may  be  that  some  of  the  men 
whose  names  were  down  on  the  prize  list  had 
been  so  sick  that  they  were  left  on  shore. 
Thus  Lieutenant  Yarnall  testified  before  a 
Court  of  Inquiry  in  1815,  that  there  were  but 
131  men  and  boys  of  every  description  on 
board  the  Lawrence  in  the  action ;  and  the 
Niagara  was  said  to  have  had  but  140. 
Lieutenant  Yarnall  also  said  that  "but  103 
men  on  board  the  Lawrence  were  fit  for 
duty  "  ;  as  Captain  Perry  in  his  letter  said  that 
31  were  unfit  for  duty,  this  would  make  a  total 
of  134.  So  I  shall  follow  the  prize-money 
list ;  at  any  rate  the  difference  in  number  is  so 
slight  as  to  be  immaterial.  Of  the  532  men 
whose  names  the  list  gives,  45  were  volunteers, 
or  landsmen,  from  among  the  surrounding 
inhabitants;  158  were  marines  or  soldiers  (I 
do  not  know  which,  as  the  list  gives  marines, 
soldiers,  and  privates,  and  it  is  impossible  to 
tell  which  of  the  two  former  heads  include  the 
last)  ;  and  329  were  officers,  seamen,  cooks, 
pursers,  chaplains,  and  supernumeraries.  Of 
the  total  number,  there  were  on  the  day  of 
action,  according  to  Perry's  report,  116  men 
unfit  for  duty,  including  31  on  board  the 
Lawrence,  28  on  board  the  Niagara^  and  57  on 
the  small  vessels. 

All  the  later  American  writers  put  the  num- 
ber of  men  in  Barclay's  fleet  precisely  at  "502," 
but  I  have  not  been  able  to  find  out  the 
original  authority.  James  ("Naval  Occur- 
rences," p.  289)  says  the  British  had  but  345, 
consisting  of  50  seamen,  85  Canadians,  and 


310  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

210  soldiers.  But  the  letter  of  Adjutant- 
General  E.  Eayne,  Nov.  24,  1813,  states  that 
there  were  250  soldiers  aboard  Barclay's 
squadron,  of  whom  23  were  killed,  49  wounded, 
and  the  balance  (178)  captured  ;  and  James 
himself  on  a  previous  page  (284)  states  that 
there  were  102  Canadians  on  Barclay's  vessels, 
not  counting  the  Detroit,  and  we  know  that 
Barclay  originally  joined  the  squadron  with 
19  sailors  from  the  Ontario  fleet,  and  that 
subsequently  50  sailors  came  up  from  the 
Dover.  James  gives  at  the  end  of  his  "  Naval 
Occurrences  "  some  extracts  from  the  court- 
martial  held  on  Captain  Barclay.  Lieut. 
Thomas  Stokes,  of  the  Queen  Charlotte,  there 
testified  that  he  had  on  board  "between  120 
and  130  men,  officers  and  all  together,"  of 
whom  "  1 6  came  up  from  the  Dover  three  days 
before."  James,  on  p.  284,  says  her  crew 
already  consisted  of  no  men;  adding  these 
16  gives  us  126  (almost  exactly  "  between  120 
and  130  ").  Lieutenant  Stokes  also  testified 
that  the  Detroit  had  more  men  on  account  of 
being  a  larger  and  heavier  vessel ;  to  give  her 
150  is  perfectly  safe,  as  her  heavier  guns  and 
larger  size  would  at  least  need  24  men  more 
than  the  Queen  Charlotte.  James  gives  the 
Lady  Prcvost  76,  Hunter 39,  Little  Belt  15,  and 
Chippeway  13  men,  Canadians  and  soldiers,  a 
total  of  143 ;  supposing  that  the  number  of 
British  sailors  placed  on  them  was  proportional 
to  the  amount  placed  on  board  the  Queen 
Charlotte,  we  could  add  21.  This  would  make 
a  grand  total  of  440  men,  which  must  certainly 
be  near  the  truth.  This  number  is  corrobo- 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  311 

rated  otherwise  :  General  Bayne,  as  already 
quoted,  says  that  there  were  aboard  250 
soldiers,  of  whom  72  were  killed  or  wounded. 
Barclay  reports  a  total  loss  of  135,  of  whom 
63  must  therefore  have  been  sailors  or  Cana- 
dians, and  if  the  loss  suffered  by  these  bore 
the  same  proportion  to  their  whole  number  as 
in  the  case  of  the  soldiers,  there  ought  to  have 
been  219  sailors  and  Canadians,  making  in  all 
469  men.  It  can  thus  be  said  with  certainty 
that  there  were  between  440  and  490  men 
aboard,  and  I  shall  take  the  former  number, 
though  I  have  no  doubt  that  this  is  too  small. 
But  it  is  not  a  point  of  very  much  importance, 
as  the  battle  was  fought  largely  at  long  range, 
where  the  number  of  men,  provided  there 
were  plenty  to  handle  the  sails  and  guns,  did 
not  much  matter.  The  following  statement 
of  the  comparative  force  must  therefore  be 
very  nearly  accurate  : 

PERRY'S  SQUADRON. 


Total      Crew 

Broad- 

Name. 

Rig. 

Tons. 

Crew,     fit  for 

side; 

Armament. 

Duty. 

Ibs. 

Lawrence, 

brig 

480 

136          105 

300 

j    2  long  12*8 
1  18  short  32*8 

Niagara., 

" 

480 

155          127 

300 

j    i  long  12*5 
1  18  short  32'* 

Caledonia, 

« 

180 

53~ 

80 

j     2  loHR    24*S 

|    i  short  32 

A  rief,         s 

•chooiier 

112 

36 

48 

4  long    i2*s 

Scorpion, 

" 

86 

35 

64 

J    '     "      32 
)    i  snort  32 

Sowers, 

" 

94 

30 

,84 

56 

(    i  long  24 
1    i  short  32 

Porcupine, 

" 

83 

25 

32 

i  long  32 

Tigress, 

" 

96 

27 

32 

'     "      32 

Trippe, 

sloop 

60 

35J 

24 

i     "     24 

9  vessels, 


532        (4'6)         936  Ibs. 


312 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 


During  the  action,  however,  the  Lawrence 
and  Niagara  each  fought  a  long  12  instead  of 
one  of  the  carronades  on  the  engaged  side, 
making  a  broadside  of  896  Ibs.,  288  Ibs.  being 
from  long  guns. 


BARCLAY'S  SQUADRON. 
Nam«.  Rig.        Tons. 


Broadsid* ; 
Crew.        Ibs.  Armament. 


'   i  long    18 

2     "      24*8 

Detroit, 

ship 

490 

150 

138 

6     "      ia's 
8     "        g's 

i  short  24 

i     "      18 

!i  long   12 

Queen  Charlotte,  " 

400 

126 

189 

2      "        9*S 

14  short  24  s 

Lady  Prevoit, 

schooner 

230 

86 

75 

!i  long  9 
2      "        6*S 

10  short  iz's 

4  long  6's 

Hunter, 

brig 

180 

45 

30 

1     2      "      4*8 
2      "      2*5 

.   2  short  iz's 

Chippeway, 

schooner 

70 

»5 

9 

i  long  9 

Little  Belt, 

sloop 

90 

18 

18 

I    '     I     '/, 

\     2                6s 

6  vessels, 

1,460 

440 

4S9  Ibs. 

These  six  vessels  thus  threw  at  a  broadside 
459  Ibs.,  of  which  195  were  from  long  guns. 

The  superiority  of  the  Americans  in  long- 
gun  metal  was  therefore  nearly  as  three  is  to 
two,  and  in  carronade  metal  greater  than  two 
to  one.  The  chief  fault  to  be  found  in  the 
various  American  accounts  is  that  they  sedu- 
lously conceal  the  comparative  weight  of  metal, 
while  carefully  specifying  the  number  of  guns. 
Thus,  Lossing  says :  "  Barclay  had  35  long 
guns  to  Perry's  15,  and  possessed  greatly  the 
advantage  in  action  at  a  distance  ;  "  which  he 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812.  313 

certainly  did  not.  The  tonnage  of  the  fleets 
is  not  so  very  important ;  the  above  tables  are 
probably  pretty  nearly  right.  It  is,  I  suppose, 
impossible  to  tell  exactly  the  number  of  men 
in  the  two  crews.  Barclay  almost  certainly 
had  more  than  the  440  men  I  have  given  him, 
but  in  all  likelihood  some  of  them  were  unfit 
for  duty,  and  the  number  of  his  effectives  was 
most  probably  somewhat  less  than  Perry's. 
As  the  battle  was  fought  in  such  smooth 
water,  and  part  of  the  time  at  long  range,  this, 
as  already  said,  does  not  much  matter.  The 
Niagara  might  be  considered  a  match  for  the 
Detroit,  and  the  Lawrence  and  Caledonia  for 
the  five  other  British  vessels  ;  so  the  Ameri- 
cans were  certainly  very  greatly  superior  in 
force. 

At  daylight  on  Sept.  zoth  Barclay's  squad- 
ron was  discovered  in  the  N.  W.,  and  Perry 
at  once  got  under  weigh;  the  wind  soon 
shifted  to  the  N.  E.,  giving  us  the  weather- 
gage,  the  breeze  being  very  light.  Barclay 
lay  to  in  a  close  column,  heading  to  the  S.  W. 
in  the  following  order :  Chippeway,  Master's 
Mate  J.  Campbell;  Detroit,  Captain  R.  H. 
Barclay ;  Hunter,  Lieutenant  G.  Bignell ; 
Queen  Charlotte,  Captain  R.  Finnis;  Lady 
Prevost,  Lieutenant  Edward  Buchan ;  and 
Little  Belt,  by  whom  commanded  is  not  said. 
Perry  came  down  with  the  wind  on  his  port 
beam,  and  made  the  attack  in  column  ahead, 
obliquely.  First  in  order  came  the  Ariel, 
Lieut.  John  H.  Packet,  and  Scorpion,  Sailing- 
Master  Stephen  Champlin,  both  being  on  the 
weather  bow  of  the  Lawrence,  Captain  O.  H. 


314  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Perry ;  next  came  the  Caledonia,  Lieut.  Daniel 
Turner  ;  Niagara,  Captain  Jesse  D.  Elliott ; 
Somers.  Lieutenant  A.  H.  M.  Conklin  ;  Por- 
cupine, Acting  Master  George  Serrat ;  Tigress, 
Sailing-Master  Thomas  C.  Almy,  and  Trippe, 
Lieutenant  Thomas  Holdup. ' 

As,  amid  light  and  rather  baffling  winds, 
the  American  squadron  approached  the 
enemy,  Perry's  straggling  line  formed  an  angle 
of  about  fifteen  degrees  with  the  more  com- 
pact one  of  his  foes.  At  11.45  the  Detroit 
opened  the  action  by  a  shot  from  her  long  24, 
which  fell  short;  at  11.50  she  fired  a  second 
which  went  crashing  through  the  Lawrence, 
and  was  replied  to  by  the  Scorpion's  long  32. 
At  11.55  the  Lawrence,  having  shifted  her  port 
bow-chaser,  opened  with  both  the  long  12*5, 
and  at  meridian  began  with  her  carronades, 
but  the  shot  from  the  latter  all  fell  short.  At 
the  same  time  the  action  became  general  on 
both  sides,  though  the  rearmost  American 
vessels  were  almost  beyond  the  range  of  their 
own  guns,  and  quite  out  of  range  of  the  guns 

1  The  accounts  of  the  two  commanders  tally  almost 
exactly.  Barclay's  letter  is  a  model  of  its  kind  for  can- 
dor and  generosity.  letter  of  Captain  R.  H.  Barclay 
to  Sir  James,  Sept.  2,  1813;  of  Lieutenant  Inglis  to 
Captain  Barclay,  Sept.  loth  ;  of  Captain  Perry  to  the 
Secretary  of  the  Navy,  Sept.  loth  and  Sept.  I3th,  and 
to  General  Harrison,  Sept.  nth  and  Sept.  i3th.  I  have 
relied  mainly  on  Lossing's  "  Field-Book  of  the  War  of 
1812  "  (especially  for  the  diagrams  furnished  him  by 
Commodore  Champlin),  on  Commander  Ward's 
"  Naval  Tactics,"  p.  76,  and  on  Cooper's  "  Naval  His- 
tory." Extracts  from  the  court-martial  on  Captain 
Barclay  are  given  in  James'  "  Naval  Occurrences," 
Ixxxiii. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  315 

of  their  antagonists.  Meanwhile  the  Law- 
rence was  already  suffering  considerably  as 
she  bore  down  on  the  enemy.  It  was  twenty 
minutes  before  she  succeeded  in  getting 
within  good  carronade  range,  and  during  that 
time  the  action  at  the  head  of  the  line  was 
between  the  long  guns  of  the  Chippeway  and 
Detroit,  throwing  123  pounds,  and  those  of 
the  Scorpion,  Ariel,  and  Lawrence,  throwing 
104  pounds.  As  the  enemy's  fire  was  directed 
almost  exclusively  at  the  Lawrence  she  suffered 
a  great  deal.  The  Caledonia,  Niagara,  and 
Somers  were  meanwhile  engaging,  at  long 
range,  the  Hunter  and  Queen  Charlotte,  op- 
posing from  their  long  guns  96  pounds  to  the 
39  pounds  of  their  antagonists,  while  from  a 
distance  the  three  other  American  gun-vessels 
engaged  the  Prevost  and  Little  Belt.  By  12.20 
the  Lawrence  had  worked  down  to  close 
quarters,  and  at  12.30  the  action  was  going  on 
with  great  fury  between  her  and  her  antago- 
nists, within  canister  range.  The  raw  and 
inexperienced  American  crews  committed  the 
same  fault  the  British  so  often  fell  into  on  the 
ocean,  and  overloaded  their  carronades.  In 
consequence,  that  of  the  Scorpion  upset  down 
the  hatchway  in  the  middle  of  the  action,  and 
the  sides  of  the  Detroit  were  dotted  with 
marks  from  shot  that  did  not  penetrate.  One 
of  the  Ariel's  long  i2's  also  burst.  Barclay 
fought  the  Detroit  exceedingly  well,  her  guns 
bring  most  excellently  aimed,  though  they 
actually  had  to  be  discharged  by  flashing  pis- 
tols at  the  touchholes,  so  deficient  was  the 
ship's  equipment.  Meanwhile  the  Caledonia 


316  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

came  down  too,  but  the  Niagara  was  wretch- 
edly handled,  Elliott  keeping  at  a  distance 
which  prevented  the  use  either  of  his  carron- 
ades  or  of  those  of  the  Queen  Charlotte ;  his  an- 
tagonist ;  the  latter,  however,  suffered  greatly 
from  the  long  guns  of  the  opposing  schooners, 
and  lost  her  gallant  commander,  Captain 
Finnis,  and  first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Stokes,  who 
were  killed  early  in  the  action  ;  her  next  in 
command,  Provincial  Lieutenant  Irvine,  per- 
ceiving that  he  could  do  no  good,  passed  the 
Hunter  and  joined  in  the  attack  on  the  Law- 
rence, at  close  quarters.  The  Niagara,  the 
most  efficient  and  best-manned  of  the  Ameri- 
can vessels,  was  thus  almost  kept  out  of  the 
action  by  her  captain's  misconduct.  At  the 
end  of  the  line  the  fight  went  on  at  long  range 
between  the  Somers,  Tigress,  Porcupine,  and 
Trippe  on  one  side,  and  Little  Belt,  and  Lady 
Prevost  on  the  other ;  the  Lady  Prevost  mak- 
ing a  very  noble  fight,  although  her  1 2-pound 
carronades  rendered  her  almost  helpless 
against  the  long  guns  of  the  Americans.  She 
was  greatly  cut  up,  her  commander,  Lieu- 
tenant Buchan,  was  dangerously,  and  her  act- 
ing first  lieutenant,  Mr.  Roulette,  severely 
wounded,  and  she  began  falling  gradually  to 
eeward. 

The  fighting  at  the  head  of  the  line  was 
fierce  and  bloody  to  an  extraordinary  degree. 
The  Scorpion,  Ariel,  Lawrence,  and  Caledonia, 
all  of  them  handled  with  the  most  determined 
courage,  were  opposed  to  the  Chippeway, 
Detroit,  Queen  Charlotte,  and  Hunter,  which 
were  fought  to  the  full  as  bravely.  At  such 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  317 

close  quarters  the  two  sides  engaged  on  about 
equal  terms,  the  Americans  being  superior  in 
weight  of  metal,  and  inferior  in  number  of 
men.  But  the  Lawrence  had  received  such 
damage  in  working  down  as  to  make  the  odds 
against  Perry.  On  each  side  almost  the  whole 
fire  was  directed  at  the  opposing  large  vessel 
or  vessels  ;  in  consequence  the  Queen  Char- 
lotte was  almost  disabled,  and  the  Detroit  was 
also  frightfully  shattered,  especially  by  the 
raking  fire  of  the  gunboats,  her  first  lieuten- 
ant, Mr.  Garland,  being  mortally  wounded, 
and  Captain  Barclay  so  severely  injured  that 
he  was  obliged  to  quit  the  deck,  leaving  his  ship 
in  the  command  of  Lieutenant  George  Inglis. 
But  on  board  the  Lawrence  matters  had  gone 
even  worse,  the  combined  fire  of  her  adver- 
saries having  made  the  grimmest  carnage  on 
her  decks.  Of  the  103  men  who  were  fit  for 
duty  when  she  began  the  action,  83,  or  over 
four-fifths,  were  killed  or  wounded.  The  ves- 
sel was  shallow,  and  the  ward-room,  used  as  a 
cock-pit,  to  which  the  wounded  were  taken, 
was  mostly  above  water,  and  the  shot  came 
through  it  continually,  killing  and  wounding 
many  men  under  the  hands  of  the  surgeon. 

The  first  lieutenant,  Yarnall,  was  three  times 
wounded,  but  kept  to  the  deck  through  all ; 
the  only  other  lieutenant  on  board,  Brooks, 
of  the  marines,  was  mortally  wounded.  Every 
brace  and  bowline  was  shot  away,  and  the 
brig  almost  completely  dismantled ;  her  hull 
was  shattered  to  pieces,  many  shot  going 
completely  through  it,  and  the  guns  on  the 
engaged  side  were  by  degrees  all  dismounted. 


318  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

Perry  kept  up  the  fight  with  splendid  courage. 
As  the  crew  fell  one  by  one,  the  commodore 
called  down  through  the  skylight  for  one  of 
the  surgeon's  assistants ;  and  this  call  was 
repeated  and  obeyed  till  none  were  left ;  then 
he  asked,  "  Can  any  of  the  wounded  pull  a 
rope  ?  "  and  three  or  four  of  them  crawled  up 
on  deck  to  lend  a  feeble  hand  in  placing  the 
last  guns.  Perry  himself  fired  the  last  effect- 
ive heavy  gun,  assisted  only  by  the  purser 
and  chaplain.  A  man  who  did  not  possess 
his  indomitable  spirit  would  have  then  struck. 
Instead,  however,  although  failing  in  the  at- 
tack so  far,  Perry  merely  determined  to  win 
by  new  methods,  and  remodelled  the  line 
accordingly.  Mr.  Turner,  in  the  Caledonia, 
when  ordered  to  close,  had  put  his  helm  up, 
run  down  on  the  opposing  line,  and  engaged 
at  very  short  range,  though  the  brig  was  abso- 
lutely without  quarters.  The  Niagara  had 
thus  become  the  next  in  line  astern  of  the 
Lawrence,  and' the  sloop  Trippe,  having  passed 
the  three  schooners  in  front  of  her,  was  next 
ahead.  The  Niagara  now,  having  a  breeze, 
steered  for  the  head  of  Barclay's  line,  passing 
over  a  quarter  of  a  mile  to  windward  of  the 
Lawrence,  on  her  port  beam.  She  was  almost 
uninjured,  having  so  far  taken  very  little  part 
in  the  combat,  and  to  her  Perry  shifted  his 
flag.  Leaping  into  a  row  boat,  with  his 
brother  and  four  seamen,  he  rowed  to  the 
fresh  brig,  where  he  arrived  at  2.30,  and  at 
once  sent  Elliott  astern  to  hurry  up  the  three 
schooners.  The  Trippe  was  now  very  near 
4he  Caledonia.  The  Lawrence,  having  but  14 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  319 

sound  men  left,  struck  her  colors,  but  could 
not  be  taken  possession  of  before  the  action 
re-commenced.  She  drifted  astern,  the  Cale- 
donia passing  between  her  and  her  foes.  At 
2.45,  the  schooners  having  closed  up.  Perry, 
in  his  fresh  vessel,  bore  up  to  break  Barclay's 
line. 

The  British  ships  had  fought  themselves  to 
a  standstill.  The  Lady  Prevost  was  crippled 
and  sagged  to  leeward,  though  ahead  of  the 
others.  The  Detroit  and  Queen  Charlotte 
were  so  disabled  that  they  could  not  effectu- 
ally oppose  fresh  antagonists.  There  could 
thus  be  but  little  resistance  to  Perry,  as  the 
Niagara  stood  down,  and  broke  the  British 
line,  firing  her  port  guns  into  the  Chippeway, 
Little  Belt,  and  Lady  Prevost,  and  the  star- 
board ones  into  the  Detroit,  Queen  Charlotte, 
and  Hunter,  raking  on  both  sides.  Too  dis- 
abled to  tack,  the  Detroit  and  Charlotte  tried 
to  wear,  the  latter  running  up  to  leeward  of 
the  former;  and,  both  vessels  having  every 
brace  and  almost  every  stay  shot  away,  they 
fell  foul.  The  Niagara  luffed  athwart  their 
bows,  within  half  pistol-shot,  keeping  up  a 
terrific  discharge  of  great  guns  and  musketry, 
while  on  the  other  side  the  British  vessels 
were  raked  by  the  Caledonia  and  the  schooners 
so  closely  that  some  of  their  grape  shot;  pass- 
ing over  the  foe,  rattled  through  Perry's  spars. 
Nothing  further  could  be  done,  and  Barclay's 
flag  was  struck  at  3  P.  M.,  after  three  and  a 
quarter  hours'  most  gallant  and  desperate 
fighting.  The  Chippeway  and  Little  Belt  tried 
to  escape,  but  were  overtaken  and  brought  to 


320  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

respectively  by  the  Trippe  and  Scorpion,  the 
commander  of  the  latter,  Mr.  Stephen  Charo- 
plin,  firing  the  last,  as  he  had  the  first,  shot  of 
the  battle.  "  Captain  Perry  has  behaved  in 
the  most  humane  and  attentive  manner,  not 
only  to  myself  and  officers,  but  to  all  the 
wounded,"  writes  Captain  Barclay. 

The  American  squadron  had  suffered  se- 
verely, more  than  two-thirds  of  the  loss  falling 
upon  the  Lawrence,  which  was  reduced  to  the 
condition  of  a  perfect  wreck,  her  starboard 
bulwarks  being  completely  beaten  in.  She 
had,  as  already  stated,  22  men  killed,  includ- 
ing Lieutenant  of  Marines  Brooks  and  Mid- 
shipman Lamb;  and  61  wounded,  including 
Lieutenant  Yarnall,  Midshipman  (acting  sec- 
ond lieutenant)  Forrest,  Sailing-Master  Taylor, 
Purser  Hambleton,  and  Midshipmen  Swartout 
and  Claxton.  The  Niagara  lost  2  killed  and 
25  wounded  (almost  a  fifth  of  her  effectives), 
including  among  the  latter  the  second  lieu- 
tenant, Mr.  Edwards,  and  Midshipman  Cum- 
mings.  The  Caledonia  had  3,  the  Somers  2, 
and  Trippe  2,  men  wounded.  The  Ariel  had 
i  killed  and  3  wounded  ;  the  Scorpion  2  killed, 
including  Midshipman  Lamb.  The  total  loss 
was  123  ;  27  were  killed  and  96  wounded,  of 
whom  3  died. 

The1  British  loss,  falling  most  heavily  on 
the  Detroit  and  Queen  Charlotte,  amounted  to 
41  killed  (including  Capt.  S.  J.  Garden,  R.  N., 
and  Captain  R.  A.  Finnis),  and  94  wounded 
(including  Captain  Barclay  and  Lieutenants 
Stokes,  Buchan,  Roulette,  and  Bignall) :  in  all 
135.  The  first  and  second  in  command  on 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  321 

every  vessel  were  killed  or  wourded,  a  suffi- 
cient proof  of  the  desperate  nature  of  the 
defence. 

The  victory  of  Lake  Erie  was  most  impor- 
tant, both  in  its  material  results  and  in  its 
moral  effect.  It  gave  us  complete  command 
of  all  the  upper  lakes,  prevented  any  fears  of 
invasion  from  that  quarter,  increased  our  pres- 
tige with  the  foe  and  our  confidence  in  our- 
selves, and  ensured  the  conquest  of  upper 
Canada ;  in  all  these  respects  its  importance 
has  not  been  overrated.  But  the  "  glory  " 
acquired  by  it  most  certainly  has  been  esti- 
mated at  more  than  its  worth.  Most  Ameri- 
cans, even  the  well  educated,  if  asked  which 
was  the  most  glorious  victory  of  the  war, 
would  point  to  this  battle.  Captain  Perry's 
name  is  more  widely  known  than  that  of  any 
other  commander.  Every  school-boy  reads 
about  him,  if  of  no  other  sea-captain ;  yet  he 
certainly  stands  on  a  lower  grade  than  either 
Hull  or  Macdonough,  and  not  a  bit  higher 
than  a  dozen  others.  On  Lake  Erie  our  sea- 
men displayed  great  courage  and  skill ;  but 
so  did  their  antagonists.  The  simple  truth  is, 
that,  where  on  both  sides  the  officers  and  men 
were  equally  brave  and  skilful,  the  side  which 
possessed  the  superiority  in  force,  in  the  pro- 
portion of  three  to  two,  could  not  well  help 
winning.  The  courage  with  which  the  Law- 
rence was  defended  has  hardly  ever  been  sur- 
passed, and  may  fairly  be  called  heroic ;  but 
equal  praise  belongs  to  the  men  on  board  the 
Detroit,  who  had  to  discharge  the  great  guns 
by  flashing  pistols  at  the  touchholes,  and  yet 


322  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 


The  following  diagrams  will  serve  to  explain  the  movements. 


^ 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  323 


AKIfl 


•*3 1  aMfts 
->-..^ 


MUCMA 


2.50P.M. 


made  such  a  terribly  effective  defence.  Cour- 
age is  only  one  of  the  many  elements  which 
go  to  make  up  the  character  of  a  first-class 
commander ;  something  more  than  bravery  is 


324  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812. 

needed  before  a  leader  can  be  really  called 
great. 

There  happened  to  be  circumstances  which 
rendered  the  bragging  of  our  writers  over  the 
victory  somewhat  plausible.  Thus  they  could 
say  with  an  appearance  of  truth  that  the  en- 
emy had  63  guns  to  our  54,  and  outnumbered 
us.  In  reality,  as  well  as  can  be  ascertained 
from  the  conflicting  evidence,  he  was  inferior 
in  number  ;  but  a  few  men  more  or  less  mat- 
tered nothing.  Both  sides  had  men  enough 
to  work  the  guns  and  handle  the  ships,  espe- 
cially as  the  fight  was  in  smooth  water,  and 
largely  at  long  range.  The  important  fact 
was  that  though  we  had  nine  guns  less,  yet, 
at  a  broadside,  they  threw  half  as  much  metal 
again  as  those  of  our  antagonist.  With  such 
odds  in  our  favor  it  would  have  been  a  dis- 
grace to  have  been  beaten.  The  water  was 
too  smooth  for  our  two  brigs  to  show  at  their 
best ;  but  this  very  smoothness  rendered  our 
gunboats  more  formidable  than  any  of  the 
British  vessels,  and  the  British  testimony  is 
unanimous,  that  it  was  to  them  the  defeat  was 
primarily  due.  The  American  fleet  came  into 
action  in  worse  form  than  the  hostile  squadron, 
the  ships  straggling  badly,  either  owing  to 
Perry  having  formed  his  line  badly,  or  else  to 
his  having  failed  to  train  the  subordinate 
commanders  how  to  keep  their  places.  The 
Niagara  was  not  fought  well  at  first,  Captain 
Elliott  keeping  her  at  a  distance  that  pre- 
vented her  from  doing  any  damage  to  the 
vessels  opposed,  which  were  battered  to  pieces 
by  the  gunboats  without  the  chance  of  re- 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 


325 


plying.  It  certainly  seems  as  if  the  small 
vessels  at  the  rear  of  the  line  should  have 
been  closer  up,  and  in  a  position  to  render 
more  effectual  assistance;  the  attack  was 
made  in  too  loose  order,  and,  whether  it  was 
the  fault  of  Perry  or  of  his  subordinates,  it 
fails  to  reflect  credit  on  the  Americans. 
Cooper,  as  usual,  praises  all  concerned ;  but 
*>»  this  instance  not  with  very  good  judgment. 
He  says  the  line-of-battle  was  highly  judicious, 
but  this  may  be  doubted.  The  weather  was 
peculiarly  suitable  for  the  gunboats,  with  their 
long,  heavy  guns ;  and  yet  the  line-of-battle 
was  so  arranged  as  to  keep  them  in  the  rear, 
and  let  the  brunt  of  the  assault  fall  on  the 
Lawrence^  with  her  short  carronades.  Cooper 
again  praises  Perry  for  steering  for  the  head 
of  the  enemy's  line,  but  he  could  hardly  have 
done  anything  else.  In  this  battle  the  firing 
seems  to  have  been  equally  skilful  on  both 
sides,  the  Detroifs  long  guns  being  peculiarly 
well  served;  but  the  British  captains  ma- 
noeuvred better  than  their  foes  at  first,  and 
supported  one  another  better,  so  that  the  dis- 
parity in  damage  done  on  each  side  was  not 
equal  to  the  disparity  in  force.  The  chief 
merit  of  the  American  commander  and  his 
followers  was  indomitable  courage,  and  de- 
termination not  to  be  beaten.  This  is  no 
slight  merit ;  but  it  may  well  be  doubted  if  it 
would  have  ensured  victory  had  Barclay's 
force  been  as  strong  as  Perry's.  Perry  made 
a  headlong  attack  ;  his  superior  force,  whether 
through  his  fault  or  his  misfortune  can  hardly 
be  said,  being  brought  into  action  in  such  a 


326  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

manner  that  the  head  of  the  line  was  crushed 
by  the  inferior  force  opposed.  Being  literally 
hammered  out  of  his  own  ship,  Perry  brought 
up  its  powerful  twin-sister,  and  the  already 
shattered  hostile  squadron  was  crushed  by 
sheer  weight.  The  manoeuvres  which  marked 
the  close  of  the  battle,  and  which  ensured  the 
capture  of  all  the  opposing  ships,  were  un- 
questionably very  fine. 

The  British  ships  were  fought  as  resolutely 
as  their  antagonists,  not  being  surrendered 
till  they  were  crippled  and  helpless,  and  almost 
all  the  officers,  and  a  large  proportion  of  the 
men  placed  hors  de  combat.  Captain  Barclay 
handled  his  ships  like  a  first-rate  seaman.  It 
was  impossible  to  arrange  them  so  as  to  be 
superior  to  his  antagonist,  for  the  latter's  force 
was  of  such  a  nature  that  in  smooth  water  his 
gunboats  gave  him  a  great  advantage,  while 
in  any  sea  his  two  brigs  were  more  than  a 
match  for  the  whole  British  squadron.  In 
short,  our  victory  was  due  to  our  heavy  metal. 
As  regards  the  honor  of  the  affair,  in  spite  of 
the  amount  of  boasting  it  has  given  rise  to,  I 
should  say  it  was  a  battle  to  be  looked  upon 
as  in  an  equally  high  degree  creditable  to 
both  sides.  Indeed,  if  it  were  not  for  the  fact 
that  the  victory  was  so  complete,  it  might  be 
said  that  the  length  of  the  contest  and  the 
trifling  disparity  in  loss  reflected  rather  the 
most  credit  on  the  British.  Captain  Perry 
showed  indomitable  pluck,  and  readiness  to 
adapt  himself  to  circumstances ;  but  his  claim 
to  fame  rests  much  less  on  his  actual  victory 
than  on  the  way  in  which  he  prepared  the 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  327 

fleet  that  was  to  win  it.     Here  his  energy  and 
activity  deserve  all  praise,   not  only  for  his 
success  in  collecting  sailors  and  vessels  and 
in  building  the  two  brigs,  but  above  all  for  the 
manner  in  which  he  succeeded  in  getting  them 
out  on  the  lake.     On  that  occasion  he  certainly 
out-generalled    Barclay;     indeed    the    latter 
committed  an  error  that  the  skill  and  address 
he  subsequently  showed  could  not  retrieve. 
But  it  will  always  be  a  source  of  surprise  that 
the  American  public  should  have  so  glorified 
Perry's  victory  over  an   inferior  force,  and 
have  paid  comparatively   little   attention   to 
Macdonough's  victory,  which  really  was  won 
against  decided  odds  in  ships,  men,  and  metal. 
There  are  always  men  who  consider  it  un- 
patriotic to  tell  the  truth,  if  the  truth  is  not 
very  flattering  ;  but,  aside  from  the  morality 
of  the  case,  we  never  can  learn  how  to  produce 
a  certain  effect  unless  we  know  rightly  what 
the  causes  were  that  produced  a  similar  effect 
in  times  past.     Lake  Erie  teaches  us  the  ad- 
vantage of  having  the  odds  on  our  side;  Lake 
Champlain,  that,   even  if  they  are  not,  skill 
can  still  counteract  them.     It  is  amusing  to 
read  some  of  the  pamphlets  written  "in  reply" 
to  Cooper's  account  of  this  battle,  the  writers 
apparently  regarding  him  as  a  kind  of  traitor 
for  hinting   that   the   victory   was  not  "  Nel- 
sonic,"  "  unsurpassed,"  etc.     The  arguments 
are  stereotyped  :  Perry  had  9  fewer  guns,  and 
also  fewer  men  than  the  foe.     This  Jast  point 
is  the  only  one  respecting  which  there  is  any 
doubt.     Taking  sick  and  well  together,  the 
Americans  unquestionably  had   the  greatest 


328  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

number  in  crew  ;  but  a  quarter  of  them  were 
sick.  Even  deducting  these  they  were  still, 
in  all  probability,  more  numerous  than  their 
foes. 

But  it  is  really  not  a  point  of  much  conse- 
quence, as  both  sides  had  enough,  as  stated, 
to  serve  the  guns  and  handle  the  ships.  In 
sea-fights,  after  there  are  enough  hands  for 
those  purposes  additional  ones  are  not  of  so 
much  advantage.  I  have  in  all  my  accounts 
summed  up  as  accurately  as  possible  the  con- 
tending forces,  because  it  is  so  customary  with 
British  writers  to  follow  James'  minute  and  in- 
accurate statements,  that  I  thought  it  best  to 
give  everything  exactly  ;  but  it  was  really 
scarcely  necessary,  and,  indeed,  it  is  impossible 
to  compare  forces  numerically.  Aside  from  a 
few  exceptional  cases,  the  number  of  men, 
after  a  certain  point  was  reached,  made  little 
difference.  For  example,  the/flZ'tf  would  fight 
just  as  effectually  with  377  men,  the  number 
James  gives  her,  as  with  426,  the  number  I 
think  she  really  had.  Again,  my  figures  make 
the  Wasp  slightly  superior  in  force  to  the  Frolic, 
as  she  had  25  men  the  most ;  but  in  reality,  as 
the  battle  was  fought  under  very  short  sail,  and 
decided  purely  by  gunnery,  the  difference  in 
number  of  crew  was  not  of  the  least  conse- 
quence. The  Hornet  had  nine  men  more  than 
the  Penguin,  and  it  would  be  absurd  to  say 
that  this  gave  her  much  advantage.  In  both 
the  latter  cases,  the  forces  were  practically 
equal,  although,  numerically  expressed,  the 
odds  were  in  favor  of  the  Americans.  The 
exact  reverse  is  the  case  in  the  last  action  of 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  329 

the  Constitution.  Here,  the  Levant  and  Cyane 
had  all  the  men  they  required,  and  threw  a 
heavier  broadside  than  their  foe.  Expressed 
in  numbers,  the  odds  against  them  were  not 
great,  but  numbers  could  not  express  the  fact 
that  carronades  were  opposed  to  long  guns, 
and  two  small  ships  to  one  big  one.  Again, 
though  in  the  action  on  Lake  Champlain 
numbers  do  show  a  slight  advantage  both  in 
weight  metal  and  number  of  men  on  the  British 
side,  they  do  not  make  the  advantage  as  great 
as  it  really  was,  for  they  do  not  show  that  the 
British  possessed  a  frigate  with  a  main-deck 
battery  of  24-pounders,  which  was  equal  to 
the  two  chief  vessels  of  the  Americans,  exactly 
as  the  Constitution  was  superior  to  the  Cyane 
Levant.  '  And  on  the  same  principles  I 


1  It  must  always  be  remembered  that  these  rules  cut 
both  ways.  British  writers  are  very  eloquent  about  the 
disadvantage  in  which  carronades  placea  the  Cyane  and 
Levant,  but  do  not  hint  that  the  Essex  suffered  from  a 
precisely  similar  cause,  in  addition  to  her  other  mis- 
fortunes ;  either  they  should  give  the  Constitution 
more  credit  or  the  Phozbe  less.  So  the  Confiattce,  throw- 
ing 480  pounds  of  metal  at  a  broadside,  was  really 
equal  to  both  the  Eagle  and  Saratoga,  who  jointly 
threw  678.  From  her  long  guns  she  threw  384  pounds, 
from  her  carronades  96.  Their  long  guns  threw  168, 
their  carronades  510.  Now  the  32-pound  carronade 
mounted  on  the  spar-deck  of  a  38-gun  frigate,  was  cer- 
tainly much  less  formidable  than  the  long  18  on  the 
main-deck;  indeed,  it  probably  ranked  more  nearly 
with  a  long  12,  in  the  ordinary  chances  of  war  (and  it 
must  be  remembered  that  Downie  was  the  attacking 
party  and  chose  his  own  position,  so  far  as  Macdon- 
ough's  excellent  arrangements  would  let  him).  So 
that  in  comparing  the  forces,  the  carronades  should  not 
be  reckoned  for  more  than  half  the  value  of  the  long 
guns,  and  we  get,  as  a  mere  approximation,  384  •+•  48  = 


330  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

think  that  every  fair-minded  man  must  admit 
the  great  superiority  of  Perry's  fleet  over  Bar- 
clay's, though  the  advantage  was  greater  in 
carronades  than  in  long  guns. 

But  to  admit  this  by  no  means  precludes  us 
from  taking  credit  for  the  victory.  Almost  all 
the  victories  gained  by  the  English  over  the 
Dutch  in  the  i;th  century  were  due  purely  to 
great  superiority  in  force.  The  cases  have  a 
curious  analogy  to  this  lake  battle.  Perry  won 
with  54  guns  against  Barclay's  63  ;  but  the 
odds  were  largely  in  his  favor.  Blake  won  a 
doubtful  victory  on  the  i8th  of  February,  1653, 
with  80  ships  against  Tromp's  70;  but  the 
English  vessels  were  twice  the  size  of  the 
Dutch,  and  in  number  of  men  and  weight  of 
metal  greatly  their  superior.  The  English 
were  excellent  fighters,  but  no  better  than  the 
Dutch,  and  none  of  their  admirals  of  that 
period  deserve  to  rank  with  De  Ruyter.  Again, 
the  great  victory  of  La  Hogue  was  won  over  a 
very  much  smaller  French  fleet,  after  a  day's 
hard  fighting,  which  resulted  in  the  capture  of 
one  vessel !  This  victory  was  most  exultingly 
chronicled,  yet  it  was  precisely  as  if  Perry  had 
fought  Barclay  all  day  and  only  succeeded  in 
capturing  the  Little  Belt.  Most  of  Lord  Nel- 
son's successes  were  certainly  won  against 
heavy  odds  by  his  great  genius  and  the  daring 
skill  of  the  captains  who  served  under  him ; 

432,  against  168  +  255  =  423.  At  any  rate,  British 
writers,  as  well  as  Americans,  should  remember  that  if 
the  Constitution  was  greatly  superior  to  her  two  foes, 
then  the  Confiance  was  certainly  equal  to  the  Fagle  and 
Saratoga  ;  and  vice  versa. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  331 

but  the  battle  of  the  Baltic,  as  far  as  the  fighting 
went,  reflected  as  much  honor  on  the  defeated 
Danes  as  on  the  mighty  sea-chief  who  con- 
quered them.  Many  a  much-vaunted  victory, 
both  on  sea  and  land,  has  really  reflected  less 
credit  on  the  victors  than  the  battle  of  Lake 
Erie  did  on  the  Americans.  And  it  must  al- 
ways be  remembered  that  a  victory,  honorably 
won,  if  even  over  a  weaker  foe,  does  reflect 
credit  on  the  nation  by  whom  it  is  gained.  It 
was  creditable  to  us  as  a  nation  that  our  ships 
were  better  made  and  better  armed  than  the 
British  frigates,  exactly  as  it  was  creditable  to 
them  that  a  few  years  before  their  vessels  had 
stood  in  the  same  relation  to  the  Dutch  ships.1 
It  was  greatly  to  our  credit  that  we  had  been 
enterprising  enough  to  fit  out  such  an  effective 
little  flotilla  on  Lake  Erie,  and  for  this  Perry 
deserves  the  highest  praise.2 

Before  leaving  the  subject  it  is  worth  while 
making  a  few  observations  on  the  men  who 
composed  the  crews.  James,  who  despised  a 
Canadian  as  much  as  he  hated  an  American, 
gives  as  one  excuse  for  the  defeat,  the  fact 

1  After  Lord  Duncan's  victory  at  Camperdown,  James 
chronicled  the  fact  that  all  the  captured  line-of-battle 
ships  were  such  poor  craft  as  not  to  be  of  as  much 
value    as  so  many   French    frigates.    This    at    least 
showed  that  the  Dutch  sailors  must  have  done  well  to 
have  made  such  a  bloody  and  obstinate  fight  as  they 
did.  with  the   materials   they  had.    According  to  his 
own  statements  the  loss  was   about  proportional   to 
the    forces   in   action.      It   was    another   parallel   to 
Perry's  victory. 

2  Some   of  my  countrymen  will   consider  this  but 
scant  approbation,  to  which  the  answer  must  be  that  a 
history  is  not  a  panegyric. 


332  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

that  most  of  Barclay's  crew  were  Canadians 
whom  he  considers  to  be  "  sorry  substitutes." 
On  each  side  the  regular  sailors,  from  the  sea- 
board, were  not  numerous  enough  to  permit 
the  battle  to  be  fought  purely  by  them.  Bar- 
clay took  a  number  of  soldiers  of  the  regular 
army,  and  Perry  a  number  of  militia,  aboard ; 
the  former  had  a  few  Indian  sharp-shooters, 
the  latter  quite  a  number  of  negroes.  A  great 
many  men  in  each  fleet  were  lake  sailors,  fron- 
tiersmen, and  these  were  the  especial  objects 
of  James'  contempt ;  but  it  may  be  doubted 
if  they,  thoroughly  accustomed  to  lake  naviga- 
tion, used  to  contests  with  Indians  and  whites, 
naturally  forced  to  be  good  sailors,  and  skilful 
in  the  use  of  rifle  and  cannon,  were  not,  when 
trained  by  good  men  and  on  their  own  waters, 
the  very  best  possible  material.  Certainly  the 
battle  of  Lake  Erie,  fought  mainly  by  Cana- 
dians, was  better  contested  than  that  of  Lake 
Champlain,  fought  mainly  by  British. 

The  difference  between  the  American  and 
British  seamen  on  the  Atlantic  was  small,  but 
on  the  lakes  what  little  there  was  disappeared. 
A  New  Englander  and  an  Old  Englander  dif- 
fered little  enough,  but  they  differed  more 
than  a  frontiersman  born  north  of  the  line  did 
from  one  born  south  of  it.  These  last  two 
resembled  one  another  more  nearly  than 
either  did  the  parent.  There  had  been  no 
long-established  naval  school  on  the  lakes, 
and  the  British  sailors  that  came  up  there 
were  the  best  of  their  kind ;  so  the  com- 
batants were  really  so  evenly  matched  in 
courage,  skill,  and  all  other  righting  qualities, 


NAVAL  WAR  OF  i8l2.  333 

as  to  make  it  impossible  to  award  the  palm  to 
either  for  these  attributes.  The  dogged  ob- 
stinacy of  the  fighting,  the  skilful  firing  and 
manoeuvring,  and  the  daring  and  coolness  with 
which  cutting-out  expeditions  were  planned 
and  executed,  were  as  marked  on  one  side  as 
the  other.  The  only  un-English  element  in 
the  contest  was  the  presence  among  the  Cana- 
dian English  of  some  of  the  descendants  of 
the  Latin  race  from  whom  they  had  conquered 
the  country.  Otherwise  the  men  were  equally 
matched,  but  the  Americans  owed  their  suc- 
cess— for  the  balance  of  success  was  largely 
on  their  side — to  the  fact  that  their  officers 
had  been  trained  in  the  best  and  most  practi- 
cal, although  the  smallest,  navy  of  the  day. 
The  British  sailors  on  the  lakes  were  as  good 
as  our  own,  bnt  no  better.  None  of  their 
commanders  compare  with  Macdonough. 

Perry  deserves  all  praise  for  the  manner 
in  which  he  got  his  fleet  ready ;  his  victory 
over  Barclay  was  precisely  similar  to  the 
quasi-victories  of  Blake  over  the  Dutch,  which 
have  given  that  admiral  such  renown.  Blake's 
success  in  attacking  Spanish  and  Algerian 
forts  is  his  true  title  to  fame.  In  his  engage- 
ments with  the  Dutch  fleets  (as  well  as  in  those 
of  Monk,  after  him)  his  claim  to  merit  is  no 
greater  and  no  less  than  Perry's.  Each  made 
a  headlong  attack,  with  furious,  stubborn 
courage,  and  by  dint  of  sheer  weight  crushed 
or  disabled  a  greatly  inferior  foe.  In  the  fight 
that  took  place  on  Feb.  18,  1653,  De  Ruyter's 
ship  carried  but  34  guns,1  and  yet  with  it  he 

1 "  La  Vie  et  Les  Actions  Memorables  de  Lt.-Amiral 


334  NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812. 

captured  the  Prosperous  of  54 ;  which  vessel 
was  stronger  than  any  in  the  Dutch  fleet. 
The  fact  that  Blake's  battles  were  generally 
so  indecisive  must  be  ascribed  to  the  fact 
that  his  opponents  were,  though  inferior  in 
force,  superior  in  skill.  No  decisive  defeat 
was  inflicted  on  the  Dutch  until  Tromp's 
death.  Perry's  operations  were  on  a  very 
small,  and  Blake's  on  a  very  large,  scale  ;  but 
whereas  Perry  left  no  antagonists  to  question 
his  claim  to  victory,  Blake's  successes  were 
sufficiently  doubtful  to  admit  of  his  antagonists 
in  almost  every  instance1  claiming  that  they 
had  won,  or  else  that  it  was  a  draw.  Of 
course  it  is  absurd  to  put  Perry  and  Blake  on 
a  par,  for  one  worked  with  a  fleet  forty  times 
the  strength  of  the  other's  flotilla ;  but  the 
way  in  which  the  work  was  done  was  very 
similar.  And  it  must  always  be  remembered 
that  when  Perry  fought  this  battle  he  was  but 
27  years  old  ;  and  the  commanders  of  his 
other  vessels  were  younger  still. 

CHAMPLAIN. 

The  commander  on  this  lake  at  this  time 
was  Lieutenant  Thomas  Macdonough,  who 
had  superseded  the  former  commander,  Lieu- 
tenant Sydney  Smith, — whose  name  was  a 
curious  commentary  on  the  close  inter-relation- 
ship of  the  two  contesting  peoples.  The  Amer- 

Michel  De  Ruyter  "  (Amsterdam,  1677),  p.  23.  By  the 
way,  why  te  Tromp  always  called  Van  Tromp  by  Eng- 
lish writers  ?  It  would  be  quite  as  correct  for  a  French- 
man to  speak  of  MacNelson. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  1812.  335 

ican  naval  force  now  consisted  of  two  sloops, 
the  Growler  and  Eagle,  each  mounting  n 
guns,  and  six  galleys,  mounting  one  gun  each. 
Lieutenant  Smith  was  sent  down  with  his  two 
sloops  to  harass  the  British  gunboats,  which 
were  stationed  round  the  head  of  Sorel  River, 
the  outlet  to  Lake  Champlain.  On  June  3d 
he  chased  three  gunboats  into  the  river,  the 
wind  being  aft,  up  to  within  sight  of  the  fort 
of  Isle-aux-noix.  A  strong  British  land-force, 
under  Major-General  Taylor,  now  came  up 
both  banks  of  the  narrow  stream,  and  joined 
the  three  gunboats  in  attacking  the  sloops. 
The  latter  tried  to  beat  up  the  stream,  but  the 
current  was  so  strong  and  the  wind  so  light 
that  no  headway  could  be  made.  The  gun- 
boats kept  out  of  range  of  the  sloop's  guns, 
while  keeping  up  a  hot  fire  from  their  long 
24*5,  to  which  no  reply  could  be  made  ;  but 
the  galling  fire  of  the  infantry  who  lined  the 
banks  was  responded  to  by  showers  of  grape. 
After  three  hours'  conflict,  at  12.30,  a  24-pound 
shot  from  one  of  the  galleys  struck  the  Eagle 
under  her  starboard  quarter,  and  ripped  out  a 
whole  plank  under  water.  She  sank  at  once, 
but  it  was  in  such  shoal  water  that  she  did 
not  settle  entirely,  and  none  of  the  men  were 
drowned.  Soon  afterward  the  Growler  had 
her  forestay  and  main-boom  shot  away,  and, 
becoming  unmanageable,  ran  ashore  and  was 
also  captured.  The  Grmvler  had  i  killed  and 
8  wounded,  the  Eagle  n  wounded;  their 
united  crews,  including 34  volunteers,  amount- 
ed to  112  men.  The  British  gunboats  suf- 
fered no  loss ;  of  the  troops  on  shore  three 


336  NAVAL  WAR  OF  1812, 

were  wounded,  one  dangerously,  by  grape.1 
Lieutenant  Smith  had  certainly  made  a  very 
plucky  fight,  but  it  was  a  great  mistake  to  get 
cooped  up  in  a  narrow  channel,  with  wind 
and  current  dead  against  him.  It  was  a  very 
creditable  success  to  the  British,  and  showed 
the  effectiveness  of  well-handled  gunboats 
under  certain  circumstances.  The  possession 
of  these  two  sloops  gave  the  command  of  the 
lake  to  the  British.  Macdonough  at  once  set 
about  building  others,  but  with  all  his  energy 
the  materials  at  hand  were  so  deficient  that  he 
could  not  get  them  finished  in  time.  On  July 
3ist,  1,000  British  troops,  under  Col.  J.  Mur- 
ray, convoyed  by  Captain  Thomas  Everard, 
with  the  sloops  Chubb  and  Finch  (late  Growler 
and  Eagle)  and  three  gunboats,  landed  at 
Plattsburg  and  destroyed  all  the  barracks  and 
stores  both  there  and  at  Saranac.  For  some 
reason  Colonel  Murray  left  so  precipitately 
that  he  overlooked  a  picket  of  20  of  his  men, 
who  were  captured ;  then  he  made  descents 
on  two  or  three  other  places,  and  returned  to 
the  head  of  the  lake  by  Aug.  3d.  Three  days 
afterward,  on  Aug.  6th,  Macdonough  com- 
pleted his  three  sloops,  the  President,  Mont- 
gomery, and  Preble,  of  7  guns  each,  and  also 
six  gunboats ;  which  force  enabled  him  to 
prevent  any  more  plundering  expeditions  tak- 
ing place  that  summer,  and  to  convoy  Hamp- 
ton's troops  when  they  made  an  abortive  effort 

1  Letter  from  Major  General  Taylor  (British)  to 
Major-General  Stone,  June  3,  1813.  Lossing  says  the 
loss  of  the  British  was  "  probably  at  least  one  hun- 
dred,"— on  what  authority,  if  any,  I  do  not  know. 


NAVAL   WAR  OF  i8l2. 


337 


to  penetrate  into  Canada  by  the  Sorel  River 
on  Sept.  2 1  st. 


Name. 

Tons. 

Guns. 

Remarks. 

Ship, 

600 

24 

Burnt  on  stocks. 

Gloucester, 

I  So 

10 

Taken  at  York. 

Mary, 

80 

3 

Burnt. 

Drummond, 

80 

3 

Captured. 

Lady  Gore, 

So 

3 

" 

Schooner, 

80 

3 

" 

Detroit, 

49° 

•9 

" 

Queen  Charlotte, 

400 

" 

Lady  Prevost, 

230 

'3 

u 

Hunter, 

1  80 

10 

tt 

Chippeway, 

70 

i 

tt 

Little  Belt, 

90 

3 

" 

12  vessels,  -,560  109 

AMERICAN  LOSS.* 

Name.  Tons.  Guns.             Remarks. 

Growler,  112  u        Captured. 

Eagle,  no  u 

2  vessels,  222  22 

1  Excluding  the  Grcnvler  and  Julia,  which  were  re- 
captured. 


•  r  43 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

Los  Angeles 
This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


RECT)  LD-URD 

NOV    3  1974! 


APR  jo  2001 


Form  L9-Series  444 


Form  L-9— 15»»-7,'85 


vLIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 
LIBRARY 


L  005  243  700  1 


i,^  .S.°,^ItlERN  REGIONAL  LIBRARY  FACILITY 


AA    000892911    9 


PLEASE  DO   NOT    REMOVE 
THIS   BOOK  CARDEJ 


University  Research  Library 


"in 

U I    I 


O 

JJ 


